Elite Chinese Politics and Political Economy

Reshuffling of Provincial PSs

Well, it is now clear that Hu is trying to maneuver as many of his people into position before he hands (some) power over in 2012. We see CYL veteran Hu Chunhua (also Hu Jintao's former secretary) and Lu Zhangong taking over Inner Mongolia and Henan respectively. Another official possibly related to Hu's faction, Wang Min, was rotated from PS of Jilin to Liaoning, a lateral promotion as Liaoning is a much more important province. Wang overlapped with Li Yuanchao in Jiangsu, although Li didn't really have a say over his promotion to Suzhou.

The other promotions, however, show that Hu did not have all the say. Sun Chunlan's promotion from a relatively powerless position in the union to party secretary of Fujian, for example, shows that Bo Xilai likely exerted some influence on high level promotions. Sun was Bo's successor in Dalian. Likewise, Huang Qifan's promotion to the mayoral post in Chongqing puts Chongqing further out of Hu Jintao's control, as Huang comes from the Jiang Zemin-Huang Ju faction in Shanghai. Again, to more credibly demonstrate his power, Hu will need to launch a comprehensive anti-corruption crackdown somewhere....



http://www.straitstimes.com/PrimeNews/Story/STIStory_460954.html
Home > Prime News > Story
Dec 1, 2009
'Little Hu' in front as future leader
Hu Jintao protege could well climb to top job in 2022
By Peh Shing Huei, China Bureau Chief

BEIJING: Chinese President Hu Jintao's protege, Mr Hu Chunhua, has
emerged as the front-runner in the race to be the country's future top
leader after a reshuffle of provincial chiefs yesterday.

The changes also included a new woman provincial party secretary, the
first in more than two decades. Ms Sun Chunlan, 59, was catapulted
from her position as a top unionist to Fujian party boss.

But it was the appointment of 46-year-old Mr Hu as the new chief of
the Inner Mongolia region which carried greater political
significance, noted analysts of Chinese elite politics.

'He is now on the fast-track to being China's sixth-generation
leader,' said Dr Bo Zhiyue, of the East Asian Institute in Singapore.
The two Hus are not related.

Going by the current trend of national leaders serving two terms of
five years each, Mr Hu and the 'sixth generation' politicians are
slated to take over as national leaders in 2022.

President Hu, 66, is widely believed to be stepping down in 2012 and
is likely to be succeeded by Vice-President Xi Jinping, 56, leader of
the 'fifth generation'.

The younger Hu, or 'Little Hu', is now in early pole position to
ascend to the top position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
thereafter.

His Inner Mongolia appointment means he is the fastest in his cohort -
those in their 40s - to be made a provincial chief.

Only Agriculture Minister Sun Zhengcai, also 46, has matched his
speedy rise, after being promoted to the role of party boss of
north-eastern Jilin province yesterday.

But Mr Hu, who was the governor of northern Hebei province, is widely
regarded as the one with a stronger political pedigree, having been
the leader of the key Communist Youth League, the power base of
President Hu.

The Chinese studies graduate from Peking University has also spent 23
years working in Tibet, a tough posting which earned him respect from
the Chinese Communist Party rank-and-file. By comparison, Mr Sun, an
agriculture PhD-holder, spent his entire political career in Beijing.

Both Mr Hu and Mr Sun were among five young leaders profiled by a
state-run magazine in April this year - a sign that the quintet had
been earmarked for higher office. But only two were promoted to
provincial chiefs yesterday, indicating that they have surged ahead of
the pack.

The others appointed were above 50 years old, such as Ms Sun, new
Henan boss Lu Zhangong and new Liaoning chief Wang Min.

Analysts believe there is a good chance that the boyish-looking Mr Hu
will even make the leap to the elite 25-man Politburo in 2012, when
the CCP holds its 18th Party Congress.

It would resemble the arrangement which Mr Hu Jintao went through,
parachuting into the decision-making Politburo Standing Committee in
1992, a good decade before he took over the reins from Mr Jiang Zemin.

But analyst Wang Zhengxu from the University of Nottingham's China
Policy Institute warned that 'Little Hu' has an Achilles heel which
his political rivals may exploit.

'His biggest weakness is that he has been working in poor places,
including now Inner Mongolia. He lacks the experience of operating in
the rich coastal provinces, which are important as China becomes a
greater economic power,' he observed.

shpeh@sph.com.sg

Another Suzhou man promoted

BEIJING: The Communist Party bosses from Suzhou city continue to power
ahead. Mr Wang Min (above), who served as Suzhou party secretary from
2002 to 2004, left his position as Jilin provincial chief to head
neighbouring Liaoning.

While the appointment appeared on paper to be a lateral move, Liaoning
is widely regarded as a more important and prestigious province.

Mr Wang, 59, is the fourth consecutive Suzhou chief to climb the
political ladder. Predecessors Liang Baohua and Chen Deming are now
Jiangsu provincial chief and Commerce Minister respectively.

A key factor in their success is Suzhou's prominence in the national
media, thanks to the 15-year-old China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial
Park. The massive project has earned Suzhou party secretaries a
reputation as economic reformists who are pro-business and have a
global outlook.
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SCMP

Reshuffle sees new mayor for Chongqing

Verna Yu
Dec 01, 2009

The central government yesterday nominated a new mayor for the
municipality of Chongqing and also promoted a close ally of President
Hu Jintao to a regional party chief position, in a new round of
leadership reshuffling at the provincial government level.

The latest changes signal that preparations for the next party
congress in 2012 are quietly under way.

Chongqing Deputy Mayor Huang Qifan has been nominated to become the
mayor of the southwestern municipality, which has recently launched a
massive crackdown on organised crime, Xinhua reported.

Huang, 57, previously deputy secretary general of the Shanghai
government, became Chongqing's deputy mayor in 2001 and has since been
in charge of the municipality's finance and industry sectors.

Reports did not mention what the next appointment of his predecessor
Wang Hongju would be, although he turned 64 last month, one year from
the official retirement age.

Meanwhile, one of Hu's closest allies, Hebei province Governor Hu
Chunhua , has been promoted to party chief of the Inner Mongolia
region .

Born in 1963, Hu Chunhua became the youngest provincial governor when
he was appointed deputy governor and acting governor of Hebei last
year at the age of 45.

Hu Chunhua is one of the youngest senior party officials and is tipped
to be a leading candidate for the next Politburo in 2012.

Potential Politburo members often need the experience of two or three
top provincial posts, according to analysts.

Hu was previously first secretary of the secretariat of the Chinese
Youth League - the power base of President Hu - and worked in Tibet
for more than 20 years.

Meanwhile, the government also announced that Jilin province party
chief Dr Wang Min would take over the top post in neighbouring
Liaoning . He will be replaced by 46-year-old Agriculture Minister Dr
Sun Zhengcai . Wang, 59, has a PhD in machinery manufacturing, and Sun
has a PhD in agriculture. Sun, born in 1963, is also tipped to be a
leading candidate for the next Politburo.

The government said Sun Chunlan , the 59-year-old vice-chairwoman of
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, would replace Fujian party
chief Lu Zhangong . Lu, 57, will become party secretary in Henan
province , replacing Xu Guangchun , who turned 65 this month.

Leveraging Big-Time by Local Development Companies

I would just like to show readers the type of leveraging that is going on in China. Hainan Highway, set up by the Hainan government ten years ago to finance highway construction, is an early example of the thousands of local development companies that now pervade China. They usually get a bit of capital from the government and use that to borrow money from banks or issue bonds to investors. Fortunately, some of these entities are listed so we can see how they work. Note, however, that because they are listed, they already represent "the best of" local development companies. finance.Sina.com has a very powerful feature that breaks down various parts of listed companies' annual and quarterly reports. See here.

So here, Hainan Highway has total asset of around 2.7 billion RMB. The largest category is various kinds of accounts receivables. Well, that sounds good, except the annual report also states that the largest debtor to Hainan Highway is the founder of the company, Hainan Department of Transportation!! Moreover, its debt to Hainan Highway ballooned from around 150 million in 2008 to nearly 450 million RMB! Okay, so this is what is happening. Local governments use some land or revenue cash flows to start these entities, which then go and borrow money from banks and investors. Then, local governments in turn borrow from these entities, especially those that generate some cash flows. My question is: since these loans to local government is identified as asset, can these companies borrow even more from banks on the basis of this "account receivable?" I think they can!

Again, this is happening to thousands of such entities across China! (by the way, kudos to reader who figures out who Chen Xuehui is, as he got a million RMB loan from the company for no apparent reason).

Let’s Look at China’s Liabilities Again

Recently, on a China specialist bulletin board, the debate on “the China collapse” hypothesis flared up again. As you can imagine, things got pretty heated between my colleagues. I have learned that predicting the future is a losing game, but we can certainly look at facts and bring in some skepticism. Incidentally, I am working on a project to calculate the extent of borrowing from local government investment entities, which are discussed below. I am about half way through the provinces, but will update interested readers on my findings in the coming months. Below is my contribution to the “collapse” debate.

Chiming in among the skeptics, I think we tend to focus on the asset side of China’s balance sheet, which is quite impressive to be sure. However, the Chinese government is also good at hiding its various liabilities (in the accounting sense) through various entities and strategies. Let’s ignore human costs like reduced life expectancy from the environment, lack of social services and work safety for the moment and only focus on financial liabilities. Among the OECD countries, we see that public debt escalated tremendously due to stimulus programs and financial bailouts. However, it would be mistaken to argue that China accomplished 9% growth without getting into massive debt. In fact, it got into much more de facto public debt as a share of GDP than the US or Europe did. If Cpolers remember a conversation about the rise of deficit this year in China, which put official debt this year at a modest 25% of GDP. However, the reason growth is so high this year is due mainly to investment. In addition to the 4 trln RMB central government package, local governments also rolled out additional trillions in investment projects. In OECD countries, much of these projects will be financed through the official budget, but in China, local governments set up urban development companies to raise this money as “corporate loans” from banks. Thus, around 70-80% of this trillions in investment was financed through bank loans.

More will have to be spent to finance these projects. Local governments learned long ago (possibly in the 50s) that when the central government is feeling generous, start as many projects as possible as oppose to spend money to complete projects. This is because they know that the central government will retrench one day, but the center is still reluctant to cut off funding from on-going projects, which result in total loss. On this basis, Nomura Securities, typically a very bullish outfit, estimates that new lending will again have to be 10 trln RMB for both 2010 and 2011 to fully finance existing construction projects. This means local governments will need to get into trillions more in debt (probably 10 trln in addition to what ever the current amount is).

Does this mean a collapse? certainly not necessarily as the government holds a lot of assets. However, as with any country, we should also pay attention to the liabilities.

The Collapse of Caijing

As many of you know already, Hu Shuli, the editor of the influential Caijing Magazine, has quit her post and will become dean of the media and journalism school at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. In the mean time, she is planning her new publication. The excellent NYT piece below outlines some of the behind-the-scene dynamics of this development. The main question of course is how much this has to do with political pressure against Caijing's hard-hitting style and how much this is related to Hu Shuli's desire to get a larger piece of the profit.

I am curious about another facet of this case-- why Zhongshan University. To be sure, it is a top university in China, but I wouldn't imagine it to be a top journalism school in China. There is journalism school at Peking U., Renmin University....etc. Why didn't any of those schools offer her positions, and why didn't she take them if offered? The issue certainly isn't money, of which she has plenty. This suggests to me that the Beijing schools were under some pressure to not hire her in an important position. Only Zhongshan University, a key institution in Guangdong Province governed by reformist leader Wang Yang, dared to hire her in an important position. Is this important? Maybe, and maybe it is useful to once again use terms like "reformist" and "conservatives" to describe the policy preferences of various elite actors.

New York Times

November 10, 2009

Editor Departs China Magazine After High-Profile Tussle

By JONATHAN ANSFIELD

BEIJING — The pioneering editor of the top Chinese business magazine has left her post with plans to start anew, after a tussle for control involving much the same mix of political and financial intrigue that she made her mark uncovering.

Hu Shuli, 56, resigned Monday from Caijing, the magazine she built into a thriving print and Web outlet that specialized in investigating government corruption and corporate fraud, said a Caijing spokeswoman, Zhang Lihui. Senior editors and most of Caijing’s journalists either had already resigned or were preparing to as well, magazine employees said.

For months, Ms. Hu, the editor in chief, and the business managers of the magazine had been locked in a stalemate with the owners of Caijing over the breadth of the magazine’s coverage and the budgeting of its operations, said former employees and current staff members who asked not to be identified because they feared losing their jobs.

The owners of the magazine had come under pressure from Communist Party officials to rein in Caijing’s aggressive journalism, people at the magazine have said.

Managers at Caijing told staff members that they had been fighting to maintain the magazine’s editorial integrity.

The managers had been seeking to create a more independent publication by changing the magazine’s shareholding structure, seeking outside investors and pressing the owners to allow more employees to own a stake in the magazine.

In a well-publicized exodus earlier this autumn, nearly 70 business employees resigned. Ms. Hu held on until Monday.

She has now accepted a new post as the dean of the journalism school at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, a job she had been offered before it became clear that she would leave Caijing.

At the same time, she, along with a large contingent of editors and executives departing Caijing, was working to secure new licenses and open a new venture, said the employees, who had knowledge of the plans but were not authorized to speak publicly about them.

Caijing’s parent company, the State Exchange Executive Council, or S.E.E.C., had already recruited a new team of editors from another progressive publication, The Economic Observer in Beijing, they said.

In 11 years at Caijing, editorials by Ms. Hu pinpointed interest groups and bottlenecks that she said blocked economic overhauls. And exclusives by Caijing hastened the demise of some of the more notorious felons in China.

