Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Dear All, this excellent piece by the Financial Times may well bar me from China! It's very good for Northwestern's reputation in Asia, however. Now everyone will want to come!

China: To the money born

By FT Reporters

Published: March 29 2010 22:37 | Last updated: March 29 2010

New Horizon Capital is one of the most influential and successful participants in China’s fledgling private equity industry. It has billions of dollars under management and a stable of investors that includes Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, UBS and Temasek, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund. But you would not guess any of that from its central Beijing headquarters.

The company has no nameplate in the lobby of the Golden Treasure Tower, a nondescript building near the Forbidden City, the traditional seat of imperial power. Its simple 12th floor offices are identified only by a small sign inside the door that reads, in Chinese, “New Horizon Growth Investment Advisory Limited”.

The company does not need flashy suites as it has one of the most valuable assets in China. He is Winston Wen, an MBA from Northwestern University’s Kellogg business school in the US who keeps a low profile and bears a striking resemblance to his father – Wen Jiabao, premier of the People’s Republic of China.

The younger Mr Wen and New Horizon are in the vanguard of a more aggressive generation of taizidang (“princelings”) – offspring of senior Communist party officials – who dominate the burgeoning home-grown private equity industry, where huge profits are to be made from restructuring state assets and financing private companies.

In 2009 private equity deals in China totalled $3.6bn, accounting for one-third of all such transactions in the Asia-Pacific region, according to Thomson Reuters. But industry participants say the potential market is far larger.

According to those working in the sector, the princelings’ ascendance is squeezing out less well connected operators, including foreign firms, which might have important consequences for two reasons. First, private equity could play an important role in modernising the economy, channelling funds to promising but capital-starved companies – but those benefits will be felt only if the industry is run in a professional and competitive manner.

Second, some in the political establishment fear that princeling dominance of private equity could exacerbate public perception of nepotism and misrule at the top of the Communist party. In an opaque authoritarian system lacking the popular legitimacy of a democracy, such fears are hard to dismiss. A recent online opinion poll by the People’s Daily, the party’s official mouthpiece, found that 91 per cent of respondents believe all rich families have political backgrounds.

In an interview with the same newspaper, the former auditor-general said the fast-growing wealth of officials’ children and relatives “is what the public is most dissatisfied about”. Li Jinhua, widely respected as the senior graft-busting official between 1998 and 2008, told the paper this month: “From the numerous cases currently coming to light, we can see that many corruption problems are transacted through sons and daughters.”

Many of the elite’s children are western educated and, over the past 15 years, dozens have been recruited by western companies and banks hoping to secure an entry into the Chinese market and win mandates to take state-owned companies public in New York or Hong Kong. As most foreign investors know, employing the relative of a senior party leader as an adviser or employee can help cut through bureaucratic obstruction and resistance from local interest groups.

But today those institutions and investors are scrambling to invest in the private equity funds of princelings who would once have been on their payroll. “In the past, the best option for these people with ‘background’ was to go to the high-paying western investment banks but now the economic strength has shifted,” says one person in the private equity industry, asking not to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic. “Now they’re saying to the foreigners, ‘Hey, I’m in the driving seat, I have all the deals – so you give me your money and I’ll invest it myself and take a big cut’.”

Prominent private equity princelings include George Li, a former banker at Merrill Lynch and UBS with an MBA from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose father, Li Ruihuan, was one of the country’s senior leaders from the late 1980s until 2003. Another son, Jeffrey Li, recently resigned as China head of Novartis, the pharmaceuticals group, to go into private equity, according to people familiar with the matter.

Wilson Feng, who bankers and private equity investors say is the son-in-law of Wu Bangguo – officially second in the party hierarchy – left Merrill Lynch two years ago to launch a fund with ties to the state-owned nuclear energy conglomerate, according to media reports and people familiar with the matter. Mr Feng was key to securing Merrill’s mandate to take Industrial and Commercial Bank of China public in Hong Kong in 2006 in the biggest initial public offering in history.