But the magazine’s own troubles have involved just the sort of topic that Ms. Hu and Caijing relished covering.

The political price of success grew in recent years. Ms. Hu found herself increasingly at odds with S.E.E.C. bosses and their Communist Party guardians, according to employees and other colleagues during interviews in recent months.

After a run-in with a Caijing reporter covering the ethnic riots in the western region of Xinjiang in July, officials leaned harder on Ms. Hu’s superiors to curb her coverage, the employees said.

At one point, the S.E.E.C. was ordered to fire Ms. Hu, they said. The pressures brought the infighting over editorial and financial control of Caijing to a boil.

Ms. Hu did not respond to requests for comment Monday.

Known for enforcing a rigid code of conduct, she has been characteristically guarded during the crisis.

“I am still working on a good result,” she wrote in an e-mail message to The New York Times late last month.

Under her current plan, her new publishing sponsor would be the province-level Zhejiang Daily Press, said the Caijing employees and a Zhejiang Daily editor.

She has been talking with well-known Chinese investors. Her proposed new publication’s title has a familiar ring: “Caixin,” short for “Caijing Newsweek.”

The split reflects the divergence of interests in a media market still governed by party cadres, said Zhan Jiang, a journalism professor at Beijing Foreign Languages University.

“Some people still stick to their ideals,” he said. “But management has become increasingly concerned with profits, and increasingly conservative.”

Moreover, as the central authorities lavish official Chinese media giants with support to grow and compete globally, they also have made moves to tighten their chain of command over muckrakers like Ms. Hu.

Not that Ms. Hu is like any other. She has become an unrivaled celebrity, and counts senior economic officials friends from her reporting days at state-owned newspapers.

At S.E.E.C., she was uniquely insulated. The chairman of the S.E.E.C., Wang Boming, a former New York Stock Exchange economist, is the son of a former deputy foreign minister.

When Mr. Wang and Ms. Hu started Caijing, in 1998, he met her demands to finance the newsroom and not interfere.

But their ambitions clashed as the influence of Caijing grew. Caijing now generates about half of the group’s revenue, but the S.E.E.C. has reinvested a considerably smaller percentage.

Mr. Wang has diversified into less daring titles, most of which have struggled.

Members of Ms. Hu’s team, in turn, went their own way, expanding Caijing online. They also tapped outside partners, like the Hong Kong tycoon Richard Li, with whom Ms. Hu has been developing a financial news service.

Behind the scenes, a conservative official named Quan Zhezhu had taken over Communist Party affairs at the organization that sponsors Caijing’s publishing license, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, in 2007. The Federation ramped up pressure on Mr. Wang to curb coverage by Ms. Hu.

“They say she’s ungrateful, that without them the magazine would have been closed a long time ago,” a friend of Mr. Wang’s said.

An S.E.E.C. executive did not answer requests for comment in recent days.

Ms. Hu was able to elude serious trouble through the spring. After Caijing revealed a corruption investigation into China Central Television earlier this year, government media officials demanded that the story be recalled, the employees said.

But within a couple days, Caijing reposted the piece online and handed out hundreds of undistributed magazines to delegates at the annual legislative sessions.

When the ethnic riots broke out in July, Ms. Hu promptly dispatched three journalists to Urumqi. But not all of them were able to obtain a permit to be there.

One day, at the official press center, a veteran reporter named Yang Binbin was caught carrying a credential borrowed from a former coworker. When an official tried to search his laptop, he resisted, and he and a guard scuffled. The police carted off the reporter for questioning.

“Our pressures and conflicts had accumulated over a long time, but this incident was the fuse,” said a Caijing colleague of Mr. Yang, who himself declined to comment.

By mid-July, journalists said, the party’s powerful Central Commission on Politics and Law discussed the need to “rectify” Caijing. The authorities have reprimanded the magazine for at least eight articles this year, including the China Central Television inquiry, and directed it to “return to positive reporting on finance and economics.”

Under orders from the All-China Federation, the S.E.E.C. demanded the right to prescreen the magazine before it went to print.

Ms. Hu resisted the order. But the magazine was still required to cut at least three investigative features, including one from Urumqi, and the Web site scrapped two new columns and left the “Politics and Law” section without new posts for three days in September, to avoid riling officials.

At a gathering with Mr. Wang in August, according to a friend of his in attendance, Mr. Wang said that officials had pressured him to fire Ms. Hu. Mr. Wang said that he would not go so far as to dismiss the acclaimed newswoman and that, he told friends, the move would cause an international scandal.

But his perceived failure to stand up to editorial pressures exacerbated the financial infighting about ownership shares and budgets, to the point that Ms. Hu and Mr. Wang, as another journalist put it, “couldn’t stand each other.”

In late September, Caijing’s general manager and other executives led a walkout of more than 60 business staff members. As of last month, dozens of those who resigned had already started working at what several said were Caixin’s new offices.

For weeks, many journalists have been planning to follow Ms. Hu to the new venture. But Ms. Hu could have to wait months for new publishing licenses, if the authorities approve them, the journalist and others said.

“She hopes that by having this new academic position will make it easier for her to negotiate” to start the new outlet, said the journalist, who was among those preparing to rejoin Ms. Hu.

Comparing Bo Xilai with Chairman Mao??

The People's Daily published the following curious comparison between Bo Xilai and Chairman Mao. Just as Mao was forced by circumstances in 1927 to fight guerilla warfare, Bo Xilai was likewise forced by circumstances to get rid of the mafia in Chongqing....Eh, I am speechless. This is either someone at RMRB trying very hard to pander to Bo, or even worse, Bo himself ordered the publication of this article in open defiance to the current succession arrangement. Actually, the historical parallels may not be so far fetched-- Mao was a dark horse and was at the bottom of the elite in 1927. However, after ruthless struggle against both internal enemies and the KMT, Mao had become the top leader of the CCP by 1937.

http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/1036/10256800.html

薄熙来被逼打黑与毛泽东被逼“扛枪”

王皋子

2009年10月26日09:20 来源：人民网-观点频道
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　　重庆打黑，很有点如诗歌描绘的那样，犹如“秋风扫落叶”，一下子就将1500多涉黑分子逮捕归案，其中，包括60多名黑帮头目和50多名公务员以及身价高达数千亿的3名企业家。重庆人民就像49年迎解放一样欢天喜地，一位农民为之拿出10余万无作广告，以示欢庆。

　　然而，就在人们为之称颂不已时，重庆市委书记薄熙来在出席世界中文报业协会年会前，向媒体代表们说：“打黑不是我们要主动而为，而是黑恶势力逼得我们没办法。”

　　好像一滴冷水掉进热油锅，网上网下一下子炸开了，有的网民甚至忽然间有点像“丈二和尚摸不着头”：一向果敢的薄哥发动组织的这次轰轰烈烈的重庆打黑怎么不是“主动而为”，而是被黑恶势力“逼得没办法”？

　　其实，这根本就没什么大惊小怪的。当年毛泽东在回答国际友人是“怎么建立新中国的”时，就说是“逼上梁山”，是因为“蒋介石不给我们活路，把我们逼上了绝境，就这么七逼八逼，逼出一个新中国”。类似的话，周恩来也曾在他的“自述”里说过：人走上革命道路不是先天的，而是由于外来的压迫和环境造成的。为此，台湾著名作家李敖曾一针见血地指出，蒋介石失败就失败在清共，如果蒋介石不是发动四一二反革命政变，大肆屠杀共产党和革命群众，共产党和工农群众也不会走上武装反抗的道路。

　　毛泽东被逼领导中国人民“扛枪”闹革命与薄熙来被逼打黑，让我们看到，反动黑恶势力是疯狂的，又是虚弱的。反动势力也好，黑恶势力也罢，往往都不得人心，人所共愤，因为他们丧失人性，从来就不会因为人民的善良而良心发现，放下屠刀，立地成佛。当年“四·一二”反革命政变是这样，重庆的黑恶势力对重庆人民也是这样，用薄熙来的叙述来说：“黑恶势力拿刀砍人，就像屠户用刀砍杀牲畜，惨不忍睹。”“我们清缴刀具，大砍刀堆积如山。”“谢才萍开赌场从中抽头，赌场开在五星级饭店，旱涝保收。这连清朝道光皇帝和林则徐都不能容忍”。显然，这些黑恶势力如果任其下去，就会变本加厉，越加猖狂，越加残忍。

　　是呵，共产党是努力追求进步，追求文明，他们丝毫也不会容忍落后、丑恶、反动的东西存在的。但是，共产党又是最大公无私，最能委屈求全，顾全大局的。当着“卢沟桥的枪炮”敲响中华民族生死存亡的警钟，中国共产党毅然肩负起挽救民族危亡的历史使命，号召全国人民奋起抗日，放弃前嫌，有力地促成了西安事变和平解决，推动了全民抗战。同样，当前，中国共产党正团结一切可以团结的力量，调动一切积极因素，领导全国人民“聚精会神搞建设、一心一意谋发展”，努力加快推进中华民族的伟大复兴。这自然是我们当前地大局。但是，中国共产党又时刻代表着最广大人民的根本利益，当着人民的生命财产受到严重威胁时，作为地方党委，作为一级人民政府，怎么会对之袖手旁观而无动于衷呢？所以，黑恶势力以为共产党正一门心思搞建设了，便可以任其为所欲为，就实在只能是打错算盘，自寻灭亡了。这，才是薄熙来被逼打黑的根本原因所在。

　　毛泽东关于被逼“扛枪”与薄熙来关于被逼打黑的率直表白，显示了他们对反动派和黑恶势力的极度愤怒和共产党人“逼上梁山”的无比正义性。它让我们看到中国共产党是坚定顽强、勇往无敌的政党，也是伟大仁爱、光明磊落的政党。只有这样一个政党，才是最合民意、最得民心的政党，因而也才是最有前途、最能领导中国人民完成中华民族复兴大业的政党。

Why China Isn't Ready to Lead

Dear all, my WSJ op ed from last Friday in case some of you missed it. This is not a criticism of the IMF for restructuring, but just a commentary on the irony of it all.


Property rights and contracts are still subordinate to the Party's interests.


By VICTOR SHIH

In an era when the most developed economies are running record fiscal deficits, it is reasonable to look for new global economic leadership. Gauging solely by officially reported deficits and cash reserves, China seems an ideal candidate. Indeed, a senior International Monetary Fund bureaucrat revealed Saturday in Beijing that China may soon become the second-largest shareholder in the organization after internal restructuring.

But leadership does not depend on cash reserves alone. To lay credible claim to a bigger global role, Beijing must show it understands the rules that make a modern economy work and how to play by them. The economic downturn has only shown how far behind Beijing is in this regard. China's market institutions clearly lag those in more advanced Asian and Western countries. Parts of the government continue to blatantly disregard property rights and contracts. Rules are conveniently bent to favor powerful state entities.

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Shih
David Klein
Shih
Shih

The greatest victims of the government's disregard for property rights and contracts are domestic private entrepreneurs. Recent months saw the forced nationalization and mergers of hundreds of privately leased or owned coal mines. With the issuance of a few decrees from Beijing, domestic investors who plowed their own savings into mining lost billions. Similar examples abound in other sectors, as state agencies try to alleviate a growing overcapacity problem by forcing private firms to sell out to state-owned competitors at state-mandated prices. Because the legal system and state agencies all stand on the side of state firms, private firms have little recourse to oppose government takeovers.

Foreign investors, who used to enjoy some protection from state predatory behavior, have also fallen victim to this in the downturn. To lessen the losses of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that entered into money-losing derivatives contracts with offshore counterparties, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, the regulator for state firms, indicated to stunned bankers in Hong Kong in early September that these SOEs may not honor their contracts because the Commission never granted some SOEs the permission to enter into derivatives contracts. Not wanting to anger the government, foreign banks are now leaning toward arbitration, but a sour taste has been left in their mouths.

In a similar case, foreign investors in China's enormous distressed-asset market were surprised by a July decision by the Supreme People's Court that foreign investors who had legally purchased a nonperforming loan cannot obtain the collateral that the original guarantor pledged to a loan without the guarantor's permission and without the approval of the local foreign-exchange authorities. This decision makes it very difficult for foreign investors in distressed assets to collect on collateral that is legally bound to a given loan without surmounting numerous legal and bureaucratic hurdles.

This ruling shows China's lack of preparation even more clearly than the reneged derivatives deals. Foreign investors in distressed loans were invited by the government in the early 2000s to help digest more than 1.4 trillion yuan ($205 billion) in nonperforming loans. These investors have helped China rescue billions in distressed assets, rehabilitating many into profitable businesses. But when a well-connected state firm, Chongqing Yi De Industrial, appealed the Supreme People's Court to overturn an earlier decision in favor of the foreign creditor, the judges went against elements of its earlier rulings and ruled in favor of Yi De Industrial in July. The legal system's usual bias toward connected insiders once again seemed to have determined the outcome.

In all these examples, the Chinese government could have chosen to show the world it is willing to respect property rights, enforce contracts fairly and discipline firms that violate the rules regardless of their political connections. Instead rules were disregarded to maintain the facade of relative budgetary balance and SOE profitability, and connected insiders and large SOEs with political influence were once again told that they need not adhere to contracts. Private entrepreneurs and outsiders were reminded that the law means little without political backing.

Chinese decision makers need to realize that global economic leadership does not stem only from a large cash hoard. In the long run, a credible respect for property rights and unbiased contract enforcement will draw a larger share of global investors into the Chinese economic sphere. Until such a day arrives, China's economy will tend to attract connected rent seekers who profit from the government's willingness to bend the rules.

Mr. Shih is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University and the author of "Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation" (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Xi Jinping Sends Signals by Giving Merkel Books by Jiang

There are moments when my gut tells me that something is very, very wrong in China, and this is one of those moments. Apparently, during his visit to Germany, Vice President Xi Jinping held a meeting with Prime Minister Merkel where he gave Merkel two books authored by the FORMER party secretary general of the CCP Jiang Zemin. The caption of the People's Daily story on the meeting reads "Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (L) presents two books written by former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the start of their meeting in the Chancellery in Berlin, capital of Germany, Oct. 12, 2009.(Xinhua/Lan Hongguang)" You can check out the whole story by going here.

So, what is one to make of this. This is clearly a strong signal of some kind. Willy Lam, as always, presents an incisive interpretation that Xi is showing his strong disapproval of Hu's delay of his entrance into the Central Military Commission (see below). The presentation of books by Jiang also signals to Jiang his loyalty, and is basically asking Jiang to ensure his entrance into the CMC. In conjunction with Jiang's prominent presence during the anniversary, Jiang seems to be making a strong come-back in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress. The reason why this move is making me queasy is that in order to maintain his authority before the 18th Party Congress, Hu will need to do something drastic to show that he still has real power and would not stand for such humiliating displays of disloyalty from Xi. I await with rather dreadful anticipation of what will come next.

Asian Sentinel

Cracks in China's Great Politburo Wall Print E-mail

Written by Willy Lam
Tuesday, 13 October 2009
ImageVice-President Xi Jinping drops strong hint at big rift with President Hu Jintao

Now we know what Vice-President Xi Jinping must have felt when he failed to make it to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission at a plenary session of the Central Committee last month. The supposed front-runner to succeed Party Chief and President Hu Jintao apparently blamed the supremo for not inducting him into the policy-setting military commission, which has been headed by Hu since 2004.

During his current trip to five European countries, Xi, 56, has departed from protocol and hardly given Hu a mention. According to long-standing diplomatic custom, a senior Chinese cadre on tour would first convey to his hosts the greetings of President Hu. Xi's failure to acknowledge and salute Hu's leadership was most obvious when he met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on Monday.

Before the official discussion began, Xi handed to Merkel the English editions of two books – on energy and on information technology – written by ex-president Jiang Zemin. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, Xi then "passed along Comrade Jiang Zemin's greetings and good wishes" to the German leader. Merkel reciprocated by asking Xi to send her greetings to Jiang. There was no reference to Hu throughout the two leaders' tete-a-tete.

This was the first time in less than two weeks that ex-president Jiang, 83, appears to have upstaged the 67-year-old Hu. During celebrations to mark the 60th birthday of the People's Republic of China on October 1, the official Chinese media gave Jiang pretty much the same prominence as Hu. For example, he appeared 20 times on CCTV's coverage of the all-important military parade. And Hu was caught a couple of times on TV assuming a humble posture next to the talkative and high-spirited Jiang. The next day, the People's Daily put two same-sized pictures of Hu and Jiang side by side on its front page.

As the highest-ranked Fifth-Generation politician in the supreme Politburo Standing Committee, Xi is slated to succeed Hu as party general secretary at the 18th CCP Congress in October 2012 – and as state president a few months later. Yet it is well-known among political circles in Beijing that Xi does not come from Hu's Communist Youth League faction. Instead, the son of former vice-premier Xi Zhongxun is the putative head of the powerful Gang of Princelings, a reference to the offspring of party elders. Moreover, it was partly due to support rendered by ex-president Jiang, himself a princeling, that Xi was virtually designated Hu's heir-apparent at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Xi's failure to be inducted into the CMC last month, however, was a signal that he might not enjoy a cosy relationship with his boss.

Instead, Hu is believed to be pulling out all the stops to improve the political fortunes of Youth League stalwarts such as Politburo Standing Committee member and First Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who at this stage is expected to take over the premiership from Wen Jiabao in early 2013.

Xi watchers are not surprised by his strange demeanor in Berlin. During his tour to Latin America early this year, the vice-president aroused controversy by using earthy language to attack a certain country – widely thought to be the US – for alleged interference in China's domestic affairs. While talking to diplomats and Chinese representatives in China's embassy in Mexico City, Xi intoned: "There are people who seem to have nothing to do after filling their stomachs. They like to point their fingers at China's internal affairs." The vice-president's remarks were not reported by the Chinese media.

In any event, Xi's apparent decision to openly side with Jiang – and his failure to appear deferential to Hu – is a good indication that factional rivalry and jockeying for position has begun some three years before the 18th Party Congress. At that all-important conclave, a new corps of party and state leadership will be picked as at least half of the current PSC and Politburo members are set to retire.

Reflections on the 60th Anniversary

A Brazilian reporter asked me some questions about the 60th anniversary, here are my answers:


1- What’s the meaning of this celebration in China that starts this Thursday in your opinion? Is it an internal celebration, or the main goal is to impress the world?

Both. Of course, the leaders want to show the world its unity and military might. However, a parade is also a way to monitor the effectiveness and loyalty of military and civilian units.

2- Why the Chinese people is not part of the celebration?

The participants in the parade and even the audience are carefully selected because the government doesn't want any disruption to the celebration. Any sign of protest would be highly embarrassing to the government and its leaders.

3- Generally, the recent history of China is divided in two phases, the socialism under Mao Zedong, and a much more pragmatic era since Deng Xiaoping. Do you think it’s possible to estimate what’s going to be the next phase?

This is difficult to estimate. Some China scholars, including myself, believe there will be a "Latin Americanization" of Chinese politics in which special interests like real estate developers and large state owned enterprises will increasingly drive policy making. If true, this would lead to a period of economic stagnation without any fundamental reform.

4- Will the presence of the State still be so strong in the future of China, or it may be eased in the next years?

The presence of special interest groups will be strong, and they will use state power to drive out competition, both domestic and abroad.

5- What are the main challenges in Chinese future, in your opinion?

Overcoming the influence of special interest groups to enact much needed reform. Because China is such a world player, I think this is important for the world as well. Highly subsidized Chinese firms drive out competitors in the US and Europe, as well as other parts of the world.

Excellent new York times piece in wu jinglian. Lao Wu is right, the rent seeking interests are getting powerful!

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/global/27spy.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss



China’s Wu Jinglian Keeps Talking

By DAVID BARBOZA
Published: September 26, 2009
AT 79, Wu Jinglian is considered China’s most famous economist.

Enlarge This Image

Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times
Wu Jinglian helped to create China's market economy, and now he is defending it against conservative hardliners in the Communist Party.
Multimedia

Graphic
A Life Woven Into Modern China’s History
In the 1980s and ’90s, he was an adviser to China’s leaders, includingDeng Xiaoping. He helped push through some of this country’s earliest market reforms, paving the way for China’s spectacular rise and earning him the nickname “Market Wu.”

Last year, China’s state-controlled media slapped him with a new moniker: spy.

Mr. Wu has not been interrogated, charged or imprisoned. But the fact that a state newspaper, The People’s Daily, among others, was allowed to publish Internet rumors alleging that he had been detained on suspicions of being a spy for the United States hints that he is annoying some very important people in the government.

He denied the allegations, and soon after they were published, China’s cabinet denied that an investigation was under way.

But in a country that often jails critics, Mr. Wu seems to be testing the limits of what Beijing deems permissible. While many economists argue that China’s growth model is flawed, rarely does a prominent Chinese figure, in the government or out, speak with such candor about flaws he sees in China’s leadership.

Mr. Wu — who still holds a research post at an institute affiliated with the State Council, China’s cabinet — has white hair and an amiable face, and he appears frail. But his assessments are often harsh. In books, speeches, interviews and television appearances, he warns that conservative hardliners in the Communist Party have gained influence in the government and are trying to dismantle the market reforms he helped formulate.

He complains that business tycoons and corrupt officials have hijacked the economy and manipulated it for their own ends, a system he calls crony capitalism. He has even called on Beijing to establish a British-style democracy, arguing that political reform is inevitable.

Provocative statements have made him a kind of dissident economist here, and revealed the sharp debates behind the scenes, at the highest levels of the Communist Party, about the direction of China’s half-market, half-socialist economy.

In many ways, it is a continuation of the debate that has been raging for three decades: What role should the government play in China’s hybrid economy?

Mr. Wu says the spy rumors were “dirty tricks” employed by his critics to discredit him.

“I have two enemies,” he said in a recent interview. “The crony capitalists and the Maoists. They will use any means to attack me.”

Nevertheless, some analysts believe that Mr. Wu’s critiques are aiding one government faction in a power struggle with another, and that he is protected.

His pro-market ideas have influenced a generation of younger economists who now hold senior government posts, including Zhou Xiaochuan, the leader of China’s central bank, and Lou Jiwei, chairman of the country’s huge sovereign wealth fund.

“He is like the father of economics here,” says Laurence Brahm, who wrote several books about China’s reform period. “What he said was the blueprint for reform.”

Critics say Mr. Wu’s influence on government is waning. (They note that he is not invited to weekly economics seminars held for top leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.)

Given this, some people say, Mr. Wu is courting danger by speaking out.

“You have to remember, China is a dictatorship,” says Victor Shih, a professor of political science at Northwestern University. “If they want to shut him up, they can.”

GIVEN the risks, it’s hard not to wonder why one of the architects of China’s reforms has turned so negative, so angry and so defiant.

Mr. Wu’s personality and tumultuous life story provide some clues.Even his supporters acknowledge that he has a combative streak and describe him as a stubborn idealist whose verbal jousting skills were honed during years of hardship and political warfare.

“He always expressed his ideas in the sharpest way,” says Zhang Chunlin, who was a student of Mr. Wu. “He’s not diplomatic. Even at close to 80 years old, he argues with journalists.”

That he has lived such a long life would have surprised his parents, wealthy intellectuals who ran one of the country’s largest independent newspapers, in Nanjing. A sickly child with tuberculosis, he was not expected to live past the age of 1. He spent much of his youth confined to bed, reading Russian novels and the works of Lu Xun, an influential Chinese writer from the 1920s.

One of his earliest memories is arriving in the wartime capital, Chongqing, in 1937, at the age of 7, as his family fled Nanjing and the invading Japanese. The emaciated rickshaw driver stopped for opium; the destitute were everywhere.

“In Shanghai or Nanjing, beggars would help you and then ask for money,” he recalls. “But in Chongqing, they’d grab food from your mouth.”

Such experiences helped mold him into an idealistic socialist, as many Chinese were during that era. He studied Marxist economics in college and graduated with honors in 1954 from Fudan University in Shanghai. That won him a position at the country’s elite research institute, the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.

Soon after he arrived, however, China was engulfed by political campaigns, like the Great Leap Forward, that required little research. The cruelest was the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, when intellectuals and the descendants of landlords were identified as “counterrevolutionaries.” In Beijing, Mr. Wu says, Red Guards shaved half the head of his wife, Zhou Nan, and ransacked his mother’s home.

Mao Zedong wanted intellectuals sent to the countryside to be “re-educated.” So in 1969, virtually the entire Academy was sent to Henan Province to learn to farm and to build houses in remote villages.

Ms. Zhou was ordered to work as a peasant in Shanxi Province; their two children, ages 4 and 6, were left with relatives in Beijing.

“When I left, I was prepared never to return home again,” Mr. Wu says solemnly. “We were told we’d farm for the rest of our lives.”

Mr. Wu says the hardships included sessions in which he was denounced as an anti-Maoist. When pressed to confess, or to denounce others, he says he refused, and then was beaten and placed in solitary confinement.

“They sent me to the stage to confess, then they started beating me,” he says. “Of course I felt extreme anger. But I realized it wouldn’t last for long; it was too absurd.”

This didn’t shake his faith in socialism, but he began to distrust the people around Mao who were calling believers like him enemies of the people.

His only solace, he later said, was the friendship he developed with a scholar named Gu Zhun, who was an early critic of central planning, and an advocate of market reform. Mr. Gu encouraged him to learn English and to explore the outside world, which Mr. Gu said was the only hope for China to develop.

When Mr. Wu returned home three years later, in 1972, his daughter said he was still “under the spell of Communism,” partly because of the guilt he felt for having grown up in a wealthy home.

“He said a person should have just one shirt,” recalls his daughter, Shelley, 46. “And he didn’t like my sister and I to write our names on our personal property.”

AFTER the Cultural Revolution ended with Mao’s death in 1976, Mr. Wu says he began to see that Mao’s economic policies had brought the country to the brink of collapse.

In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping began to press ahead with bold reforms aimed at opening up the country, Mr. Wu was heavily influenced by the thought and advice of his colleague Mr. Gu, who had died in 1974. He learned English, and in 1983 went to Yale as a visiting scholar. Much of his time there was spent studying modern economic theory.

Mr. Wu returned to Beijing in 1984, just as China’s economic reforms were gathering momentum under Zhao Ziyang, the party leader and chief economic planner.

That year, Mr. Wu says he helped Ma Hong, a top government adviser, draft a paper that defined the country’s shift from a planned to a market economy. “This was a very important turning point for China’s economy,” he says.

Once the proposal was accepted, Mr. Wu was elevated to the Development Research Center, the institute affiliated with the powerful State Council. Soon, he was visiting Zhongnanhai, Beijing’s leadership compound, to offer advice and debate economic policy.

Several research institutes advised Mr. Zhao and Mr. Deng on how to remake the old socialist system with elements of free enterprise. Some who sat in on those meetings say that Mr. Wu was argumentative and prickly when debating economic policy, even with Mr. Zhao.

The reforms, though, fueled strong growth and are widely credited with changing the course of the nation.