Other private equity princelings include Li Tong, daughter of Li Changchun, the member of the nine-strong ruling Politburo standing committee in charge of propaganda and the media. Ms Li now runs a private equity fund at Hong Kong-based Bank of China International focusing on the media sector, according to three people familiar with the matter. Stanford-educated Jeffrey Zeng, son of Zeng Peiyan, former vice-premier, has also set up a fund affiliated with state-owned financial institutions.

“This is turning into a crucial moment for the financial industry in China,” says the head of a foreign bank in Beijing.“But we are very worried that foreigners and other skilled Chinese are being shut out by a string of princelings and other very well-connected people trying to dominate [the private equity] market.”

The government has been encouraging the creation of a home-grown private equity industry in recent years but approvals to set up funds are tightly controlled and investments often require them from numerous state agencies. Having the relative of a top leader in its management team can help fledgling funds overcome these hurdles.

Princelings have long been suspected of leveraging parental political power for personal gain; the topic was a source of public anger during the 1989 Tiananmen Square student protests that ended in a bloody military crackdown. But Beijing political insiders say two men led the way for the ambitious new generation, fostering the modern perception of close ties between money and political power.

Levin Zhu, son of former premier Zhu Rongji, and Jiang Mianheng, son of former president Jiang Zemin, are familiar to many foreign investors, having worked for or set up joint ventures with several large western companies. Their fathers helped push through some of the past two decades’ most important market-based reforms, including World Trade Organisation membership.

Mr Zhu has a PhD in meteorology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Following a stint at Credit Suisse First Boston in New York, he returned to China in the late 1990s and orchestrated a virtual take­over of China International Capital Corp, a joint venture in which Morgan Stanley holds about 34 per cent.

Mr Jiang boasts a PhD in electrical engineering from Drexel University in Philadelphia. Returning to Shanghai in the early 1990s he was courted by foreign investors who saw him as the country’s most valuable joint venture partner. Today, he controls Shanghai Alliance Investment Limited, a government investment company operating much like a private equity firm.

With their parents both out of formal office since 2003, the influence of Mr Jiang and Mr Zhu has waned. But as children of the “third generation” of technocratic leaders, they are seen to have paved the way for the current wave of princelings. “Those two really helped create the image of Red families running this country for their own benefit,” according to one person who deals closely with many princeling families. “Their actions have given all the younger generation a green light to go out and aggressively build their own buckets of gold, no matter what the consequences for the image of the party or the leadership.”

By squeezing out foreigners and other competition, dominance of the private equity sector by princelings will bring few benefits in terms of management skills or financial discipline, some analysts and industry participants say.

“Private equity is a very good area for princelings because with these sorts of connections you can get into companies ahead of their IPOs and make a lot of money in a short space of time,” says Professor Victor Shih of Northwestern University. “It is an easy way to make money because everyone will be willing to back them because of their connections. Everyone will do it willingly in order to potentially get favours from senior leaders in return.”

People close to several private equity princelings say they often feel they are victims of reverse discrimination; that no matter how smart or hard-working they are, the public will assume their success relies purely on nepotism. However, some important operators in the Chinese sector, while benefiting from family links, are seen in the industry as well qualified in their own right. One such person is Liu Lefei, son of Liu Yunshan, head of the party’s central propaganda department. The younger Mr Liu previously managed Rmb1,000bn ($147bn; €109bn; £98bn) as chief investment officer for state-owned China Life Insurance and has taken over the reins of the state-controlled Citic private equity fund.

The Financial Times was unable to reach some of the individuals named in this article or their companies, and those who were contacted refused to comment.

Because it can prompt public dissatisfaction and accusations of nepotism, information about the private lives and business dealings of leaders and their offspring often falls within the scope of vague and wide-ranging state secrecy laws, regularly used to silence critics of the regime. Even the existence of leaders’ relatives is usually a well-guarded secret. Internet searches on princelings and their activities are usually blocked in China.

Most live in luxurious gated communities around Beijing and maintain holiday homes around the country and the world. Spouses are almost never seen in public. Younger, less discreet, princelings can be identified in Beijing by their luxury sports cars with military or paramilitary licence plates, which allow them to ignore traffic regulations and avoid being stopped by the police.

But the princelings themselves face a dilemma. If their business activities are too successful or high profile they may damage the political fortunes of their powerful parents, even without specific allegations of inappropriate dealings or special privileges.