But by the late 1980s the reforms also opened the doors to corruption and soaring inflation, feeding public anger that contributed to the 1989 student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

Mr. Zhao was removed from office just ahead of the bloody assault on the students and the campaign against dissent and “liberalization.” The reforms stalled.

Not long after, Mr. Wu and other reformers were attacked for favoring a Western-style market system.

Bao Tong, a former aide to Mr. Zhao, said the reformers faced strong opposition from Soviet-trained economists who were wedded to the ideas of central planning.

“For the first guys who advocated a market system, it was pretty dangerous,” Mr. Wu said in a recent telephone interview.

He was among them, and so he was derisively branded “Market Wu.” For a time, publishers refused to sell his books.

“That’s when the conservatives came in and said the reforms had messed everything up,” says Barry J. Naughton, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, and author of “The Chinese Economy.”

Mr. Naughton says: “Wu Jinglian fought against the backlash. He said, ‘We need more market reform, not less.’ ”

The reform camp became stronger after Mr. Deng’s famous 1992 “southern tour” — in which he called for bolder reforms and encouraged people to get rich.

Soon, Mr. Wu’s influence in government grew. In the 1990s, he served as an adviser toZhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin, the country’s top leaders, helping them speed up reforms and restructure badly run state-owned companies.

Every step of the way, he fought off opposition, and debated, often publicly, the shape and pace of the reforms.

“This debate about the market economy is the most important discussion throughout the 30 years of reform,” says Liang Guiquan, an economist at the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences. “And it’s still going on now. Wu Jinglian has always been at the center of that debate.”

BY most measures, China’s economic transformation has been a resounding success. Anyone who travels here can see it: the change in people’s living standards, the makeover of big cities — what has come to be called China’s economic miracle.

But Mr. Wu sees the defects: a government prone to “meddling” in the marketplace; a widening income gap; inefficient monopolies; and crony capitalism.

His critique sharpened considerably after Jiang Zemin stepped down as president in 2003, and Mr. Wu’s role was diminished.

In interviews, Mr. Wu says he feels compelled to speak out because conservatives and “old-style Maoists” have been gaining influence in the government since 2004. These groups, he said, are pressing for a return to central planning and placing blame for corruption and social inequality on the very market reforms he championed.

At the same time, Mr. Wu says, corrupt bureaucrats are pushing for the state to take a larger economic role so they can cash in on their positions through payoffs and bribes, as well as by steering business to allies.

“I’m not optimistic about the future,” Mr. Wu said. “The Maoists want to go back to central planning and the cronies want to get richer.”

Hu used agenda power to freeze out Xi

A colleague posted an interesting article in which Wang Changjiang, a cadre at the Central Party School, revealed that Hu Jintao used his agenda setting power to freeze Xi from entering the CMC. It is of course significant that Wang revealed this information, likely on behalf of Xi, which suggest some degree of dissatisfaction on the part of Xi Jinping on Hu's action. The relevant passage is:

"At the plenum, there was no reflection of personnel changes related
to the party's leadership of the military, because this was not
included in the agenda for discussion," Wang Changjiang,...

Although the party secretary general's power may be waning, it still includes agenda setting power at Politburo and PSC meetings, which in turn set the agenda for CC plenums. This power, I believe, is (somewhat) enshrined in the party constitution. If what he says is true, then it seems clear that Hu used his agenda setting power to delay Xi's entrance into the CMC. And Wang's revelation further suggests that Xi is dissatisfied with this, perhaps a lot.


China party scholar hints at Xi Jinping promotion
Reuters
Tuesday, September 22, 2009 5:52 AM
BEIJING (Reuters) - A Chinese Communist official on Tuesday held out
the possibility that Vice President Xi Jinping could still be promoted
to a military position, in a step toward ultimately taking over the
nation's top leadership post.
Some media had speculated that Xi, who is expected to succeed
President Hu Jintao in 2013, would be anointed vice chairman of the
Central Military Commission at a party plenum last week, reinforcing
his succession claim. However, the plenum closed last Friday with no
word of any personnel changes.
If Xi rises through the ranks according to schedule, it could reduce
worries about instability among the secretive inner circles of the
Communist Party, which has no transparent mechanism for choosing its
leaders.
"At the plenum, there was no reflection of personnel changes related
to the party's leadership of the military, because this was not
included in the agenda for discussion," Wang Changjiang, director
general of the Central Party School's department of education and
research on party building, told reporters.
"But there will be personnel changes at some point," he told a news
conference designed to explain the decisions of the just-concluded
plenum when asked about Xi's possible promotion.
Wang refused to be drawn any further on possible mechanisms for such a
promotion, or the timing of future meetings at which it might be
decided.
The promotion could be announced at an expanded meeting of the
Military Commission after the October 1 National Day celebration, Hong
Kong media have reported, without giving an exact date.
When Hu took over the top party, military and government positions
from his predecessor Jiang Zemin, it marked the first smooth
transition of power since the Communist Party began ruling China in
1949.
The lack of any announcement of Xi getting the No. 2 job in the
military commission suggested that Hu, who still has three years left
in his term as party chief, would wait to begin ceding positions, and
influence, to his likely successors.

PLA Resistance to Xi Jinping?

A colleague sent me the piece below on Central Party School Professor Du Guang's comment on Xi's exclusion from the CMC at the 4th plenum. There is a rather jarring passage in the piece in which Du Guang said "Jiang Zemin panders to powerful figures in the military and promote them at will. Relatively speaking, Hu Jintao does this less. This is perhaps why his arrangements in military personnel are meeting resistance." Although Du is an "old liberal" at the Party School, it still seems rather out of bound to comment on the party secretary general's relations
with the army, and even compare it with the loose promotion practice of his predecessor (which I also find to be unfair as Hu just promoted three princelings to full general).

Reluctance in the PLA against Xi Jinping is plausible. I have always thought that Xi Zhongxun's revolutionary stature and Jinping's wife's connections in the military would make him a popular figure in the military. It turns out this may not be the case. I was doing some research on the Fourth Front Army recently and looked through a list of all officers who were made generals in 1955. Of the over 1000 generals promoted at the time, only ten or so came from the Shaanbei revolutionary area where Xi Zhongxun had been active before 1935. Thus, Xi Zhongxun did not have
any base in the army; This may explain why Xi was a compromise candidate because his influence in the army was limited, thus making him vulnerable to whoever still retained influence in the army.


Hong Kong Economic Times

四中全會閉幕 不提軍委副主席安排

胡錦濤接班人習近平遇阻力

2009 年09 月19 日

備受關注的中共十七屆四中全會昨日閉幕。令外界意外的是，全會未有提及習近平

接任中央軍委副主席的人事安排。有學者認為，此或意味習近平接班在黨內受阻；

也有學者指，即使習近平最終接班，但事件反映中共黨內對現有接班模式不滿，欽

點接班人的做法今後未必能繼續。

官方新華社昨晚全文刊發了四中全會閉幕公報。此前海外一直揣測，沿襲胡錦濤

10 年前的接班模式，中共政治局常委習近平或會出任軍委第一副主席，以便在

2012 年中共十八大上順利接班，出任中共總書記兼軍委主席。但昨日公佈的全會

公報，對此隻字不提，亦無提及其他人事安排。

1999 年 9 月 19 日中共十五屆四中全會閉幕時，當局發佈會議公報專門提及人事安

排：「全會決定增補胡錦濤同志為中央軍事委員會副主席，郭伯雄、徐才厚同志為

中央軍事委員會委員。」但本屆四中全會習近平沒能如期更上一層樓，引起海外廣

泛關注。港台媒體、美聯社、英國廣播公司（ BBC）等，專門就此事報道。美聯

社稱，習近平今次沒如外界預料進入中央軍委，但相信中共會按以往做法，確保政

權會順利交接。 BBC 引述境外報道指，當局有可能在稍後的軍委擴大會，才公佈

有關任命。

中共中央黨校教授杜光昨接受本報電話採訪指，中共全會通過的決議不可能在公報

發表後再另外公佈。他指，胡錦濤主政後，與軍方的關係沒有江澤民時代親密，

「江澤民拉攏軍頭，封官許願；相對而言，胡錦濤做得少，這也許是導致他在軍中

人事安排受阻的原因。」他認為這也意味着習近平的接班安排，在黨內受阻。

學者：反映黨內不滿欽點接班人

國情專家、北京理工大學教授胡星斗指，事件雖不能證明習近平接班成問題，但至

少可說明中共黨內對接班人有不同聲音，由個別人欽點接班人的做法，受到挑戰，

「你可以說這是黨內鬥爭激烈，但我認為是民主的一種表現。」

本港時事評論員張華認為，事件不能推論出習近平接班落空，只能說明接班模式不

同，「另一個解讀是，習近平現在入軍委，在黨內還沒有共識。」北京時事評論員

蔣兆勇對習近平未能入軍委表示「意外」，認為事情「值得進一步觀察分析。」

56 歲的習近平是中太子黨成員之一，父親是中共元老習仲勛，習仲勛在 20
年前六

四事件中曾堅決反對動用軍隊鎮壓。習近平清華大學畢業後，曾在中央軍委辦公廳

任軍委秘書長耿飆的秘書，其妻子是中國著名歌唱家彭麗媛，兩人生育一女習明澤。

外界對習也有一些負面報道，例如質疑他的博士文憑，以及今年初在墨西哥用粗話

反駁外國對中國的指摘等。

四中全會昨日通過《中共中央關於加強和改進新形勢下黨的建設若干重大問題的決

定》，公報還提及反民族分裂問題。

本報記者

More ambiguity about Xi Jinping

Now the Hong Kong press reports that Xi was voted into the CMC, but they won't announce it until after the national day parade. Well, why? Hu's induction into the CC was announced at the 4th plenum of the 15th CC, so why break the tradition now? Just to give Hu some face? I don't understand at all, if this rumor is true.

Xi Jinping did NOT get into the CMC?!

Well folks, I read through the announcement of the 4th plenum twice carefully and saw no mention of anyone being promoted into any position. I suppose a late announcement is possible, but at this point, it doesn't seem like Xi Jinping has been promoted into the Central Military Commission.

My original hypothesis was that Hu would try to delay Xi's entrance in order to set himself up for serving another full term as chairman of the CMC. Through whatever maneuvering, Hu seems to be succeeding thus far. Xi, however, received further assurance that he is still the designated successor as he was the only person who made an important speech at the 4th plenum besides Hu. Thus, an emerging compromise may be that Xi would allow Hu to serve another term as CMC Chairman. In exchange, Hu would not cause trouble for Xi's ascension into the party secretary general position in 2012. We'll see if this arrangement holds.

Another mild surprise of the announcement is that despite all this talk of political reform, the 4th plenum ended with the same vague language of "strengthening inner party democracy" as in the past. I am not seeing any concrete reform. Perhaps the concrete measures will come later, but I somehow doubt that.

Willy Lam says Xi will get into CMC

Well, I just can't bear it any more, and now it is possible that Wang Lequan may be removed after the plenum. Oh, the suspense!

Asia Sentinel
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2050&Itemid=171

Written by Willy Lam
Tuesday, 15 September 2009


Hu Jintao's political woes may afford Xi an early opportunity to be inducted into the powerful Central Military Commission

While most plenary sessions of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee – usually held once a year – merely endorse decisions made by the supreme Politburo Standing Committee, the plenum now taking place in Beijing deserves special attention.

Party insiders say Vice-President Xi Jinping, 56, may be promoted to the vice-chairmanship of the CCP's Central Military Commission. This will not only confirm Xi's status as Hu's successor as party general secretary and state president, but also spell a bonanza to the political fortune of the "Gang of Princelings" – the offspring of party elders – that Xi heads.

Xi, the son of former vice-premier Xi Zhongxun, does not come from the Communist Youth League faction led by President Hu Jintao. And Hu, who has been military commission chairman since 2004, has maneuvered to delay Xi's induction to the policy-setting military organ. One reason is that while the princelings are heavily represented in the top echelons of the People's Liberation Army, very few youth league affiliates have attained senior ranks in the defense forces.

Within the standing committee put together at the 17th Party Congress in late 2007, Xi outranks long-time Hu protégé Li Keqiang, who as First Vice-Premier is expected to take over from Wen Jiabao as premier in 2013. It is understood, however, that Hu has hoped to delay Xi's induction to the military commission so as to allow Li, a former party boss of the Youth League, time to build up a power base at the top.

However, recent events in Xinjiang, in which more than 200 people were killed in ethnic violence since early July, have dealt a blow to the Youth League faction. The bulk of the top cadres running Xinjiang and Tibet, including their party secretaries, respectively Wang Lequan and Zhang Qingli, are veteran youth League affiliates.

At the plenum, which runs until Friday, Hu is expected to have to explain why he hasn't sacked Wang, who has worked in Xinjiang since the early 1990s, in the wake of the disastrous riots. A well-known hawk, Wang has masterminded a ruthless Sinicization policy in Xinjiang, which means weaning Uighurs from their linguistic, cultural and religious heritage. So far, supremo Hu has only fired the party secretary of Urumqi and the police chief of Xinjiang, who are regarded as scapegoats to cover up for Wang's failed policies.

With Hu and his Youth League faction on the defensive, Xi's supporters in the Politburo and Central Committee are pushing for his appointment to the Military Commission. After all, Hu himself was first made CMC vice-chairman in 1999, three years before he succeeded ex-president Jiang Zemin as party general secretary in 2012.

There are, however, no specifications in the party charter concerning when a crown prince should be made a CMC member. And given that Hu is still the undisputed supremo of Chinese politics, the president could count on the support of the majority of Central Committee members who are loyal to him – and deny Xi his price until the next Central Committee plenum in 2010.

In the meantime, Hu has to tackle another political minefield at the on-going Central Committee plenum: the plethora of scandals involving the offspring of party leaders. After all, the major theme of the conclave is "party construction," a codeword for ridding the party of corrupt cadres and other bad apples.

It is no coincidence that former premier Zhu Rongji, who retired in 2003, published last month an anthology of the interviews he had given during his five year term as head of government. One of China's most popular politicians, Zhu is remembered as an incorruptible official who personally handled a dozen-odd major graft cases. Several of Chinese media have recently cited one of Zhu's best known sayings: "My only hope is that after retirement, the people will say ‘he is a Mr Clean' – and I'll be satisfied."

Given reports that a high-tech firm once run by Hu's son, Hu Haifeng, was implicated in a corruption incident in Namibia, Africa, senior cadres in the party have indirectly blasted the president by singing the praises of Zhu. While Hu's close aides have banned all reference to Hu Haifeng or his company in the Chinese media, the president still has a lot of explaining to do about how to effectively prevent the spouses and kids of cadres from turning their political connections into hefty profits.

It's Plenum Season Again,

Dear readers, it's plenum season again,which is a bit like election season, except there is no data, just a lot of speculations. The big question in the on-going plenum is whether Xi Jinping, Hu's likely successor, will be inducted into the Central Military Commission, as this would further seal his candidacy. We will see; I think there is a chance that Hu will find some excuse to exclude Xi from the body in order to prolong his own influence in the future. Here are a couple of excellent pieces on this issue:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/asia/15china.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=print [link OK]

The New York Times


September 15, 2009
China Watched for Sign of New Leader
By MICHAEL WINES

BEIJING — China’s governing Communist Party will convene its annual policy meeting on Tuesday with a sober, if not soporific, mandate to root out government corruption and make the party adapt to changing times.

But lurking in the background is a more compelling topic: Who will become China’s next ruler in 2012?

Analysts will watch the meeting, the annual plenary session of the party’s 17th Central Committee, to see whether Vice President Xi Jinping is given the additional title of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Such an appointment would be seen as a confirmation that Mr. Xi, 56, is set to succeed President Hu Jintao when Mr. Hu’s second term ends in 2012. Any Chinese leader must have experience in leading the military, which is under party control. Mr. Hu was awarded the same post in 1999, three years before he became the party’s general secretary in 2002.

Yet Chinese politics are so opaque that no outsider can say for certain that Mr. Xi, the presumed heir, will win the position — or that there will be a mark against him should he not.

“There is no foregone conclusion these days,” said a political analyst at a Beijing institution tied to the Communist Party.

Whether that is true is a central question hanging over the meeting this week. Since the founding of the People’s Republic 60 years ago, the Communist Party has governed both the Chinese people and itself strictly from the top down, with all important actions approved by a handful of party leaders united by power and personal relationships.

Officially, at least, the 2,000 or more Central Committee members meeting this week have been given an agenda to shake up that model. The members are supposed to prepare plans to bring democracy to the party’s inner deliberations, choosing new leaders by consensus, not by the dictates of those at the top.

“A new crop of leaders who grew up after the reform and opening up started are going to step into new leadership roles” in 2012, Zhen Xiaoying, a professor at the Communist Party’s central party school, stated in a recent article in the state-run newspaper People’s Daily. He was referring to the period of economic reform that began in 1978.

“The era of relying on authority and personal charm to run the party is over,” he said.

Mr. Xi and Mr. Hu epitomize that shift. Mr. Hu, 66, joined the party in 1964, two years before Mao’s Cultural Revolution brought China a decade of social and political chaos. Mr. Xi joined in 1974, two years after President Richard M. Nixon first visited Beijing and China began to reconnect to the outside world.

Mr. Hu was the party’s designated successor to Jiang Zemin, who ruled a battened-down China after the bloody suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

The process of political succession in China’s one-party system is always shrouded in intrigue. The party elite elevated Mr. Xi to the ruling Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 and gave him the highest rank of any leader of his age group, signaling that he had been chosen to succeed Mr. Hu when the latter’s second five-year stint as top leader ends in 2012. But the party’s internal deliberations on such matters are in the highest order of state secret, and there has been no public confirmation of Mr. Xi’s status.

Whatever changes the plenum orders are unlikely to resemble democracy as Westerners know it. China has long shunned Western democracy, branding it anarchy, and embraced what it calls “democratic centralism” — essentially, passing carefully reviewed suggestions from lower-level party organs to leaders at the top.

Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, recently quoted Mr. Hu as saying that democratic centralism would remain China’s guiding version of democracy. One liberal political analyst who has called for a more open Chinese society, Liu Junning, argued in a telephone interview that prospects for genuine changes this week were dim.

“I think it is important in China first to strengthen formal institutions such as the legislature and the court system, rather than informal structures such as the ruling party,” he said. “Let’s see if there are any open factions within the party — any open opposition, any open minorities.”

China’s governing elite, like any group, has factions, but they are tightly cloaked. Mr. Xi, for example, is widely believed to be the favorite of Mr. Jiang, who still has considerable sway in retirement.

After Mao wreaked havoc with the party hierarchy by designating and then toppling multiple successors, the party’s elite clawed back the power to oversee political succession. Mr. Hu was effectively designated China’s future top leader in 1992, leaving Mr. Jiang, then the new No. 1 official, little choice in the matter. Likewise, Mr. Hu’s apparent favorite, Deputy Prime Minister Li Keqiang, was not selected as his future successor, though Mr. Li is now considered likely to be the next prime minister.

The plenum will be closely watched for any signs that internal politicking has kept the succession contest alive.

The analyst at the Communist Party institution, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press, said he believed that Mr. Xi might not win the military post this week. “If he doesn’t,” he said, “it would show that there’s more of a balance of power. But it would not mean that Xi lost the opportunity.”

The plenum is also scheduled to take up anticorruption measures that could include a requirement that some party officials disclose their holdings of property or financial instruments.

Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting, and Li Bibo contributed research.


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574411830894747864.html#printMode
A Party Plenum Worth Watching
China's Communist Party has some tough decisions to make.
By RUSSELL LEIGH MOSES

BEIJING—The largest ruling body of the Chinese Communist Party—the Central Committee—will convene its annual meeting in Beijing today. This meeting isn't just another plenum. It will say much about how the current Chinese leadership wants to unjam a backlog of reform initiatives and what role it wants the Party to play in the years to come.

The current leadership has coped with crises of all sorts, from earthquakes to ethnic unrest, exceptionally well, all the while avoiding the soul-searching and power-sharing that many outside of China have insisted was necessary for the Party to survive and the country to prosper. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have a right to feel pleased.

But there is also ample reason for anxiety about the Hu-Wen legacy. For all the praise heaped on China's economic performance by outsiders, many scholars and officials here know better, and they continue to express concern about structural challenges. Analysts bemoan the high cost of housing, the appalling state of health care and the stubbornly high unemployment rates of college graduates. These issues may be raised by plenum delegates. Many ordinary Chinese and some officials believe they have been shunted aside by Party elites more concerned with overseas corporate takeovers and access to oil and strategic minerals than the widening income gap.
Xi Jinping, the future Hu Jintao?
Moses
Moses

To counter this dissatisfaction, the Hu administration may restart local elections, expanding the means by which dissent can take place within the Party. The Party may also announce measures to discipline cadres who employ power for private purposes. The well-oiled state-run media machine has run stories hinting of a coming full-scale crackdown on corruption in Party ranks, as well as a requirement that cadres declare their private and family assets publicly. Even if those rumors are simply smoke, they must reflect discontent among some Party officials who feel themselves excluded from decision-making.

The other major issue on the agenda concerns the future leadership of the Party. Xi Jinping, the current Vice President, heads the shortlist to succeed Mr. Hu as party secretary in 2012, followed closely by Vice Premier Li Keqiang. Many analysts outside China expect that Messrs. Xi and Li will ascend together, sharing the same sort of arrangement that their predecessors President Hu and Premier Wen enjoyed: a division of responsibilities and a tacit agreement not to challenge the prevailing political protocol. Policy disagreements are allowed, so long as power plays are eschewed.

But the problem might turn out to be chemistry. Messrs. Hu and Wen appear to genuinely respect and even like each other. It is not at all clear whether Messrs. Xi and Li can work out the same understanding, for they are competitors whose time in the political saddle has not been especially long. They are each expanding their networks inside the Party but they are still working out whom they can trust at the apex of the political system.

There is also no clear sign that Mr. Hu is ready to name a clear successor, or if he did, that his choice would be met with acclaim across the Party. Whether the armed forces feel comfortable with Mr. Xi is also very much an unknown: A key test of his support base at this plenum will be whether he is chosen to be the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. Should deadlock result, there are other officials in the Party who could seek to seize the opportunity to disrupt the usual process of political succession and try to claim Party leadership for themselves.

There are plenty of examples of Chinese plenums making history. The plenum held in 1978 marked the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's effort to engineer economic transformation through modernization and moving the state away from its dominance of the market. The 1992 plenum, barely three years after the Tiananmen Square incident, stiff-armed conservatives who tried to roll back market reforms but also left no room for organized dissent. Those plenums were the beginnings of a great economic experiment that has largely worked.

This plenum might turn out to be another defining meeting for the current leadership, which has so far been interested less in transforming China than securing continued tenure for the Party. The plenum could be the takeoff point for a more confident Communist Party, one that would be willing to experiment with political alternatives like direct elections. Whatever the outcome, this week's plenum promises to make a bit of history.

Mr. Moses is dean of the Beijing Center for Chinese Studies.

Chongqing Cabs and Municipal Budgeting

Anonymous reader raised an interesting point: "I have to say its not very logic to link the gangster investigation and Chongqing's bankruptcy together. The additional CNY1500 income from taxi driver even can't afford the interest from Chongqing government's CNY1 trln debt. However, it is true that the government will make some "action" if it finds out someone not following its order.But I think every government around the world will make similar decision, right?"

Let's do some math: 1500/cab/month*12=18000/cab/year. Let's say there are 3000 cabs in Chongqing. This would make 54 million in additional income per year. Now, that's not a large amount, but it can pay interest on a much larger loan. As a government, Chongqing can borrow cheaply from banks, probably in the 5-6% interest rate loan. An additional 54 million in income would allow Chongqing to take out a loan worth 900 million RMB. Now we are talking about somewhat real money. Also, most local governments would not even try to impose such a fee on mafia controlled taxi companies. They would prey on normal residents. Chongqing, due to the connections of the party secretary, can do both.

More on Chongqing Gangs and Wen Qiang

First of all, I just did a radio interview on Moneytalk with Bob Brinker. If you are interested on my views on everything related to China (45 minutes worth), my sister has kindly recorded and put the clips on-line: http://www.thefacebookera.com/victor/

Second, 21st Century Business Herald did an excellent investigative report on the Wen Qiang case in Chongqing. Apparently, the whole thing began with the taxi strike back in June, which was caused by a fee Chongqing wanted to collect. The private entrepreneurs/mobster behind the taxi company called the strike, which necessitated Bo Xilai to crackdown on them, which led to their protector, Wen Qiang.

In truth, I am somewhat sympathetic to the gangsters, who were unfortunate enough to run into a bigger gangster, Bo Xilai. Basically, where property rights are not secured, a private businessperson has to secure by some means, including bribing officials or cultivating a gang. The problem of course is that once you have acquired those resources, you further use it to gain a monopoly, thus stifling competition. But all this is pretty normal. So, why was Bo Xilai trying to get an additional 1500 RMB in taxes from each taxi in Chongqing? Because Chongqing is broke! It has leveraged itself up the tilt with the formation of 8 major investment companies which have borrowed nearly 1 trillion RMB from the banks. Interest payments alone is in the tens of billions, if not over 100 billion a year. Land sales is still lagging due to still not very robust real estate sales. So, Bo has to be a bigger gangster to concentrate more economic resources.