Some analysts and industry insiders foresee a situation where the scions of powerful political families use the private equity industry to carve up parts of the economy at the expense not only of foreign investors but also of the older generations of princelings with direct bloodlines to China’s revolutionary Communist party founders.

But the constant jockeying for position within the party behind closed doors in Beijing is set to intensify as the next big leadership transition approaches in 2012. Some analysts say the private equity activities of the more aggressive younger princelings could be used by political enemies as a weapon against their parents.

In the case of Winston Wen, “You have to wonder if this will leave Wen [Jiabao] open to some sort of blackmail if his son has such a high-profile position in the financial sector, where all sorts of favours might be offered”, says Mr Shih. “What if someone gets some dirt on Winston Wen?”


‘Red-blooded ‘veterans versus ruthless arrivistes

The term “princeling” was coined to refer specifically to the children of senior leaders of China’s Communist revolution – the veterans who joined Mao Zedong on the fabled Long March of the mid-1930s or were members of the inner circle at the time of the 1949 Communist victory.

Today it is used more broadly to include the offspring of later generations of technocratic leaders – but a distinction remains between them and the truly “Red-blooded” revolutionary families.

Beijing political insiders say that distinction is made sharper today by the aggressive business dealings of the newer generation of princelings and their moves into the hot new field of private equity.

None of the most prominent players in the burgeoning domestic private equity sector is from the revolutionary dynasties that include the offspring of such Communist icons as Deng Xiaoping, the late paramount leader, and the children of the “eight immortal” party elders who supported his rule through the 1980s and 1990s.

“The old revolutionary royalty, like the family of Deng Xiaoping, are still untouchable and they regard this country as belonging to them in a very real sense,” says one such insider. “They see the newer generation of princelings as more ruthless, and some even go as far as saying that when the eunuchs become powerful it means the end of the dynasty is near.”

Some analysts see the private equity activities of princelings as a potential political problem as the government prepares for a leadership transition in 2012, especially since there is a recent precedent of senior leaders cracking down on the business activities of their predecessors’ children.

When he was consolidating his power in the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin, former president, shut down companies and arrested a number of business executives with close ties to Deng’s children.

After Hu Jintao, the current president, came to power in 2003 he launched a similar high-level crackdown that brought down the party secretary in Mr Jiang’s power base of Shanghai and netted prominent real estate developers and businessmen with close ties to his son.

In the jockeying for power and influence that is sure to dominate the Beijing political scene for the next two years and beyond, the new generation of princelings may become pawns in a high-stakes game, just as their predecessors did before them.

Nice post. I am very skeptical that the original structure of the PRC can survive the influx of capital it has experienced. This article is troubling as it appears oligarchy is imminent.
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Thursday, March 04, 2010

New Mobilization Law a Political Maneuver?

Well, I have been really busy with the local debt stuff that I hardly paid any attention to the on-going NPC session. Fortunately, I saw a twit yesterday on something I think will be very important. Apparently, the NPC will try to pass a law which divides the power to mobilize the army between three actors. First, a full or even a partial mobilization must be approved by the NPC Standing Committee. Second, both the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC) will implement this order from the NPC. To be sure, people say that well, that is just procedural because the army always just obey the party through the CMC.

This has been the case up to this point indeed. But imagine if Li Yuanchao was the head of the NPC and Li Keqiang was the premier, they now have strong legal grounds to veto a mobilization order by Xi Jinping, who at some point may become chairman of the CMC. May this be an intentional move by Hu Jintao to dilute the power of the CMC? I think so, and we can find numerous examples of this kind of power dilution through institutional changes. I think it is a brilliant move on the part of Hu. One implication, however, is that the principle of "party controlling the military" is weakened by this law because now the NPC has the constitutional authority to approve mobilization. This may have enormous long-term implications.

The key provision is "国务院、中央军事委员会领导全国的国防动员工作,制定国防动员工作的方针、政策和法规,向全国人民代表大会常务委员会提出实施国防动员的建议,根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定和国家主席发布的动员令,组织国防动员的实施。"

But then there is also an escape clause which allows the CMC to act unilaterally in an extreme emergency...