荣耀末路：重庆市司法局长文强涉黑调查
来源：21世纪经济报道 　2009-08-16 09:14:30 　作者：木村

　　

2000年9月19日晚，中国头号悍匪张君被重庆警方擒获，扑地。时任重庆市公安局副局长的文强，一脚踏于其脸一侧，厉声喝问，你服不服？

是役，文强声名远扬。

9年后，连任公安局副局长11年，现任重庆市司法局局长的文强再次引起轰动，此次却是因为他本人的落马。

8月8日，据新华社消息，重庆市纪委证实，文强涉嫌严重违纪，目前正在接受组织调查。

8月13日，重庆市政府新闻发言人周波说，文强被“双规”充分证明了市委市政府打黑除恶的决心是坚决的，不管背景有多深，关系有多复杂，经济压力有多大，只要侵害了党和人民的利益都将一查到底，绝不手软。

最新消息显示，文强案发前后，重庆市公安机关在打黑除恶专项斗争中已抓获一批犯罪嫌疑人，缴获了一批枪支弹药和管制刀具，14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙受到了打击，陈明亮等19名黑恶势力头目无一漏网。同时，将100多名黑恶势力团伙骨干成员全部缉拿归案。

周波称，此成效为当地打黑除恶专项行动的“第一阶段的初步胜利”。而重庆市高级法院亦做出表态，对于黑社会性质组织罪犯，一律不予假释；除了刑法规定的“被判死缓的，两年考察期满后应减为无期”和“有重大立功表现应减刑”外，黑老大将没有减刑机会，被判死缓、无期徒刑的黑老大将面临“终身监禁”。

目前文强一案更多内情仍有待调查。但在重庆当地民声中，“打黑除恶”、“平安重庆”战役，获得了公众空前信任和高度赞赏。

抓捕

实际上，从文强2008年6月由公安局调至市司法局，重庆展开打黑除恶专项行动以来，关于文强被“双规”的传言就此起彼伏。现在终于尘埃落定。

多位政界人士向记者证实，文强系8月6日在京被限制行动，并于8月7日上午通过民航班机押解回渝。当时他正在参加全国司法厅(局)长座谈会。

此前的7月31日，重庆市就司法行政机关贯彻落实“平安重庆”建设等事项展开专题调研，文强作了工作汇报。这是他最后一次出现在民众视野。

重庆警方人士证实，文强在京被采取措施时，重庆本地也有抓捕行动同步展开。

8月7日凌晨两点左右，重庆市公安局一辆警车来到位于重庆南滨路附近的“海棠晓月”小区。据在场人士透露，警方表示的身份为“重庆市公安局文强案专案组”。

专案组要求物管公司负责人提供协助，突击搜查小区的三套住宅，包括B区的一套，C区两套。其中B区所在房屋为200多平方米的跃层豪宅，有多位小区居民称，该处为文强主要居住地。C区两套住房，知情人士透露，登记业主分别为两位女性。

这位知情人称，警方于当晚从小区带走了一男一女，“二三十岁的年龄，看起来很年轻”。

8月8日，重庆市纪委向媒体证实，文强涉嫌严重违纪，目前正在接受组织调查。文强案最终曝光。

据公开的消息，在文强案发前后，重庆市警方已经展开了为期数月的打黑除恶活动，除严打当地黑恶社会势力之外，此次专项斗争的重点也包括打击黑恶势力的“保护伞”。

如重庆市公安局局长王立军所言，“这一轮打黑除恶斗争，要‘内除积弊，外销积怨’，对于黑势力的保护伞将一查到底。”

信息显示，文强是目前专项行动中落马的级别最高的官员，他被指涉嫌包庇黑社会犯罪。

但文强并非警界落马的唯一官员。据知情人士向记者表示，有一批涉嫌包庇黑社会犯罪的警员被限制行动或接受调查，其中包括有区、县公安局局长或副局长。

重庆市公安局婉拒了记者的采访，称现在还不到发布消息的时机。

文强其人

据公开简历，文强出生于1955年12月，重庆市巴南区人，在职大专学历，一级警监。1972年1月参加工作，先后担任过四川省巴县公安局副局长，巴县政法委副书记兼公安局副局长，巴县县委常委、副书记等职务。

1992 年9月，文强调任四川省重庆市公安局任副局长。据知情人士介绍，1990年代初期，文强尚在巴县任职时，曾在西南师范大学举办的研究生课程进修班在职学习两年，“那时候提拔干部学历是很重要一个指标，而警界当时高学历者少，这段学习经历，成为文强到市局任要职的重要砝码。”

1997年重庆直辖后，文强担任重庆市公安局副局长，在任11年，并于2000年11月被提任正厅局级侦查员。2003年任重庆市公安局党委副书记。在公安局期间，文强一直分管刑事侦查工作。

2008年7月，文强出任重庆市司法局局长，接替他位置的为王立军——这位中国警界知名的“打黑英雄”从辽宁空降至重庆，并在2009年3月正式就任重庆市公安局局长。

在市公安局期间，文强在系统内一度是个英雄般的人物。

除2000年闻名全国的张君案外，他主办的好几起要案被公安部记一等功，包括1992年震惊全国的重庆警匪枪战，1994年中国第一盗案，以及2000年的重庆抢劫运钞车案等。

熟知文强的人士评价说，文强工作能力很强，颇有“强人风范”。有接近文强本人的人士称，文强闲时爱斗地主，喜欢金庸、古龙的武侠小说，是一个性情中人。

该人士举例说，1999年5月27日重庆市石桥铺派出所民警芦振龙，在辖区抓捕犯罪嫌疑人过程中，身中21刀，因伤势过重身亡，年仅26岁。该案非文强亲办，但在嫌疑人被抓获后，他坚持要到看守所去见识一下嫌犯。见到嫌疑人后，他飙了一句脏话，大致意思是“你也太黑了 ”，言毕便顺手将刚买不久的价值 4000多元的手机，砸向嫌疑人，拂袖而去。

然而文强在政界及民间被议论最多的，却是他和当地一些“江湖人士”过往甚密。

重庆市一位政府官员说，1990年代时期，重庆一王姓的黑社会大佬在解放碑为女儿办生日宴，文强参加了这次宴会，并为很多人所知。

另一个重庆坊间广为流传的段子则是，文强与这位王姓老大关系亲近到可以在街边破烂的小摊一起吃面。它甚至被一些重庆人引申为，这是衡量与一个权势人物关系是否至“铁”的最高标准。

后来该王姓人士涉案潜逃，至今尚未归案。

而与此同时，重庆屡发涉黑涉枪大案，整体治安形势严峻，这直接导致文强在当地民众中一直口碑不佳。根据重庆市公安局的统计，重庆近年来治安案件每年在10万件以上，严重暴力犯罪时有发生。

7月31日，重庆市公安局召开了一个扫黑除恶通报会，一参会人士透露，市公安局负责人介绍说，在过去很长一段时间内，重庆治安形势非常严峻。

一位司法界人士认为，如此多积案，加上扫黑专项斗争所暴露的重庆黑社会势力猖獗的事实，“作为分管刑事侦查这么年的公安局负责人，文强应负主要责任”。

扫黑

文强落马，与6月份以来开展的轰轰烈烈打黑除恶专项行动息息相关。

这一行动开展背景，是薄熙来在去年5月提出了建设宜居重庆、畅通重庆、森林重庆、平安重庆、健康重庆五大目标，以此为重庆的扩大开放提供优良的软硬环境，同时提升市民生活品质，增强幸福感。

据一位政界人士称，促使重庆决意整顿黑恶势力最直接的原因，是去年的出租车罢运事件及民营公交收编改革——政府在推行有关政策时，感受到来自黑恶利益集团的强烈阻力，政令不能畅通。

2008年11月3日，重庆市发生8000辆出租车集体罢市事件。出租车司机主要诉求称，出租车公司收取高昂的规费，导致司机受到严重盘剥。重庆市委市政府随后做出了妥善处理，很快平息了事件。

作为主要善后措施，重庆市政府要求主城区出租车公司每辆车降低50元“板板钱”。但在一些出租车公司，该项措施却受到强力阻挠。“一辆车每天50元，一个月每辆出租车的营运损失就是1500元，这就触及很多利益，执行遇到相当大阻力。”上述政界人士称。

而此后的民营公交收编事件，则使地方恶势力对政府政令的抵制态度更加明显----因民营公司经营的“7字头”公交车管理散乱，事故频发，多次改革不见成效，市政府终于决定在今年5月31日前，将全市380多辆“7字头”收归为国有，而“民营公交公司提出的收购要价达到 1亿多元，与政府谈判时的态度非常强硬”。

在此背景下，重庆市的打黑行动开始迅猛进行。重庆市政府新闻发言人周波在13日表示，这次行动系“根据市委市政府和公安部的整体部署”。空降重庆的王立军是这次打黑的领军人物。

王立军上任后重拳不断。去年7月10日至9月30日期间，他领导警方进行了重庆市历年来规模最大“夏季社会治安综合整治行动”。行动开展期间，全市日均破案258起，日均逮捕犯罪嫌疑人93人，一时监狱人满为患。

此外，王还在今年1月，部署了“灭枪治暴”专项行动，出动上千名公安特警、刑警和武警官兵，乘专列突袭渝、湘、黔交界区，清剿围捕了一批地下兵工厂及制枪窝点。

一位警界人士对记者称，两次行动，都意在“扫黑”，“这一步是将上面浮漂的部分打去，为下一步深入清理黑势力打下基础。”

今年6月，“打黑除恶”专项行动正式拉开序幕，重庆警方说将对“恶势力进行拉网式的全天候密集打击”。

此后，一批黑恶势力头目相继落网，其中不乏如渝强实业(集团)有限公司董事长黎强这样有影响、有身份的亿万富翁。有警方人士透露，这位从事公交运输的民企老板，与文强交往甚密。

随着行动的深入，打黑也指向了警方内部。知情人士称，多位有“保护伞”嫌疑的警界官员，相继被查或被逮捕。

知情人士透露，这些警界人士有的是自动暴露，如黎强被捕后半个小时内，其手机不断有警示其逃跑的短信，发信者多是警方内部人士；而有的则是在侦办过程被牵涉进来，一位办理刑事案件多年、与警方接触较为密切的律师对记者说，几位熟知的警方人士，最近手机都莫名停机了。

迹象显示，重庆的打黑除恶专项活动还在持续深入中，7月15日，王立军兼任武警重庆市总队第一政委、第一书记。如此一来，重庆武警系统也将被纳入打黑行动的统一调配中。

重庆一位资深律师分析说，最后所有的焦点都会指向文强，因为他负责全市的刑事、治安管理11年之久，对此难脱其咎。

保护伞

“文强的落马，最令人震惊的是，掀开了警界与黑恶势力勾结谋取非法利益的盖子。”该市一位政协委员对记者称。

“据我的了解，重庆黑社会的发展，跟拥有保护伞不无关系。”重庆某大学教授王力(化名)说。王力1994年就开始潜心研究黑社会，并深入黑社会组织进行调查。

而在7月31日该市一次通报会上，王立军亦表示，重庆涉黑案件的总体特点是时间长、跨度大、背景深、人数多、质量高、影响恶劣，特别是一些黑恶组织已有“合法”外衣，以商养“黑”，以“黑”富商。

根据王力对各地黑社会的调查发现，部分成型的黑社会组织与保护伞之间，是相辅相成，互相发展的过程。

王力说，“有些组织一开始并不是黑社会，只是与官员有某种关系，如亲属、同事、朋友、战友、老乡、邻居中，并利用这样一个靠山，不断发展，后来才形成黑社会；有的官员，则靠着黑社会的钱往上爬，比如买官。随着他的升迁，周围聚的集团，利益越来越多，他自然也就成为这个利益体的保护伞。而过去的团伙，随着他升迁，发展越来越大，也逐渐形成了黑社会。”

“中国正处于工业化中期，这个时期的社会特征，就是黑社会成长迅速，并有条件迅速集聚资本，增强实力，这样一个过程中，他们从过去暴力为主，转向以更高层次的经济犯罪为主，治安案件反而大为减少，但危害性更大，更深层次危害社会肌体。”王力认为，而这个过程也是黑社会与保护伞相互作用的过程。

“没有保护伞，黑社会难以长期生存和发展，两者是一个相辅相成的关系。”王力说，“黑社会本质上是市场经济的伴随物，它本身是‘经济动物’，它本质是追求非法的经济利益，发展到一定程度，就会不断向政府浸透，寻求靠山和地域控制力，以维持这种关系。”

王力表示，文强的发展轨迹，也不会脱离上述规律，更为严重的是，“一个公安局局长如果涉入黑恶势力，他自然不会事事亲为，就会牵连各部门、派出所、民警”。

2000 年发生的重庆“白云湖事件”，就是一个典型案例。当时有王渝男等十多人合资在璧山县白云湖度假村开设“百家乐”地下赌场，长期聚众赌博，非法敛取钱财—— 案发后，原重庆市公安局治安总队总队长李某等四名警员被一同抓捕，罪名为“利用职务之便，为王渝男等提供保护，甚至通风报信”。

法院的判决书称，上述警察最后“致使王渝男、董理等人以白云湖为依托，长期非法聚敛钱财未被查禁，并发展成为非法持有枪支、弹药，实施故意杀人等犯罪行为的黑社会性质组织”。

据知情人士透露，作为保护伞，李某获得利益惊人——不仅每月可按时领取5万利钱，并可随时调取300万元以下现金。

王力称，“在这样巨资的诱惑下，有些官员是很难抵抗的，也就被金钱牢牢拴在了贼船上。”

“中国正处于社会转型期，本身就是黑恶势力层出不穷的时期，就像犯罪一样不可能消灭。”长期从事城市平安建设的重庆市社科院研究员孙元明称，“一个地方黑社会存在，除了全局性背景，有其强烈的区域特性，必须要针对性地采取措施。”

孙元明认为，“过去对黑恶势力也在打击，但更多满足于治安层面的一次次运动式出击，基本没有触及社会经济层上的本质的矛盾。所以收效不大，而薄熙来现在提的平安重庆，是以治安为突破口，强调社会经济发展的文化，经济良性安全，跟以往扫黑的概念大有不同，也会大大减少文强这样的现象”。

据重庆市公安部门8月12日公开的数据，今年1到7月，警方破获积案13867起，其中命案积案303起，超过前5年破命案积案的总和。

对于重庆这次扫荡式的扫黑专项活动，重庆民众普遍持欢迎态度。

舆论表示，治安形势的彻底好转不能寄望于某一次严打活动，而应该从制度层面着手，切断黑恶势力向社会各阶层渗透的可能，并断绝其和保护伞之间的关联。而这有待于重庆政府的更进一步努力。

但往事并非如烟，有关于文强的那些故事和传说，注定将会成为这一个民生战役中最核心的段落。

2001年5月，张君案一审宣判后，文强接受一家杂志专访，聊到他的退休后的生活，当时44岁的他表示，要写一本关于张君的书，“张君是一个复杂的人，不能从单一的角度去看，其实最要命的就是把人的简单化。”

他自己的故事，注定不会简单。

The SCMP did a couple of interesting articles on the Chongqing case, one generalizing the role of gangsters. Well, I guess now the "businessmen" on Bo's side can run things in Chongqing....


South China Morning Post Aug 15, 2009 Saturday He Huifeng p.5


Organised crime calls the shots when it comes to doing business in Chongqing

Organised crime has terrorised the commercial world in Chongqing for so long that it has become part of everyday business. Gangsters have gradually infiltrated many sectors and made their presence felt through blackmail, extortion and loan sharking, local businessmen said. "For most businessmen in Chongqing, you can't survive if you don't submit to the gangsters," said Hu Shuang , whose father runs a lumber company. "Surrender is the only way to protect ourselves. The gangs and officials are together, so revenge would come if you called the police."

Huang Wei , head of Chongqing's Private Economic Promotion Association, said usury was the most common tactic gangs employed to acquire assets from legal businesses. Mr Huang said gangsters would lure businesses with seemingly reasonable rates of interest, and then fail to provide the agreed amount of cash while still demanding full repayment. The deadline for repaying money was also very tough, sometimes only a matter of days, he said. "If you pay it late, they will smash your office with knives and clubs," he said.

Ordinary people and even soldiers have suffered from the gang violence. In March, a soldier standing guard outside a garrison in Chongqing was killed and his machine gun was stolen. The authorities treated it as a terrorist attack at first but later discovered it was the work of organised crime. In November, five amusement arcade workers were killed in a fight at the establishment. Local reports said more than 20 gangsters armed with knives and batons had clashed with the employees.

"Chongqing has a deeply rooted tradition of armed gangs," said Yao Shibo, who runs a trading company. He said many munitions factories had been built in the area when it was the wartime capital of the Kuomintang and "homemade" knives and firearms were readily available in rural areas. He said gangs were widely active, especially in taxi companies, farm produce markets and commercial property construction sites. "The gangs have thousands of youngsters and unemployed men as reserves," Mr Yao said. "They would fight for anyone. You just need to pay them 100 yuan [$113HK] each per attack. Being a hoodlum is a way to make a living."

In Beijing's development blueprint for western regions, Chongqing was pitched as an export and trade base and the major city in the west. But the revelations of gang activity are putting a stain on the municipality's image as a place gearing up for international business. An intercontinental rail line linking Chongqing to Rotterdam is scheduled to be completed by 2012. The rail link has been touted as a way to gradually resolve the economic imbalance between the mainland's prosperous coastal areas and the poorer interior regions.


Dramatic tale of triad fighter's fall from grace
Ng Tze-wei Ibid., p. 5

From triad-buster to police chief, from police chief to target of triad-buster - the story of Wen Qiang is no movie plot, but no less dramatic. Mr Wen, director of the Chongqing Justice Bureau and formerly deputy police chief for 16 years, was placed under internal party investigation last Saturday for allegedly shielding the rampant and growing triad forces in the sprawling municipality of 30 million. The 54-year-old Chongqing native started working right after high school, and slowly climbed up the ladder with the police force in Sichuan , the province Chongqing belonged to before becoming an independent municipality in 1997. Mr Wen became vice-chief of the Chongqing police in 1992, and deputy party secretary in 2003. Mr Wen shot to fame by solving several high-profile robberies in the early 1990s, and became a household name when he caught the infamous crime boss Zhang Jun after a six-year pursuit. Zhang was caught by Mr Wen in 2000, faced charges ranging from armed robbery to murder, and was executed the year after.

During his tenure as police chief, Mr Wen slowly gained a reputation for his close involvement with the rich and powerful, and the darker side of the city's business deals.

In the few months before his fall from grace, three billionaires close to Mr Wen - two were also local legislators - were arrested. Property developer Chen Mingliang , motorbike businessman Gong Gangmo and Li Qiang , the second-richest man in the municipality's Banan region - with interests from property to transport - were among more than 100 people taken away during a 50-day assault on organised crime in Chongqing.

When former Liaoning party chief Bo Xilai was transferred to Chongqing in 2007, he swore to fight crime gangs that were growing out of control in the booming industrial municipality. In July last year, he parachuted Wang Lijun , a well-known triad-buster from Liaoning province, in to take Mr Wen's position. Mr Wen was transferred to head the Justice Bureau, an apparent promotion.

Mr Wang, 40, in his 20 years as a policeman has reportedly sent 800 criminals to their execution. His long-term battle with the triads also gave him at least 20 scars from knife and bullet wounds, and a 10-day coma. He is now rumoured to have a seven-figure price on his head.

Last month Mr Wang said the triads in Chongqing were known for "having a long history, wide coverage, deep connections, huge membership, high quality, and vicious influence".

Above all, "some of the organised crime gangs already have a 'legal' coat, and are using business to support triad activities, and using triad activities to enrich their business".

Many legitimate businesses have fallen victim to organised crime, and have complained about the high extortion fees they pay to survive.

Mr Wen was the most senior official brought down since Mr Wang's drive to crack down on this mingling of power, money and crime.

Public administration professor Mao Shoulong of Renmin University said collusion between police and organised crime was not uncommon around the world, but in China the situation was somewhat different. "The collusion is not so much between police and organised crime gangs. The Chinese police are still quite effective in combating crime," Professor Mao said. "The collusion is more between police and a growing number of businesses using triad-like methods to conduct their affairs."

I am now on twitter

Dear Readers, my sister just dragged me kicking and screaming into twitter and its universe of 100 characters limit (wish that was 100 Chinese characters!). If you twitter, click on twitter.com/vshih2 or search for me by my name.I will do my best to update with various views and links. I will probably twitter a lot during conferences!

On another note, Bo Xilai is further cleaning house in Chongqing. After the arrest of former vice police chief Wen Qiang, many of his "business" associates were also arrested. Now, we can say that Bo Xilai has complete control over Chongqing. The question is: to what end? This could be a Li Ruihuan strategy of planting factional followers up and down the city bureaucracy so that he maintains residual influence on the city for years down the road.....


重庆多名民企老板涉黑被抓 其中不乏亿万富翁
来源：南方都市报 　2009-08-14 07:56:36 　作者：

　　
　　本报讯 重庆市政府新闻发言人周波昨日称，重庆在50多天内打掉14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙，19名首犯全部落网，100多名黑社会性质组织骨干成员全部缉拿归案。在严厉打击黑恶势力的同时，警方在查封、扣押涉黑人员的企业资产账号时给企业保留下生产经营资金，保证企业正常经营活动不受影响。

周波称，在全国开展的打黑除恶专项行动开始以来，重庆市重拳出击对恶势力进行了拉网式的全天候的密集打击。经过50多天的战役攻坚，重庆警方已抓获了一批犯罪嫌疑人，缴获了一批枪支弹药和管制刀具，查封冻结了一大批涉案资产，14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙已受到了打击，首犯陈明亮、龚刚模、陈坤志、岳村，樊奇杭、王兴强、王天伦等19人无一漏网，100多名黑社会性质组织骨干成员全部缉拿归案。

据介绍，经过近50天的专项集中整治，该市现行命案破案率达到了91.35%，高于全国平均水平2.95个百分点，破命案积案超过过去五年的总和，抓获故意杀人逃犯同比上升了20.7%，杀人犯罪下降了14.74%，创造了五年来同期的最低。

据此间了解，在被抓的犯罪嫌疑人中，有不少是当地的企业家和商人，其中不乏亿万富翁。周波表示，重庆警方在查封、扣押涉案企业资产账号时给企业保留下生产经营资金，指定不涉案负责人管理经营，保证涉案企业不掉链、不断档，保证了诸如今普食品有限公司、渝强集团实业有限公司等涉案企业的正常经营活动。

周波称，不久前重庆市司法局局长文强因严重违纪被双规，充分证明了重庆市委市政府打黑除恶的决心是坚决的，不管背景有多深、关系有多复杂、经济实力有多大，只要侵害了党和人民的利益都将一查到底、绝不手软。　　　　　中新

Not all 100 millionaires in China are princelings!

The People's Daily today carried an interesting article rebutting the well-cited figure that 90% of the 100 millionaires in China are children of high level cadres. It carefully traced the source of the rumor and found experts to rebut it. To be sure, such a figure is impossible to derived from conventional survey instruments. As someone who is trying hard to track the influence of princelings, I can tell you that it is hard, and figuring out their wealth would be even harder. So, I am sure the official rebuttal has some merit. However, clearly, the reason why this figure is so widely believed is that there is a pervasive popular and elite belief that it takes connections to get rich!



组虚假数据是如何在网上网下以讹传讹的？
——关于“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”的新闻调查

2009年08月05日15:38 来源：人民网-时政频道
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　　人民网北京8月5日电　记者唐维红 张玉珂 常红报道：近日，关于“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”的信息和议论在网上广为流传。8月4日，记者在百度上输入“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”这一标题，显示相关网页2810余页，而仅仅在两天前，网页的数字还是2650页。与此同时，传统媒体也陆续推出以此数据为由头的时评、专论，引起广泛关注。

　　那么，这些数据从何而来？权威部门是否发布过这样的调查报告？这样的信息为何能引起如此高的关注度？带着这一系列疑问，人民网记者采访了相关人员和机构，希望通过调查揭开数据背后的真相。

　　数据拼凑嫁接　信息以讹传讹

　　蔡继明委员呼吁媒体准确报道

　　6月26日，《时代周报》刊发了记者韩洪刚采写的报道，报道在导语中称：“在日前召开的政协十一届常委会上，中国财富的‘集中度’正在受到政协常委和委员的热切关注。蔡继明委员说：‘中国权威部门的一份报告显示，0.4％的人掌握了70％的财富，财富集中度高于美国。’”

　　记者称：他 “查阅了几组权威数据显示，中国财富的确在以全球最快的速度流入富人钱包。” 随后，该记者在报道中写道：“据国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中宣部研究室、中国社科院等部门一份联合调查报告的数据,截至2006年3月底，中国内地私人拥有财产(不含在境外、外国的财产)超过5000万元以上的有 27310人，超过1亿元以上的有3220人。在超过1亿元以上的富豪当中，有2932人是高干子女。他们占据了亿元户的91%，拥有资产20450余亿元。”

　　这篇报道刊发后立刻被众多网站、论坛、博客，以及传统媒体转载、转贴。许多媒体和网友在转载、转贴的时候，将数据来源“简化”成蔡继明的发言，将这位曾因倡导假日改革成媒体焦点的全国政协委员再次推上舆论的风口浪尖。

　　人民网记者几经周折，于7月31日终于联系上了《时代周报》记者韩洪刚。他承认，这段数据不是引自蔡继明委员的发言，而是引自互联网上转载的某位国内经济学者2006年写的一篇文章。

　　随后，人民网记者又与该经济学者联系核实。该学者称此数据引自当年的互联网，他说：“当时网上（这组数据）非常流行”。

　　处在舆论旋涡中的蔡继明近来不胜其扰，他曾在7月11日通过个人博客发布澄清声明，但收效甚微。这组数据仍在继续传播和热议。

　　7月31日下午，蔡继明接受了人民网记者的采访。他说，事实上，他在全国政协十一届常委会第六次会议专题讨论会发言时，只是提到“国外一家研究机构估计，中国0.4%的最富裕的人掌握了70%的财富”，并没有指明是哪一家研究机构，更没有说是中国权威部门的报告。《时代周报》记者在没有对他进行采访的前提下，写了这则报道。《时代周报》并未说明后一个数据是他所说，但其他媒体再次引用《时代周报》数据时，就变成了：“蔡继明委员在近日召开的全国政协十一届常委会第六次会议上，援引一份由国务院研究室、中央党校研究室等部门一份联合调查报告的数据。”

　　蔡继明强调：“我对媒体这种乱引数据，误会当事者本意的做法感到非常反感。媒体报道应本着客观、真实、准确的原则，而不是恶意炒作。”

“权威数据”不权威　中宣部、中央党校、国务院、中国社科院等相关部门纷纷辟谣

　　为了增加这组所谓数据的可信度，一些媒体在报道、转载、评论这些信息和数据时，一再强调“中国权威部门”、“全国政协委员”等关键词，可假的终究是假的。不仅蔡继明委员出面澄清事实，该“报告”列举的权威部门也纷纷通过记者正式辟谣。

　　中宣部政研室有关负责人明确表示，“我室从未与国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中国社会科学院等部门联合作过关于社会经济状况的调研，我室也从未进行过这方面的专题调研，更未起草过这方面的调查报告，在已有的调研报告中也未引用过这些数据。”

　　有媒体报道称这组数字最早来自于中国社科院的“当代中国社会流动”课题。该课题负责人中国社科院研究员陆学艺对此坚决否认，连称荒唐！

　　他说：“‘高干子女占超亿元富豪人数的91%’，是不可信的，因为无法统计，并且比例数还精确到个位数，很荒唐！至于说这一数据来源于‘当代中国社会流动’课题，更是荒唐！我们的课题完成于2004年，而统计数据说的是‘截至2006年3月’，这怎么可能？”

　　国务院研究室、中央党校研究室相关负责人则告诉记者，根本没有这份报告，这组数据是假的，两年前曾在网上炒作过，最早来自海外某刊物。

　　记者通过互联网搜索，发现早在2006年10月19日，境外星岛环球网就刊发了题为“官方报告：中国亿万富豪九成以上是高干子女”的报道。报道称：“官方研究机构的调查报告披露：在金融、外贸、国土开发、大型工程、证券五大领域中，担任主要职务的基本上都是高干子弟。中国的亿万富豪九成以上是高干子女，其中有2900多名高干子女，共拥有资产二万多亿。国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中国社会科学院等部门近日出炉一份关于社会经济状况的调查报告，详细记录了社会不同阶层的经济收入。”这不知是不是网上最早出现的此虚假报告的来源，但此篇报道被传载、引用的频率很高。

　　记者还搜索到了英文时事杂志《远东经济评论》（Far Eastern Economic Review）2007年第4期上的一篇文章，文中也提到了这些数字。文章原文为：“Article after article pores over the potential economic reasons for
the increase in income inequality in China. We ignore the fact that of
the 3,220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of 100 million yuan
($13 million) or more, 2, 932 are children of high-level cadres.”