Here is the draft law:

中国人大网 www.npc.gov.cn日期: 2009-04-24浏览字号:大 中 小打印本页 关闭窗口




第一章 总  则

  第一条 为了加强国防建设,完善国防动员制度,保障国防动员工作的顺利进行,维护国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全,制定本法。

  第二条 国防动员的准备、实施以及相关活动,适用本法。

  第三条 国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受威胁时,全国人民代表大会常务委员会依照宪法和有关法律的规定,决定全国总动员或者局部动员。国家主席根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定,发布动员令。

  第四条 国防动员坚持平战结合、军民结合、寓军于民的方针,遵循统一领导、全民参与、长期准备、重点建设、统筹兼顾、有序高效的原则。

  第五条 公民和组织在和平时期应当依法完成国防动员准备工作;国家决定实施国防动员后,公民和组织应当完成规定的国防动员任务。

  第六条 国家保障国防动员所需经费。国防动员经费按照事权划分的原则,分别列入中央和地方财政预算。

  第七条 国家对在国防动员工作中做出突出贡献的公民和组织,给予表彰和奖励。

第二章 组织领导机构及其职权

  第八条 国务院、中央军事委员会领导全国的国防动员工作,制定国防动员工作的方针、政策和法规,向全国人民代表大会常务委员会提出实施国防动员的建议,根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定和国家主席发布的动员令,组织国防动员的实施。


  第九条 县级以上地方人民政府应当贯彻和执行国防动员工作的方针、政策和法律、法规,并依照法律规定的权限管理本行政区域的国防动员工作;国家决定实施国防动员后,应当根据上级下达的国防动员任务,组织本行政区域国防动员的实施。

  第十条 国家国防动员委员会在国务院、中央军事委员会的领导下负责组织、指导、协调全国的国防动员工作;军区和县级以上地方人民政府国防动员委员会负责组织、指导、协调本区域的国防动员工作。



  第十一条 县级以上人民政府有关部门和军队有关部门在各自的职责范围内,负责有关的国防动员工作。

  第十二条 国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受的威胁消除后,应当按照决定实施国防动员的权限和程序解除国防动员。

第三章 国防动员计划、预案与潜力统计调查

  第十三条 国家实行国防动员计划、国防动员实施预案和国防动员潜力统计调查制度。

  第十四条 国防动员计划和国防动员实施预案,根据国防动员的方针和原则、国防动员潜力状况和军事需求编制。军事需求由军队有关部门按照规定的权限和程序提出。

  第十五条 各级国防动员计划和国防动员实施预案的编制和审批,按照国家有关规定执行。

  第十六条 县级以上人民政府应当将国防动员的相关内容纳入国民经济和社会发展计划。军队有关部门应当将国防动员实施预案纳入战备计划。


  第十七条 县级以上人民政府统计机构和有关部门应当根据国防动员的需要,准确及时地向本级国防动员委员会的办事机构提供有关统计资料。提供的统计资料不能满足需要时,国防动员委员会办事机构可以依据《中华人民共和国统计法》和国家有关规定组织开展国防动员潜力专项统计调查。

第四章 与国防密切相关的建设


  第十八条 根据国防动员的需要,与国防密切相关的建设项目和重要产品应当贯彻国防要求,具备国防功能。

  第十九条 与国防密切相关的建设项目和重要产品目录,由国务院发展改革部门会同国务院其他有关部门以及军队有关部门拟定,报国务院、中央军事委员会批准。


  第二十条 列入目录的建设项目和重要产品,应当依照有关法律、行政法规和贯彻国防要求的技术标准进行设计、施工、监理和验收,保证建设项目和重要产品的质量。

  第二十一条 企业事业单位投资或者参与投资列入目录的建设项目建设和重要产品制造的,依照有关法律、行政法规和国家有关规定,享受补贴或者其他政策优惠。

  第二十二条 县级以上人民政府应当对列入目录的建设项目和重要产品贯彻国防要求工作给予指导和政策扶持,县级以上人民政府有关部门应当按照职责做好有关的管理工作。

第五章 预备役人员的储备与征召

  第二十三条 国家根据国防动员的需要,储备所需的预备役人员。


  第二十四条 预备役人员按照专业对口、便于动员的原则,采取预编到现役部队、编入预备役部队、编入民兵组织或者其他形式进行储备。

  第二十五条 国家根据国防动员需要,建立预备役专业技术兵员储备区。

  第二十六条 县级以上地方人民政府兵役机关负责组织实施本行政区域预备役人员的储备工作。县级以上地方人民政府有关部门、预备役人员所在乡(镇)人民政府、街道办事处或者企业事业单位,应当协助兵役机关做好预备役人员储备的有关工作。

  第二十七条 预编到现役部队和编入预备役部队的预备役人员、预定征召的其他预备役人员,离开常住户口所在地1个月以上的,应当向其预备役登记的兵役机关报告去向、联系方式;联系方式发生变化的,应当及时报告变更情况。

  第二十八条 国家决定实施国防动员后,县级人民政府兵役机关应当根据上级的命令,迅速向被征召的预备役人员下达征召通知。


  第二十九条 被征召的预备役人员所在单位应当协助兵役机关做好预备役人员的征召工作。


  第三十条 国家决定实施国防动员后,预定征召的预备役人员,未经其常住户口所在地的县级人民政府兵役机关批准,不得离开常住户口所在地;已经离开常住户口所在地的,接到兵役机关要求其返回的通知,应当立即返回。

第六章 战略物资储备与调用

  第三十一条 国家实行适应国防动员需要的战略物资储备和调用制度。


  第三十二条 承担战略物资储备任务的单位,应当按照国家有关规定和标准对储备物资进行保管和维护,定期调整更换,保证储备物资的使用效能和安全。


  第三十三条 战略物资按照国家有关规定调用。国家决定实施国防动员后,战略物资的调用由国务院和中央军事委员会批准。

第三十四条 国防动员所需的其他物资的储备和调用,依照有关法律、行政法规的规定执行。

第七章 军品科研、生产和维修保障

  第三十五条 国家建立军品科研、生产和维修保障动员体系,根据战时军队订货和装备保障的需要,储备军品科研、生产和维修保障能力。


  第三十六条 军品科研、生产和维修保障能力储备的种类、布局和规模,由国务院有关主管部门会同军队有关部门提出方案,报国务院、中央军事委员会批准后组织实施。

  第三十七条 承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位,应当根据所担负的国防动员任务,储备军品转产、扩大生产所需的设备、材料、技术,建立军品转产、扩大生产所需的专业技术队伍,制定和完善军品的转产、扩大生产预案和措施。

  第三十八条 各级人民政府应当支持和帮助承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位开发和应用先进的军民两用技术,推广军民通用的技术标准,提高军品转产、扩大生产的综合保障能力。

  第三十九条 国家决定实施国防动员后,承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位,应当按照国家军事订货合同和转产、扩大生产的要求,组织军品科研、生产,保证军品质量,按时交付订货,协助军队完成维修保障任务。为军品转产、扩大生产提供能源、材料、设备和配套产品的单位,应当优先满足军品转产、扩大生产的需要。


第八章 战争灾害的预防与救助

  第四十条 国家实行战争灾害的预防与救助制度,保护人民生命和财产安全,保障国防动员潜力和持续动员能力。

  第四十一条 国家建立军事、经济目标和首脑机关分级防护制度。分级防护标准由国务院、中央军事委员会规定。


  第四十二条 承担军事、经济目标和首脑机关防护任务的单位,应当制定防护计划和抢险抢修预案,组织防护演练,落实防护措施,提高综合防护效能。

  第四十三条 国家决定实施国防动员后,人员、物资的疏散和隐蔽,在本行政区域进行的,由本级人民政府决定并组织实施;跨行政区域进行的,由相关行政区域共同的上一级人民政府决定并组织实施。


  第四十四条 战争灾害发生时,当地人民政府应当迅速启动应急救助机制,组织力量抢救伤员、保护财产,尽快消除战争灾害后果,恢复正常生产生活秩序。


第九章 国防勤务

  第四十五条 国家决定实施国防动员后,县级以上人民政府根据国防动员实施的需要,可以动员符合本法规定条件的公民和组织担负国防勤务。


  第四十六条 18周岁至60周岁的男性公民和18周岁至55周岁的女性公民,应当担负国防勤务;但有下列情形之一的,免于担负国防勤务:








  第四十七条 被确定担负国防勤务的人员,应当服从指挥,遵守纪律,保守秘密。担负国防勤务的人员所在单位应当给予支持和协助。

  第四十八条 交通运输、邮政、电信、医药卫生、食品和粮食供应、工程建筑、能源化工、大型水利设施、民用核设施、新闻媒体、国防科研生产和市政设施保障单位,应当依法担负国防勤务。


  第四十九条 公民和组织担负国防勤务,由县级以上人民政府负责组织。担负预防与救助战争灾害、协助维护社会秩序勤务的公民和专业保障队伍,由当地人民政府指挥,并提供勤务和生活保障;跨行政区域执行勤务的,由相关行政区域的县级以上地方人民政府组织落实相关保障;担负军队作战支援保障勤务的公民和专业保障队伍,由所在部队指挥,并提供勤务和生活保障。

  第五十条 担负国防勤务的人员在执行勤务期间,继续享有原工作单位的工资、津贴和其他福利待遇;没有工作单位的,由当地县级人民政府参照民兵执行战备勤务的补贴标准给予补贴;因执行国防勤务伤亡的,由当地县级人民政府依照《军人抚恤优待条例》的有关规定给予抚恤优待。

第十章 民用资源征用与补偿

  第五十一条 国家决定实施国防动员后,储备物资无法及时满足动员需要的,县级以上人民政府可以依法对民用资源进行征用。


  第五十二条 任何公民和组织都有接受依法征用民用资源的义务。


  第五十三条 下列民用资源免予征用:






  第五十五条 被征用的民用资源使用完毕,县级以上地方人民政府应当及时组织返还;经过改造的,应当恢复原使用功能后返还;不能修复或者灭失的,以及因征用给公民或者组织造成直接经济损失的,按照国家有关规定给予补偿。

  第五十六条 中国人民解放军现役部队和预备役部队、中国人民武装警察部队、民兵组织进行军事演习、训练,需要征用民用资源或者采取临时性管制措施的,按照国务院、中央军事委员会的有关规定执行。

第十一章 宣传教育

  第五十七条 各级人民政府应当组织开展国防动员的宣传教育,增强公民的国防观念和依法履行国防义务的意识。有关军事机关应当协助做好国防动员的宣传教育工作。

  第五十八条 国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位和基层群众性自治组织,应当组织所属人员学习和掌握必要的国防知识与技能。

  第五十九条 各级人民政府应当运用各类宣传媒体和宣传手段,对公民进行爱国主义、革命英雄主义宣传教育,激发公民的爱国热情,鼓励公民踊跃参战支前,采取多种形式开展拥军优属和慰问活动,按照国家有关规定做好抚恤优待工作。


第十二章 特别措施

  第六十条 国家决定实施国防动员后,根据需要,可以依法在实施国防动员的区域采取下列特别措施:






  第六十一条 在全国或者部分省、自治区、直辖市实行特别措施,由国务院、中央军事委员会决定并组织实施;在省、自治区、直辖市范围内的部分地区实行特别措施,由国务院、中央军事委员会决定,由特别措施实施区域所在省、自治区、直辖市人民政府和同级军事机关组织实施。

  第六十二条 组织实施特别措施的机关应当在规定的权限、区域和时限内实施特别措施。特别措施实施区域内的公民和组织,应当服从组织实施特别措施的机关的管理。

  第六十三条 采取特别措施不再必要时,应当及时终止。

第十三章 法律责任

  第六十四条 公民有下列行为之一的,由县级人民政府有关主管部门责令改正;拒不改正的,处2000元以上2万元以下罚款:







  第六十五条 企业事业单位有下列行为之一的,由有关人民政府主管部门责令改正;拒不改正的,处5万元以上20万元以下罚款:









  第六十六条 有下列行为之一的,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,依法给予处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任:







第十四章 附则

  第六十七条 本法自 年 月 日起施行。




























great stuff victor. do you have an estimate of china's total short term external debt (including local) compared to reserves, or any pointers on how one would begin to gather data to construct such a rato? will read through your posts and see what i can find also. thanks for any help.
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