　　翻译成中文，大意为“一篇又一篇文章在研讨中国贫富差距扩大的潜在经济原因。但是，我们忽视了一个事实，有3220个中国人拥有财富超过1亿元，2932人是高干子女”。记者发现，该文章引用这组数据时并未注明数据来源和统计时间。

　　就是这样一个被相关部门断定为造假的报告，就是这样一组语焉不详的数据，却在境内外许多网站、论坛上广泛流传，且“版本”不尽相同。有网友在此类帖文下跟帖置疑：“我希望通过数据考证来说话，不管原作者出于何种想法或意识形态写了这篇文章，我认为错误的事实都是无法支持的。”

　警惕“刻板印象”　关注舆论热点

　　以权威真实的信息挤压谣言空间

　　这组虚假数据的传播，让人们再次领略了互联网的传播能量和放大器的功能。

　　其实，媒体尤其是互联网上统计数据混乱的现象早已有之。出自境内外民间机构、专家学者的统计数据，乃至一些拼凑捏造、以讹传讹的虚假数据，时常处于一种任意转贴、转载的状态。许多媒体和个人在转贴、引用之前，鲜有人去了解、追问这些数据的科学性和准确度。当然，普通网民个体往往很难核实，但媒体、专业机构、专业人士则不同，不能淡忘职业操守，不能以此来炒作、膨胀公众的不满情绪，更不能违犯相关法律法规。

　　中国人民大学商法研究所所长、博士生导师刘俊海教授在接受人民网记者采访时介绍说，全国人大常委会6月27日表决通过的《中华人民共和国统计法》规定，民间统计调查活动的管理办法，由国务院制定。但是，这方面的规章制度目前还没有制定出来，而许多民间机构、非政府组织却一直在发布与国民经济和社会生活相关的统计结论或结果，这部分数据的真实性、完整性等，常常无法确认。

　　为此，他建议应尽快出台对非官方机构统计数据的管理规定。他提出，在不损害国家安全，不泄漏国家机密，不进行欺诈欺骗，不损害社会公共利益前提下，对民间统计调查活动应允许存在，但要加强监管，加强规范。民间统计活动只要纳入法制化监管轨道，对官方统计数据也可以起到拾遗补缺的作用，促进官方统计数据的真实性、准确性、及时性，从而进一步增强官方统计数据的公信力。

　　蔡继明委员在接受人民网记者采访时，也建议国家有关部门加强对统计数据的管理。他还一再强调，国家有关部门应及时对境内外民间机构和组织等发布的不实数据进行澄清，以免给其留下传播空间。

　　记者在调查中也注意到，许多网友在关注、甚至转贴此类信息时，并不完全相信这些内容。一位网友就明确表示：“网上传播的这些信息，包括高干子女占超亿元富豪的比例等等，其数字不一定很准确，但收入差距过大以及特权阶层掌握了过多的社会财富，却是不争的事实。”

　　可以说，对贫富差距加大的忧虑、对反腐败的期盼、对自己生存状态的不满，等等，都会成为促使大家关注、热议此类信息的原因。

　　前不久，《第24次中国互联网发展状况统计报告》发布，中国网民已达3.38亿，稳居世界第一。一个超过3亿人的群体不再虚拟，他们常常通过发贴、开博、留言等方式表达诉求、宣泄情绪，而用数据说话，正是表达最常用的手段之一。

　　国家行政学院教授、博士生导师刘熙瑞在接受人民网记者采访时就谈到了此类虚假信息传播背后的原因。他说，“这类虚假数据之所以在博客和论坛广为传播，大多是网民们的一种情绪宣泄，或者作为他们一种价值理念的传播。”他认为，尽管这种信息缺乏根据，但是导致此类信息如此广泛传播背后所隐藏的群众的某种不满情绪应引起相关部门的重视。刘熙瑞建议，各级政府及有关部门在依法整治网上网下虚假、有害信息的同时，也应重视这种现象，分析、研究这种现象背后的深层原因，并采取有效措施予以解决。

　　中国人民大学新闻学院副院长、舆论研究所所长喻国明在解读此类现象时，使用了传播学的一个概念——“刻板印象”。他说，一个真假并无确认的数据之所以被广泛流传，甚至为不少人认可，形成共震，是因为社会上有大量的类似这样事件的逻辑积累，传播学称之为“刻板印象”。

　　他认为，社会贫富差距已成为目前影响社会稳定问题的一个重要因素。在现实生活中，一方面少数人利用公款大吃大喝，另一方面还有很多人处在生活的困境中。在这种情况下，这方面的虚假数据就很容易给人们造成一种逻辑上的真实。其实，这正是社会的一种预警信号。他认为，政府部门应针对这些预警做出相应的政策性的调整和安排，切实解决民众关心的热点问题；此外，还应给公众创建一种情绪宣泄的平台，使这种社会情绪得以舒解。

　　在采访的最后，喻国明特别强调，媒介使用相关数据时，应该有严格的核查意识。如果数据信息没有权威解读而又未得到核实时，应注明这是未经核实的数据，提醒社会公众阅读此类信息时应保持一种质疑的态度。

SMEs Electricity Usage Plunges by 50%!

Wow, it is breath-taking that first half 2009 electricity usage by small-medium enterprises in China dropped by 50% compared with the same period last year. However, it should not be interpreted as SMEs facing mass bankruptcy. In fact, I think slowing and stopping production is a very healthy reaction on the part of many SMEs, which allow them to survive the crisis financially intact. With orders slowly picking up in the second half, some SMEs in Zhejiang are opening up production again. I think this story is significant for the growth story in China this year, which will reach 8% due to massive state investment and bank loans. However, it should not be interpreted as the annihilation of the private sector, which is still resilient in the short run. In the long run, massive state money may crowd out private investment, which is a worry.

http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-03/110220099.html
中国中小工业企业用电量下降近五成
本文来源于《财经网》　 2009年08月03日 18:57 共有 0 条点评


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2009年上半年，消耗电力相对较少的工业行业，支撑了整体工业增加值的增长

　　【《财经网》/北京】2009年上半年，中小工业企业用电量下降近五成，大幅拉低整体工业企业用电量增长。

　　2009年上半年，全国规模以上工业增加值增长7%，带动国内生产总值累计增长7.1%，但全社会用电量减少2.2%。经济增长与用电量下降的反差，一度引起人们质疑。
相关新闻：


交通银行首席经济学家连平建议，应加快银行对中小企业不良贷款核销速度

　　8月3日，国家统计局能源统计司发表分析文章称，2009年上半年，规模以下工业企业（即中小工业企业）用电量同比下降48.9%，而同期全国工业企业用电量下降5.9%。

　　对于中小工业企业用电量下降更快的原因，瑞银证券中国区首席经济学家汪涛认为，在经济下行时，中小企业订单通常最先减少，甚至一张订单也拿不到；和大企业相比，中小企业减产幅度更大，关停更多。

　　“由于中小企业能源利用率较低，再加上大企业也会维持更先进、能耗更低的生产线的运行，淘汰落后生产线，”汪涛说，“因此，用电量的下跌幅度要大于产量。”

　　国家统计局能源统计司认为，根据中国电力企业联合会统计的全部工业企业用电，以及国家统计局统计的规模以上工业企业用电测算，2009年上半年，中小工业企业用电的大幅下降，对全部工业用电减少产生了较大的拉动作用。

　　另外，2009年上半年，高能耗工业以及部分高能耗工业产品产出快速回落，也使得工业用电急剧减少。

　　汪涛认为，这主要是因为中国经济受到内需、外需快速下滑双重冲击。其中，内需不振使得重工业的产出迅速减少。

　　国家统计局数据显示，2009年上半年，黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业、有色金属冶炼和压延加工业、化学原料和化学制品、电力和热力生产供应这四大高耗电行业，其工业增加值快速回落，增幅均在7%以下。其中，黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业，上半年工业增加值仅增长1%。

　　因此，2009年上半年，消耗电力相对较少的工业行业，支撑了整体工业增加值的增长。

　　此外，在上述四大行业中，一些耗电多行业的产品产量下降得更快，从而减少了用电量。国家统计局认为，这也是经济增长与用电量背离的原因之一。

　　以黑色金属冶炼业为例，在钢材产量总体上升5.7%的同时，冷轧薄板、冷轧薄宽钢带、镀层板和电工钢板（带）等耗电多的加工材，产量却分别下降了3.3%、3.7%、1.4%和10.9%。■

　　（《财经》记者 王晶）

Interesting article on Princeling, nothing we don't know already though!

The Straits Times (Singapore) July 25, 2009 Saturday Peh Shing Huei


China's corporate world ruled by princes;
About 90 per cent of China's billionaires are the children of high-ranking officials

BEIJING: It has been days since news first broke of a graft probe in Namibia into a firm formerly run by the son of Chinese President Hu http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifNews, Most Recent 60 Days

Jintao. Yet, in China, hardly anyone knows of the case. Nuctech - which makes security scanners and was headed by the 38-year-old Mr Hu Haifeng until last year - is being investigated over a lucrative contract it had won to deliver equipment to Namibia. It is not known if the case, which happened last year, took place while Hu junior was still in charge. There has been nothing to suggest that he is involved in any way in the probe, but Namibia's Anti-Corruption Commission has requested an interview with him and senior Nuctech management.

In China, discussions about the business dealings of the 'princelings' or taizidang - offspring of political leaders - are considered taboo. People might whisper about them over dinner tables, but will never discuss them in public. Some princelings, such as Vice-President Xi Jinping, become public figures after being drawn into politics, but their counterparts in the corporate world shy away from the limelight. Nevertheless, they are a force to be reckoned with. A 2006 study by several Chinese research institutions showed that almost 90 per cent of the country's top leaders in sectors encompassing finance, foreign trade, property development, construction and stock trading were princelings.

And about 90 per cent of China's billionaires are the children of high-ranking officials. Princelings have fared far better in business than in politics, observed analyst Zhang Hua, who commented on the phenomenon in Hong Kong's Apple Daily in 2007. 'Not a single (princeling) family has been left behind,' he said sardonically. The various families have carved out territories in various industries. The family of former premier Li Peng, for example, controls the country's energy sector. His daughter Li Xiaolin is chairman of China Power International Development, an electricity monopoly. His son Li Xiaopeng used to head Huaneng Power, another energy heavyweight.

The family of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin has moved into telecommunications, while the offspring of former premier Zhu Rongji are strong figures in banking. His son Levin Zhu is the chief executive of China International Capital Corp. The princelings began staking out their dominions in the business world in the 1980s when China was opening up its economy. Armed with their fathers' connections, they were able to exploit the opportunities thrown up by China's economic transformation.By the 1980s, this economic revolution had led to much public disquiet, and when students staged protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, much of their anger was initially directed at what they saw as rampant corruption by senior officials and their families.

The bloody crackdown that followed left deep scars in the political psyches of most Chinese. For the princelings, Tiananmen provided further incentive to move away from politics into business. 'After 1989, princelings in politics suffered. They were very unpopular within the Chinese Communist Party,' explained analyst Bo Zhiyue, an expert on China's elite politics at the National University of Singapore's East Asian Institute. 'It was very hard for them to get into the Central Committee. They were not chosen at internal elections because of their family names, so many left politics and jumped into the corporate world.'

After Tiananmen, their business dealings became even more politically sensitive. A bad slip could see their fathers stepping on that proverbial banana skin and tumbling from power.

For President Hu President Hu -Search using:

http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifBiographies Plus News who has repeatedly pointed out that the battle against graft is 'a matter of life and death' - the timing of the Nuctech case could prove awkward. In just three months, on Oct 1, the nation will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of Communist China - at which glorious occasion he is expected to be conferred the rare honour of a military review on Tiananmen Square.

Unsavoury rumours about the princelings' business activities do damage the image of the leaders concerned, said Hong Kong-based analyst Joseph Cheng. Still, he feels that any fallout from the Nuctech case will be extremely limited and that Mr Hu's political rivals are unlikely to use it against him because almost all the top leaders have family members with substantial stake in the corporate world.

shpeh@sph.com.sg

Princelings have fared far better in business than in politics, observed analyst Zhang Hua in Hong Kong's Apple Daily in 2007.

Five princes and their business ties

HU HAIFENG, 38 Son of Chinese President Hu President Hu -Search using: http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifBiographies Plus News http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifNews, Most Recent 60 Days

Jintao Chief of Tsinghua Holdings, the group which controls Nuctech and 30 other companies. Nuctech is one of the world's top providers of security scanning equipment, supplying to about 50 nations. It has 90 per cent of the Chinese market for scanners and X-ray systems.

WINSTON WEN YUNSONG, 35 Son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao CEO of Beijing-based Unihub Global Networks, a telecoms services provider which he set up in 1999. The company mainly deals in setting up telecommunications facilities and networks for banks, stock agencies and insurance companies.

JIANG MIANHENG, 57 Son of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin Co-founded Shanghai-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which became one of the leading semiconductor foundries in the world. Mr Jiang also sits on the board of many major Chinese companies, ranging from telecommunications and airport management to TV manufacture.

LI XIAOPENG, 50 Eldest son of former Chinese premier Li Peng The former general manager of energy giant Huaneng Power became vice-governor of Shanxi province last year. Huaneng develops, constructs, operates and manages large power plants throughout China.

LEVIN ZHU, 52 Son of former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji Chief executive of China International Capital Corp (CICC), a state-owned company which is one of China's largest in the field of investment banking and research. Headquartered in Beijing, CICC, among other things, offers advice to fund managers and corporate clients on corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions.