Elite Chinese Politics and Political Economy

2011-05-26T07:43:00.001-05:00

Rightful Resistance Turned Wrongful?

Dear All, over night, the biggest news in China was a series of explosions in the town of Fuzhou in Jiangxi Province. I attach some news summaries of the events below. What's really striking is that the perpetrator seems to be a farmer who had petitioned through both the courts and the petition system for over ten years. In fact, he had his own weibo account, which recounts his ordeals. In the end, he apparently took matters into his own hand. On the Chinese weibo-sphere, users almost universally lauded his actions as justified! (His weibo account is: http://weibo.com/1773401361) I venture to guess that the leaders in Beijing may be more disturbed by his martyr status than by the bombing itself. For us political scientists, the may be a watershed event in the rightful resistance model developed by Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang.

China Explosions Kill at Least Two

Wall Street Journal

By JAMES T. AREDDY

SHANGHAI—Three explosions rocked government offices in a small city in the relatively poor Chinese province of Jiangxi, killing at least two people and injuring others, state media said.

A blast in a parking lot near the prosecutor's office in Fuzhou city's Linchuan district Thursday morning was followed minutes later by a second inside the nearby headquarters building of the district government, where two people were killed and six injured, China's state-run Xinhua news agency said. Another blast rocked an office in the district related to food and drug administration, a witness and Xinhua said.

Smoke rising from explosions that shook government offices in Fuzhou city Thursday
0526cblast02
0526cblast02

The explosions took place between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Citing a witness, Xinhua reported that windows were blown out of the eight-floor building housing the prosecutor's office. Xinhua said it didn't yet have casualty figures for the explosion there or at the third building struck.

The buildings are located within a short drive of each other.

A woman answering telephones in the Fuzhou city government offices said no one was available to comment, and calls to the local police department went unanswered.

"The cause of the blasts is still being probed, but the source with the provincial government said a farmer was suspected to have triggered the explosions to (avenge) his resentment," Xinhua said.

A photo showed grey smoke rising at least 100 meters over the site of one of the blasts.

Xinhua and other reports said it was likely at least one of the blasts was in a car. A Volkswagen Santana was destroyed and several other cars were damaged, Xinhua said.

Such incidents aren't unusual in China's city centers. In recent years, for instance, people have died in suspicious bus fires in Kunming, Chengdu, Wuxi and Shanghai that were blamed in some cases on gasoline brought on board.

Earlier this month, an explosion possibly ignited by a crude gasoline bomb injured 49 people at a rural bank office in northwestern China's Gansu province, government media reported. According to Xinhua, the county government later reported police had apprehended a suspect, a former bank employee recently fired for embezzlement.

Series of Blasts Leaves at Least 2 Dead in Southern Chinese City
By EDWARD WONG
Published: May 26, 2011
New York Times

BEIJING — At least two people were killed and six injured by three explosions within an hour on Thursday at different government office buildings in a city in southern China, according to state media and a provincial government Web site.

The blasts occurred in the city of Fuzhou in Jiangxi Province between 9 and 9:45 a.m., according to the government posting, which appeared on the province’s propaganda bureau Web site. The first one was at the Fuzhou Procurator’s Office, the second at the Linzhuan District government building and the third in a car park at the Linzhuan Food and Drug Administration office.

A photograph posted on a Chinese social networking Web site and on the Web site of Phoenix Television, based in Hong Kong, showed a large cloud of smoke rising above a cluster of buildings as scores of people watched from a wide avenue. Other photos and a short video on the Phoenix Television Web site showed government buildings with windows blown out, shattered glass on sidewalks and damaged cars.

The Web site of Xinhua, the state news agency, posted an item saying the explosives were planted by a farmer who was angry with the handling of a court case, which could explain why the first explosion took place at the procurator’s office. That office supervises legal matters in Fuzhou and is responsible for the prosecution and investigation of legal cases. The Xinhua posting had been deleted by 1 p.m.

The lack of rule of law in the country is an abiding source of frustration for ordinary Chinese, many of whom believe that true justice is elusive. Legal experts say China’s attempts at legal reform have stalled in recent years, and in many cases have gone backwards. The central government’s disregard for legal proceedings has been evident during a broad crackdown this year on progressive speech and thought, as security officers have detained and interrogated hundreds of intellectuals, artists, dissidents and rights advocates without citing any legal basis.

If the attacks in Fuzhou were carried out by a disgruntled farmer, as the Xinhua Web site had reported, then that raises again the question of whether China needs to establish greater rule of law in order to ensure stability.

A report under the local news section of the Xinhua Web site said the mayor of Fuzhou, Zhang Yong, gave a talk earlier this week on “maintaining social stability” to officials who were attending a class on social management. Fuzhou is a city of four million in a farming region.

Deadly explosions have taken place in recent years in several Chinese cities, even outside the restive western region of Xinjiang. In May 2008, an explosion during rush hour on a public bus in Shanghai killed at least three people and injured at least 12, according to official reports. In July 21, 2008, bomb attacks took place at around the same time on two buses in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, killing at least two people. The explosions in both cities, along with violence in Xinjiang, raised security concerns ahead of the Summer Olympics, which began in August 2008 in Beijing.

Five days after the Kunming attack, a shadowy group called the Turkestan Islamic Party, which claims to be a jihadist group working for the liberation of Xinjiang, where many ethnic Uighurs are frustrated by the policies of the ruling ethnic Han, put out a video taking credit for the explosions in Kunming and Shanghai. Chinese officials said their investigations showed the group was not responsible, but it was unclear who had carried out the attacks.

2011-05-25T01:17:00.002-05:00

How do we characterize China?

When people ask me about contemporary China, I find myself describing something that is a mix of socialism, state capitalism, and crony capitalism. Of course, China has the socialist legacy of state ownership of strategic firms and the entire financial sector (except for underground banks and trust products....etc.). Because these SOEs face competition within China and in the global market, some of us call this phenomenon state capitalism. Of course, China endowed itself with capitalist competition by deliberately opening its market in many sectors to global competition, which set it apart from autarkies like North Korea. Increasingly, however, we see interest groups with strong state connections trying to influence state policies in order to obtain private gains. Crony-influenced state policies tax the households, as in the case of forced evictions, create oligopolies, as in the case of oil companies in China, and stall further reform in various sectors.

In the case of England, it might have been some form of state capitalism, as was the US. However, in both cases, institutions eventually developed to allow different interest groups to influence policies in a more transparent way. Powerful interest groups still drive policies in both of these countries, but the media and the public provide some (I emphasize "some" here) checks against crony capitalist tendencies. Eventually, some institutions (not necessarily a constitution) develop to protect the property rights of ordinary citizens.

In China, leaders with regime-wide influence used to check against cronyist tendencies. Today, I see less clear stance against powerful interest groups, and more inaction dressed up as reform. I would agree with the assessment that institutional development is lagging, although I hesitate to call this "fascist," as some have done

2011-01-24T15:25:00.002-06:00

Land Grab in Yunnan and Political Struggle?

Once again, Caixin hit the nail on its head within its expose of a major real estate scandal in a Yunnan county. Tengchong County, which is close to the Burmese border, is supposedly a beautiful place. In late 2007, Century Golden Resource Group rolled into this sleepy town and grabbed over 5000 mou of virgin forest land to build a giant golf luxury villa complex. After acquiring the land for 51 yuan a sq meter, Century Golden is now selling the villas at 7000-12000 yuan a sq meter. Now, there are several anomalies at work here. First, county authorities or even provincial authorities can't approve this large a tract of land. It needs the approval of Ministry of Land in Beijing. Also, some of this land was protected virgin forest, and developing of such land usually takes a lengthy approval process involving several central ministries. All of this was bypassed. Now, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) has made this a "high priority case," but Caixin found that villas are still being sold and that there are no plans to demolish the villas at all. In fact, it looks as though Century Golden Resource will get away with a light fine. What kind of political power is behind this mysterious project?

Now comes the speculative part:
1. Century Golden Resource Group is headed by Fujianese Huang Rulun, who is known to be the real estate king of Fuzhou. Of course he has branched out all over China since then, most recently in Chongqing. Of course, we know that Xi Jinping lived and worked in Fuzhou for many years as party secretary of Fuzhou and later as governor of Fujian. It is all but certain that Xi and Huang had a close working relationship.

2. The article implies that "high level provincial approval" was given for this project. The party secretary of Yunnnan at the time and today is Bai Enpei, who is from Shaanxi. Curiously, both Bai and Xi Jinping were working in the Yan'an area during the late Cultural Revolution period. Bai was first at a farm then in a tractor factory, while Xi was the head of a production brigade. Well, guess what collective farms need to farm-- tractors. Although the tie is more tenuous, there is a high probability that Bai and Xi knew each other. After all, Bai's career went nowhere until 1985, when he was suddenly catapulted into the Yan'an leadership. A year before that, Xi Zhongxun was elevated to the Politburo. "Dad, my good friend Bai needs a job..."

3. The timing of the approval of the project was also curious. Century Golden signed an MOU with the county government on October 11th, 2007, four days before the 17th Party Congress formally elevated Xi Jinping into the PSC. By early November, the county had given formal approval for the project to go ahead (again in violation of dozens of central regulations). Talking about acting fast!

4. Now, the Ministry of Land, by publicly condemning this project, is clearly under instruction to give Century Golden and its political backers an embarrassing slap on the wrist. To be sure, the project will go ahead because the MLR clearly cannot impose punitive measures on an entity with this much political backing, but everyone now knows that certain leading cadre is not so clean after all.

谁动了土地
本文来源于《新世纪》周刊 2011年第4期出版日期2011年01月24日财新传媒杂志订阅
地方与地产商合流，圈地运动勃兴；中央是纵有意愿约束也鞭长莫及；底层是难以抗拒。出路何在？

　　2008年3月，世纪金源以每平方米不到52元的价格在美丽的云南古镇腾冲拿下了5571亩林地，两年后将这里变成了一个高尔夫度假村。

　　这是国土资源部执法监察局2010年公布的违规批地清单中的一项，也是国土部督办大案之一。2011年1月，这张名单上又增加了一个新面孔——中国海外集团违反土地利用总体

规划，在重庆大观至黎香湖以租代征违法占地747亩。

　　按照国土资源部的相关规定，省国土厅有权批准的是590亩以下的建设用地。然而，类似规模宏大的“圈地运动”在中国屡禁不止。

　　随着中国城市化进程的推进，土地的资源属性日益凸显，价值日益提升。每一块土地资源的背后，都是一个多方利益的复杂博弈，至少包括中央政府、地方政府、开发商和农

民四个层面。但在其中，地方政府谋求经济体量迅速膨胀的冲动与房地产勃兴的浪潮迅速结合，构成“圈地”最强大的推动力。

　　大片的土地，通过地方政府少批多征、先征后批、分拆批地、拍卖作弊等方式，化整为零，再转手与作为地方政府合作伙伴的房地产开发商。手法隐蔽而谨慎，既有以既成事

实倒逼合法认证，亦有巧设心思规避法律红线。

　　为谋地方经济发展而招商引资，往往是地方政府做土地文章的源动力。尤其在营商环境较差的地区，政府用以吸引外来投资的“好牌”并不多，无外土地与附着其上的优惠政策

。在以“土地换发展”的思路下，地方政府热衷于推动大规模的工业园区、公用事业园区以及庞大的城市更新计划，继之以庞大的用地规划。

　　在四川成都温江区永宁镇，镇政府向取得集体土地统一经营的村庄“租用”土地，并开发房地产或建设工厂，镇政府通过支付一定的土地补偿费和劳动力安置费，消弭了村民的

承包经营权。当地镇政府将这种做法叫“下清”。这一切均不按征地程序，而土地已从村民手中腾挪至政府控制之下。同样在温江，以工业园区“圈地”，以及以公共事业园区名义兴

建的地产项目，仅举数例，已占整个温江面积的20%以上。

　　具有实力的投资者则有挟政府以争土地的便利。海尔集团在落户重庆时即是如此。2005年7月，海尔和当地政府签订《投资合作协议书》，当地政府表示将约1440亩的宗地，

协议出让与海尔，用于建设以公司命名的工业园区，同时约定将土地价款全额返还。之后，地方政府如约出让并返回土地出让金 5431万元，但海尔却中途提出将其中一块地（约

284亩）用于做房地产，亦得到地方政府部门的默许支持。

　　更多的故事类似于世纪金源在腾冲的经历，商业地产开发以新的地方经济支柱的名义出现，并获得地方政府护航。这样的项目通常仍以“招商引资”引进，然后再冠以土地整理

的名号，跟这些公司签订土地整理和整体开发合同，即通常所说的土地一、二级开发联动。

　　在这些项目中，政府为供地，而不惜在拿不出征地批文之下，以租代征、少报多征，或者先征后报、分拆报批；进而不经“招拍挂”程序或者在“招拍挂”中做手脚，将大片土地

分割出让，使开发商以“蚂蚁吃大象”的方式，一举揽得数千亩，甚至上万亩的土地，坐享资源价值，或以开发获利。

　　而在地方政府看来，这种种“圈地”只是为地方发展而身不由己的“突破”规范，介入其中者甚至是拉动当地经济建设和财政增长的功臣。即使在因违规批地而被罚之后，多数项

目也会在地方多个多级政府部门的串联包庇下，安然过关。腾冲世纪金源项目即是一例——从2010年8月就被责令停售的项目至今仍在对外销售，相关部门均视若无睹。而失地农民

们一个家庭拿到10万元补偿的都不多见，之前虽曾有过“安排工作”的口头允诺，最终却不见下文。

　　成都温江的农民不甘沉默，开车围着地块绕圈，估算周长，据此测量温江区没有征地批文而被“圈”的地块面积，并向官方举报，也无下文。

　　那些急于凭大项目开发拉动当地GDP的地方主管官员们，则或以政绩迅速升迁，或以利益输送曝光而迅速坠落。这样的故事几乎每天都上演着。不在这里，便在那里。

　　这正是上述提及的四方博弈的鲜明写照，地方政府与开发商合流，居于主导；中央政府纵有心约束也鞭长莫及，各种约束和监管被地方逐渐消化分解，效用递减；最底层的农

民，博弈能力缺乏系统有效的法律支持而无法形诸于实。这最终构成了中国征地与用地博弈结构中两头小中间大的失衡现实。其代价不仅是土地资源的批量流失，还包括随之而来

的基层激烈对抗。

　　在当下，寄望于地方政府改变“以土地换发展”的路径并不可能。对于中国而言，改变两头小中间大的畸形结构方是解决之道。中央的监查风暴或将陆续袭来，而赋权农民亦须

提上日程。

世纪金源腾冲违规占地
本文来源于《新世纪》周刊 2011年第4期出版日期2011年01月24日财新传媒杂志订阅
国土部挂牌督办大案，有什么下文？
《新世纪》周刊记者付涛李慎
单页阅读

　　到过云南腾冲的人，很少不会喜欢上这块翡翠般碧绿的土地。森林覆盖率70.7%，80多处地表温泉资源，独特的火山景观，加上四季如春的气候，这些禀赋都使得距离云南省

会昆明600多公里的腾冲，被看好成为云南丽江的后继者。

　　如果不是近年来推土机隆隆之声日增，打破了这座高黎贡山西麓边陲古城的寂静，朴实安足的腾冲人仍沉湎于大自然所赐的静谧与雄奇之美中。

　　“最近三年是腾冲变化最快时期。腾冲县批地用地最多的一年（2008年），可能已接近东部某些省全省的批地用地总量。”一位腾冲当地官员说。

　　在中国几乎所有大中城市上演的土地资源争夺与房地产勃兴的故事，如今也在这座偏远的古镇重现。只是，因其美丽，争抢者尤为强大；因其边远，方式更为大胆。

　　2010年8月19日上午，在国土资源部召开的房地产用地专项整治工作新闻通气会上，一纸通报将近年来高歌猛进的腾冲推上到全国媒体面前。“云南省腾冲县政府违规供地和云

南世纪金源投资置业公司违规建别墅案”，被列为六宗没有处理到位的违规违法案件之一，由国土部进行挂牌督办。

　　然而，四个月过去了。上述挂牌督办案件的办理结果至今尚未正式公布，过去几个月在腾冲县内稍显低调的推土机们，如今又重新热闹起来。

违规别墅买卖依旧

“‘大牛场’的别墅还在卖？那是他们晕头了吧。”

　　“我们一期开发了将近600套别墅，大部分都已经出售，现在只剩下20多套了。”2010年12月13日下午，在腾冲国际高尔夫度假村，一位售楼人员指着售楼中心的沙盘告诉本刊

记者。

　　腾冲国际高尔夫度假村位于腾越镇侍郎坝村附近的“大牛场”，透过售楼中心窗子看去，是连片的高尔夫绿茵和成群的独栋别墅。

　　这个度假村正是国土部挂牌督办的“违规建别墅”项目。可是，当问起售楼人员这一项目被挂牌督办是否还能买卖时，售楼人员以肯定的口气回答，“没有问题，目前别墅每平

方米单价在7000元至1.2万元之间，先交5万元定金，一周内签合同，土地证与产权证半年至一年内办下来。”

　　据售楼人员介绍，项目第二期可能在两年后开盘，还有200多套别墅。

　　根据腾冲国际高尔夫度假村官方网站资料，该项目规划占地面积高达6272亩，总建筑面积达45万平方米，包括体育休闲公园、商务会所及低密度住宅，有54洞国际高尔夫球场

和上千栋别墅，别墅每栋平均占地2亩左右。

　　“‘大牛场’的别墅还在卖？那是他们晕头了吧。”12月17日下午，腾冲县国土局副局长郭强在办公室面对本刊记者的提问回应称，“他们肯定是晕头了，早就不让卖了。”

　　然而，这位副局长说罢此话便无下文，继续其他工作，既未进一步解释，亦看不出要采取任何解决措施。

　　按照《国土资源领域违规违法案件公开通报和挂牌督办办法（试行）》，世纪金源涉及的土地违规建别墅案件，云南省国土资源管理部门应及时向云南省政府分管领导报告，

按有关规定配合或会同纪检监察机关进行调查处理，一般在两个月之内处理完毕。若是重大或复杂案件，由省级人民政府国土资源行政主管部门向国土资源部提出书面申请，经部

专题会议或部长办公会议批准后，可以适当延长办理时限。

　　自2010年8月19日宣布挂牌督办至12月中旬，已近四个月。当本刊记者一再追问该项目挂牌督办的处理结果时，郭强不置可否，回应称：“这事你去问国土部。”

　　据腾冲县国土局办公室有关人士介绍，2010 年8月18日，腾冲县政府给世纪金源公司发了函，要求停止高尔夫别墅项目一切销售活动。第二天，世纪金源公司回复称，已撤销

一切销售活动和广告宣传。

“排头兵”世纪金源

世纪金源两个项目都是占地数千亩的大盘，合在一起或逾万亩

　　腾冲国际高尔夫度假村只是房地产开发商世纪金源在腾冲的两个项目之一，另一个是位于腾越镇西山坝规划中的腾冲新城内的世纪城项目。

　　世纪城项目位于腾冲老县城往北约四五分钟车程的西山坝，位置在规划中的腾冲新城的东部。2010年年末，本刊记者在黄土飞扬的项目工地看到施工人员忙碌的身影，工地上

有即将完工的成片住宅楼房和别墅，也有等待建设的大片黄土裸露的工地，推土机和运土车在其上奔忙着。世纪城项目以西的大块土地，亦在新城规划的范围内，建设尚未开始，

还长着茂盛苍翠的丛林。

　　世纪金源两个项目都是占地数千亩的大盘，合在一起或逾万亩，算得上目前腾冲开发建设规模最大的房地产商。

　　2007年，世纪金源与众多房地产开发商一起，扎堆腾冲。在此以前，来腾冲拿地的外省房企凤毛麟角。

　　“由于交通原因，此前来腾冲旅游的人很少，大多数是周边城市的居民。”腾冲县旅游局的一位官员在接受本刊记者采访时称。

　　与云南的大多数城市一样，交通是制约腾冲发展的巨大瓶颈。腾冲一直未通火车，前往省会昆明，只能乘坐长达约10个小时的长途汽车，直到2009年初才开通了航班。

　　云南省内企业中，来自昆明的官房集团先拔头筹，在腾冲县城中心建造了当地第一家五星级酒店。

　　“2005年之前，官房来腾冲拿地，这里的地价非常便宜，人们还没有意识到这里的土地会一下子变得那么值钱。”一位腾冲当地的生意人说，“短短的几年，土地价格翻了几十

倍甚至百倍，这让多年来财力不足的地方政府也尝到了甜头。”

　　世纪金源也非十足的“外来汉”，2005年前后在昆明开发了世纪城项目，其大盘开发模式在当地房地产业领一时风气之先。2007年世纪金源进入腾冲，以拿地万亩的气魄取代官

房，成为当地房企中的“排头兵”。

　　世纪金源是国内知名地产开发商，在全国开发各类商品房8000万平方米，在北京、重庆、昆明、贵阳、长沙和合肥等地，均拥有以“世纪城”命名的住宅开发项目和以“金源时

代购物中心”为名的商业地产项目，并在全国拥有16家五星级酒店。

　　奥宸地产、大港旺宝、华隆集团等地产商，也在腾冲盘桓多年，但无论拿地速度还是开发进展，都远远落在世纪金源之后。对于到腾冲淘金的房地产开发商来说，世纪金源成

为了他们的一个标杆，其开发节奏和定价策略，都是其他开发商判断政策风向的重要依据。

“大牛场”前世今生

对于“大牛场”如何由集体用地转变为国有用地，腾冲农业局一位负责人语焉不详

　　根据国土部2010年8月19日的通报材料，位于腾冲县腾越镇侍郎坝村的“大牛场”，为腾冲县农业局2003年取得的国有土地。

　　2007年10月11日，云南世纪金源投资置业集团有限公司与腾冲县政府签订投资协议，在大牛场建设腾冲国际旅游体育健身休闲公园项目。

　　2007年10月17日，腾冲县旅游局向县政府申请将腾冲县农业局使用的大牛场土地变更给云南世纪金源投资置业集团有限公司作为旅游设施及开发用地。

　　2007年11月，腾冲县政府下发《腾冲县人民政府关于大牛场土地使用权变更的批复》，同意将大牛场5571.469亩土地变更给世纪金源投资置业集团有限公司使用。

　　本刊记者在当地采访时发现，情况与通报材料颇有出入。腾冲县岗峨村一位村干部告诉记者，“大牛场”是当地村民的习惯叫法，一直以来是当地13个自然村（7个行政村）的

集体用地，总共有3000多亩土地，并没有5571.469亩之巨，常年是一片长了些草的荒坡，因农民常在这里放牛而得名，也有农民在上面种些苦荞。

　　2003年，当地农业局（2005年腾冲县农业局与畜牧局分家，此后归畜牧局管理）向村里以每亩2元的年租价格租用该土地植草发展畜牧业，后转租给腾冲当地一位李姓私营业

主供其养牛，直到2007年10月被世纪金源征用。

　　“世纪金源征用时，补偿我们的价格为每亩1.2万元。”这位村干部称，“这些钱我们大部分按照人头分发给村民，还有一部分用于修路等村内公共设施的建设。”

　　对于“大牛场”如何由集体用地转变为国有用地，腾冲农业局一位负责人语焉不详，但他承认“一部分是农业局的土地，一部分是附近农村的集体用地，集体土地居多。集体用

地都做了补偿，农民还是比较高兴的，因为这个地放在那里，效益很低，就是荒草地。”

　　这位官员也承认，“大牛场”并没有5571.469亩那么大，“政府批了那么多，可能是把周边土地也算上了”。

　　侍郎坝村与岗峨村的几位村干部都证实，世纪金源在2007年10月征地后，还在2008年进行了两次扩征。

　　“扩征时，有分到村民的林地，也有村里集体的林地。”一位岗峨村村干部称，“补偿标准大约为每亩1.4万元，成材林地为每亩2万元。”

程序缺失乱象

尽管市场质疑之声不绝于耳，世纪金源对腾冲“大牛场”的开发进程却丝毫未受到影响

　　虽然征地事实上先后分三次进行，一直持续到2008年中，但世纪金源在2007年底便领到了土地证。

　　2007年11月26日，腾冲县国土局为世纪金源在腾冲县成立的子公司云南世纪金源体育度假有限责任公司办理了土地登记并发国有土地使用证，登记面积4798.209亩。证书内容

为：国用（2007）第109392号，地号533023101-DL-29-2，50年的土地使用权（2057年 11月25日），用地类型为综合用地，使用权类型为出让，使用权面积为3198806平方米（约

4798.209亩）。

　　更为令人费解的是，世纪金源竟在拿到土地证之后数月才缴纳土地款。国土部的通报材料显示，2008年3月，通过对土地及地上建筑物、附着物整体打包转让的方式，世纪金

源体育度假有限责任公司支付了16466万元价款（即大约每平米51.48元，每亩3.4317万元）。

　　“我们从来没有看到过关于‘大牛场’用地的招拍挂公告。”一位腾冲当地的开发商向本刊记者称，算下来这块土地的购买成本仅每亩3万多元，这样的价格在腾冲市场上早已绝

迹，目前腾冲新城规划区的土地价格大约是每亩14万至18万元，县城中心区域的地价最高已达每亩400万-500万元，而目前“大牛场”别墅售价，高于腾冲县城普通商品房售价的1倍

以上，后者每平方米约3500至4000元。

　　尽管市场质疑之声不绝于耳，世纪金源对腾冲“大牛场”的开发进程却丝毫未受到影响。2008年4月8日，腾冲世纪金源体育度假有限责任公司进驻“大牛场”并在此开发建设，开

始动工建设高尔夫球场，同时进行房地产开发。

　　2009年9月，世纪金源高尔夫项目一期建成并投入使用，别墅开盘销售。项目一期独栋540套、联排30栋（60套），占地约1000亩。10 月，世纪金源体育度假有限责任公司申

请将腾越镇侍郎坝村大牛场，更名为“腾冲县腾越镇观景大道1号”。10月22日，腾冲县民政局批准改名。

　　至此，“大牛场”在腾冲永远成为了一个历史名词。

隐藏的秘密

一口气批4798.209亩土地，这远超过县政府和地方国土部门的权限，完全不是我们能够想象

　　在腾冲，大多数官员对“大牛场”项目的情况三缄其口。一位官员私下告诉本刊记者，这个项目当时是省里面甚至更高层领导打过招呼，县领导也做不了主。“这么大的项目，

若是省里面不点头，我们也不敢做。”

　　上述官员透露，当时世纪金源来腾冲，政府做过承诺，企业负责投资开发，相关土地报批手续由政府帮助完成。

　　“一口气批4798.209亩土地，这远超过县政府和地方国土部门的权限，完全不是我们能够想象。”一位腾冲当地的开发商向本刊记者称，“我们知道，一个批次最多不可能超过

600亩，因为省国土厅的审批权限就那么大。”

　　这位开发商历数了“大牛场”开发过程中，按照当地正常的土地报批流程，让人费解的六点操作：

　　第一，大片的集体土地，转眼间变更为国有土地进行出让；第二，一个批次报批近5000亩土地，竟能顺利拿到土地证；第三，先拿到土地证，数月之后才缴纳土地款；第四，

边拿到土地证，边进行土地征用；第五，边开发建设，边进行扩征；第六，至今没有看到公开的招拍挂公告。

　　事实上，短短半年时间中，“大牛场”项目便从立项签约到开工建设，其审批过程中，还有诸多隐秘未与外人道。例如，“腾冲国际高尔夫度假村”规划面积和目前实际占有土地

面积，已远超出当初“大牛场”的占地面积，而且这一项目除占用荒山坡，还占用了大片林地，估计至少达千亩以上。

　　腾冲县林业局官员和当地村民都证实了这一说法。“有些还是很好的成材林，树径有碗口那么粗了。”一位岗峨村村民一边比划一边告诉本刊记者，“像这样的林地，我们感觉

拿到手的征地补偿太低。”

　　一位腾冲县建设局官员告诉本刊记者，“大牛场”项目所在地一直未纳入其规划范围，“这块地既没有总规，也没有详规，自然谈不上规划要求”。

　　与西山坝项目不一样，“大牛场”项目正因没有纳入城镇规划区的范围，其土地补偿标准较西山坝低得多。

　　“西山坝的土地可以享受‘六八政策’，我们‘大牛场’的土地就不能享受，”一位岗峨村干部告诉本刊记者，“我们拿到的补偿是一次性的。”

　　所谓“六八政策”，即除了一次性拿到一笔土地征用补偿，农民每年还能获得每亩600元（旱地）或800元（水田）的征地补贴。

　　以岗峨村为例，全村2000多人，目前被“腾冲国际高尔夫度假村”征用的田地已近2000亩，大多数农户手中的田地也所剩无几，只能村外寻找临时工的机会。

　　“目前拿到10万元以上补偿费的家庭并不多。”上述村干部称，“但岗峨村一直是个贫困村，很多农民拿到补偿费后，发现一辈子也没见过那么多钱，大多用来修自己的住房或

买摩托车。”

　　“现在手头是宽裕不少，但想想以后家里连田地都没有了，还是有些担心，毕竟物价涨得也很快。”一位村民表达了自己的担忧，“前段时间家里还有人在‘大牛场’帮世纪金源

做工，现在他们招工的要求挑剔了，只能去西山坝找机会。”

　　上述腾冲县官员告诉本刊记者，尽管没有对外公开，但政府内部已通报，腾冲县国土局和林业局的两位负责人，因“大牛场”项目将受到行政记过处分。前者因供地程序违规，

后者则因林地占用，森林受到破坏。

　　对于世纪金源违规建别墅的处理，有知情人士透露，不会让他们拆除，但要进行罚款。

从违规占地到造城运动二三线城市“圈地”冲动不减
来源：中国广播网
2011年01月24日09:10
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　　中广网北京1月24日消息（记者柴华）据中国之声《新闻纵横》报道，金灿灿的田垄边上，一位头戴遮阳帽、脚踏胶底绿布鞋的农妇正在为一片青菜地浇水。这是在农村里常常会看到的一幅典型画面，然而，到了明天，这块平静的土地上还会不会长出绿油油的青菜呢？

　　最新一期《新世纪周刊》推出封面文章《谁动了土地？》，深入追踪了“世纪金源云南腾冲违规占地案”，以及“恒大地产在四川大邑的造成运动”两个典型案例。《新世纪周刊》报道称，地方政府谋求经济体量迅速膨胀的冲动与房地产勃兴的浪潮迅速结合，构成了“圈地”最强大的推动力。

　　而这种冲动正在面临着来自中央的监查风暴与来自基层的强烈对抗。如果地方政府短期内不改变“以土地换发展”的方式，我们将如何遏制城市强大的“圈地”冲动呢？记者对《新世纪周刊》副主编王晓冰进行了采访。

　　记者：2008年3月，世纪金源以每平方米不到52元的价格在美丽的云南古镇腾冲拿下了5571亩林地，两年后将这里变成了一个高尔夫度假村。如今，土地资源争夺与房地产勃兴的故事已经蔓延到这座偏远的古镇。世纪金源是如何拿到这么大一块地的？作为2010年国土部挂牌督办的大案，如今这个案件又有何下文呢？

　　王晓冰：世纪金源应该是在2007年11月份的时候就已经拿到了，根据我们看到的文件，腾冲县政府已经把5000多亩的国有土地变更给世纪金源来使用，但是实际上从我们看到的所有相关的公开资料来看，2008年3月份的时候，它才交纳了相关的土地款。而且根据当地开发商介绍，他们从来没有看到过，关于这块用地，当地俗称为大牛场招牌挂的公告，而算下来土地的购买成本大概每亩就有三万多元，每平方米就相当于51.48元的样子，跟当地相关的价格来比是非常之便宜的。

　　而这些土地存在这么几个问题：第一是这么大片的集体土地几乎在一夜之间变成了世纪金源的，就是云南省一级的国土局都没有资格来报批，那五千亩的土地为什么一夜之间就变成世纪金源使用了，这里头是非常奇怪的。当然在这个过程中，刚才我前面讲到的，它先拿到土地证，过了几个月之后才交纳的土地款，而且它一边在拿土地过程中间，一边又进行了扩地的征用。而且从始自终根本没有看到过公开的招牌挂的公告，这个事情当时是国土部去年8月份的时候挂牌督办的六个比较重大的案件之一，但是直到现在这个别墅项目依然在销售，记者12月底的时候去当地看，销售人员说一期已经卖的只剩60多套了，二期他们还在建，还要建200多套。记者：根据《新世纪周刊》的报道，恒大地产进驻四川大邑县是始于2005年地方上发展旅游业的战略规划，而这一点上地方也很无奈。他们的无奈从何而来？像恒大山水城这“突破”万亩的大规模开发，又怎样去获得征地批文呢？

　　王晓冰：他们过去财政收入主要是来自于煤炭产业，但煤炭产业作为一种能源，它开掘总有枯竭的时候，而且最重要的是它给当地带来了非常严重的污染问题，所以最后全县以人大决议的方式要关掉煤矿、水泥厂等污染企业发展旅游业，把旅游业作用重要的支柱产业。从地方来上讲是没有什么错的，但是作为一个三线的城市它怎么才能够吸引到投资，来填补它基础设施的缺口，特别是比方说宾馆、酒店，当地是没有资金的，所以它必须要引入大量的开发商帮助它开发旅游地产的项目，而地产商往往就会提出大规模要地的要求，而政府一旦给出这种承诺它在用地上就不得不突破国家的一些相关规定。我们知道恒大就是非常典型的这样一个情况，采取的方法就是分割，本来是连成一线的土地，但是它裁成21块，一块一块的卖给恒大。

　　记者：如果寄希望于让地方政府改变“以土地换发展”的路径短期内难以实现，那么我们又该如何去遏制这样的“圈地”冲动呢？

　　王晓冰：现在问题出在地方政府和开发商，它的决定权太大了，而中央政府和农民，他们的博弈力量又太小，我们想这种局面有一个什么样的解决方法呢？就要改变现在中间大两头小的局面，一方面在中央这一层的责任追究的过程中间，我觉得应该引入媒体的力量；同时中央政府应该建立一套更加公开透明的督办的规则，定时向公众来通报相关的这种结果，同时鼓励各方面来加强监督等等。

　　最重要的我们觉得最底层的层面还是要给农民赋权，让农民自己去维护自己相关的权益，现在我们看到一方面是农民因为认知水平的局限，他可能博弈能力很有限，所以这需要一些相关的主角进行基层教育的工作；另一方面还要有系统、有效的法律来支持，比方说地方法院也很有可能跟地方政府走到一起去，解决相关法律支持的问题。

2010-12-27T19:38:00.004-06:00

CNOOC vs China Customs
Well, Caixin published a very interesting story which immediately got "harmonized". Fortunately, Bill Bishop (Twitter @niubi) caught it and forwarded it to me. As you can see China Customs actually sent customs police and arrested sub contractors who worked with a CNOOC subsidiary which imported oil drilling machineries for cnooc. Although cnooc was given low customs rate when importing oil machineries in the 80s, that privilege has been revoked by a more recent state council document. However, cnooc still refused to pay the full rate. Now the interesting thing is that this dispute simmered below the surface until customs sent police to arrest cnooc officials and subcontractors. I would guess that high level approval is needed before this is done. This likely was done with the approval of li keqiang or Wang qishan. One or both of them seemto be flexing some muscle. However, I don't think this infringes on Zhou yongkang's turf as his power base is petro china rather than cnooc. Anyway interesting case to chew on.

caixin reporter linked to this on tianya
http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/news/1/195229.shtml

http://magazine.caing.com/chargeFullNews.jsp?id=100210977&time=2010-12-25&cl=115&page=all

　　中海油关税事件
　　本文来源于《新世纪》周刊 2010年第51期出版日期2010年12月27

　　中海油与海关就海洋石油设备进口税政发生争议，涉及两家机构个别人员间的利益纠结与冲突，漩涡不断扩大

　　《新世纪》周刊记者陈竹特派香港记者王端

　　　　2010年岁末，由关税引发的风暴仍在中国海关与中国第三大国有石油公司中海油之间持续发酵。

　　　　10月14日，一份由中海油总部签发的任免通知，免去了姜锡肇海油工程总裁职务。随后10月中下旬的一个凌晨，姜被海关缉私警察带走。其他多位海油工程高管也陆续被要求协助调查。

　　　　一个多月后，海油工程发布公告，承认公司正被天津海关调查。“调查涉及公司与天津海关对外籍工程船舶进出境申报的适用法律、申报方式和具体操作程序等有关政策规定的理解和执行方面存在着的不同认识。”

　　　　这篇措辞谨慎的公告背后，是中海油与海关总署之间一场持续了一年的暗战，中心是双方对于与海洋石油开采相关的一些设备进口税政的争议，同时涉及两家机构个别人员间的利益纠结与冲突。随着矛盾升级，外部监管监督机构也被卷入其中，漩涡不断扩大。

　　　　多位消息人士向本刊记者透露，关税争议案值高达数十亿元，从海关到中海油，均有多人涉案。针对相关争议，国资委相关部门亦向财政部、发改委、能源局等多个部委打报告，就相关争议商品关税的认定征询意见。

　　　　据本刊记者从接近海关及中海油的多位人士处了解，中海油总公司在自查后，已向中央纪委举报自家前采办部经理陆麟接受天津一家报关公司天津海润的贿赂，中央纪委随后控制了陆麟、天津海润总经理胡晓波和天津新港海关相关官员。海关总署也出动缉私部门，加紧对海油工程前总裁姜锡肇及其下属的调查。知情人士透露，这场由“逃税门”演化而来的“二海之争”很可能分缉私和反腐两路查办。

　　关税争议

　　　　作为国内惟一一家承揽海洋油气开发工程建设项目的总承包公司，中海油的子公司海油工程每年进口大量设备，用于海上油气田开发工程及其陆地终端的建造、海底管道与电缆的铺设等。

　　　　自1997年以来，国家对中国海洋开采石油、天然气进口物资采取免征进口税的政策。海油工程所需大部分进口设备，都可在免税清单上找到。用一位业内人士的话说，“中海油成立之时，国家给的不是钱，是政策，其中就包括关税减免。”这点，各界并无争议。

　　　　但是，随着中国石油工业和中海油的发展壮大，政策也在逐渐变化。在这个过程中，特别是由于中海油作为中国具有海上对外合作专营权的惟一一家企业，经常需要与外国石油作业公司合作，而这些合作者、承包商以及中海油海外子公司带着工程船舶和相关设备进来作业时，相关船舶和设备的关税是否也应减免？争议出现了。

　　　　1982年中海油成立时，中国海洋石油事业几乎是一片空白，完全依靠海上对外招标，为了鼓励这一新兴事业，国务院于1982年2月28日批准《海关总署、财政部关于中外合作开采海洋石油进出口货物征免关税和工商统一税的规定》，提出“外国合同者为开采海洋石油而暂时进口并保证复运出口的机器和其他工程器材，在进口或复运出口时予以免税”，并发布《中外合作开采海洋石油进口物资免税清表》。执行时间为1996年4月1日至2000年12月31日。

　　　　执行该免税清表的老合作项目包括了从1980年6月9日和日中石油开发株式会社合作的渤西南区块项目，到1994年12月27日和阿科（中国）有限公司合作的63/20区块项目的共计19个项目。

　　　　但2000年12月31日后，这一法规被废止了。国务院2008年1月15日发布的《国务院关于废止部分行政法规的决定》再次确认“适用期已过，实际上已经失效”。替代的是《海关总署关于执行“十五”期间在我国海洋和陆上特定地区开采石油（天然气）进口物资税收政策的通知》。通知规定，“项目单位和外国合作者暂时进口相应物资，准予免税，进口时海关按‘暂时进口’货物办理手续”。执行时间为2001年1月1日至2005年12月31日。

　　　　在中海油来看，这一政策在实质意义上延续了中海油自上世纪80年代起享受的作业相关设备进出口关税优惠政策。但据知情人士透露，海关看法与此不同，措辞上的微妙变化已为后来的争议埋下伏笔。

　　　　根据《中华人民共和国海关进出口货物征税管理办法》（下称《管理办法》，“租赁进口”和“暂时进口”是两回事，关税征收办法也大相径庭。如果将中海油合作作业单位或海外子公司带来的工程船舶或其他设备，按“租赁进口”来处理，就需按租金缴纳租赁关税；如按“暂时进口”来处理，则基本可以免税或象征性缴纳少量税收。

　　　　而海关在《管理办法》中规定，“暂时进口”货物往往指“在展览会、交易会、会议及类似活动中展示或者使用的货物；文化、体育交流活动中使用的表演、比赛用品”等。以此定义来套中海油情况其实比较牵强，其中已透露了海关希望逐渐取消关税优惠之意。而中海油则认为，中国海洋石油事业仍处于起步阶段，照顾政策应当继续。

　　　　“十五”结束时，矛盾又摆上台面。几番较量下，2007年4月13日海关总署出台了《海关总署关于执行“十一五”期间在我国海洋和陆上特定地区开采石油（天然气）进口物资税收优惠政策的通知》。据这份通知，财政部、海关总署和税务总局审核认定了“十一五”期间中国开采海洋油气项目及项目免税物资的进口额度。也就是说，额度以内的免税，额度以外的正常缴税。

　　　　此外，《通知》也进一步厘清了1994年12月31日之前批准的对外合作“老项目”和之后批准的新项目的关系。对于老项目，准予免税。但对于新项目，分“暂时进口”和“租赁进口”两种情况——暂时进口准予按规定免税；而租赁进口，符合《免税物资清单》范围的才准予免税，而且免税进口租赁物资也需要申请额度。

　　　　据海关总署一位不便具名官员透露，海油工程正是将上述油气开采设备的租赁合同“伪造”成暂时进口合同，海关稽查部门已掌握足够证据。据此，海关在2010年下半年向国务院领导报称，中海油涉巨额逃税案，申请严处。

　　　　而中海油则认为，国家对海洋石油开采给予包括关税在内的政策优惠，是中海油能够发展起来的一个重要因素，以此指责中海油偷逃关税无异于否定中海油发展模式。2009年，海油工程归属上市公司股东的净利润仅为9.23亿元，无法承受沉重的关税负担。据悉，国资委已就此请能源和税务专家研究出具了一份报告，知情人士称，国资委报告支持中海油的结论，亦获得财政部、发改委、商务部、能源局等多部委认同，但海关总署坚持“逃税说”，目前此事仍在僵持之中。

　　天津海润

　　　　按照一位海关内部人士的说法，报关“技术含量最高”的部分就是“归类”，进口商品归为哪类，在关税上相差很大。模糊的措辞，与日渐收紧的关税政策，都使得中海油越来越感到需要有专业的报关公司来夯实原有的免税待遇。2006年前后，天津海润国际货运代理有限公司（下简称天津海润）浮出水面，并逐渐成为为中海油承担通关事宜的一家主要报关公司。

　　　　天津海润来头不小。据接近中海油人士透露，2006年前后，即“十一五”期间中国海洋油气进口物资税政策出台的前夕，海关总署监管司的官员将中海油总公司采办部的工作人员召至办公室，介绍了海关优惠政策的调整思路，同时推荐了几家报关行，其中就包括天津海润。事后，中海油采办部工作人员获悉，天津海润的法人代表胡晓波在海关总署和天津海关均有深厚人脉，其妻即在监管司任职。不久，在中海油采办部经理陆麟的推动下，中海油向下属公司发文建议将在天津等北方港区的报关相关业务交给天津海润。

　　　　胡晓波2003年3月加入报关行业，注册成立了天津市海润物流有限公司。2004年初，天津市海润物流有限公司出资400万元，天津开发区四达仓储有限公司出资100万元，联合成立了天津海润国际货运代理有限公司。其中，天津开发区四达仓储有限公司主营集装箱的储存、装卸，是塘沽新港发展最快的堆场之一，创立人孙荣鸣，为胡晓波妻弟。公开资料显示，孙荣鸣亦在天津从事报关行业多年，从1993年起先后参与创立过天津四达报关行有限公司、天津汇葆物流有限公司等多家企业。

　　　　2005年2月16日，天津海润两家企业股东变成三个自然人：胡晓波、王冬和曹洪生。注册资本在2005年和2007年两次增资后至700万元。其中，胡晓波出资385万元，占总股本的55％。

　　　　据天津海润官网信息，它是经商务部批准的国际运输一级代理公司，总部位于天津，在天津新港拥有近4万平方米集装箱堆场，在宁波、上海、厦门、深圳、香港也有分支机构。在同行眼中，天津海润擅长大型企业及大型设备的进口操作，专营大客户，客户名单中包括海油工程，也包括康菲石油公司、哈利伯顿、斯伦贝谢、壳牌中国等。

　　　　由在海关人脉深厚的天津海润承理报关，在海油工程内部人看来，更多是“顺水人情、锦上添花”。中海油享受国家关税优惠政策多年，海油工程又是海关总署评定的AA级进出口企业，2006年还进入“红名单”（全国海关系统评定进出口企业的最高管理级别），这意味着海油工程本就享受各项通关便利优惠，包括最低的查验率、最快的清关速度，以及“先放后税”的政策。

　　　　但天津海润显然有不同理解。据上述知情人士透露，天津海润收费标准近年来大幅攀升，其船代收费比其他同行高出数倍。自2006年到2009年，天津海润仅从中海油系统有关公司，就收取了1.52亿元保管费和“特殊服务费”。

　　　　对此，天津海润业务部经理金鑫在12月20日接受电话采访时表示，海润的业务都是靠招标，不可能垄断相关业务，一般大客户也都会选择两三家货代，不会完全依赖一家。对于海润船代费是否大大高于同行，金鑫解释说，货物进口量大，相应的船代费就会高。

　　　　无论如何，随着天津海润代理费用渐增，海油工程与天津海润的关系走过了蜜月期。2009年下半年，海油工程下决心弃用天津海润的独家代理，而对其货代业务实施公开招标。由于海润报价较高，部分项目未能中标。

　　3亿保证金事件

　　　　2009年天津新港海关正逢“困难年”。受国际金融危机影响，新港海关2009年实征税收559.87亿元，较2008年有所下降。当年天津海关实征税收980.84亿元，其中关税236.85亿元，同比下降30.93％。据消息人士透露，2009年
11 月，天津新港海关正为完不成年度海关税收目标而发愁。这时海油工程境外子公司所属一艘工程船抵达天津，向新港海关申报。新港海关同意以“暂时进口”方式报关，但提出此次申报不通过银行担保函担保，而是缴纳3亿元保证金。据知情人士透露，新港海关一位官员对海油工程人员暗示说：“过去我们帮你，关键时候你们要帮我。”

　　　　但海洋工程没有当回事，拒绝了新港海关的要求。一位接近海油工程内部的人士说，时任海油工程总裁的姜锡肇当时没有清楚认识各方微妙的利益关系，多年来也习惯于享受“免税”和“暂时进口”报关等优惠政策。国资委一位人士也私下评价说，中海油“太洋化”，过去习惯于和外国人打交道，和国内官员打交道缺乏经验。

　　　　但另一个不可忽视的因素是，2009年之于中海油工程也是“勒紧裤腰带”的一年。受恶劣天气影响，在南海施工的惠州一项目成本超支，导致项目亏损4.2亿元，影响净利润3.6亿元。海油工程2009年归属上市公司股东的净利润仅9.23亿元，同比减少17.48％——这还是动用了各种方法降本增效的结果。

　　　　在海油工程的坚持下，新港海关最后不得不同意，接受银行担保函，但要求中海油额外缴纳1000万元的保证金。在不少熟悉此事的业内人士看来，这次过节，导致了双方关系的恶化。

　　稽查开始

　　　　2010年1月26日，一个周二，天津海关缉私局出动武装人员和便衣人员40多人，展开针对海油工程偷逃关税的“1·26专案”行动。据接近此事人士透露，当时海关查封了海油工程相关账号，抓了几位管理人员，抱走了他们的电脑。

　　　　调查持续了大半年。与此同时，据接近中海油人士透露，中海油开始在中海油内部展开自查，并在自查中发现，当初将天津海润引入海油工程的中海油采办部工作人员陆麟曾收受天津海润60万元。其时，陆麟业已退休，身体状况不佳。因涉及贿案，此案迅速由相关纪律监察部门接手。

　　　　中央纪委控制调查的，还有天津海润总经理胡晓波和与之关系密切的天津新港海关高级官员。

　　　　此时，海油工程在天津的“逃税门”已经逐渐演化成中海油总部和海关总署的高层角力。据知情人士透露，海关总署此后向国务院递交报告，称中海油构成建国以来最大的偷逃关税事件。在此之后，海关部署缉私部门不断收紧相关调查，最后在10月中下旬将姜锡肇带走调查。其他近十位海油工程高管也陆续被要求协助调查。

　　　　海油工程则与11月2日发布公告，称姜锡肇因工作变动关系辞去公司董事职务。直到11月26日《21世纪经济报道》发表“涉嫌偷逃关税海油工程前总裁被查”三天之后，海油工程才于11月29日晚间发布公告承认，天津海关正在对其外籍船舶进出境事宜进行调查。

　　　　中海油总公司对内正式评价这件事，是在11月初。总经理傅成玉在一个内部勘探会议上通报了姜的情况。11月18日，傅又在内部电视电话会议上严令下属企业进行自查，要求下属企业在今后的经营中要严守法律法规，避免再次出现类似违规事件。

　　　　与此同时，中海油也就关税争议问题向国资委做出汇报。据国资委内部人士介绍，国资委的确请了一些关税和能源专家进行研讨，并出具了一份报告，陈述历史渊源，并向财政部、发改委、商务部等相关部委征询意见。

　　　　据接近内情人士透露，目前海关总署仍坚持中海油应补交关税，而中海油则举出历年政策证明，中海油相关海油开采业务是在中央支持下享受免税政策，无须为此补交税款。但在姜锡肇及多位新港海关官员被调查之后，事件已进一步发酵。在相当长一段时间里，中海油总公司直接分管海油工程的，是总公司副总周守为，他自2003年12月就兼任海油工程董事长和法定代表人——这是中海油的传统，总公司副总通常会兼任下属控股子公司的董事长。

　　　　可能是意识到这一管理架构的问题，中海油作为海油工程的大股东，于11月下旬提出修改公司章程临时提案，提请将公司法定代表人由董事长转为总裁。这一提议很快在海油工程12月2日的董事会上通过。这也意味着海油工程的法人将不再是原海油工程董事长周守为。12月2日的董事选举，又进一步产生了新一届董事会成员，中海油总公司副总经理兼中海油服董事长刘健取代周守为，成为新一任海油工程董事长。

　　后续

　　　　对于“逃税门”的收场，市场分析人士多态度乐观。安信证券在一份分析报告中估计，“该等事项可以在公司、海关、政府的共同努力下得到解决，不会对公司的长期发展构成较大影响。”

　　　　一位不便具名的石油专家指出，无论
“逃税门”事件如何收场，中国油气开采进口物资的关税优惠将逐渐收紧甚至取消，这个趋势不会变。截至2009年5月，中国石油石化设备上规模企业数量升至1367家，东营、盘锦和大庆都明确提出发展石油装备制造基地的思路。不仅陆上，海洋石油装备业的竞争也逐渐铺开——中石油2005年成立中石油集团海洋工程有限公司，2009年9月，中石油首个海洋装备制造基地辽河石油装备制造总公司海工基地进入规模化生产阶段。中海油也于2007年定下了投资150亿元建造深水钻井船等一系列深水大型装备的目标。开征上述进口装备的关税，有利于扶持国内油气开采设备制造商、增加国产化率。

　　　　2008年12月9日，财政部、国家发展改革委、海关总署、国家税务总局四部门又联合发布2008年第39号公告，针对《国内投资项目不予免税的进口商品目录（2006年修订）》执行中存在的问题，对不予免税的目录进行调整，新增条目包括“船舶设备”和“石油天然气设备”。自2009年7月1日起，国内投资项目项下申报进口的设备一律按照调整后目录执行。

　　　　但接受采访的各方人士均认为，这场纷争很可能分缉私和反腐两路查办。缉私调查告一段落，而反腐调查也许才刚刚开始。

　　　　据天津海润业务部经理金鑫透露，此次风波对天津海润的冲击也很大，短短几月间，数个部门前来调查，公司的形象大受打击，“圈内说什么的都有”，业务量也急剧减少。

　　　　天津一家报关公司的负责人在接受本刊记者采访时抱怨说，此次风波后，天津新港海关对物流报关行业加强了监管力度。“海关的操作难度将更大，过关时间将更长，客户负担也会增加。”

　　　　截至目前，天津海关和中海油仍拒绝对上述消息作出正面回应——负责海洋石油《进出口货物征免税证明》审批的天津海关减免税管理科、负责新港海关减免税货物的后续稽查的天津新港海关直属稽核科、天津海关监察室及中海油总部均婉拒采访要求。

　　　　本刊记者于宁、张宇哲、王和岩对此文亦有贡献

2010-12-10T00:04:00.002-06:00

How China Really Works...

True, I haven't posted for a long time, sorry loyal readers. Anyway, wikileak provided even some fodder for the discussion on elite politics in the form of a cable on how China really works. As seen below, top leaders are close to various business interests, and princelings are powerful. I would say the assessment below is more or less true. Moreover, at the local level, local leaders are close to various real estate companies and construction contractors, who help finance their promotions. Now, we can understand why imposing strict monetary policy that would cut off credit to SOEs and real estate developers may be difficult to do.

Telegraph

WikiLeaks: China's Politburo a cabal of business empires

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8184216/WikiLeaks-Chinas
-Politburo-a-cabal-of-business-empires.html

China's ruling Politburo is a cabal of business empires that puts vested
interests over the needs of the poor and curtails media freedoms to avoiding
having shady business deals exposed in the press, according to a leaked US
government diplomatic cable.

Peter Foster
By Peter Foster, Beijing 9:00PM GMT 06 Dec 2010

The damning description of China's secretive leadership machinations also
described how the descendants of China's Communist revolutionaries - known
as "princelings" - derided officials from less august revolutionary
backgrounds as mere "shopkeepers".

The assessment of what motivates China's opaque top-level decision-makers
was relayed to Washington in July 2009 in one of the 250,000 cables
published by the WikiLeaks website.

"China's top leadership had carved up China's economic 'pie,'" the US
embassy contact said, "creating an ossified system in which 'vested
interests' drove decision-making and impeded reform as leaders maneuvered to
ensure that those interests were not threatened." The US embassy contact
also asserted there were no "reformers" within the top Communist Party
leadership, only competing factions that sought to protect their business
empires from attack by in-coming leaderships.

The source said that it was "well known" that former Chinese premier Li Peng
and his family controlled China's "electric power interests" while the
country's security tsar Zhou Yongkang controlled the state monopoly of the
oil sector.

The wife of China's premier Wen Jiabao, a popular figure in China often
affectionately referred to as "grandpa Wen" for his feelings for the common
man, is said to control China's "precious gems" sector, while Jia Qinglin,
ranked fourth in the Politburo, has "major Beijing real estate
developments".

Further down the political food-chain, the desire of local officials to
protect current business interests also explained China's reluctance to rein
in rising inflation and take steps advocated by international economists to
re-orientate its economy more towards domestic consumption.

"They [local officials] always supported fast-growth policies and opposed
reform efforts that might harm their interests," the contact said, adding,
"As a result, the proponents of "growth first" would always be in a stronger
position than those who favored controlling inflation or taking care of the
poor." The assessment also said that economic self-preservation was one of
the key reasons why China's leaders were so resistant to increased media
freedoms.

"Vested interests were especially inclined to oppose media openness, he [the
contact] said, lest someone question the shady deals behind land
transactions." China's reluctance to engage in political reform is to be
highlighted this week when Liu Xiaobo, the dissident author of the Charter
08 petition for greater rights in China, is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
"in absentia" after being jailed in China for 11 years for challenging state
power.

The perception inside China that the country is run in the interests of a
Party elite is also growing, with an online poll last February by the
state-run China Daily finding that more than 90 per cent of Chinese believed
that the new rich had achieved their wealth through political connections.

The web of commercial interests also forces China's modern rulers to act by
consensus, with the current President Hu Jintao likened to the "Chairman of
the Board or CEO of a big corporation", juggling factional interests, unlike
the autocratic figures of Mao Tse-tung or Deng Xiaoping who could rule by
fiat.

The man tipped as China's next leader, Xi Jinping, was selected, not for his
leadership qualities but, the contact said, because he "maintained a
non-threatening low profile and had never made enemies" and could be relied
upon not to wage political vendettas through anti-corruption investigations.

"The central feature of leadership politics was the need to protect oneself
and one's family from attack after leaving office. Thus, current leaders
carefully cultivated proteges who would defend their interests once they
stepped down," the contact said.

In the past in-coming Chinese leaders have consolidated their position by
instituting crackdowns, with Jiang Zemin, the former president, shutting
down a number of businesses owned by the associates of his predecessor, Deng
Xiaoping, when he came to power in the early 1990s.

A similar process was observed in 2003 after Hu Jintao took office, with
several high-level figures in Jiang Zemin's Shanghai power-base facing
investigations and purges that analysts said were aimed at curtailing the
power and influence of the Jiang faction.

The contact also outlined the scornful factionalism that divided the scions
of the old 'red' families - those with revolutionary lineage whose fathers
and grandfathers fought to bring the Communists to power in 1949 - and those
who had risen up the Party ranks, so-called "shopkeepers".

China's current leaders, President Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao,
both fall into the latter category, while the putative next leader,
57-year-old Xi Jinping, is the son of a revolutionary hero Xi Zhongxun and
often referred to as a 'princeling'.

The US embassy contact said that China's princelings felt they had a "right"
to the fruits of the revolution, recalling one family deriding those without
revolutionary pedigrees by saying: "While my father was bleeding and dying
for China, your father was selling shoelaces".

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2010-05-18T12:08:00.002-05:00

The People's Daily Cites Me

Dear Readers, my life has reached a great milestone-- the People's Daily website has cited my work through an NDRC official. As you can see though, the official number and my number have converged in recent weeks. The official number used to be 6 trillion. It is now 7.38 trillion, which actually is a CICC number....

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/6989145.html

Local govt. debt crisis unlikely: official
13:24, May 18, 2010

A Chinese local governments' debt crisis is unlikely to break out in China, but it is worth close attention, Xu Lin, an official from the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a forum Sunday.

Bank regulators and economists say they are increasing concerned that borrowing by local governments is fueling asset bubbles and may lead to a surge in bad debts at the nation’s banks. Local-government entities may have had 11.4 trillion yuan (US$1.7 trillion) in outstanding debt by the end of last year, according to estimates from Northwestern University Professor Victor Shih.

However, according to data from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, China’s outstanding loans to local governments’ financing platforms stood at 7.38 trillion yuan by the end of 2009, rising 70.4 percent year on year.

The risks posed by local government financing vehicles should not be exaggerated, government adviser Ba Shusong also wrote in the Shanghai-based Wenhui Bao last week.

Commercial banks in China are “very cautious” about lending to the investment arms of county-level governments who account for more than 70 percent of all such local authority entities, said Ba, who is deputy director-general of the Financial Research Institute at the State Council Development Research Center.

Very few local governments rely on land transfer income for more than 50 percent of their funding and most have many sources of income, he said.

Source: Shenzhen Daily

2010-04-16T13:58:00.004-05:00

Premier Wen's Essay on Hu Yaobang

As many of you know, Premier Wen Jiabao recently penned a very emotional essay remembering former Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang. To be sure, it was published on the 21st anniversary of his death, but there are some very unusual elements of this essay. I attach the full text below for readers' own analysis. Needless to say, the China studies community has been in an uproar about this essay. Below, I present my own take of this essay; comments welcomed!

To be sure, Wen shows no hesitation to display affection publicly, but if his feelings were "sincere," why didn't he write such an article last year? Also, like many, I find the last paragraph especially strange. Isn't reminiscing Hu's greatness enough? Why also tell readers that he continues to visit Hu's widow every year? I read that as a credible signal to all Hu YB sympathizers which side Wen stands on.

Now, the question is why send such a signal. To be sure, Hu Yaobang has been making a come-back in the official press. the last time that Hu was praised by a Politburo Standing Committee member was Zeng Qinghong's speech in 2005. If you read the text of the Zeng Qinghong's 2005 speech on HYB (which I also append below), it reads like a detailed official biography of Hu with some usual pleasantry about "great Marxist"...etc at the end. The Wen piece clearly appears to be the most "heart-felt." Again, the issue is why the need to send such an emotional signal.

One possibility is that Hu Jintao is trying to send a strong signal of the CYL's power in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress. But if that were the case, why not just write such an article himself. I am sure Hu can conjure up many emotional anecdotes of his former mentor.

Finally, we come to the hypothesis that Wen Jiabao himself is in deep trouble and may be under threat of being removed. I find this possibility the most reasonable. In essence, Wen may feel that he is under direct threat of being removed or may implement a policy which puts him in danger of being removed. As either a last ditch effort or an insurance policy, he writes this article to rally HYB sympathizers on his side in case his enemies move to remove him from power. In particular, I was struck by the paragraph on Hu YB's insistence of working despite
being ill. We know of course that "illness" has historically been used to sideline or remove top officials in China (Chen Yun, Li Peng...etc.). It seems that Wen is saying through that passage that "as a loyal student of HYB, I would never let illness stop me, so you shouldn't believe people if they say I am stepping down due to illness." All this may be related to the possible implementation of the property tax, which may indeed place Wen under the threat of removal by powerful interests.

温家宝在人民日报发表文章纪念胡耀邦
http://www.sina.com.cn 2010年04月15日05:24 人民网-人民日报

　　温家宝：再回兴义忆耀邦

　　前些天，我到贵州黔西南察看旱情。走在这片土地上，望着这里的山山水水，我情不自禁地想起24年前随耀邦同志在这里考察调研的情形，尤其是他在兴义派我夜访农户的往事。每念及此，眼前便不断浮现出耀邦同志诚挚坦荡、平易近人的音容笑貌，胸中那积蓄多年的怀念之情如潮水般起伏涌动，久久难以平复。

　　1986年年初，耀邦同志决定利用春节前后半个月时间，率领由中央机关27个部门的30名干部组成的考察访问组，前往贵州、云南、广西的一些贫困地区调研，看望慰问各族干部群众。耀邦同志想以此举做表率，推动中央机关干部深入基层，加强调查研究，密切联系群众。

　　当时，我刚调任中央办公厅副主任不久，耀邦同志让我具体负责组织这次考察访问工作。2月4日上午，耀邦同志带领考察访问组全体成员从北京出发，前往贵州安顺。由于安顺大雾，飞机临时改降贵阳。当天下午，耀邦同志又换乘面包车奔波4个多小时赶到安顺。晚饭后，耀邦同志召开会议，把考察访问组人员分成三路，分头前往云南文山、广西河池和贵州毕节地区。

　　第二天清晨，耀邦同志带着我和中央办公厅几位同事从安顺出发，乘坐面包车，沿着曲折的山路在黔、滇、桂交界处的崇山峻岭中穿行。耀邦同志尽管已年过七旬，但每天都争分夺秒地工作。他边走边调研，甚至把吃饭的时间都用上，每天很晚休息。离开安顺后的几天里，耀邦同志先后听取贵州镇宁、关岭、晴隆、普安、盘县和云南富源、师宗、罗平县的汇报，沿途不断与各族群众交流，了解他们的生产生活情况。他还在罗平县长底乡与苗族、布依族、彝族、汉族群众跳起《民族大团结》舞。2月7日傍晚，耀邦同志风尘仆仆赶到黔西南州首府兴义市，入住在州府低矮破旧的招待所。

　　时已立春，兴义早晚的天气仍然阴冷潮湿。由于没有暖气，房间里冷冰冰的。我们临时找来3个小暖风机放在耀邦同志的房间，室温也只有摄氏12度左右。经过几天马不停蹄地奔波调研，耀邦同志显得有些疲惫。我劝他晚上好好休息一下，但他仍坚持当晚和黔西南州各族干部群众代表见面。

　　晚饭前，耀邦同志把我叫去：“家宝，给你一个任务，等一会带上几个同志到城外的村子里走走，做些调查研究。记住，不要和地方打招呼。”

　　到中央办公厅工作之前，我就听说耀邦同志下乡时，经常临时改变行程，与群众直接交流，了解基层真实情况。用他常说的话就是，“看看你们没有准备的地方”。所以，当耀邦同志给我布置这个任务时，我心里明白：他是想尽可能地多了解基层的真实情况。

　　天黑后，我带着中央办公厅的几位同志悄悄离开招待所向郊外走去。那时，兴义城区只有一条叫盘江路的大路。路旁的房子比较低矮，路灯昏暗，街道冷清。我们沿着盘江路向东走了10多分钟就到了郊外。这里到处是农田，四周一片漆黑，分不清东南西北。看见不远处，影影绰绰有几处灯光，我们便深一脚浅一脚摸了过去。到近处一看，果然是个小村子。进村后，我们访问了几户农家。黑灯瞎火的夜晚，纯朴的村民们见到几个外地人感到有些意外，但当知道我们来意后，很热情地招呼我们。

　　晚上十点多，我们赶回招待所。我走进耀邦同志的房间，只见他坐在一把竹椅上正在等我。我向他一五一十地汇报了走访农户时了解到的有关情况。耀邦同志认真地听着，还不时问上几句。他对我说，领导干部一定要亲自下基层调查研究，体察群众疾苦，倾听群众呼声，掌握第一手材料。对担负领导工作的人来说，最大的危险就是脱离实际。多年来，耀邦同志这几句语重心长的话经常在我耳旁回响。

　　2月8日是农历大年三十。耀邦同志一大早来到黔西南民族师范专科学校，向各族教师拜年并和他们座谈。接着，他又兴致勃勃地赶到布依族山寨乌拉村看望农民，并到布依族农民黄维刚家做客。黄维刚按照布依族接待贵客的习俗，把一个炖熟的鸡头夹放在耀邦同志的碗里。就这样，耀邦同志和黄维刚全家有说有笑地吃了顿团圆年饭。

　　随后，耀邦同志又乘汽车沿山路行驶一百多公里，赶到黔桂交界处的天生桥水电站工地，向春节期间坚持施工的建设者们致以节日的问候。当晚，耀邦同志在武警水电建设部队招待所一间简陋的平房中住下。不久，他开始发烧，体温升到38.7度。事实上，从午后开始，耀邦同志就感到身体不适。不过，他依旧情绪饱满地参加各项活动。

　　除夕之夜，辞旧迎新的鞭炮在四周响个不停，但大家没有心思过年。我和耀邦同志身边的工作人员一直守候着他。2月9日，初一早晨，耀邦同志的体温达到39度。这里远离昆明、贵阳、南宁等大城市，附近又没有医院，大家都很着急。好在经过随行医生的治疗，耀邦同志到晚上开始退烧，大家的心才放了下来。

　　2月10日上午，身体稍稍恢复的耀邦同志不顾大家的劝阻，坚持前往广西百色。经过320多公里的山路颠簸，耀邦同志于晚上6点多到了百色。在百色期间，耀邦同志带着我们参观了中国工农红军第七军旧址，并与百色地区8个县的县委书记座谈。2月11日晚，我们赶到南宁。随后两天，耀邦同志在南宁进行短暂的休整。我根据耀邦同志的要求，又带着几个同志到南宁市郊区就农业生产、水牛养殖、农产品市场等问题进行调研。每次回到住地，他总是等着听我的汇报。 14日和15日，耀邦同志经钦州前往北海市，先后考察了北海港和防城港的港口建设。2月16日，耀邦同志又折回南宁，与三路考察访问组人员会合。接着，他用两天半的时间听取了考察访问组和云南、广西、贵州的汇报。

　　2月19日下午，耀邦同志根据自己13天沿途调查的思考并结合有关汇报，在干部大会上作了即席讲话。他特别强调，中央和省级领导干部要经常到群众中去，到基层去，进行调查研究，考察访问，密切上级与下级、领导机关同广大人民群众之间的联系。这样，不仅可以形成一种好的风气，产生巨大的精神力量，更重要的是有助于实现正确的领导，减少领导工作的失误，提高干部的素质，促进干部特别是年轻干部健康成长。

　　1986年2月20日下午，耀邦同志率领考察访问组回到北京，结束了历时半个多月的西南贫困地区之行……

　　时光飞逝。耀邦同志当年带领我们在西南考察时的情形历历在目，仿佛就在昨天。今年4月3日，当我再次来到兴义市时，简直不敢相信自己的眼睛：原先低矮落后的小城已发展成为一个高楼林立的现代化城市，兴义城区现在的面积比1986年拓展了4倍多，城区人口增长近3倍。

　　睹物思人，触景生情。耀邦同志派我夜访的情景又在眼前，一股旧地重寻的念头十分强烈。当天晚饭后，我悄悄带了几个随行的同志离开驻地，想去寻找那个多年前夜访过的村庄。灯火辉煌的盘江路上，商铺林立，十分热闹。原先那个村庄早已不在，取而代之的是一幢幢拔地而起的高楼。我坚持要再夜访一个村庄，仍然只带随行的几个工作人员来到郊外。在远处几片灯光引领下，我们走进永兴村，敲开农户雷朝志的家门，和他及他的邻居们聊了起来……

　　耀邦同志离开我们21年了。如今，可以告慰耀邦同志的是，他一直牵挂的我国西南贫困地区发生了翻天覆地的变化，他竭尽毕生精力为之奋斗的国家正沿着中国特色社会主义道路阔步前行。

　　1985年10月，我调到中央办公厅工作后，曾在耀邦同志身边工作近两年。我亲身感受着耀邦同志密切联系群众、关心群众疾苦的优良作风和大公无私、光明磊落的高尚品德，亲眼目睹他为了党的事业和人民的利益，夜以继日地全身心投入工作中的忘我情景。当年他的谆谆教诲我铭记在心，他的言传身教使我不敢稍有懈怠。他的行事风格对我后来的工作、学习和生活都带来很大的影响。1987年1月，耀邦同志不再担任中央主要领导职务后，我经常到他家中去看望。 1989年4月8日上午，耀邦同志发病抢救时，我一直守护在他身边。4月15日，他猝然去世后，我第一时间赶到医院。1990年12月5日，我送他的骨灰盒到江西共青城安葬。耀邦同志去世后，我每年春节都到他家中看望，总是深情地望着他家客厅悬挂的耀邦同志画像。他远望的目光，坚毅的神情总是给我力量，给我激励，使我更加勤奋工作，为人民服务。

　　再回兴义，抚今追昔，追忆耀邦。我写下这篇文章，以寄托我对他深深的怀念。

在纪念胡耀邦同志诞辰90周年座谈会上的讲话（2005年11月18日）
曾庆红 (2005.11.19)
　　在纪念胡耀邦同志诞辰90周年座谈会上的讲话
　　（2005年11月18日）同志们，朋友们：
今天，我们怀着崇敬的心情在这里举行座谈会，纪念胡耀邦同志诞辰90周年，缅怀他为民族独立、人民解放和国家富强、人民幸福建立的历史功勋，学习他伟大的革命精神和崇高的品德风范，更好地把中国特色社会主义事业推向前进。
胡耀邦同志是久经考验的忠诚的共产主义战士，伟大的无产阶级革命家、政治家，我军杰出的政治工作者，长期担任党的重要领导职务的卓越领导人。他在长达60年的革命生涯中，为中国人民的解放和幸福，为我国社会主义事业的发展和繁荣，为改革开放的实行和社会主义现代化建设的推进，呕心沥血、奋斗不息，贡献了毕生精力，建立了不朽功勋。他的历史功绩和优秀品德永远铭记在党和人民心中。
胡耀邦同志从青少年时期就投身新民主主义革命。1915年11月20日，胡耀邦同志出生在湖南省浏阳县一个贫苦的农民家庭。1929年冬，胡耀邦同志加入中国共产主义青年团，在党领导下开始从事青少年工作。1933年9月，他转为中国共产党党员。在革命斗争的实践中，他树立起坚定的共产主义信念，为革命根据地团的建设做了大量工作。1934年，胡耀邦同志随中央红军参加二万五千里长征，经受了各种艰难困苦的考验，磨炼了革命意志。到达陕北后，他先后任少共中央局秘书长、组织部长、宣传部长，为党的青年工作贡献了力量。1937年5月，胡耀邦同志到延安抗日军政大学学习，并先后任校政治部副主任、瓦窑堡一大队政委。1939年，他任中央军委总政治部组织部副部长、部长。在坚持抗战的过程中，他为加强人民军队的政治思想建设和组织建设作出了重要贡献。解放战争时期，胡耀邦同志先后任冀热辽军区代理政治部主任，晋察冀军区四纵队、三纵队政委，十八兵团政治部主任，转战华北和西北，参加领导了大同、张家口、石家庄、太原、宝鸡战役等，为中国人民抗日战争和解放战争的胜利发挥了重要作用。
新中国成立后，胡耀邦同志致力于推动社会主义革命和建设事业。1949年冬，他率部进军大西南，任中共川北区委书记、行署主任、军区政委，领导人民群众进行土地改革，开展剿匪反霸斗争，稳定社会秩序，迅速恢复和发展了工农业生产。1952年后，胡耀邦同志先后任团中央书记处书记、第一书记。在主持团中央工作期间，他创造性地执行党中央的指示，围绕党的中心工作组织富有青年特色的活动，注重在实践中用共产主义思想教育团员青年，在全团倡导“朝气蓬勃，实事求是”的作风，团结带领团员青年积极参加社会主义建设，使团的工作和青少年事业得到巨大的发展，充分发挥了共青团作为党的助手和后备军的重要作用。1956年，他在党的八大上当选为中央委员。1962年，胡耀邦同志兼任中共湖南省委书记处书记兼湘潭地委第一书记。1964年11月起，他兼任中共中央西北局第二书记和陕西省委第一书记。在地方工作中，他深入实际，调查研究，实事求是，反对浮夸，关心群众，扎实工作，推进了当地经济建设和各项事业的发展。
“文化大革命”期间，胡耀邦同志遭受严重迫害，但他不顾个人的荣辱安危，同林彪、江青反革命集团进行了坚决斗争。1975年，他在担任中国科学院党组织领导时，认真贯彻邓小平同志提出的全面整顿的方针，领导起草了《关于科技工作的几个问题》的汇报提纲，实事求是地反映科技战线的实际情况，努力消除“文化大革命”给科技工作造成的不良影响。
粉碎江青反革命集团后，胡耀邦同志于1977年3月任中共中央党校副校长，8月在党的十一大上当选为中央委员，12月任中共中央组织部部长。1978年12月，他在党的十一届三中全会上当选为中央政治局委员、中央纪律检查委员会第三书记，随后任中共中央秘书长兼中央宣传部部长。1980年2月，他在党的十一届五中全会上当选为中央政治局常委、中央委员会总书记。1981年6月，他在党的十一届六中全会上当选为中央委员会主席。1982年9月，他在党的十二届一中全会上当选为中央政治局委员、中央政治局常委、中央委员会总书记。1987年11月，他在党的十三届一中全会上当选为中央政治局委员。胡耀邦同志在担任党的主要领导职务期间，积极参与制定和贯彻以邓小平同志为核心的党的第二代中央领导集体的重大决策和战略部署，为坚持党的十一届三中全会以来的路线方针政策，为推动改革开放和社会主义现代化建设，为推进中国特色社会主义事业，作出了多方面的重大贡献。
他坚持党的解放思想、实事求是的思想路线，组织和推动了关于真理标准的讨论。在邓小平同志等老一辈无产阶级革命家领导和支持下开展的这场思想解放运动，冲破“两个凡是”的严重束缚，为党的十一届三中全会重新确立党的马克思主义思想路线作了重要的理论准备，成为拨乱反正和改革开放的思想先导，对党和国家的历史进程产生了深远的影响。
他坚持党的干部路线，坚持实事求是、有错必纠，组织和领导了平反冤假错案、落实干部政策的大量工作。他顺应人民群众的意愿和要求，以非凡的胆略和勇气，组织有关部门开展艰苦细致的工作，使一大批遭受冤屈和迫害的老一辈革命家、干部、知识分子和人民群众得以平反昭雪、恢复名誉，受到广大干部群众高度赞誉。
他坚决拥护党和国家工作重点的转移，大力推进改革开放和社会主义现代化建设。他在党的十二大上代表中央所作的题为《全面开创社会主义现代化建设的新局面》的报告，鲜明地提出了党在新时期的重大历史任务。他主持和参与主持制定了包括《中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定》在内的一系列关于农村改革、城市改革、对外开放的重要文件，努力探索党和国家领导体制的改革，为推进改革开放进程倾注了大量心血。他十分关心欠发达地区的建设事业，经常深入老少边穷地区，同当地干部群众共商脱贫致富大计，促进这些地区的开发开放。
他坚持党的尊重知识、尊重人才的方针，注意发挥知识分子在现代化建设中的重要作用。他先后主持制定了《中共中央关于教育体制改革的决定》和《中共中央关于社会主义精神文明建设指导方针的决议》，推动科技、教育、文艺、新闻工作出现了蓬勃发展的局面。他热情鼓励年轻知识分子到基层去，到群众中去，到现代化建设的实践中去，经受锻炼，健康成长。
他坚持贯彻党的统一战线工作的方针政策，着眼于调动各方面的积极因素，积极推进党的统一战线工作和民族工作、宗教工作。他为坚持和完善中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度，加强中国共产党同各民主党派和无党派人士的合作，建立肝胆相照、荣辱与共的关系，为推动民族地区经济社会发展，做了大量富有成效的工作。
他坚持推动新形势下党的建设，为加强和改善党的领导做了大量工作。他在纪念马克思逝世100周年大会上作的题为《马克思主义伟大真理的光芒照耀我们前进》的报告，充分表达了我们党在新的历史条件下坚持和发展马克思主义的坚定信念。他参与主持制定《关于党内政治生活的若干准则》，强调要发扬党的优良传统和作风，维护党的民主集中制，严明党的纪律，发展党内民主。他坚持党的干部队伍“四化”方针，大力推进各级领导班子建设和干部人事制度改革，满腔热情地关怀和培养优秀年轻干部。
他坚定不移地与不正之风和腐败现象作斗争，号召各级领导干部和中央机关在端正党风方面发挥表率作用。
他坚持党的外交方针政策，积极推动新时期我国对外交往工作开创新局面。他根据邓小平同志的思想，明确提出处理党际关系的四项原则，为恢复和发展我们党同外国一些政党的关系，为增进中国人民同世界各国人民的相互了解和友谊，为新时期我国对外政策的制定和实施，发挥了积极作用。
胡耀邦同志把自己的毕生精力献给了党和人民的事业。作为马克思主义者，他的一生是光辉的。我们纪念胡耀邦同志诞辰90周年，就是要学习他伟大的革命精神和高尚的思想品德，把中国特色社会主义事业继续推向前进。
我们要学习胡耀邦同志忠于党的事业、鞠躬尽瘁的献身精神。胡耀邦同志具有强烈的革命事业心和政治责任感，具有忘我工作的热情和勇往直前的干劲，始终不知疲倦地为党和人民贡献自己的智慧和力量，为我们树立了共产党人始终为中国特色社会主义事业和共产主义理想不懈奋斗的榜样。
我们要学习胡耀邦同志锐意改革、勇于创新的思想境界。胡耀邦同志长期孜孜不倦地学习和研究马克思主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论，坚持理论联系实际，勤于思考和研究各种现实课题，提出了许多重要主张和建议，同时博览群书，追求新知，不断丰富知识、增长才干，为我们树立了共产党人始终保持进取精神的榜样。
我们要学习胡耀邦同志密切联系群众、关心群众疾苦的优良作风。胡耀邦同志作风民主，平易近人，经常深入基层，广交朋友，加强同人民群众包括知识界和党外朋友的直接联系和坦诚交流，了解他们的愿望和要求，亲自阅处大量群众来信，千方百计为人民群众排忧解难，为我们树立了共产党人始终实践全心全意为人民服务宗旨的榜样。
我们要学习胡耀邦同志顾全大局、光明磊落的高尚品德。胡耀邦同志胸怀坦荡，按党的原则办事，敢于讲真话、讲实话，勇于开展批评和自我批评，以身作则，廉洁奉公，严于律己，宽以待人，坚决维护党和人民的利益，为我们树立了共产党人始终以党和人民的利益为重的榜样。
当前，我国正处在全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的关键时期。紧紧抓住和切实用好重要战略机遇期，不断开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面，是我们肩负的重大历史责任。我们要始终坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，坚持党的基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验，坚持用科学发展观统领经济社会发展全局，切实抓好发展这个党执政兴国的第一要务，聚精会神搞建设，一心一意谋发展，积极推动社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设全面发展。我们要高举和平、发展、合作的旗帜，坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持走和平发展道路，坚持对外开放的基本国策，努力促进同世界各国的友好交往和互利合作，共同推进人类和平与发展的崇高事业。我们要大力加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设，深入开展党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争，不断提高党的创造力、凝聚力、战斗力，使党始终成为建设中国特色社会主义的坚强领导核心。
同志们，让我们更加紧密地团结在以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央周围，全面贯彻党的十六大和十六届三中、四中、五中全会精神，求真务实，锐意进取，扎实工作，为推动全面建设小康社会进程、实现中华民族的伟大复兴而努力奋斗！（新华社北京11月18日电）

2010-04-04T18:17:00.000-05:00

A Reply to my Critics on Local Debt

Victor Shih

Since the publication of my editorial in the Asian Wall Street Journal on local debt, there has been a wave of interest on this issue. Several investment banks have issued reports on local debt, and some of them have disputed my main finding that current local government investment vehicle debt stands at around 11.4 trillion RMB. The World Bank likewise addressed this issue and came up with a much lower estimate on local investment company (LIC) debt. In the discussion below, I outline some reasons why I still adhere to my estimate that existing local investment vehicle debt stands at around 11 trillion RMB. Furthermore, I once again reiterate that local debt is a serious problem which will require decisive actions from the Chinese government.

Some points people have raised about my estimate of local debt:
1. The Chinese government claims that there is only 6 trillion RMB in local investment vehicle debt.
My response: A. This widely cited figure was produced by a 6/2009 CBRC survey of the situation. The exact methodology is unclear, but informants state that the CBRC extrapolated this amount on the basis of a partial study of a few provinces.
B. Other government agencies have provided conflicting and higher amounts. For example, a MOF research team uncovered "well over 4 trillion" in late 2008 (excellent Credit Swiss research even states that the 4 trillion was a YE 2007 figure).
C. The CBRC finding concerns only bank loans, but total debt should also include bond issuance and accounts payable, which constitute triangular debt.
D. if we sum the gross debt of just the top 50 or so LICs, we quickly arrive at gross debt of over 2 trillion (try adding the gross debt of Guangdong Highway, Guangdong Transportation Group, Chongqing Highway, Beijing Basic Construction, Shanghai Urban Construction and Development Company, Shanghai Pudong Development Co., Tianjin Urban Basic Infrastructure, Binhai Development...etc.), so the remaining 8000 or so entities only owe 4 trillion (on average 500 mln RMB each)?

2. The 11.4 trillion is too high when compared with total bank loans in various categories.
My response: A. First of all, total loans outstanding at the end of 2009 was well over 40 trillion RMB, and I think it is completely reasonable to believe that nearly 1/4 of it was loans to LICs. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised that a higher share of bank loans ended up in LICs.
B. Some analysts have trouble believing that such a high share of medium and long-term loans ended up in LICs. When we consider how many LICs there are and the vital role they play in the local economic strategy, it is not surprising that likely as much as 3/4 of new medium and long term loans in 2009 ended up in LICs.
C. Beyond medium and long term loans, many LICs are holding companies with subsidiaries engaged in a wide range of businesses. For example, the LICs run thousands of hotels across China, and loans to these hotels would be classified as loans to the service industry. Thus, in addition to medium and long term loans and loans to infrastructure, it is perfectly reasonable for a sizable share of working capital loans, trust loans, and loans in the "other" category to end up in LICs. Again, gross debt of these entities would also include bond issuance and debt owed to each other.

3. LIC debt can be calculated by subtracting government spending on basic infrastructure from the total infrastructure spending figure. In that light, LIC debt only increased by 2.8 trillion RMB in 2009.
My response:
A. First, as pointed out, LIC are diversified holding companies which do not only engage in infrastructure construction. For example, thousands of subsidiaries of local investment companies engage in real estate development and absorb some share of the real estate loans. The figure generated using the method above, however, may be meaningful one-day when the government decides how much of the existing LIC debt it will seek to take over as part of a bail out.
B. The calculation above assumes that much of the extrabudgetary revenue from local governments derived from land sales went to infrastructure construction. According to excellent research done by Standard Chartered and UBS on land sales, much of the land sales revenue is spent on compensating original residents, leaving only a minority share for actual investment. Thus, a realistic application of this methodology would lead to something like 3.5 trillion RMB in new loans to LICs, not just 2.8 trillion.

4. My estimate of 12.7 trillion in future LIC debt is baseless and is way too high for YE 2011.
My response:
A. To be sure, I now think most of this debt will not realize by YE 2011 also. However, it would not be far-fetched to think that most of this debt will be realize by YE 2012. This estimate is not "baseless" as it comes from the hundreds of lines of credit that banks have granted to local governments. As long as banks more or less adhere to these lines of credit, they will lend this amount to local governments at some point in the future.
B. Although the State Council has called for more caution in lending to local investment vehicles, we still see local governments aggressively trying to raise money from the banks. Hubei, for example, has an investment plan worth 12 trillion RMB, and plans on investing 6 trillion RMB between now and 2012 (please see http://nf.nfdaily.cn/epaper/21cn/content/20100324/ArticelJ07002FM.htm). Of the 6 trillion, at least 3 trillion will come from bank loans and other forms of debt. If Hubei is able to realize its ambition, we are already 1/4 of the way toward my 12.7 trillion estimate. Thus, unless the central government harshly restricts overall credit, I think local governments at the provincial and municipal levels will have no trouble borrowing an additional 12.7 trillion by YE 2011 or 2012.

Beyond critizing my estimate, some investment bank reports also argue that whatever the debt amount, the Chinese government is fully capable of addressing this issue and in heading off a financial crisis. On this point, I mainly agree with my colleagues, but I still don't think the problem is trivial, especially in light that local governments seem determined to take on trillions in additional debt in the coming two years to finance ambitious investment plans. My main worry is that unless Beijing decisively restricts local investment projects, local investment companies will continue to borrow in large quantities in the coming two years.

Even relatively bullish investment bank report suggests that new non-performing loans in the banks can increase by 2-3 trillion RMB in the next couple of years. To be sure, this is well within the government's ability to handle and likely will not lead to any kind of financial crisis. However, this remains a daunting problem for the government and for current shareholders of China's banking stocks. This will require the China Investment Corporation to inject tens of billions of dollars into banks through Huijin. Additional asset management companies will have to be formed to take over the NPLs. This is a lengthy and difficult process involving numerous ministries and interests, which is expected to generate a great deal of uncertainty. If the expectation indeed is a couple of trillions in NPLs, it deserves careful watching rather than dismissal.

Finally, some investment bank reports suggest that the enormous sum of state assets must be considered along side of the debt. If debt ever becomes a problem, the Chinese government can always sell state assets to repay the debt. Here, I am in complete agreement with my colleagues. It will be a great day when the Chinese government decides to privatize trillions in state assets to raise money to repay local debt. The record of the Chinese government in privatization, however, is spotty at best. Even in the late 1990s, when the fiscal shape of the central government was at its weakest, only small SOEs were privatized, often through murky processes to insiders. Since then, both the central and local governments have done their utmost to maintain the dominance of large state-owned corporations through protectionism and subsidies from both the budget and the financial system. Instead of privatizing these firms and allowing them to compete on equal footings with private and foreign firms, they are given every advantage so that they can dominate the domestic and even the global markets. The financial system in particular channels the bulk of its resources to the state sector. Unfortunately, it does not seem privatization is anywhere near on the horizon. Instead, we can expect trillions more being poured into state entities, including local investment companies, in the foreseeable future.

2010-03-30T23:02:00.001-05:00

Dear All, this excellent piece by the Financial Times may well bar me from China! It's very good for Northwestern's reputation in Asia, however. Now everyone will want to come!

China: To the money born

By FT Reporters

Published: March 29 2010 22:37 | Last updated: March 29 2010

New Horizon Capital is one of the most influential and successful participants in China’s fledgling private equity industry. It has billions of dollars under management and a stable of investors that includes Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, UBS and Temasek, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund. But you would not guess any of that from its central Beijing headquarters.

The company has no nameplate in the lobby of the Golden Treasure Tower, a nondescript building near the Forbidden City, the traditional seat of imperial power. Its simple 12th floor offices are identified only by a small sign inside the door that reads, in Chinese, “New Horizon Growth Investment Advisory Limited”.

The company does not need flashy suites as it has one of the most valuable assets in China. He is Winston Wen, an MBA from Northwestern University’s Kellogg business school in the US who keeps a low profile and bears a striking resemblance to his father – Wen Jiabao, premier of the People’s Republic of China.

The younger Mr Wen and New Horizon are in the vanguard of a more aggressive generation of taizidang (“princelings”) – offspring of senior Communist party officials – who dominate the burgeoning home-grown private equity industry, where huge profits are to be made from restructuring state assets and financing private companies.

In 2009 private equity deals in China totalled $3.6bn, accounting for one-third of all such transactions in the Asia-Pacific region, according to Thomson Reuters. But industry participants say the potential market is far larger.

According to those working in the sector, the princelings’ ascendance is squeezing out less well connected operators, including foreign firms, which might have important consequences for two reasons. First, private equity could play an important role in modernising the economy, channelling funds to promising but capital-starved companies – but those benefits will be felt only if the industry is run in a professional and competitive manner.

Second, some in the political establishment fear that princeling dominance of private equity could exacerbate public perception of nepotism and misrule at the top of the Communist party. In an opaque authoritarian system lacking the popular legitimacy of a democracy, such fears are hard to dismiss. A recent online opinion poll by the People’s Daily, the party’s official mouthpiece, found that 91 per cent of respondents believe all rich families have political backgrounds.

In an interview with the same newspaper, the former auditor-general said the fast-growing wealth of officials’ children and relatives “is what the public is most dissatisfied about”. Li Jinhua, widely respected as the senior graft-busting official between 1998 and 2008, told the paper this month: “From the numerous cases currently coming to light, we can see that many corruption problems are transacted through sons and daughters.”

Many of the elite’s children are western educated and, over the past 15 years, dozens have been recruited by western companies and banks hoping to secure an entry into the Chinese market and win mandates to take state-owned companies public in New York or Hong Kong. As most foreign investors know, employing the relative of a senior party leader as an adviser or employee can help cut through bureaucratic obstruction and resistance from local interest groups.

But today those institutions and investors are scrambling to invest in the private equity funds of princelings who would once have been on their payroll. “In the past, the best option for these people with ‘background’ was to go to the high-paying western investment banks but now the economic strength has shifted,” says one person in the private equity industry, asking not to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic. “Now they’re saying to the foreigners, ‘Hey, I’m in the driving seat, I have all the deals – so you give me your money and I’ll invest it myself and take a big cut’.”

Prominent private equity princelings include George Li, a former banker at Merrill Lynch and UBS with an MBA from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose father, Li Ruihuan, was one of the country’s senior leaders from the late 1980s until 2003. Another son, Jeffrey Li, recently resigned as China head of Novartis, the pharmaceuticals group, to go into private equity, according to people familiar with the matter.

Wilson Feng, who bankers and private equity investors say is the son-in-law of Wu Bangguo – officially second in the party hierarchy – left Merrill Lynch two years ago to launch a fund with ties to the state-owned nuclear energy conglomerate, according to media reports and people familiar with the matter. Mr Feng was key to securing Merrill’s mandate to take Industrial and Commercial Bank of China public in Hong Kong in 2006 in the biggest initial public offering in history.

Other private equity princelings include Li Tong, daughter of Li Changchun, the member of the nine-strong ruling Politburo standing committee in charge of propaganda and the media. Ms Li now runs a private equity fund at Hong Kong-based Bank of China International focusing on the media sector, according to three people familiar with the matter. Stanford-educated Jeffrey Zeng, son of Zeng Peiyan, former vice-premier, has also set up a fund affiliated with state-owned financial institutions.

“This is turning into a crucial moment for the financial industry in China,” says the head of a foreign bank in Beijing.“But we are very worried that foreigners and other skilled Chinese are being shut out by a string of princelings and other very well-connected people trying to dominate [the private equity] market.”

The government has been encouraging the creation of a home-grown private equity industry in recent years but approvals to set up funds are tightly controlled and investments often require them from numerous state agencies. Having the relative of a top leader in its management team can help fledgling funds overcome these hurdles.

Princelings have long been suspected of leveraging parental political power for personal gain; the topic was a source of public anger during the 1989 Tiananmen Square student protests that ended in a bloody military crackdown. But Beijing political insiders say two men led the way for the ambitious new generation, fostering the modern perception of close ties between money and political power.

Levin Zhu, son of former premier Zhu Rongji, and Jiang Mianheng, son of former president Jiang Zemin, are familiar to many foreign investors, having worked for or set up joint ventures with several large western companies. Their fathers helped push through some of the past two decades’ most important market-based reforms, including World Trade Organisation membership.

Mr Zhu has a PhD in meteorology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Following a stint at Credit Suisse First Boston in New York, he returned to China in the late 1990s and orchestrated a virtual takeover of China International Capital Corp, a joint venture in which Morgan Stanley holds about 34 per cent.

Mr Jiang boasts a PhD in electrical engineering from Drexel University in Philadelphia. Returning to Shanghai in the early 1990s he was courted by foreign investors who saw him as the country’s most valuable joint venture partner. Today, he controls Shanghai Alliance Investment Limited, a government investment company operating much like a private equity firm.

With their parents both out of formal office since 2003, the influence of Mr Jiang and Mr Zhu has waned. But as children of the “third generation” of technocratic leaders, they are seen to have paved the way for the current wave of princelings. “Those two really helped create the image of Red families running this country for their own benefit,” according to one person who deals closely with many princeling families. “Their actions have given all the younger generation a green light to go out and aggressively build their own buckets of gold, no matter what the consequences for the image of the party or the leadership.”

By squeezing out foreigners and other competition, dominance of the private equity sector by princelings will bring few benefits in terms of management skills or financial discipline, some analysts and industry participants say.

“Private equity is a very good area for princelings because with these sorts of connections you can get into companies ahead of their IPOs and make a lot of money in a short space of time,” says Professor Victor Shih of Northwestern University. “It is an easy way to make money because everyone will be willing to back them because of their connections. Everyone will do it willingly in order to potentially get favours from senior leaders in return.”

People close to several private equity princelings say they often feel they are victims of reverse discrimination; that no matter how smart or hard-working they are, the public will assume their success relies purely on nepotism. However, some important operators in the Chinese sector, while benefiting from family links, are seen in the industry as well qualified in their own right. One such person is Liu Lefei, son of Liu Yunshan, head of the party’s central propaganda department. The younger Mr Liu previously managed Rmb1,000bn ($147bn; €109bn; £98bn) as chief investment officer for state-owned China Life Insurance and has taken over the reins of the state-controlled Citic private equity fund.

The Financial Times was unable to reach some of the individuals named in this article or their companies, and those who were contacted refused to comment.

Because it can prompt public dissatisfaction and accusations of nepotism, information about the private lives and business dealings of leaders and their offspring often falls within the scope of vague and wide-ranging state secrecy laws, regularly used to silence critics of the regime. Even the existence of leaders’ relatives is usually a well-guarded secret. Internet searches on princelings and their activities are usually blocked in China.

Most live in luxurious gated communities around Beijing and maintain holiday homes around the country and the world. Spouses are almost never seen in public. Younger, less discreet, princelings can be identified in Beijing by their luxury sports cars with military or paramilitary licence plates, which allow them to ignore traffic regulations and avoid being stopped by the police.

But the princelings themselves face a dilemma. If their business activities are too successful or high profile they may damage the political fortunes of their powerful parents, even without specific allegations of inappropriate dealings or special privileges.

Some analysts and industry insiders foresee a situation where the scions of powerful political families use the private equity industry to carve up parts of the economy at the expense not only of foreign investors but also of the older generations of princelings with direct bloodlines to China’s revolutionary Communist party founders.

But the constant jockeying for position within the party behind closed doors in Beijing is set to intensify as the next big leadership transition approaches in 2012. Some analysts say the private equity activities of the more aggressive younger princelings could be used by political enemies as a weapon against their parents.

In the case of Winston Wen, “You have to wonder if this will leave Wen [Jiabao] open to some sort of blackmail if his son has such a high-profile position in the financial sector, where all sorts of favours might be offered”, says Mr Shih. “What if someone gets some dirt on Winston Wen?”

PRIVATE EQUITY PRINCELINGS

‘Red-blooded ‘veterans versus ruthless arrivistes

The term “princeling” was coined to refer specifically to the children of senior leaders of China’s Communist revolution – the veterans who joined Mao Zedong on the fabled Long March of the mid-1930s or were members of the inner circle at the time of the 1949 Communist victory.

Today it is used more broadly to include the offspring of later generations of technocratic leaders – but a distinction remains between them and the truly “Red-blooded” revolutionary families.

Beijing political insiders say that distinction is made sharper today by the aggressive business dealings of the newer generation of princelings and their moves into the hot new field of private equity.

None of the most prominent players in the burgeoning domestic private equity sector is from the revolutionary dynasties that include the offspring of such Communist icons as Deng Xiaoping, the late paramount leader, and the children of the “eight immortal” party elders who supported his rule through the 1980s and 1990s.

“The old revolutionary royalty, like the family of Deng Xiaoping, are still untouchable and they regard this country as belonging to them in a very real sense,” says one such insider. “They see the newer generation of princelings as more ruthless, and some even go as far as saying that when the eunuchs become powerful it means the end of the dynasty is near.”

Some analysts see the private equity activities of princelings as a potential political problem as the government prepares for a leadership transition in 2012, especially since there is a recent precedent of senior leaders cracking down on the business activities of their predecessors’ children.

When he was consolidating his power in the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin, former president, shut down companies and arrested a number of business executives with close ties to Deng’s children.

After Hu Jintao, the current president, came to power in 2003 he launched a similar high-level crackdown that brought down the party secretary in Mr Jiang’s power base of Shanghai and netted prominent real estate developers and businessmen with close ties to his son.

In the jockeying for power and influence that is sure to dominate the Beijing political scene for the next two years and beyond, the new generation of princelings may become pawns in a high-stakes game, just as their predecessors did before them.

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2010-03-04T12:27:00.002-06:00

New Mobilization Law a Political Maneuver?

Well, I have been really busy with the local debt stuff that I hardly paid any attention to the on-going NPC session. Fortunately, I saw a twit yesterday on something I think will be very important. Apparently, the NPC will try to pass a law which divides the power to mobilize the army between three actors. First, a full or even a partial mobilization must be approved by the NPC Standing Committee. Second, both the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC) will implement this order from the NPC. To be sure, people say that well, that is just procedural because the army always just obey the party through the CMC.

This has been the case up to this point indeed. But imagine if Li Yuanchao was the head of the NPC and Li Keqiang was the premier, they now have strong legal grounds to veto a mobilization order by Xi Jinping, who at some point may become chairman of the CMC. May this be an intentional move by Hu Jintao to dilute the power of the CMC? I think so, and we can find numerous examples of this kind of power dilution through institutional changes. I think it is a brilliant move on the part of Hu. One implication, however, is that the principle of "party controlling the military" is weakened by this law because now the NPC has the constitutional authority to approve mobilization. This may have enormous long-term implications.

The key provision is "国务院、中央军事委员会领导全国的国防动员工作，制定国防动员工作的方针、政策和法规，向全国人民代表大会常务委员会提出实施国防动员的建议，根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定和国家主席发布的动员令，组织国防动员的实施。"

But then there is also an escape clause which allows the CMC to act unilaterally in an extreme emergency...

Here is the draft law:

国防动员法（草案）全文及说明
中国人大网 www.npc.gov.cn日期： 2009-04-24浏览字号：大中小打印本页关闭窗口

十一届全国人大常委会第八次会议初次审议了《中华人民共和国国防动员法(草案)》。现将《中华人民共和国国防动员法(草案)》及草案说明在中国人大网公布，向社会公开征集意见。社会各界群众可以直接登录中国人大网(www.npc.gov.cn)提出意见，也可以将意见寄送全国人大常委会法制工作委员会(北京市西城区西交民巷23号，邮编：100805，信封上请注明国防动员法草案征集意见)。意见征集截止日期：2009年5月31日。

中华人民共和国国防动员法（草案）

　　

第一章　总　　则

　　第一条　为了加强国防建设，完善国防动员制度，保障国防动员工作的顺利进行，维护国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全，制定本法。

　　第二条　国防动员的准备、实施以及相关活动，适用本法。

　　第三条　国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受威胁时，全国人民代表大会常务委员会依照宪法和有关法律的规定，决定全国总动员或者局部动员。国家主席根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定，发布动员令。

　　第四条　国防动员坚持平战结合、军民结合、寓军于民的方针，遵循统一领导、全民参与、长期准备、重点建设、统筹兼顾、有序高效的原则。

　　第五条　公民和组织在和平时期应当依法完成国防动员准备工作；国家决定实施国防动员后，公民和组织应当完成规定的国防动员任务。

　　第六条　国家保障国防动员所需经费。国防动员经费按照事权划分的原则，分别列入中央和地方财政预算。

　　第七条　国家对在国防动员工作中做出突出贡献的公民和组织，给予表彰和奖励。

第二章　组织领导机构及其职权

　　第八条　国务院、中央军事委员会领导全国的国防动员工作，制定国防动员工作的方针、政策和法规，向全国人民代表大会常务委员会提出实施国防动员的建议，根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定和国家主席发布的动员令，组织国防动员的实施。

　　国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受直接威胁必须立即采取应对措施时，国务院、中央军事委员会可以在全国人民代表大会常务委员会做出全国总动员或者局部动员决定之前，根据应急处置的需要，采取本法规定的国防动员措施，同时向全国人民代表大会常务委员会报告。

　　第九条　县级以上地方人民政府应当贯彻和执行国防动员工作的方针、政策和法律、法规，并依照法律规定的权限管理本行政区域的国防动员工作；国家决定实施国防动员后，应当根据上级下达的国防动员任务，组织本行政区域国防动员的实施。

　　第十条　国家国防动员委员会在国务院、中央军事委员会的领导下负责组织、指导、协调全国的国防动员工作；军区和县级以上地方人民政府国防动员委员会负责组织、指导、协调本区域的国防动员工作。

　　国防动员委员会的办事机构承担本级国防动员委员会的日常工作，依法履行有关的国防动员职责。

　　国家决定实施国防动员后，由国务院、中央军事委员会授权的机构负责组织指挥国防动员的实施。

　　第十一条　县级以上人民政府有关部门和军队有关部门在各自的职责范围内，负责有关的国防动员工作。

　　第十二条　国家的主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受的威胁消除后，应当按照决定实施国防动员的权限和程序解除国防动员。

第三章　国防动员计划、预案与潜力统计调查

　　第十三条　国家实行国防动员计划、国防动员实施预案和国防动员潜力统计调查制度。

　　第十四条　国防动员计划和国防动员实施预案，根据国防动员的方针和原则、国防动员潜力状况和军事需求编制。军事需求由军队有关部门按照规定的权限和程序提出。

　　第十五条　各级国防动员计划和国防动员实施预案的编制和审批，按照国家有关规定执行。

　　第十六条　县级以上人民政府应当将国防动员的相关内容纳入国民经济和社会发展计划。军队有关部门应当将国防动员实施预案纳入战备计划。

　　县级以上人民政府及其有关部门和军队有关部门应当按照职责落实国防动员计划，并按照国防动员实施预案组织演练。

　　第十七条　县级以上人民政府统计机构和有关部门应当根据国防动员的需要，准确及时地向本级国防动员委员会的办事机构提供有关统计资料。提供的统计资料不能满足需要时，国防动员委员会办事机构可以依据《中华人民共和国统计法》和国家有关规定组织开展国防动员潜力专项统计调查。

第四章　与国防密切相关的建设

项目和重要产品的国防要求

　　第十八条　根据国防动员的需要，与国防密切相关的建设项目和重要产品应当贯彻国防要求，具备国防功能。

　　第十九条　与国防密切相关的建设项目和重要产品目录，由国务院发展改革部门会同国务院其他有关部门以及军队有关部门拟定，报国务院、中央军事委员会批准。

　　列入目录的建设项目和重要产品，其军事需求由军队有关部门提出；建设项目审批、核准和重要产品设计定型时，县级以上人民政府有关主管部门应当征求军队有关部门的意见。

　　第二十条　列入目录的建设项目和重要产品，应当依照有关法律、行政法规和贯彻国防要求的技术标准进行设计、施工、监理和验收，保证建设项目和重要产品的质量。

　　第二十一条　企业事业单位投资或者参与投资列入目录的建设项目建设和重要产品制造的，依照有关法律、行政法规和国家有关规定，享受补贴或者其他政策优惠。

　　第二十二条　县级以上人民政府应当对列入目录的建设项目和重要产品贯彻国防要求工作给予指导和政策扶持，县级以上人民政府有关部门应当按照职责做好有关的管理工作。

第五章　预备役人员的储备与征召

　　第二十三条　国家根据国防动员的需要，储备所需的预备役人员。

　　国务院、中央军事委员会根据国防动员的需要，决定预备役人员储备的规模、种类和方式。

　　第二十四条　预备役人员按照专业对口、便于动员的原则，采取预编到现役部队、编入预备役部队、编入民兵组织或者其他形式进行储备。

　　第二十五条　国家根据国防动员需要，建立预备役专业技术兵员储备区。

　　第二十六条　县级以上地方人民政府兵役机关负责组织实施本行政区域预备役人员的储备工作。县级以上地方人民政府有关部门、预备役人员所在乡（镇）人民政府、街道办事处或者企业事业单位，应当协助兵役机关做好预备役人员储备的有关工作。

　　第二十七条　预编到现役部队和编入预备役部队的预备役人员、预定征召的其他预备役人员，离开常住户口所在地1个月以上的，应当向其预备役登记的兵役机关报告去向、联系方式；联系方式发生变化的，应当及时报告变更情况。

　　第二十八条　国家决定实施国防动员后，县级人民政府兵役机关应当根据上级的命令，迅速向被征召的预备役人员下达征召通知。

　　接到征召通知的预备役人员应当按照通知要求的时间，到指定地点报到。

　　第二十九条　被征召的预备役人员所在单位应当协助兵役机关做好预备役人员的征召工作。

　　从事交通运输的单位和个人，应当优先运送被征召的预备役人员。

　　第三十条　国家决定实施国防动员后，预定征召的预备役人员，未经其常住户口所在地的县级人民政府兵役机关批准，不得离开常住户口所在地；已经离开常住户口所在地的，接到兵役机关要求其返回的通知，应当立即返回。

第六章　战略物资储备与调用

　　第三十一条　国家实行适应国防动员需要的战略物资储备和调用制度。

　　战略物资储备由国务院有关主管部门组织实施。

　　第三十二条　承担战略物资储备任务的单位，应当按照国家有关规定和标准对储备物资进行保管和维护，定期调整更换，保证储备物资的使用效能和安全。

　　国家按照有关规定对承担战略物资储备任务的单位给予补贴。

　　第三十三条　战略物资按照国家有关规定调用。国家决定实施国防动员后，战略物资的调用由国务院和中央军事委员会批准。

第三十四条　国防动员所需的其他物资的储备和调用，依照有关法律、行政法规的规定执行。

第七章　军品科研、生产和维修保障

　　第三十五条　国家建立军品科研、生产和维修保障动员体系，根据战时军队订货和装备保障的需要，储备军品科研、生产和维修保障能力。

　　本法所称军品，是指用于军事目的的装备、物资以及专用生产设备、器材等。

　　第三十六条　军品科研、生产和维修保障能力储备的种类、布局和规模，由国务院有关主管部门会同军队有关部门提出方案，报国务院、中央军事委员会批准后组织实施。

　　第三十七条　承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位，应当根据所担负的国防动员任务，储备军品转产、扩大生产所需的设备、材料、技术，建立军品转产、扩大生产所需的专业技术队伍，制定和完善军品的转产、扩大生产预案和措施。

　　第三十八条　各级人民政府应当支持和帮助承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位开发和应用先进的军民两用技术，推广军民通用的技术标准，提高军品转产、扩大生产的综合保障能力。

　　第三十九条　国家决定实施国防动员后，承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位，应当按照国家军事订货合同和转产、扩大生产的要求，组织军品科研、生产，保证军品质量，按时交付订货，协助军队完成维修保障任务。为军品转产、扩大生产提供能源、材料、设备和配套产品的单位，应当优先满足军品转产、扩大生产的需要。

　　国家对因承担军品转产、扩大生产任务造成直接经济损失的单位给予补偿。

第八章　战争灾害的预防与救助

　　第四十条　国家实行战争灾害的预防与救助制度，保护人民生命和财产安全，保障国防动员潜力和持续动员能力。

　　第四十一条　国家建立军事、经济目标和首脑机关分级防护制度。分级防护标准由国务院、中央军事委员会规定。

　　军事、经济目标和首脑机关的防护工作，由县级以上人民政府会同有关军事机关共同组织实施。

　　第四十二条　承担军事、经济目标和首脑机关防护任务的单位，应当制定防护计划和抢险抢修预案，组织防护演练，落实防护措施，提高综合防护效能。

　　第四十三条　国家决定实施国防动员后，人员、物资的疏散和隐蔽，在本行政区域进行的，由本级人民政府决定并组织实施；跨行政区域进行的，由相关行政区域共同的上一级人民政府决定并组织实施。

　　承担人员、物资疏散和隐蔽任务的单位，应当按照有关人民政府的决定，在规定时间内完成疏散和隐蔽任务。

　　第四十四条　战争灾害发生时，当地人民政府应当迅速启动应急救助机制，组织力量抢救伤员、保护财产，尽快消除战争灾害后果，恢复正常生产生活秩序。

　　遭受战争灾害的人员和组织应当及时采取自救、互救措施，减少战争灾害造成的损失。

第九章　国防勤务

　　第四十五条　国家决定实施国防动员后，县级以上人民政府根据国防动员实施的需要，可以动员符合本法规定条件的公民和组织担负国防勤务。

　　本法所称国防勤务，是指支援保障军队作战、承担预防与救助战争灾害以及协助维护社会秩序的任务。

　　第四十六条　18周岁至60周岁的男性公民和18周岁至55周岁的女性公民，应当担负国防勤务；但有下列情形之一的，免于担负国防勤务：

　　（一）从事托儿所、幼儿园和孤儿院、养老院、残疾人康复机构、救助站等社会福利机构管理和服务工作的公民；

　　（二）从事义务教育阶段学校教学、管理和服务工作的公民；

　　（三）怀孕和在哺乳期内的女性公民；

　　（四）患病无法担负国防勤务的公民；

　　（五）丧失劳动能力的公民；

　　（六）在联合国等政府间国际组织任职的公民；

　　（七）其他经县级以上人民政府决定免予担负国防勤务的公民。

　　第四十七条　被确定担负国防勤务的人员，应当服从指挥，遵守纪律，保守秘密。担负国防勤务的人员所在单位应当给予支持和协助。

　　第四十八条　交通运输、邮政、电信、医药卫生、食品和粮食供应、工程建筑、能源化工、大型水利设施、民用核设施、新闻媒体、国防科研生产和市政设施保障单位，应当依法担负国防勤务。

　　前款规定的单位平时应当按照专业对口、人员精干、应急有效的原则组建专业保障队伍，组织训练、演练，提高完成国防勤务的保障能力。

　　第四十九条　公民和组织担负国防勤务，由县级以上人民政府负责组织。担负预防与救助战争灾害、协助维护社会秩序勤务的公民和专业保障队伍，由当地人民政府指挥，并提供勤务和生活保障；跨行政区域执行勤务的，由相关行政区域的县级以上地方人民政府组织落实相关保障；担负军队作战支援保障勤务的公民和专业保障队伍，由所在部队指挥，并提供勤务和生活保障。

　　第五十条　担负国防勤务的人员在执行勤务期间，继续享有原工作单位的工资、津贴和其他福利待遇；没有工作单位的，由当地县级人民政府参照民兵执行战备勤务的补贴标准给予补贴；因执行国防勤务伤亡的，由当地县级人民政府依照《军人抚恤优待条例》的有关规定给予抚恤优待。

第十章　民用资源征用与补偿

　　第五十一条　国家决定实施国防动员后，储备物资无法及时满足动员需要的，县级以上人民政府可以依法对民用资源进行征用。

　　本法所称民用资源，是指公民和组织所有或者使用的用于社会生产、服务和生活的设施、设备、场所和其他物资。

　　第五十二条　任何公民和组织都有接受依法征用民用资源的义务。

　　需要使用民用资源的中国人民解放军现役部队和预备役部队、中国人民武装警察部队、民兵组织，应当提出征用需求，由县级以上地方人民政府统一组织征用。县级以上地方人民政府应当对被征用的民用资源予以登记，向被征用人出具收据。

　　第五十三条　下列民用资源免予征用：

　　（一）个人和家庭生活必需的物品和居住场所；

　　（二）托儿所、幼儿园和孤儿院、养老院、残疾人康复机构、救助站等社会福利机构保障儿童、老人、残疾人和救助对象生活必需的物品和居住场所；

　　（三）法律、行政法规规定免予征用的其他民用资源。

　　第五十四条被征用的民用资源根据军事要求需要进行改造的，由县级以上地方人民政府会同有关军事机关组织实施。

　　承担改造任务的单位应当按照使用单位提出的军事要求和改造方案进行改造，并保证按期交付使用。改造所需经费由国家负担。

　　第五十五条　被征用的民用资源使用完毕，县级以上地方人民政府应当及时组织返还；经过改造的，应当恢复原使用功能后返还；不能修复或者灭失的，以及因征用给公民或者组织造成直接经济损失的，按照国家有关规定给予补偿。

　　第五十六条　中国人民解放军现役部队和预备役部队、中国人民武装警察部队、民兵组织进行军事演习、训练，需要征用民用资源或者采取临时性管制措施的，按照国务院、中央军事委员会的有关规定执行。

第十一章　宣传教育

　　第五十七条　各级人民政府应当组织开展国防动员的宣传教育，增强公民的国防观念和依法履行国防义务的意识。有关军事机关应当协助做好国防动员的宣传教育工作。

　　第五十八条　国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位和基层群众性自治组织，应当组织所属人员学习和掌握必要的国防知识与技能。

　　第五十九条　各级人民政府应当运用各类宣传媒体和宣传手段，对公民进行爱国主义、革命英雄主义宣传教育，激发公民的爱国热情，鼓励公民踊跃参战支前，采取多种形式开展拥军优属和慰问活动，按照国家有关规定做好抚恤优待工作。

　　新闻出版、广播影视和网络传媒等单位，应当按照国防动员的要求做好宣传教育工作。

第十二章　特别措施

　　第六十条　国家决定实施国防动员后，根据需要，可以依法在实施国防动员的区域采取下列特别措施：

　　（一）对金融、交通运输、邮政、电信、新闻媒体、广播影视、能源水源供应、医药卫生、食品和粮食供应、商业贸易等行业实行监管；

　　（二）对人员活动的区域、时间、方式以及物资、运载工具进出的区域进行必要的限制；

　　（三）在国家机关、社会团体和企业事业单位实行特殊工作制度；

　　（四）为武装力量优先提供各种交通保障；

　　（五）需要采取的其他特别措施。

　　第六十一条　在全国或者部分省、自治区、直辖市实行特别措施，由国务院、中央军事委员会决定并组织实施；在省、自治区、直辖市范围内的部分地区实行特别措施，由国务院、中央军事委员会决定，由特别措施实施区域所在省、自治区、直辖市人民政府和同级军事机关组织实施。

　　第六十二条　组织实施特别措施的机关应当在规定的权限、区域和时限内实施特别措施。特别措施实施区域内的公民和组织，应当服从组织实施特别措施的机关的管理。

　　第六十三条　采取特别措施不再必要时，应当及时终止。

第十三章　法律责任

　　第六十四条　公民有下列行为之一的，由县级人民政府有关主管部门责令改正；拒不改正的，处2000元以上2万元以下罚款：

　　（一）预编到现役部队和编入预备役部队的预备役人员、预定征召的其他预备役人员离开常住户口所在地1个月以上未向兵役机关报告的；

　　（二）国家决定实施国防动员后，预定征召的预备役人员未经兵役机关批准离开常住户口所在地，或者未按照兵役机关要求及时返回的；

　　（三）拒绝、逃避征召、担负国防勤务的；

　　（四）拒绝、拖延民用资源征用或者阻碍对被征用的民用资源进行改造的；

　　（五）干扰、破坏国防动员工作秩序，或者阻碍从事国防动员工作的人员依法履行职责的。

　　公民有前款第（三）、（四）项行为的，县级人民政府有关主管部门可以强制其履行；战时有前款第（三）、（四）、（五）项行为，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

　　第六十五条　企业事业单位有下列行为之一的，由有关人民政府主管部门责令改正；拒不改正的，处5万元以上20万元以下罚款：

　　（一）在承建的贯彻国防要求的建设项目中未按照国防要求和规定标准进行设计或者施工、生产的；

　　（二）因管理不善导致战略储备物资丢失损坏的，或者不服从战略储备物资调用的；

　　（三）未按照转产、扩大生产任务的要求进行军品科研、生产和维修保障能力储备的，或者未按照规定组建专业技术队伍的；

　　（四）拒绝、拖延执行专业保障任务的；

　　（五）拒绝或者故意延误军事订货的；

　　（六）拒绝、拖延民用资源征用或者阻碍对被征用的民用资源进行改造的；

　　（七）阻挠公民履行征召、担负国防勤务义务的。

　　企业事业单位有前款第（二）、(三)、（四）、（五）、（六）、（七）项行为的，有关人民政府主管部门可以强制其履行；战时有前款第（五）、（六）项行为，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

　　第六十六条　有下列行为之一的，对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员，依法给予处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任：

　　（一）拒不执行上级下达的国防动员命令的；

　　（二）滥用职权或者玩忽职守，给国防动员工作造成严重损失的；

　　（三）对征用的民用资源管理、使用不善，造成严重损坏，或者不按照规定予以返还或者补偿的；

　　（四）泄露国防动员秘密的；

　　（五）贪污、挪用国防动员经费、物资的；

　　（六）滥用职权，侵犯和损害公民和组织合法权益的。

第十四章　附则

　　第六十七条　本法自年月日起施行。

关于《中华人民共和国国防动员法

（草案）》的说明

　　

一、制定国防动员法的必要性

　　国防动员是《中华人民共和国国防法》确立的一项国防基本制度，是维护国家安全与发展的战略措施。制定一部具有中国特色的国防动员法，依法加强国防动员建设，增强国防潜力，对于提升综合国力，维护国家安全和发展，具有十分重要的意义。

　　（一）制定国防动员法是填补国防动员立法的空白，完善中国特色社会主义法律体系的需要。

　　随着我国立法工作的加速发展，以宪法为核心的中国特色社会主义法律体系基本形成。党的十七大明确提出，要加快建设社会主义法治国家，完善中国特色社会主义法律体系。制定国防动员法，尽快建立起我国国防动员的基本制度，是实现国防动员工作有法可依的重要举措，是完善中国特色社会主义法律体系的实际步骤。加强国防动员法律制度建设，也是世界主要国家的普遍做法。中国作为一个大国，也应当有一部具有中国特色的国防动员法。

　　（二）制定国防动员法是提高国家平战转换能力，维护国家安全的需要。

　　当今世界，和平与发展仍然是时代的主题。但世界并不安宁，霸权主义与强权政治依然存在，局部冲突和热点问题此起彼伏，传统安全威胁与非传统安全威胁相互交织，国家安全面临诸多挑战，为此，必须增强忧患意识和国防观念。制定国防动员法，对国防动员做出明确规范，为平时动员准备和战时动员实施提供法律依据，切实提高国家平战转换的能力，确保国家主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受威胁时，能够迅速依法动员，将国防潜力转化为军事实力。

　　（三）制定国防动员法是适应经济社会发展变化，保证国防动员工作健康发展的需要。

　　随着我国社会主义市场经济和社会事业的加快发展，国防动员工作所处的社会环境发生了深刻变化，过去主要依靠行政手段开展国防动员的做法已难以适应新的形势和要求，迫切需要通过制定国防动员法，建立起适应国家经济社会发展变化的国防动员工作体制机制，科学规范政府、公民和组织在国防动员活动中的责任、权利和义务。

　　二、草案起草的简要经过

　　1998年12月，国防动员法列入了《九届全国人大常委会立法规划》；2000年9月，国防动员法起草工作全面展开。八年来，国防动员法起草领导小组及办公室，认真学习党和国家领导人有关国防动员的重要论述以及国家有关国防动员的政策规定，搜集各地开展国防动员的经验以及国外有关国防动员的立法情况，先后到17个省、自治区、直辖市和40多个地市以及7个军区进行实地调研，召开数十次不同类型座谈会，组织有关机构和专家学者就国防动员立法中政策性、理论性、专业性较强的问题，进行研究论证，并与国家和军队有关部门反复沟通协商。在此基础上，起草了草案征求意见稿。之后，将征求意见稿先后3次印发国家和军队有关部门以及各省、自治区、直辖市国防动员委员会征求意见，并认真做了修改；草案经国家国防动员委员会审议通过，呈报国务院、中央军委后，国务院和中央军委法制工作机构进一步征求了国家和军队有关部门以及各省、自治区、直辖市人民政府的意见，根据各方面的意见对草案又做了反复研究修改。

　　三、对草案中几个主要问题的说明

　　(一)关于国防动员的组织领导体制。

　　建立科学合理、权威高效的国防动员组织领导体制，是提高国家动员能力的组织保证。根据宪法和国防法对国家机构国防职权的规定，草案对国防动员的组织领导机构及其职权划分做了规定。一是规定了全国人民代表大会常务委员会依照宪法和有关法律的规定，决定全国总动员或者局部动员。国家主席根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定，发布动员令。(第三条)国务院、中央军事委员会领导全国的国防动员工作，根据全国人民代表大会常务委员会的决定和国家主席发布的动员令，组织国防动员的实施。(第八条第一款)二是为了能够有效应对国家主权、统一、领土完整和安全遭受直接威胁的紧急情况，草案规定：国务院、中央军事委员会可以在全国人民代表大会常务委员会做出动员决定之前，根据应急处置的需要，采取本法规定的国防动员措施，同时向全国人民代表大会常务委员会报告。(第八条第二款)三是规定了国家国防动员委员会在国务院、中央军事委员会的领导下负责组织、指导、协调全国的国防动员工作，国防动员委员会的办事机构承担本级国防动员委员会的日常工作，依法履行有关的国防动员职责；国家决定实施国防动员后，由国务院、中央军事委员会授权的机构负责组织指挥国防动员的实施。(第十条)这些规定有利于加强国防动员工作的集中统一领导，为有关各方履职尽责、协调一致地抓好国防动员工作提供了法律依据。

　　(二)关于经济建设的国防要求。

　　在经济建设中贯彻国防要求，是我国抓国防动员建设的一条成功经验，也是贯彻国防建设与经济建设协调发展方针，实现平战结合、军民结合、寓军于民的重要举措。为了使经济建设贯彻国防要求、保证战时国民经济的快速转换，草案一是规定县级以上人民政府应当将国防动员的相关内容纳入国民经济和社会发展计划。(第十六条第一款)二是规定与国防密切相关的建设项目和重要产品实行目录管理；列入目录的建设项目和重要产品，其军事需求由军队有关部门提出；建设项目审批、核准和重要产品设计定型时，县级以上人民政府有关主管部门应当征求军队有关部门的意见。(第十九条)三是规定列入目录的建设项目和重要产品，应当依照有关法律、行政法规和贯彻国防要求的技术标准进行设计、施工、监理和验收。(第二十条)四是规定县级以上人民政府应当对列入目录的建设项目和重要产品贯彻国防要求工作给予指导和政策扶持，县级以上人民政府有关部门应当按照职责做好有关的管理工作。（第二十二条）这些规定为各地各部门在经济建设和社会发展中贯彻国防要求提供了基本的法律依据。

　　(三)关于预备役人员的储备与征召。

　　预备役人员的储备与征召是人民武装力量动员的基础，草案针对市场经济条件下人员流动频繁的特点和信息化条件下局部战争快速动员的要求，对预备役人员的储备与征召做出了相应规定。一是规定国家根据国防动员的需要储备所需的预备役人员；储备应当按照专业对口、便于动员的原则进行。(第二十三条、第二十四条)二是规定了国家决定实施国防动员后，县级以上人民政府的兵役机关、被征召的预备役人员所在单位以及被征召的预备役人员的责任和义务。(第二十六条至第三十条)草案还规定：预编到现役部队和编入预备役部队的预备役人员、预定征召的其他预备役人员，离开常住户口所在地1个月以上的，应当向其预备役登记的兵役机关报告去向、联系方式；联系方式发生变化的，应当及时报告变更情况。（第二十七条）这些规定为加强后备兵员管理，解决好战时首批动员和持续动员问题提供了法律保障。

　　（四）关于物资动员。

　　物资动员是国防动员的重要方面，对于保障战时的物资需要具有重要作用。草案从战略物资储备与调用，军品科研、生产和维修保障，民用资源征用与补偿三个方面，确立了物资动员的基本制度。一是规定国家实行适应国防动员需要的战略物资储备和调用制度。战略物资储备由国务院有关主管部门组织实施；国家决定实施国防动员后，战略物资的调用由国务院和中央军事委员会批准。（第三十一条、第三十三条）二是规定了国家建立军品科研、生产和维修保障动员体系，根据战时军队订货和装备保障的需要，储备军品科研、生产和维修保障能力。(第七章)三是规定了国家决定实施国防动员后，在储备物资无法及时满足动员需要的情况下，县级以上人民政府可以依法对民用资源进行征用。(第五十一条第一款)这些规定，充分体现了寓动员潜力于经济实力之中的要求，有利于从根本上提高国家的动员能力。

　　(五)关于公民和组织的国防义务与权利。

　　按照权利与义务相一致的原则，草案对有关公民和组织的国防动员义务和权利做了规定。一是规定公民和组织在和平时期应当依法完成国防动员准备工作；国家决定实施国防动员后，应当完成规定的国防动员任务。(第五条)二是对承担贯彻国防要求建设项目的企业事业单位，承担战略物资储备任务的单位，承担军品转产、扩大生产任务的单位的国防动员义务以及所享有的补贴、补偿和政策优惠做了规定。(第二十一条、第三十二条、第三十九条)三是规定国家决定实施国防动员后，县级以上人民政府根据国防动员实施的需要，可以动员符合本法规定条件的公民和组织担负支援保障军队作战、承担预防与救助战争灾害等国防勤务。(第四十五条)对担负国防勤务的人员，在执行勤务期间的工资、补贴和伤亡抚恤等待遇做了规定。(第五十条)四是规定了任何公民和组织都有接受依法征用民用资源的义务，并对征用的程序和补偿的原则以及免予征用的资源做了规定。(第十章)这些规定，把保证公民和组织依法履行国防动员义务与保障公民和组织因履行国防动员义务而享有的合法权益有机地统一起来，有利于将对公民和组织的国防动员落到实处。

　　(六)关于特别措施。

　　为了保证战时动员的顺利实施，需要对关系国计民生的重要行业和社会实行管制、限制等特别措施。这是世界主要国家国防动员的通行做法。草案规定的特别措施主要是国家决定实施国防动员后，根据需要，可以对关系国计民生的重要行业实行监管；对人员活动的区域、时间、方式以及物资、运载工具进出的区域进行必要的限制；在国家机关、社会团体和企业事业单位实行特殊工作制度等特别措施。(第六十条)草案同时规定了实行特别措施的决定机关、组织实施机关和实施的要求。(第六十一条至第六十三条)这些规定，完善了国防动员的措施和手段，对保障战时动员任务的完成具有重要意义。

　　草案还规定了违反本法的法律责任，保证法律的执行，维护法律的严肃性。

2010-02-14T23:50:00.003-06:00

Expose on Princelings

Really not much to add to this wonderful expose on princeling politics and business by Sydney Morning Herald reporter John Garnaut. I wholeheartedly agree that Bo junior is indeed trying to demonstrate something to somebody by going after Peng Zhen's children and the Deng clan. I think Bo's actions will make the coming two years very interesting...

http://www.smh.com.au/world/children-of-the-revolution-20100212-nxjh.html

Children of the revolution

JOHN GARNAUT

February 13, 2010

A sensational court case has exposed the power and connections of China's princelings, writes John Garnaut.

The arrest and kangaroo-court conviction of another successful lawyer might hardly be worth mentioning in a place where imprisoning, deregistering, or beating lawyers for doing their jobs is becoming commonplace. But the case of Li Zhuang has generated a heated 10-week media and internet debate in China, and not just because of the way it was carried out.

It is the first time a lawyer has been convicted of coaching his client to lie on the basis of testimony from mobster, Gong Gangmo, according to another respected lawyer (who has himself been beaten and deregistered for representing the wrong kind of clients). The 4000-word character assassination planted in the China Youth Daily straight after Li's arrest was also unusual.

But it is the background to this case that makes it so riveting for onlookers and disruptive for China's political status quo.

The man who must have authorised Li's arrest is Bo Xilai, the only Politburo member who can comfortably wear epithets such as colourful, mercurial or maverick. The Communist Party boss of the central-west city of Chongqing has captivated the nation with a brave but risky war against the city's organised crime.

Bo got to where he is partly because he is the son of Bo Yibo, one of China's "eight immortals" - the tag for an exalted club of revolutionaries who lived long enough to stamp their marks on China's reform era history.

The China Youth Daily hinted at the equally impressive power behind the lawyer that Bo arrested: "As Li Zhuang arrived at Chongqing, he began to play the peacock, saying many times 'do you know my background? Do you know who my boss is?"

What the censors won't let local media spell out is that Li's law firm is headed by Fu Yang, who is the son of Peng Zhen, also one of the eight immortals and more powerful than Bo Yibo. Li's lawyer from the same Kangda law firm, Gao Zicheng, said he could not talk about the background politics: "I can't go there …''

But the fathers Bo Yibo and Peng Zhen were once factional allies. Their families lived close together and were closely entwined, often entertaining guests at a Shanxi restaurant they both helped to open, says a Beijing political aficionado.

"Both Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo were loyalists of [Mao's one time chosen successor] Liu Shaoqi," says Huang Jing, a visiting professor at the National University of Singapore. "This hate-love relationship is certainly inherited by their children."

So it turns out that Bo Xilai has just spectacularly arrested, convicted and rejected the appeal of a lawyer who works for Bo's equally powerful childhood playmate, Fu Yang.

The Communist Party has enjoyed enormous success in turning China into a powerful nation and lifting its citizens out of poverty. But the party is also a club that allocates political, financial and social privilege to its members. It has its own internal system of hierarchy and quasi-royalty, where revolutionary leaders bequeath their status to their children and children's children. Those descendants are called "princelings" in China.

Mostly, China's princelings get on with expanding the national cake and carving it up. It was Bo Xilai's own father, Bo Yibo, who is said to have helped institutionalise the princeling nexus of power and wealth in the 1990s by supporting a proposal that each powerful family can have only one princeling in politics, leaving other siblings to cash their political inheritances for financial ones.

But the case of lawyer Li Zhuang suggests the country may not be big enough for all of them.

Political analysts say Bo is pursuing an audacious but calculated political strategy. Most say he is appealing directly to the people by implicitly attacking his peers, in the hope of forcing his own promotion into the nine-member Politburo standing committee at the next leadership reshuffle in 2012.

"Bo Xilai is indeed challenging the privilege of some princelings to boost his own popularity," says Bo Zhiyue, an expert on China's princelings at the National University of Singapore.

It's not impossible for an outsider to secure the right patrons and make it to the top, like President Hu Jintao (who was anointed by former party secretaries Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping).

Generally, however, modern China belongs to the children of the revolution. All three officers appointed last year to the rank of full general in the People's Liberation Army were children of senior party leaders. Xi Jinping, who many expect to be the next president, is the son of a revolutionary hero. Eight or nine of the 25-member Politburo are princelings (defined as having a parent or parent in-law who held the rank of vice-minister or above), according to Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institutution. In the previous Politburo there were only three.

The strategic heights of China's economy are also in princeling hands.

The family of former president Jiang Zemin - whose adopted father was a revolutionary martyr - pulls strings in the telecommunications, railways and postal systems. The family of former premier Li Peng - who was adopted by former premier Zhou Enlai - has outsized influence over electricity production, transmission and hydro-electric dam building. His daughter Li Xiaolin, who became famous in Australia this week for her disagreement with Clive Palmer over a $60 billion deal, is at the helm of a major power generating company. Her brother headed another large electricity company before being transferred to help run the coal-powered province of Shanxi. Family friend Liu Zhenya controls the electricity grid.

Distinctions between state and personal enterprise are not always clear in China. Some of the most eminent princeling families discreetly control large companies that are listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, sometimes in concert with Hong Kong's mega-billionaire families, and often through loyal personal secretaries or close relatives who have changed their names.

Further in the background, Chinese political analysts say the descendants of Marshall Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo are China's real political and financial king makers.

Which brings us back to Bo Yibo and Peng Zhen's children, Bo Xilai and Fu Yang.

Overwhelmingly, China's intellectuals and the legal professionals castigated Bo Xilai (although not by name) for his crackdown in Chongqing and for cloaking himself as a modern day Maoist and making a mockery of the rule of law.

The intellectual tide seemed to turn last week when the accused lawyer, Li Zhuang, shocked his own legal advisers with this open court confession: "I fabricated evidence to deceive the police, the procuratorate, and the court to exculpate Gong."

While that confession was itself clouded in controversy, liberal opinion leaders began to reframe the debate. Li and his law firm, Kangda, are respected for being very good at what they do. But they are also welded into the elite of a Communist Party judicial system that runs on kickbacks and connections.

It is no stretch to say the fathers of Kang Da's three founding principals ran China's entire political-security and judicial systems in the 1980s.

The law firm was itself spun out of the legal department of an immensely profitable and unaccountable corporate-charity empire called Kanghua, which was run by Deng Pufang, son of Deng Xiaoping. Controversy about this type of cronyism was one ingredient in the build up of public unease leading up to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989.

All that concealed backdrop helps explain why Li was once again the leading chat topic on leading blogging portals this week, after a Chongqing court rejected his appeal but reduced his jail sentence.

"Bo is the great saviour of Chinese ordinary people," said one reader's comment on the People's Daily website. "Strike hard against gangsters and black lawyers. Drag all their [mafia] uncles out!"

And Bo hasn't just locked up one well-connected lawyer who may or may not have been doing his job. In China it is impossible for the mafia to thrive without it being joined at the hip to the Communist Party, as the open trials of some of Bo's nearly 800 gangland prosecutions have shown.

Wen Qiang, Chongqing's former deputy police chief and then justice bureau chief, was in court trying to explain more than 16 million yuan ($2.6 million) of suspected kickbacks and sheltering mobsters such as his sister-in-law, "the godmother of Chongqing".

But it emerged in court for the first time this week that the bulk of Wen's wealth was acquired from payments received in return for handing out promotions.

"The trial of the underworld has become a trial of corrupt officials,'' wrote Liang Jing, the pseudonym of a political columnist on overseas Chinese language websites.

Yang Hengjun, one of China's most influential political commentators, had previously criticised Bo for his Maoist rhetoric and politicisation of the legal process. Last week he took a different course, skating close to the limits of permissible speech, after his email inbox had filled to overflowing with unhappy readers.

Yang wrote that the whole debate about defending "rule of law" in Chongqing was premised on the assumption that there was actually something already resembling "rule of law" anywhere in China, which there patently is not.

"If you are serious about spreading the 'rule of law' in China I have a suggestion," he wrote.

"All legal elites and opinion leaders can join hundreds of thousands of netizens in demanding that Chongqing's fight against gangsters be introduced across the whole nation so that it can terminate unlawful 'rule of law' by corrupt officials."

In the end, writes Yang, debates about rule of law will remain academic in China for as long as it is run by a one-party state: ''Only a greater political system or democracy can provide an answer.''

Privately, close political observers in China say that whatever you think of Bo Xilai or his personal motivations, he has thrown a bomb inside Party Central. His public dissection of Chongqing's power and protection rackets invites Chinese people to worry and talk more openly about whether their country is evolving towards some kind of mafia state.

Some liberal thinkers hope Bo is a catalyst for those in the system who are not beholden to "princelings" - perhaps the Vice-Premier, Li Keqiang - to rise and challenge the party's privileges. But the party's princeling bonds will be hard to break. To the extent that they stick together they will loosen their grip on power only when necessary to preserve it.

"Reporters have every reason to explore the infighting among the princelings,'' writes Cheng Li, at the Brookings Institution.

''But I believe the princelings' incentive for co-operation and the need to share wealth and power are far more important than their internal tensions and conflicts.''

John Garnaut is the Herald's correspondent in Beijing.

2010-02-10T11:38:00.000-06:00

Looming Problem of Local Debt in China-- 1.6 Trillion Dollar and Rising

Did China accomplish the impossible? Did it generate almost 9% growth and maintain low debt to GDP ratio even as its export plummeted by 20%? What about claims that the torrent of investment in China has come without too much leveraging? After spending half a year looking into the debt level of local government investment entities-- some 8000 of them-- my conclusion is no. As in the past, the Chinese government just ordered banks to lend to investment companies set up by both central and local governments. Local governments have fully taken advantage of the green light in late 2008 and borrowed an enormous sums from banks and bond investors starting in late 2008 (well, a large amount even before that). In an editorial in the Asian Wall Street Journal yesterday, I outline some problems with this massive amount of borrowing:

Beijing is no longer sure how much money local investment entities have borrowed from banks and raised from bond and equity investors. The amount, however, must be large. In September, the Chinese press, citing government sources, suggested that these entities have borrowed $880 billion (6 trillion yuan). In a January interview with the Twentieth Century Business Herald, a Chinese newspaper, the vice chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress, Yi Zhongliu, revealed that local investment entities borrowed some $735 billion in 2009 alone.

These are mere guesses, however. A National Audit Agency audit conducted late last year uncovered so many problems with the data that Premier Wen Jiabao ordered another large-scale audit of local investment entities. Until a thorough audit is completed and the results announced to the public, no one really knows the total scale of local borrowing.

Given the information vacuum surrounding this issue, I spent half a year collecting data that would allow me to provide an estimate of total local debt (and also for each of China's provinces). Again, in the WSJ piece, I briefly outline my methodology and the results in the piece.

To obtain an independent estimate, I collected data from thousands of sources, including regulatory filings, bond-rating reports and press releases of government-bank cooperative agreements. I estimate local investment entities' borrowing between 2004 and the end of 2009 totals some $1.6 trillion. The data are far from perfect because borrowing by low-level government entities and lending by small banks are difficult to track. Nonetheless, my evidence suggests that the scale of the problem is much larger than previous government estimates. At $1.6 trillion, the size of local debt is roughly one-third of China's 2009 GDP and 70% of its foreign-exchange reserves.

So basically, in addition to the 20% of official debt-to-GDP ratio, one has to add an additional 30%. We also have to add other debt that the central government guarantees, such as the nearly 1 trillion RMB in Ministry of Railway bonds and bonds issued by the asset management companies. All of this gives China a high debt to GDP ratio. Also, there are some disturbing implications of this high debt. For one, local governments would have to sell lots and lots of land every year for many years to come to pay interest payment on this debt. Thus, to the extent that there is a real estate bubble today, it must continue for local governments to remain solvent. Regardless of what you believe about Chinese real estate, you have to think that this growth in real estate and land prices must slow or reverse at some point.

I think that the best course of action for the Chinese government is to credibly stop leveraging by local investment companies. Instead of the half measures in place today, a public and stern order should be given to banks to stop lending to all new projects undertaken by these local entities. Other measures should follow:

Since county governments are in the poorest fiscal shape and have the least ability to repay banks, the central government should take over the debt of almost all of the county-level investment vehicles. Although this will increase China's debt-to-GDP ratio significantly, the total would still be low by international standards.

A sudden contraction of lending to local investment vehicles will generate a wave of nonperforming loans, but a greater reliance on market mechanisms can easily solve this problem over the next few years. First, banks will fully recover the debt of the healthiest local entities, which may account for half of total local debt. For the remainder, the government needs to allow banks to directly sell subprime or distressed loans to both foreign and domestic investors. Beijing need not fear that China's listed banks will sell their nonperforming loans at below-market prices, as these banks report to shareholders. Banks, in conjunction with investment banks and distressed-asset investors, should also explore ways to securitize local debt for sale to both domestic and international investors. The latter in particular would have a healthy appetite for yuan-denominated security, anticipating a currency revaluation soon.

Basically, I think the Chinese government can turn this into a great opportunity for market reform in the financial system and the internationalization of the RMB. However, it has to act soon before local debt gets too large to handle.

2010-01-31T22:46:00.003-06:00

Northwestern University's Most Distinguished Alumni

While I am in the mood, I would like to post my favorite article in the past week which is about the commercial endeavors of Wen Jiabao's son Wen Yunsong, who now runs a PE outfit called New Horizon Capital. It has big money behind it in the form of Temasek and Softbank. Due to his genius and a first-rate education from Northwestern University, the fund has landed several high profile deals already. Although he is flying high now, he may become a point of vulnerability for the Hu Jintao faction. With his son in such a high profile situation, Wen will be vulnerable to blackmail by the princelings, who are also engaged in their own private equity activities across China. I am not saying there is dirt, but the chance is that there is some dirt on Wen junior. So, in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress, I think Wen will, as usual, wait and see which way the wind blows and throw his weight behind the likely winner. Given his son's vulnerability and the princelings' ability to deliver sweet-heart deals, Wen may not be a reliable ally to Hu.

Exclusive: China PM's son eyes $1 billion fund for deals
Mon Jan 25, 2010 1:46am EST
Related News

*By George Chen, Asia Private Equity Correspondent

Deals

HONG KONG (Reuters) - New Horizon Capital, whose co-founders include the son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, aims to raise a $1 billion private equity fund to invest in domestic industry leaders ready to make initial public share offerings.

This would be the third and largest private equity fund for New Horizon, which had about $500 million under management since it was established in 2007, according to sources with direct knowledge of the matter.

New Horizon Capital recently completed raising $600-$700 million for its latest fund by a first closing date, with capital commitments from Japan's Softbank Corp (9984.T) and Singapore state investor Temasek Holdings TEM.UL, the sources said.

It started pitching the fund as early as 2008, but found it tough going as a result of the financial crisis and suspended the fund until early 2009, the sources said.

"That was a very tough time, but now people are willing to pour money into the fund again since China is still the focus worldwide," said one of the sources.

Softbank, run by influential Japanese tycoon Masayoshi Son, and Temasek were long-time investors since the firm launched its first fund in 2007, the source added.

The sources declined to be identified because of the sensitive nature of Wen's family background. A representative for New Horizon Capital could not be immediately reached for comment.

BACK FROM THE U.S.

Wen Yunsong, also known as Winston Wen, helped form New Horizon Capital in 2005, a few years after graduating with an MBA from Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in the United States, according to the sources close to Wen.

Between graduation and the launch of New Horizon Capital, Wen started a telecoms equipment maker whose key clients included large banks and securities firms, according to Chinese and Hong Kong media reports. Wen later sold the company.

Beijing, which historically viewed private equity firms as speculators, is becoming more welcoming to foreign private equity funds that are boosting investment in China and creating jobs, which the government sees as key to maintaining social stability.

Despite Wen's background, New Horizon Capital is considered a foreign fund because of its legal structure and the foreign sources of its dollar capital.

New Horizon Capital's first fund was launched in 2007. Soon afterwards, Wen and his management team, which includes long-time friends from his U.S. days, made some quick investments in privately-held Chinese enterprises with potential to be market leaders.

"They have a very stable team ... They were schoolmates or old friends. They know each other very well," said another of the sources.

TRACK RECORD

Private equity investment in China has a brief history, but New Horizon Capital has had some notable achievements.

It recently bought a large stake in Shenzhen-listed wind power producer Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co (002202.SZ), a leading wind power equipment maker in China. Goldwind is looking to raise $1.5 billion via a Hong Kong listing this year, Reuters reported last week.

Other New Horizon corporate investments, such as Yingli Green Energy (YGE.N) and Kingsoft (3888.HK), have already gone public.

New Horizon Capital is also an investor in Shineway Group, China's top meat processor, in a landmark buyout deal led by Goldman Sachs (GS.N) a few years ago.

It is also an investor in Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industries Co, China's biggest privately-owned shipbuilder, along with Goldman Sachs and other funds. The company is seeking to list in Hong Kong, Reuters reported last year.

(Editing by Chris Lewis and Ian Geoghegan)

2010-01-31T11:05:00.002-06:00

Elite Political Maneuvers

Dear Readers, after a long absence, I post an excellent piece by John Garnault of the Sydney Morning Post. The only issue I take with his piece is that I don't think Hu avoided Shanghai out of fear. That might have been true in Chen Liangyu's last days, but with Yu Zhengsheng in charge and a new PAP commander, I think Hu has nothing to fear. His absence from Shanghai probably was due to intentional neglect stemming from the desire to not raise Shanghai's profile any more than is necessary. With recent consolidation of power (which I agree), Hu feels more secure to give Shanghai more credit in the run-up to the Shanghai Expo. This may also suggest that Hu is trying to make an alliance with Yu Zhengsheng, a princeling with close ties to the Deng family. This would make sense, if Yu would bite, as this would be a good balance against the Jiang-Zeng axis.

http://www.smh.com.au/business/battle-for-shanghai-takes-centre-stage-in-hus-strategy-20100131-n6je.html

Battle for Shanghai takes centre stage in Hu's strategy

February 1, 2010

Just as the world is adjusting to a harsher, more assertive and, frankly, scary China, there are reminders the country could swing back the other way.

The President, Hu Jintao, didn't just surprise Australian diplomats by turning up with four hours notice to the Australian Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo 10 days ago. The visit confirmed that last year's diplomatic rancour between China and Australia had been buried and China wants to be friends again. But Chinese observers saw something more significant: "It's now safe for Hu Jintao to go to Shanghai."

Amazingly, Hu had not been publicly seen in Shanghai for at least two years. In fact I can't find reports of Hu passing through China's most glamorous city since June 2006. That's akin to Barack Obama governing America sans-New York, or Kevin Rudd micro-managing Australia without touching down in Sydney.

In the closet warfare of Chinese elite politics, Shanghai has been the political bastion of Hu Jintao's predecessor and nemesis, Jiang Zemin. Hu's arrival in Shanghai was seen to offer proof that he is getting the upper hand in his war of attrition against Jiang's "Shanghai Gang".

To over-simplify, Hu's key protégés are associated with the China Youth League and a more liberal, egalitarian and intellectual outlook, while Jiang's protégés are more closely linked with the security, propaganda and military apparatus as well as strategic state owned companies, particularly oil. More importantly, when China's elite are divided they tend to make doubly sure the rest of the country is locked down.

If Hu's apparent confidence is well-placed, it explains some other signs that suggest the recent political freeze may not be forever. First is the re-emergence of the super-educated and one-time student leader, Vice-Premier Li Keqiang.

Li was Hu Jintao's chosen heir until Jiang interrupted those succession plans in September 2007. Li seemed in political trouble as recently as July. But since the last key Communist Party Central Committee meeting in September he has been everywhere (as has another of Hu's once-wounded allies in the standing committee, Premier Wen Jiabao ). Li is obviously in line for future premier, or maybe one step higher.

Li's speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Thursday was more conciliatory and made more sense than anything we've seen recently from a Chinese leader in the international arena. It was all about China's need to correct its own economic imbalances, rather than dancing on the grave of the US-led global financial order, and co-operation on a slew of global challenges. The significance of Li's speech lies not so much in what he said, but that the internal politics permitted him to say it.

Equally significant was the announcement of a new energy policy body, which strengthened Li's standing just before he took the stage at Davos. Until now, China's energy policy has been notoriously captured by vested interests, particularly those associated with the state-owned behemoth Petrochina and the People's Liberation Army.

Although the new National Energy Commission lacks teeth, two things are notable. First, its formation had been on hold - some would say the whole country has been on hold, including the next leadership transition - while Hu pushed some of Jiang's acolytes out of the Central Military Commission and replaced them with his own. (Some say the new line-up to control the People's Liberation Army has been settled; others caution nothing is settled in China until it is publicly announced.)

Second, the new energy commission is stacked with liberally-oriented policy makers and Hu's men (the two categories are not the same but substantially overlap).

At the head of the commission is Wen Jiabao, followed by Li Keqiang. It includes Li's underling You Quan, leaders of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) who work easily with Hu (Zhang Ping and Zhang Guobao) as well as market-oriented policy makers like Zhou Xiaochuan (head of the central bank) and Liu Mingkang (the banking regulator).

Nowhere to be seen is Xie Zhenhua, who is in charge of climate change policy at the NDRC. Xie is internationally respected for his grasp of climate change policy. But he also owes his political resurrection (after a massive Petrochina oil spill) to the Shanghai Gang. And it was his finger-pointing outburst at Obama behind closed doors at Copenhagen that arguably did more than any other single recent event to turn Western opinion away from engaging China to fearing it.

Another notable absentee is Wang Qishan. Wang is widely known and respected in the West. But he has also been trampling over the economic policy turf that was, some thought, reserved for Li Keqiang.

Gone from the formal energy policy scene is Jiang's crony Zhang Dejiang, who was meant to be in charge of energy policy in the State Council. Zhang has been wounded by a recent corruption probe into Shenzhen Airlines, according to a source with connections with the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission, which Hu controls. Indeed, it seems that most of the top-level corruption scalps over the past year are linked with Jiang in one way or another.

Events since the Tibetan uprising in March 2008 have shown it was naive to assume China is on a slow but inexorable march towards a more liberal political system and a more co-operative international outlook. But it would be equally wrong to assume China's recent political hardening - which spilled into the international arena with the arrest of Stern Hu and aggressive diplomacy at Copenhagen - marks a new, inexorable trend.

Hu Jintao is no Mikhail Gorbachev and China is hardly on the brink of a glasnost moment. But China's future hinges, in part, on the battle for Shanghai.

2009-11-30T22:44:00.002-06:00

Reshuffling of Provincial PSs

Well, it is now clear that Hu is trying to maneuver as many of his people into position before he hands (some) power over in 2012. We see CYL veteran Hu Chunhua (also Hu Jintao's former secretary) and Lu Zhangong taking over Inner Mongolia and Henan respectively. Another official possibly related to Hu's faction, Wang Min, was rotated from PS of Jilin to Liaoning, a lateral promotion as Liaoning is a much more important province. Wang overlapped with Li Yuanchao in Jiangsu, although Li didn't really have a say over his promotion to Suzhou.

The other promotions, however, show that Hu did not have all the say. Sun Chunlan's promotion from a relatively powerless position in the union to party secretary of Fujian, for example, shows that Bo Xilai likely exerted some influence on high level promotions. Sun was Bo's successor in Dalian. Likewise, Huang Qifan's promotion to the mayoral post in Chongqing puts Chongqing further out of Hu Jintao's control, as Huang comes from the Jiang Zemin-Huang Ju faction in Shanghai. Again, to more credibly demonstrate his power, Hu will need to launch a comprehensive anti-corruption crackdown somewhere....

http://www.straitstimes.com/PrimeNews/Story/STIStory_460954.html
Home > Prime News > Story
Dec 1, 2009
'Little Hu' in front as future leader
Hu Jintao protege could well climb to top job in 2022
By Peh Shing Huei, China Bureau Chief

BEIJING: Chinese President Hu Jintao's protege, Mr Hu Chunhua, has
emerged as the front-runner in the race to be the country's future top
leader after a reshuffle of provincial chiefs yesterday.

The changes also included a new woman provincial party secretary, the
first in more than two decades. Ms Sun Chunlan, 59, was catapulted
from her position as a top unionist to Fujian party boss.

But it was the appointment of 46-year-old Mr Hu as the new chief of
the Inner Mongolia region which carried greater political
significance, noted analysts of Chinese elite politics.

'He is now on the fast-track to being China's sixth-generation
leader,' said Dr Bo Zhiyue, of the East Asian Institute in Singapore.
The two Hus are not related.

Going by the current trend of national leaders serving two terms of
five years each, Mr Hu and the 'sixth generation' politicians are
slated to take over as national leaders in 2022.

President Hu, 66, is widely believed to be stepping down in 2012 and
is likely to be succeeded by Vice-President Xi Jinping, 56, leader of
the 'fifth generation'.

The younger Hu, or 'Little Hu', is now in early pole position to
ascend to the top position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
thereafter.

His Inner Mongolia appointment means he is the fastest in his cohort -
those in their 40s - to be made a provincial chief.

Only Agriculture Minister Sun Zhengcai, also 46, has matched his
speedy rise, after being promoted to the role of party boss of
north-eastern Jilin province yesterday.

But Mr Hu, who was the governor of northern Hebei province, is widely
regarded as the one with a stronger political pedigree, having been
the leader of the key Communist Youth League, the power base of
President Hu.

The Chinese studies graduate from Peking University has also spent 23
years working in Tibet, a tough posting which earned him respect from
the Chinese Communist Party rank-and-file. By comparison, Mr Sun, an
agriculture PhD-holder, spent his entire political career in Beijing.

Both Mr Hu and Mr Sun were among five young leaders profiled by a
state-run magazine in April this year - a sign that the quintet had
been earmarked for higher office. But only two were promoted to
provincial chiefs yesterday, indicating that they have surged ahead of
the pack.

The others appointed were above 50 years old, such as Ms Sun, new
Henan boss Lu Zhangong and new Liaoning chief Wang Min.

Analysts believe there is a good chance that the boyish-looking Mr Hu
will even make the leap to the elite 25-man Politburo in 2012, when
the CCP holds its 18th Party Congress.

It would resemble the arrangement which Mr Hu Jintao went through,
parachuting into the decision-making Politburo Standing Committee in
1992, a good decade before he took over the reins from Mr Jiang Zemin.

But analyst Wang Zhengxu from the University of Nottingham's China
Policy Institute warned that 'Little Hu' has an Achilles heel which
his political rivals may exploit.

'His biggest weakness is that he has been working in poor places,
including now Inner Mongolia. He lacks the experience of operating in
the rich coastal provinces, which are important as China becomes a
greater economic power,' he observed.

shpeh@sph.com.sg

Another Suzhou man promoted

BEIJING: The Communist Party bosses from Suzhou city continue to power
ahead. Mr Wang Min (above), who served as Suzhou party secretary from
2002 to 2004, left his position as Jilin provincial chief to head
neighbouring Liaoning.

While the appointment appeared on paper to be a lateral move, Liaoning
is widely regarded as a more important and prestigious province.

Mr Wang, 59, is the fourth consecutive Suzhou chief to climb the
political ladder. Predecessors Liang Baohua and Chen Deming are now
Jiangsu provincial chief and Commerce Minister respectively.

A key factor in their success is Suzhou's prominence in the national
media, thanks to the 15-year-old China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial
Park. The massive project has earned Suzhou party secretaries a
reputation as economic reformists who are pro-business and have a
global outlook.
--------------------------------------------------------------------

SCMP

Reshuffle sees new mayor for Chongqing

Verna Yu
Dec 01, 2009

The central government yesterday nominated a new mayor for the
municipality of Chongqing and also promoted a close ally of President
Hu Jintao to a regional party chief position, in a new round of
leadership reshuffling at the provincial government level.

The latest changes signal that preparations for the next party
congress in 2012 are quietly under way.

Chongqing Deputy Mayor Huang Qifan has been nominated to become the
mayor of the southwestern municipality, which has recently launched a
massive crackdown on organised crime, Xinhua reported.

Huang, 57, previously deputy secretary general of the Shanghai
government, became Chongqing's deputy mayor in 2001 and has since been
in charge of the municipality's finance and industry sectors.

Reports did not mention what the next appointment of his predecessor
Wang Hongju would be, although he turned 64 last month, one year from
the official retirement age.

Meanwhile, one of Hu's closest allies, Hebei province Governor Hu
Chunhua , has been promoted to party chief of the Inner Mongolia
region .

Born in 1963, Hu Chunhua became the youngest provincial governor when
he was appointed deputy governor and acting governor of Hebei last
year at the age of 45.

Hu Chunhua is one of the youngest senior party officials and is tipped
to be a leading candidate for the next Politburo in 2012.

Potential Politburo members often need the experience of two or three
top provincial posts, according to analysts.

Hu was previously first secretary of the secretariat of the Chinese
Youth League - the power base of President Hu - and worked in Tibet
for more than 20 years.

Meanwhile, the government also announced that Jilin province party
chief Dr Wang Min would take over the top post in neighbouring
Liaoning . He will be replaced by 46-year-old Agriculture Minister Dr
Sun Zhengcai . Wang, 59, has a PhD in machinery manufacturing, and Sun
has a PhD in agriculture. Sun, born in 1963, is also tipped to be a
leading candidate for the next Politburo.

The government said Sun Chunlan , the 59-year-old vice-chairwoman of
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, would replace Fujian party
chief Lu Zhangong . Lu, 57, will become party secretary in Henan
province , replacing Xu Guangchun , who turned 65 this month.

2009-11-17T01:27:00.004-06:00

Leveraging Big-Time by Local Development Companies

I would just like to show readers the type of leveraging that is going on in China. Hainan Highway, set up by the Hainan government ten years ago to finance highway construction, is an early example of the thousands of local development companies that now pervade China. They usually get a bit of capital from the government and use that to borrow money from banks or issue bonds to investors. Fortunately, some of these entities are listed so we can see how they work. Note, however, that because they are listed, they already represent "the best of" local development companies. finance.Sina.com has a very powerful feature that breaks down various parts of listed companies' annual and quarterly reports. See here.

So here, Hainan Highway has total asset of around 2.7 billion RMB. The largest category is various kinds of accounts receivables. Well, that sounds good, except the annual report also states that the largest debtor to Hainan Highway is the founder of the company, Hainan Department of Transportation!! Moreover, its debt to Hainan Highway ballooned from around 150 million in 2008 to nearly 450 million RMB! Okay, so this is what is happening. Local governments use some land or revenue cash flows to start these entities, which then go and borrow money from banks and investors. Then, local governments in turn borrow from these entities, especially those that generate some cash flows. My question is: since these loans to local government is identified as asset, can these companies borrow even more from banks on the basis of this "account receivable?" I think they can!

Again, this is happening to thousands of such entities across China! (by the way, kudos to reader who figures out who Chen Xuehui is, as he got a million RMB loan from the company for no apparent reason).

2009-11-11T12:27:00.001-06:00

Let’s Look at China’s Liabilities Again

Recently, on a China specialist bulletin board, the debate on “the China collapse” hypothesis flared up again. As you can imagine, things got pretty heated between my colleagues. I have learned that predicting the future is a losing game, but we can certainly look at facts and bring in some skepticism. Incidentally, I am working on a project to calculate the extent of borrowing from local government investment entities, which are discussed below. I am about half way through the provinces, but will update interested readers on my findings in the coming months. Below is my contribution to the “collapse” debate.

Chiming in among the skeptics, I think we tend to focus on the asset side of China’s balance sheet, which is quite impressive to be sure. However, the Chinese government is also good at hiding its various liabilities (in the accounting sense) through various entities and strategies. Let’s ignore human costs like reduced life expectancy from the environment, lack of social services and work safety for the moment and only focus on financial liabilities. Among the OECD countries, we see that public debt escalated tremendously due to stimulus programs and financial bailouts. However, it would be mistaken to argue that China accomplished 9% growth without getting into massive debt. In fact, it got into much more de facto public debt as a share of GDP than the US or Europe did. If Cpolers remember a conversation about the rise of deficit this year in China, which put official debt this year at a modest 25% of GDP. However, the reason growth is so high this year is due mainly to investment. In addition to the 4 trln RMB central government package, local governments also rolled out additional trillions in investment projects. In OECD countries, much of these projects will be financed through the official budget, but in China, local governments set up urban development companies to raise this money as “corporate loans” from banks. Thus, around 70-80% of this trillions in investment was financed through bank loans.

More will have to be spent to finance these projects. Local governments learned long ago (possibly in the 50s) that when the central government is feeling generous, start as many projects as possible as oppose to spend money to complete projects. This is because they know that the central government will retrench one day, but the center is still reluctant to cut off funding from on-going projects, which result in total loss. On this basis, Nomura Securities, typically a very bullish outfit, estimates that new lending will again have to be 10 trln RMB for both 2010 and 2011 to fully finance existing construction projects. This means local governments will need to get into trillions more in debt (probably 10 trln in addition to what ever the current amount is).

Does this mean a collapse? certainly not necessarily as the government holds a lot of assets. However, as with any country, we should also pay attention to the liabilities.

2009-11-10T01:50:00.003-06:00

The Collapse of Caijing

As many of you know already, Hu Shuli, the editor of the influential Caijing Magazine, has quit her post and will become dean of the media and journalism school at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. In the mean time, she is planning her new publication. The excellent NYT piece below outlines some of the behind-the-scene dynamics of this development. The main question of course is how much this has to do with political pressure against Caijing's hard-hitting style and how much this is related to Hu Shuli's desire to get a larger piece of the profit.

I am curious about another facet of this case-- why Zhongshan University. To be sure, it is a top university in China, but I wouldn't imagine it to be a top journalism school in China. There is journalism school at Peking U., Renmin University....etc. Why didn't any of those schools offer her positions, and why didn't she take them if offered? The issue certainly isn't money, of which she has plenty. This suggests to me that the Beijing schools were under some pressure to not hire her in an important position. Only Zhongshan University, a key institution in Guangdong Province governed by reformist leader Wang Yang, dared to hire her in an important position. Is this important? Maybe, and maybe it is useful to once again use terms like "reformist" and "conservatives" to describe the policy preferences of various elite actors.

New York Times

November 10, 2009

Editor Departs China Magazine After High-Profile Tussle

By JONATHAN ANSFIELD

BEIJING — The pioneering editor of the top Chinese business magazine has left her post with plans to start anew, after a tussle for control involving much the same mix of political and financial intrigue that she made her mark uncovering.

Hu Shuli, 56, resigned Monday from Caijing, the magazine she built into a thriving print and Web outlet that specialized in investigating government corruption and corporate fraud, said a Caijing spokeswoman, Zhang Lihui. Senior editors and most of Caijing’s journalists either had already resigned or were preparing to as well, magazine employees said.

For months, Ms. Hu, the editor in chief, and the business managers of the magazine had been locked in a stalemate with the owners of Caijing over the breadth of the magazine’s coverage and the budgeting of its operations, said former employees and current staff members who asked not to be identified because they feared losing their jobs.

The owners of the magazine had come under pressure from Communist Party officials to rein in Caijing’s aggressive journalism, people at the magazine have said.

Managers at Caijing told staff members that they had been fighting to maintain the magazine’s editorial integrity.

The managers had been seeking to create a more independent publication by changing the magazine’s shareholding structure, seeking outside investors and pressing the owners to allow more employees to own a stake in the magazine.

In a well-publicized exodus earlier this autumn, nearly 70 business employees resigned. Ms. Hu held on until Monday.

She has now accepted a new post as the dean of the journalism school at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, a job she had been offered before it became clear that she would leave Caijing.

At the same time, she, along with a large contingent of editors and executives departing Caijing, was working to secure new licenses and open a new venture, said the employees, who had knowledge of the plans but were not authorized to speak publicly about them.

Caijing’s parent company, the State Exchange Executive Council, or S.E.E.C., had already recruited a new team of editors from another progressive publication, The Economic Observer in Beijing, they said.

In 11 years at Caijing, editorials by Ms. Hu pinpointed interest groups and bottlenecks that she said blocked economic overhauls. And exclusives by Caijing hastened the demise of some of the more notorious felons in China.

But the magazine’s own troubles have involved just the sort of topic that Ms. Hu and Caijing relished covering.

The political price of success grew in recent years. Ms. Hu found herself increasingly at odds with S.E.E.C. bosses and their Communist Party guardians, according to employees and other colleagues during interviews in recent months.

After a run-in with a Caijing reporter covering the ethnic riots in the western region of Xinjiang in July, officials leaned harder on Ms. Hu’s superiors to curb her coverage, the employees said.

At one point, the S.E.E.C. was ordered to fire Ms. Hu, they said. The pressures brought the infighting over editorial and financial control of Caijing to a boil.

Ms. Hu did not respond to requests for comment Monday.

Known for enforcing a rigid code of conduct, she has been characteristically guarded during the crisis.

“I am still working on a good result,” she wrote in an e-mail message to The New York Times late last month.

Under her current plan, her new publishing sponsor would be the province-level Zhejiang Daily Press, said the Caijing employees and a Zhejiang Daily editor.

She has been talking with well-known Chinese investors. Her proposed new publication’s title has a familiar ring: “Caixin,” short for “Caijing Newsweek.”

The split reflects the divergence of interests in a media market still governed by party cadres, said Zhan Jiang, a journalism professor at Beijing Foreign Languages University.

“Some people still stick to their ideals,” he said. “But management has become increasingly concerned with profits, and increasingly conservative.”

Moreover, as the central authorities lavish official Chinese media giants with support to grow and compete globally, they also have made moves to tighten their chain of command over muckrakers like Ms. Hu.

Not that Ms. Hu is like any other. She has become an unrivaled celebrity, and counts senior economic officials friends from her reporting days at state-owned newspapers.

At S.E.E.C., she was uniquely insulated. The chairman of the S.E.E.C., Wang Boming, a former New York Stock Exchange economist, is the son of a former deputy foreign minister.

When Mr. Wang and Ms. Hu started Caijing, in 1998, he met her demands to finance the newsroom and not interfere.

But their ambitions clashed as the influence of Caijing grew. Caijing now generates about half of the group’s revenue, but the S.E.E.C. has reinvested a considerably smaller percentage.

Mr. Wang has diversified into less daring titles, most of which have struggled.

Members of Ms. Hu’s team, in turn, went their own way, expanding Caijing online. They also tapped outside partners, like the Hong Kong tycoon Richard Li, with whom Ms. Hu has been developing a financial news service.

Behind the scenes, a conservative official named Quan Zhezhu had taken over Communist Party affairs at the organization that sponsors Caijing’s publishing license, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, in 2007. The Federation ramped up pressure on Mr. Wang to curb coverage by Ms. Hu.

“They say she’s ungrateful, that without them the magazine would have been closed a long time ago,” a friend of Mr. Wang’s said.

An S.E.E.C. executive did not answer requests for comment in recent days.

Ms. Hu was able to elude serious trouble through the spring. After Caijing revealed a corruption investigation into China Central Television earlier this year, government media officials demanded that the story be recalled, the employees said.

But within a couple days, Caijing reposted the piece online and handed out hundreds of undistributed magazines to delegates at the annual legislative sessions.

When the ethnic riots broke out in July, Ms. Hu promptly dispatched three journalists to Urumqi. But not all of them were able to obtain a permit to be there.

One day, at the official press center, a veteran reporter named Yang Binbin was caught carrying a credential borrowed from a former coworker. When an official tried to search his laptop, he resisted, and he and a guard scuffled. The police carted off the reporter for questioning.

“Our pressures and conflicts had accumulated over a long time, but this incident was the fuse,” said a Caijing colleague of Mr. Yang, who himself declined to comment.

By mid-July, journalists said, the party’s powerful Central Commission on Politics and Law discussed the need to “rectify” Caijing. The authorities have reprimanded the magazine for at least eight articles this year, including the China Central Television inquiry, and directed it to “return to positive reporting on finance and economics.”

Under orders from the All-China Federation, the S.E.E.C. demanded the right to prescreen the magazine before it went to print.

Ms. Hu resisted the order. But the magazine was still required to cut at least three investigative features, including one from Urumqi, and the Web site scrapped two new columns and left the “Politics and Law” section without new posts for three days in September, to avoid riling officials.

At a gathering with Mr. Wang in August, according to a friend of his in attendance, Mr. Wang said that officials had pressured him to fire Ms. Hu. Mr. Wang said that he would not go so far as to dismiss the acclaimed newswoman and that, he told friends, the move would cause an international scandal.

But his perceived failure to stand up to editorial pressures exacerbated the financial infighting about ownership shares and budgets, to the point that Ms. Hu and Mr. Wang, as another journalist put it, “couldn’t stand each other.”

In late September, Caijing’s general manager and other executives led a walkout of more than 60 business staff members. As of last month, dozens of those who resigned had already started working at what several said were Caixin’s new offices.

For weeks, many journalists have been planning to follow Ms. Hu to the new venture. But Ms. Hu could have to wait months for new publishing licenses, if the authorities approve them, the journalist and others said.

“She hopes that by having this new academic position will make it easier for her to negotiate” to start the new outlet, said the journalist, who was among those preparing to rejoin Ms. Hu.

2009-10-26T12:56:00.003-05:00

Comparing Bo Xilai with Chairman Mao??

The People's Daily published the following curious comparison between Bo Xilai and Chairman Mao. Just as Mao was forced by circumstances in 1927 to fight guerilla warfare, Bo Xilai was likewise forced by circumstances to get rid of the mafia in Chongqing....Eh, I am speechless. This is either someone at RMRB trying very hard to pander to Bo, or even worse, Bo himself ordered the publication of this article in open defiance to the current succession arrangement. Actually, the historical parallels may not be so far fetched-- Mao was a dark horse and was at the bottom of the elite in 1927. However, after ruthless struggle against both internal enemies and the KMT, Mao had become the top leader of the CCP by 1937.

http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/1036/10256800.html

薄熙来被逼打黑与毛泽东被逼“扛枪”

王皋子

2009年10月26日09:20 来源：人民网-观点频道
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　　重庆打黑，很有点如诗歌描绘的那样，犹如“秋风扫落叶”，一下子就将1500多涉黑分子逮捕归案，其中，包括60多名黑帮头目和50多名公务员以及身价高达数千亿的3名企业家。重庆人民就像49年迎解放一样欢天喜地，一位农民为之拿出10余万无作广告，以示欢庆。

　　然而，就在人们为之称颂不已时，重庆市委书记薄熙来在出席世界中文报业协会年会前，向媒体代表们说：“打黑不是我们要主动而为，而是黑恶势力逼得我们没办法。”

　　好像一滴冷水掉进热油锅，网上网下一下子炸开了，有的网民甚至忽然间有点像“丈二和尚摸不着头”：一向果敢的薄哥发动组织的这次轰轰烈烈的重庆打黑怎么不是“主动而为”，而是被黑恶势力“逼得没办法”？

　　其实，这根本就没什么大惊小怪的。当年毛泽东在回答国际友人是“怎么建立新中国的”时，就说是“逼上梁山”，是因为“蒋介石不给我们活路，把我们逼上了绝境，就这么七逼八逼，逼出一个新中国”。类似的话，周恩来也曾在他的“自述”里说过：人走上革命道路不是先天的，而是由于外来的压迫和环境造成的。为此，台湾著名作家李敖曾一针见血地指出，蒋介石失败就失败在清共，如果蒋介石不是发动四一二反革命政变，大肆屠杀共产党和革命群众，共产党和工农群众也不会走上武装反抗的道路。

　　毛泽东被逼领导中国人民“扛枪”闹革命与薄熙来被逼打黑，让我们看到，反动黑恶势力是疯狂的，又是虚弱的。反动势力也好，黑恶势力也罢，往往都不得人心，人所共愤，因为他们丧失人性，从来就不会因为人民的善良而良心发现，放下屠刀，立地成佛。当年“四·一二”反革命政变是这样，重庆的黑恶势力对重庆人民也是这样，用薄熙来的叙述来说：“黑恶势力拿刀砍人，就像屠户用刀砍杀牲畜，惨不忍睹。”“我们清缴刀具，大砍刀堆积如山。”“谢才萍开赌场从中抽头，赌场开在五星级饭店，旱涝保收。这连清朝道光皇帝和林则徐都不能容忍”。显然，这些黑恶势力如果任其下去，就会变本加厉，越加猖狂，越加残忍。

　　是呵，共产党是努力追求进步，追求文明，他们丝毫也不会容忍落后、丑恶、反动的东西存在的。但是，共产党又是最大公无私，最能委屈求全，顾全大局的。当着“卢沟桥的枪炮”敲响中华民族生死存亡的警钟，中国共产党毅然肩负起挽救民族危亡的历史使命，号召全国人民奋起抗日，放弃前嫌，有力地促成了西安事变和平解决，推动了全民抗战。同样，当前，中国共产党正团结一切可以团结的力量，调动一切积极因素，领导全国人民“聚精会神搞建设、一心一意谋发展”，努力加快推进中华民族的伟大复兴。这自然是我们当前地大局。但是，中国共产党又时刻代表着最广大人民的根本利益，当着人民的生命财产受到严重威胁时，作为地方党委，作为一级人民政府，怎么会对之袖手旁观而无动于衷呢？所以，黑恶势力以为共产党正一门心思搞建设了，便可以任其为所欲为，就实在只能是打错算盘，自寻灭亡了。这，才是薄熙来被逼打黑的根本原因所在。

　　毛泽东关于被逼“扛枪”与薄熙来关于被逼打黑的率直表白，显示了他们对反动派和黑恶势力的极度愤怒和共产党人“逼上梁山”的无比正义性。它让我们看到中国共产党是坚定顽强、勇往无敌的政党，也是伟大仁爱、光明磊落的政党。只有这样一个政党，才是最合民意、最得民心的政党，因而也才是最有前途、最能领导中国人民完成中华民族复兴大业的政党。

2009-10-26T03:27:00.003-05:00

Why China Isn't Ready to Lead

Dear all, my WSJ op ed from last Friday in case some of you missed it. This is not a criticism of the IMF for restructuring, but just a commentary on the irony of it all.

Property rights and contracts are still subordinate to the Party's interests.

By VICTOR SHIH

In an era when the most developed economies are running record fiscal deficits, it is reasonable to look for new global economic leadership. Gauging solely by officially reported deficits and cash reserves, China seems an ideal candidate. Indeed, a senior International Monetary Fund bureaucrat revealed Saturday in Beijing that China may soon become the second-largest shareholder in the organization after internal restructuring.

But leadership does not depend on cash reserves alone. To lay credible claim to a bigger global role, Beijing must show it understands the rules that make a modern economy work and how to play by them. The economic downturn has only shown how far behind Beijing is in this regard. China's market institutions clearly lag those in more advanced Asian and Western countries. Parts of the government continue to blatantly disregard property rights and contracts. Rules are conveniently bent to favor powerful state entities.

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Shih
David Klein
Shih
Shih

The greatest victims of the government's disregard for property rights and contracts are domestic private entrepreneurs. Recent months saw the forced nationalization and mergers of hundreds of privately leased or owned coal mines. With the issuance of a few decrees from Beijing, domestic investors who plowed their own savings into mining lost billions. Similar examples abound in other sectors, as state agencies try to alleviate a growing overcapacity problem by forcing private firms to sell out to state-owned competitors at state-mandated prices. Because the legal system and state agencies all stand on the side of state firms, private firms have little recourse to oppose government takeovers.

Foreign investors, who used to enjoy some protection from state predatory behavior, have also fallen victim to this in the downturn. To lessen the losses of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that entered into money-losing derivatives contracts with offshore counterparties, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, the regulator for state firms, indicated to stunned bankers in Hong Kong in early September that these SOEs may not honor their contracts because the Commission never granted some SOEs the permission to enter into derivatives contracts. Not wanting to anger the government, foreign banks are now leaning toward arbitration, but a sour taste has been left in their mouths.

In a similar case, foreign investors in China's enormous distressed-asset market were surprised by a July decision by the Supreme People's Court that foreign investors who had legally purchased a nonperforming loan cannot obtain the collateral that the original guarantor pledged to a loan without the guarantor's permission and without the approval of the local foreign-exchange authorities. This decision makes it very difficult for foreign investors in distressed assets to collect on collateral that is legally bound to a given loan without surmounting numerous legal and bureaucratic hurdles.

This ruling shows China's lack of preparation even more clearly than the reneged derivatives deals. Foreign investors in distressed loans were invited by the government in the early 2000s to help digest more than 1.4 trillion yuan ($205 billion) in nonperforming loans. These investors have helped China rescue billions in distressed assets, rehabilitating many into profitable businesses. But when a well-connected state firm, Chongqing Yi De Industrial, appealed the Supreme People's Court to overturn an earlier decision in favor of the foreign creditor, the judges went against elements of its earlier rulings and ruled in favor of Yi De Industrial in July. The legal system's usual bias toward connected insiders once again seemed to have determined the outcome.

In all these examples, the Chinese government could have chosen to show the world it is willing to respect property rights, enforce contracts fairly and discipline firms that violate the rules regardless of their political connections. Instead rules were disregarded to maintain the facade of relative budgetary balance and SOE profitability, and connected insiders and large SOEs with political influence were once again told that they need not adhere to contracts. Private entrepreneurs and outsiders were reminded that the law means little without political backing.

Chinese decision makers need to realize that global economic leadership does not stem only from a large cash hoard. In the long run, a credible respect for property rights and unbiased contract enforcement will draw a larger share of global investors into the Chinese economic sphere. Until such a day arrives, China's economy will tend to attract connected rent seekers who profit from the government's willingness to bend the rules.

Mr. Shih is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University and the author of "Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation" (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2009-10-15T03:19:00.002-05:00

Xi Jinping Sends Signals by Giving Merkel Books by Jiang

There are moments when my gut tells me that something is very, very wrong in China, and this is one of those moments. Apparently, during his visit to Germany, Vice President Xi Jinping held a meeting with Prime Minister Merkel where he gave Merkel two books authored by the FORMER party secretary general of the CCP Jiang Zemin. The caption of the People's Daily story on the meeting reads "Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (L) presents two books written by former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the start of their meeting in the Chancellery in Berlin, capital of Germany, Oct. 12, 2009.(Xinhua/Lan Hongguang)" You can check out the whole story by going here.

So, what is one to make of this. This is clearly a strong signal of some kind. Willy Lam, as always, presents an incisive interpretation that Xi is showing his strong disapproval of Hu's delay of his entrance into the Central Military Commission (see below). The presentation of books by Jiang also signals to Jiang his loyalty, and is basically asking Jiang to ensure his entrance into the CMC. In conjunction with Jiang's prominent presence during the anniversary, Jiang seems to be making a strong come-back in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress. The reason why this move is making me queasy is that in order to maintain his authority before the 18th Party Congress, Hu will need to do something drastic to show that he still has real power and would not stand for such humiliating displays of disloyalty from Xi. I await with rather dreadful anticipation of what will come next.

Asian Sentinel

Cracks in China's Great Politburo Wall Print E-mail

Written by Willy Lam
Tuesday, 13 October 2009
ImageVice-President Xi Jinping drops strong hint at big rift with President Hu Jintao

Now we know what Vice-President Xi Jinping must have felt when he failed to make it to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission at a plenary session of the Central Committee last month. The supposed front-runner to succeed Party Chief and President Hu Jintao apparently blamed the supremo for not inducting him into the policy-setting military commission, which has been headed by Hu since 2004.

During his current trip to five European countries, Xi, 56, has departed from protocol and hardly given Hu a mention. According to long-standing diplomatic custom, a senior Chinese cadre on tour would first convey to his hosts the greetings of President Hu. Xi's failure to acknowledge and salute Hu's leadership was most obvious when he met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on Monday.

Before the official discussion began, Xi handed to Merkel the English editions of two books – on energy and on information technology – written by ex-president Jiang Zemin. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, Xi then "passed along Comrade Jiang Zemin's greetings and good wishes" to the German leader. Merkel reciprocated by asking Xi to send her greetings to Jiang. There was no reference to Hu throughout the two leaders' tete-a-tete.

This was the first time in less than two weeks that ex-president Jiang, 83, appears to have upstaged the 67-year-old Hu. During celebrations to mark the 60th birthday of the People's Republic of China on October 1, the official Chinese media gave Jiang pretty much the same prominence as Hu. For example, he appeared 20 times on CCTV's coverage of the all-important military parade. And Hu was caught a couple of times on TV assuming a humble posture next to the talkative and high-spirited Jiang. The next day, the People's Daily put two same-sized pictures of Hu and Jiang side by side on its front page.

As the highest-ranked Fifth-Generation politician in the supreme Politburo Standing Committee, Xi is slated to succeed Hu as party general secretary at the 18th CCP Congress in October 2012 – and as state president a few months later. Yet it is well-known among political circles in Beijing that Xi does not come from Hu's Communist Youth League faction. Instead, the son of former vice-premier Xi Zhongxun is the putative head of the powerful Gang of Princelings, a reference to the offspring of party elders. Moreover, it was partly due to support rendered by ex-president Jiang, himself a princeling, that Xi was virtually designated Hu's heir-apparent at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Xi's failure to be inducted into the CMC last month, however, was a signal that he might not enjoy a cosy relationship with his boss.

Instead, Hu is believed to be pulling out all the stops to improve the political fortunes of Youth League stalwarts such as Politburo Standing Committee member and First Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who at this stage is expected to take over the premiership from Wen Jiabao in early 2013.

Xi watchers are not surprised by his strange demeanor in Berlin. During his tour to Latin America early this year, the vice-president aroused controversy by using earthy language to attack a certain country – widely thought to be the US – for alleged interference in China's domestic affairs. While talking to diplomats and Chinese representatives in China's embassy in Mexico City, Xi intoned: "There are people who seem to have nothing to do after filling their stomachs. They like to point their fingers at China's internal affairs." The vice-president's remarks were not reported by the Chinese media.

In any event, Xi's apparent decision to openly side with Jiang – and his failure to appear deferential to Hu – is a good indication that factional rivalry and jockeying for position has begun some three years before the 18th Party Congress. At that all-important conclave, a new corps of party and state leadership will be picked as at least half of the current PSC and Politburo members are set to retire.

2009-10-01T18:10:00.001-05:00

Reflections on the 60th Anniversary

A Brazilian reporter asked me some questions about the 60th anniversary, here are my answers:

1- Whatâ€™s the meaning of this celebration in China that starts this Thursday in your opinion? Is it an internal celebration, or the main goal is to impress the world?

Both. Of course, the leaders want to show the world its unity and military might. However, a parade is also a way to monitor the effectiveness and loyalty of military and civilian units.

2- Why the Chinese people is not part of the celebration?

The participants in the parade and even the audience are carefully selected because the government doesn't want any disruption to the celebration. Any sign of protest would be highly embarrassing to the government and its leaders.

3- Generally, the recent history of China is divided in two phases, the socialism under Mao Zedong, and a much more pragmatic era since Deng Xiaoping. Do you think itâ€™s possible to estimate whatâ€™s going to be the next phase?

This is difficult to estimate. Some China scholars, including myself, believe there will be a "Latin Americanization" of Chinese politics in which special interests like real estate developers and large state owned enterprises will increasingly drive policy making. If true, this would lead to a period of economic stagnation without any fundamental reform.

4- Will the presence of the State still be so strong in the future of China, or it may be eased in the next years?

The presence of special interest groups will be strong, and they will use state power to drive out competition, both domestic and abroad.

5- What are the main challenges in Chinese future, in your opinion?

Overcoming the influence of special interest groups to enact much needed reform. Because China is such a world player, I think this is important for the world as well. Highly subsidized Chinese firms drive out competitors in the US and Europe, as well as other parts of the world.

2009-09-26T16:17:00.003-05:00

Excellent new York times piece in wu jinglian. Lao Wu is right, the rent seeking interests are getting powerful!

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/global/27spy.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss

China’s Wu Jinglian Keeps Talking

By DAVID BARBOZA
Published: September 26, 2009
AT 79, Wu Jinglian is considered China’s most famous economist.

Enlarge This Image

Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times
Wu Jinglian helped to create China's market economy, and now he is defending it against conservative hardliners in the Communist Party.
Multimedia

Graphic
A Life Woven Into Modern China’s History
In the 1980s and ’90s, he was an adviser to China’s leaders, includingDeng Xiaoping. He helped push through some of this country’s earliest market reforms, paving the way for China’s spectacular rise and earning him the nickname “Market Wu.”

Last year, China’s state-controlled media slapped him with a new moniker: spy.

Mr. Wu has not been interrogated, charged or imprisoned. But the fact that a state newspaper, The People’s Daily, among others, was allowed to publish Internet rumors alleging that he had been detained on suspicions of being a spy for the United States hints that he is annoying some very important people in the government.

He denied the allegations, and soon after they were published, China’s cabinet denied that an investigation was under way.

But in a country that often jails critics, Mr. Wu seems to be testing the limits of what Beijing deems permissible. While many economists argue that China’s growth model is flawed, rarely does a prominent Chinese figure, in the government or out, speak with such candor about flaws he sees in China’s leadership.

Mr. Wu — who still holds a research post at an institute affiliated with the State Council, China’s cabinet — has white hair and an amiable face, and he appears frail. But his assessments are often harsh. In books, speeches, interviews and television appearances, he warns that conservative hardliners in the Communist Party have gained influence in the government and are trying to dismantle the market reforms he helped formulate.

He complains that business tycoons and corrupt officials have hijacked the economy and manipulated it for their own ends, a system he calls crony capitalism. He has even called on Beijing to establish a British-style democracy, arguing that political reform is inevitable.

Provocative statements have made him a kind of dissident economist here, and revealed the sharp debates behind the scenes, at the highest levels of the Communist Party, about the direction of China’s half-market, half-socialist economy.

In many ways, it is a continuation of the debate that has been raging for three decades: What role should the government play in China’s hybrid economy?

Mr. Wu says the spy rumors were “dirty tricks” employed by his critics to discredit him.

“I have two enemies,” he said in a recent interview. “The crony capitalists and the Maoists. They will use any means to attack me.”

Nevertheless, some analysts believe that Mr. Wu’s critiques are aiding one government faction in a power struggle with another, and that he is protected.

His pro-market ideas have influenced a generation of younger economists who now hold senior government posts, including Zhou Xiaochuan, the leader of China’s central bank, and Lou Jiwei, chairman of the country’s huge sovereign wealth fund.

“He is like the father of economics here,” says Laurence Brahm, who wrote several books about China’s reform period. “What he said was the blueprint for reform.”

Critics say Mr. Wu’s influence on government is waning. (They note that he is not invited to weekly economics seminars held for top leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.)

Given this, some people say, Mr. Wu is courting danger by speaking out.

“You have to remember, China is a dictatorship,” says Victor Shih, a professor of political science at Northwestern University. “If they want to shut him up, they can.”

GIVEN the risks, it’s hard not to wonder why one of the architects of China’s reforms has turned so negative, so angry and so defiant.

Mr. Wu’s personality and tumultuous life story provide some clues.Even his supporters acknowledge that he has a combative streak and describe him as a stubborn idealist whose verbal jousting skills were honed during years of hardship and political warfare.

“He always expressed his ideas in the sharpest way,” says Zhang Chunlin, who was a student of Mr. Wu. “He’s not diplomatic. Even at close to 80 years old, he argues with journalists.”

That he has lived such a long life would have surprised his parents, wealthy intellectuals who ran one of the country’s largest independent newspapers, in Nanjing. A sickly child with tuberculosis, he was not expected to live past the age of 1. He spent much of his youth confined to bed, reading Russian novels and the works of Lu Xun, an influential Chinese writer from the 1920s.

One of his earliest memories is arriving in the wartime capital, Chongqing, in 1937, at the age of 7, as his family fled Nanjing and the invading Japanese. The emaciated rickshaw driver stopped for opium; the destitute were everywhere.

“In Shanghai or Nanjing, beggars would help you and then ask for money,” he recalls. “But in Chongqing, they’d grab food from your mouth.”

Such experiences helped mold him into an idealistic socialist, as many Chinese were during that era. He studied Marxist economics in college and graduated with honors in 1954 from Fudan University in Shanghai. That won him a position at the country’s elite research institute, the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.

Soon after he arrived, however, China was engulfed by political campaigns, like the Great Leap Forward, that required little research. The cruelest was the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, when intellectuals and the descendants of landlords were identified as “counterrevolutionaries.” In Beijing, Mr. Wu says, Red Guards shaved half the head of his wife, Zhou Nan, and ransacked his mother’s home.

Mao Zedong wanted intellectuals sent to the countryside to be “re-educated.” So in 1969, virtually the entire Academy was sent to Henan Province to learn to farm and to build houses in remote villages.

Ms. Zhou was ordered to work as a peasant in Shanxi Province; their two children, ages 4 and 6, were left with relatives in Beijing.

“When I left, I was prepared never to return home again,” Mr. Wu says solemnly. “We were told we’d farm for the rest of our lives.”

Mr. Wu says the hardships included sessions in which he was denounced as an anti-Maoist. When pressed to confess, or to denounce others, he says he refused, and then was beaten and placed in solitary confinement.

“They sent me to the stage to confess, then they started beating me,” he says. “Of course I felt extreme anger. But I realized it wouldn’t last for long; it was too absurd.”

This didn’t shake his faith in socialism, but he began to distrust the people around Mao who were calling believers like him enemies of the people.

His only solace, he later said, was the friendship he developed with a scholar named Gu Zhun, who was an early critic of central planning, and an advocate of market reform. Mr. Gu encouraged him to learn English and to explore the outside world, which Mr. Gu said was the only hope for China to develop.

When Mr. Wu returned home three years later, in 1972, his daughter said he was still “under the spell of Communism,” partly because of the guilt he felt for having grown up in a wealthy home.

“He said a person should have just one shirt,” recalls his daughter, Shelley, 46. “And he didn’t like my sister and I to write our names on our personal property.”

AFTER the Cultural Revolution ended with Mao’s death in 1976, Mr. Wu says he began to see that Mao’s economic policies had brought the country to the brink of collapse.

In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping began to press ahead with bold reforms aimed at opening up the country, Mr. Wu was heavily influenced by the thought and advice of his colleague Mr. Gu, who had died in 1974. He learned English, and in 1983 went to Yale as a visiting scholar. Much of his time there was spent studying modern economic theory.

Mr. Wu returned to Beijing in 1984, just as China’s economic reforms were gathering momentum under Zhao Ziyang, the party leader and chief economic planner.

That year, Mr. Wu says he helped Ma Hong, a top government adviser, draft a paper that defined the country’s shift from a planned to a market economy. “This was a very important turning point for China’s economy,” he says.

Once the proposal was accepted, Mr. Wu was elevated to the Development Research Center, the institute affiliated with the powerful State Council. Soon, he was visiting Zhongnanhai, Beijing’s leadership compound, to offer advice and debate economic policy.

Several research institutes advised Mr. Zhao and Mr. Deng on how to remake the old socialist system with elements of free enterprise. Some who sat in on those meetings say that Mr. Wu was argumentative and prickly when debating economic policy, even with Mr. Zhao.

The reforms, though, fueled strong growth and are widely credited with changing the course of the nation.

But by the late 1980s the reforms also opened the doors to corruption and soaring inflation, feeding public anger that contributed to the 1989 student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

Mr. Zhao was removed from office just ahead of the bloody assault on the students and the campaign against dissent and “liberalization.” The reforms stalled.

Not long after, Mr. Wu and other reformers were attacked for favoring a Western-style market system.

Bao Tong, a former aide to Mr. Zhao, said the reformers faced strong opposition from Soviet-trained economists who were wedded to the ideas of central planning.

“For the first guys who advocated a market system, it was pretty dangerous,” Mr. Wu said in a recent telephone interview.

He was among them, and so he was derisively branded “Market Wu.” For a time, publishers refused to sell his books.

“That’s when the conservatives came in and said the reforms had messed everything up,” says Barry J. Naughton, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, and author of “The Chinese Economy.”

Mr. Naughton says: “Wu Jinglian fought against the backlash. He said, ‘We need more market reform, not less.’ ”

The reform camp became stronger after Mr. Deng’s famous 1992 “southern tour” — in which he called for bolder reforms and encouraged people to get rich.

Soon, Mr. Wu’s influence in government grew. In the 1990s, he served as an adviser toZhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin, the country’s top leaders, helping them speed up reforms and restructure badly run state-owned companies.

Every step of the way, he fought off opposition, and debated, often publicly, the shape and pace of the reforms.

“This debate about the market economy is the most important discussion throughout the 30 years of reform,” says Liang Guiquan, an economist at the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences. “And it’s still going on now. Wu Jinglian has always been at the center of that debate.”

BY most measures, China’s economic transformation has been a resounding success. Anyone who travels here can see it: the change in people’s living standards, the makeover of big cities — what has come to be called China’s economic miracle.

But Mr. Wu sees the defects: a government prone to “meddling” in the marketplace; a widening income gap; inefficient monopolies; and crony capitalism.

His critique sharpened considerably after Jiang Zemin stepped down as president in 2003, and Mr. Wu’s role was diminished.

In interviews, Mr. Wu says he feels compelled to speak out because conservatives and “old-style Maoists” have been gaining influence in the government since 2004. These groups, he said, are pressing for a return to central planning and placing blame for corruption and social inequality on the very market reforms he championed.

At the same time, Mr. Wu says, corrupt bureaucrats are pushing for the state to take a larger economic role so they can cash in on their positions through payoffs and bribes, as well as by steering business to allies.

“I’m not optimistic about the future,” Mr. Wu said. “The Maoists want to go back to central planning and the cronies want to get richer.”

2009-09-22T17:19:00.002-05:00

Hu used agenda power to freeze out Xi

A colleague posted an interesting article in which Wang Changjiang, a cadre at the Central Party School, revealed that Hu Jintao used his agenda setting power to freeze Xi from entering the CMC. It is of course significant that Wang revealed this information, likely on behalf of Xi, which suggest some degree of dissatisfaction on the part of Xi Jinping on Hu's action. The relevant passage is:

"At the plenum, there was no reflection of personnel changes related
to the party's leadership of the military, because this was not
included in the agenda for discussion," Wang Changjiang,...

Although the party secretary general's power may be waning, it still includes agenda setting power at Politburo and PSC meetings, which in turn set the agenda for CC plenums. This power, I believe, is (somewhat) enshrined in the party constitution. If what he says is true, then it seems clear that Hu used his agenda setting power to delay Xi's entrance into the CMC. And Wang's revelation further suggests that Xi is dissatisfied with this, perhaps a lot.

China party scholar hints at Xi Jinping promotion
Reuters
Tuesday, September 22, 2009 5:52 AM
BEIJING (Reuters) - A Chinese Communist official on Tuesday held out
the possibility that Vice President Xi Jinping could still be promoted
to a military position, in a step toward ultimately taking over the
nation's top leadership post.
Some media had speculated that Xi, who is expected to succeed
President Hu Jintao in 2013, would be anointed vice chairman of the
Central Military Commission at a party plenum last week, reinforcing
his succession claim. However, the plenum closed last Friday with no
word of any personnel changes.
If Xi rises through the ranks according to schedule, it could reduce
worries about instability among the secretive inner circles of the
Communist Party, which has no transparent mechanism for choosing its
leaders.
"At the plenum, there was no reflection of personnel changes related
to the party's leadership of the military, because this was not
included in the agenda for discussion," Wang Changjiang, director
general of the Central Party School's department of education and
research on party building, told reporters.
"But there will be personnel changes at some point," he told a news
conference designed to explain the decisions of the just-concluded
plenum when asked about Xi's possible promotion.
Wang refused to be drawn any further on possible mechanisms for such a
promotion, or the timing of future meetings at which it might be
decided.
The promotion could be announced at an expanded meeting of the
Military Commission after the October 1 National Day celebration, Hong
Kong media have reported, without giving an exact date.
When Hu took over the top party, military and government positions
from his predecessor Jiang Zemin, it marked the first smooth
transition of power since the Communist Party began ruling China in
1949.
The lack of any announcement of Xi getting the No. 2 job in the
military commission suggested that Hu, who still has three years left
in his term as party chief, would wait to begin ceding positions, and
influence, to his likely successors.

2009-09-19T17:03:00.002-05:00

PLA Resistance to Xi Jinping?

A colleague sent me the piece below on Central Party School Professor Du Guang's comment on Xi's exclusion from the CMC at the 4th plenum. There is a rather jarring passage in the piece in which Du Guang said "Jiang Zemin panders to powerful figures in the military and promote them at will. Relatively speaking, Hu Jintao does this less. This is perhaps why his arrangements in military personnel are meeting resistance." Although Du is an "old liberal" at the Party School, it still seems rather out of bound to comment on the party secretary general's relations
with the army, and even compare it with the loose promotion practice of his predecessor (which I also find to be unfair as Hu just promoted three princelings to full general).

Reluctance in the PLA against Xi Jinping is plausible. I have always thought that Xi Zhongxun's revolutionary stature and Jinping's wife's connections in the military would make him a popular figure in the military. It turns out this may not be the case. I was doing some research on the Fourth Front Army recently and looked through a list of all officers who were made generals in 1955. Of the over 1000 generals promoted at the time, only ten or so came from the Shaanbei revolutionary area where Xi Zhongxun had been active before 1935. Thus, Xi Zhongxun did not have
any base in the army; This may explain why Xi was a compromise candidate because his influence in the army was limited, thus making him vulnerable to whoever still retained influence in the army.

Hong Kong Economic Times

四中全會閉幕不提軍委副主席安排

胡錦濤接班人習近平遇阻力

2009 年09 月19 日

備受關注的中共十七屆四中全會昨日閉幕。令外界意外的是，全會未有提及習近平

接任中央軍委副主席的人事安排。有學者認為，此或意味習近平接班在黨內受阻；

也有學者指，即使習近平最終接班，但事件反映中共黨內對現有接班模式不滿，欽

點接班人的做法今後未必能繼續。

官方新華社昨晚全文刊發了四中全會閉幕公報。此前海外一直揣測，沿襲胡錦濤

10 年前的接班模式，中共政治局常委習近平或會出任軍委第一副主席，以便在

2012 年中共十八大上順利接班，出任中共總書記兼軍委主席。但昨日公佈的全會

公報，對此隻字不提，亦無提及其他人事安排。

1999 年 9 月 19 日中共十五屆四中全會閉幕時，當局發佈會議公報專門提及人事安

排：「全會決定增補胡錦濤同志為中央軍事委員會副主席，郭伯雄、徐才厚同志為

中央軍事委員會委員。」但本屆四中全會習近平沒能如期更上一層樓，引起海外廣

泛關注。港台媒體、美聯社、英國廣播公司（ BBC）等，專門就此事報道。美聯

社稱，習近平今次沒如外界預料進入中央軍委，但相信中共會按以往做法，確保政

權會順利交接。 BBC 引述境外報道指，當局有可能在稍後的軍委擴大會，才公佈

有關任命。

中共中央黨校教授杜光昨接受本報電話採訪指，中共全會通過的決議不可能在公報

發表後再另外公佈。他指，胡錦濤主政後，與軍方的關係沒有江澤民時代親密，

「江澤民拉攏軍頭，封官許願；相對而言，胡錦濤做得少，這也許是導致他在軍中

人事安排受阻的原因。」他認為這也意味着習近平的接班安排，在黨內受阻。

學者：反映黨內不滿欽點接班人

國情專家、北京理工大學教授胡星斗指，事件雖不能證明習近平接班成問題，但至

少可說明中共黨內對接班人有不同聲音，由個別人欽點接班人的做法，受到挑戰，

「你可以說這是黨內鬥爭激烈，但我認為是民主的一種表現。」

本港時事評論員張華認為，事件不能推論出習近平接班落空，只能說明接班模式不

同，「另一個解讀是，習近平現在入軍委，在黨內還沒有共識。」北京時事評論員

蔣兆勇對習近平未能入軍委表示「意外」，認為事情「值得進一步觀察分析。」

56 歲的習近平是中太子黨成員之一，父親是中共元老習仲勛，習仲勛在 20
年前六

四事件中曾堅決反對動用軍隊鎮壓。習近平清華大學畢業後，曾在中央軍委辦公廳

任軍委秘書長耿飆的秘書，其妻子是中國著名歌唱家彭麗媛，兩人生育一女習明澤。

外界對習也有一些負面報道，例如質疑他的博士文憑，以及今年初在墨西哥用粗話

反駁外國對中國的指摘等。

四中全會昨日通過《中共中央關於加強和改進新形勢下黨的建設若干重大問題的決

定》，公報還提及反民族分裂問題。

本報記者

2009-09-18T09:12:00.002-05:00

More ambiguity about Xi Jinping

Now the Hong Kong press reports that Xi was voted into the CMC, but they won't announce it until after the national day parade. Well, why? Hu's induction into the CC was announced at the 4th plenum of the 15th CC, so why break the tradition now? Just to give Hu some face? I don't understand at all, if this rumor is true.

2009-09-18T07:31:00.002-05:00

Xi Jinping did NOT get into the CMC?!

Well folks, I read through the announcement of the 4th plenum twice carefully and saw no mention of anyone being promoted into any position. I suppose a late announcement is possible, but at this point, it doesn't seem like Xi Jinping has been promoted into the Central Military Commission.

My original hypothesis was that Hu would try to delay Xi's entrance in order to set himself up for serving another full term as chairman of the CMC. Through whatever maneuvering, Hu seems to be succeeding thus far. Xi, however, received further assurance that he is still the designated successor as he was the only person who made an important speech at the 4th plenum besides Hu. Thus, an emerging compromise may be that Xi would allow Hu to serve another term as CMC Chairman. In exchange, Hu would not cause trouble for Xi's ascension into the party secretary general position in 2012. We'll see if this arrangement holds.

Another mild surprise of the announcement is that despite all this talk of political reform, the 4th plenum ended with the same vague language of "strengthening inner party democracy" as in the past. I am not seeing any concrete reform. Perhaps the concrete measures will come later, but I somehow doubt that.

2009-09-16T08:08:00.003-05:00

Willy Lam says Xi will get into CMC

Well, I just can't bear it any more, and now it is possible that Wang Lequan may be removed after the plenum. Oh, the suspense!

Asia Sentinel
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2050&Itemid=171

Written by Willy Lam
Tuesday, 15 September 2009

Hu Jintao's political woes may afford Xi an early opportunity to be inducted into the powerful Central Military Commission

While most plenary sessions of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee – usually held once a year – merely endorse decisions made by the supreme Politburo Standing Committee, the plenum now taking place in Beijing deserves special attention.

Party insiders say Vice-President Xi Jinping, 56, may be promoted to the vice-chairmanship of the CCP's Central Military Commission. This will not only confirm Xi's status as Hu's successor as party general secretary and state president, but also spell a bonanza to the political fortune of the "Gang of Princelings" – the offspring of party elders – that Xi heads.

Xi, the son of former vice-premier Xi Zhongxun, does not come from the Communist Youth League faction led by President Hu Jintao. And Hu, who has been military commission chairman since 2004, has maneuvered to delay Xi's induction to the policy-setting military organ. One reason is that while the princelings are heavily represented in the top echelons of the People's Liberation Army, very few youth league affiliates have attained senior ranks in the defense forces.

Within the standing committee put together at the 17th Party Congress in late 2007, Xi outranks long-time Hu protégé Li Keqiang, who as First Vice-Premier is expected to take over from Wen Jiabao as premier in 2013. It is understood, however, that Hu has hoped to delay Xi's induction to the military commission so as to allow Li, a former party boss of the Youth League, time to build up a power base at the top.

However, recent events in Xinjiang, in which more than 200 people were killed in ethnic violence since early July, have dealt a blow to the Youth League faction. The bulk of the top cadres running Xinjiang and Tibet, including their party secretaries, respectively Wang Lequan and Zhang Qingli, are veteran youth League affiliates.

At the plenum, which runs until Friday, Hu is expected to have to explain why he hasn't sacked Wang, who has worked in Xinjiang since the early 1990s, in the wake of the disastrous riots. A well-known hawk, Wang has masterminded a ruthless Sinicization policy in Xinjiang, which means weaning Uighurs from their linguistic, cultural and religious heritage. So far, supremo Hu has only fired the party secretary of Urumqi and the police chief of Xinjiang, who are regarded as scapegoats to cover up for Wang's failed policies.

With Hu and his Youth League faction on the defensive, Xi's supporters in the Politburo and Central Committee are pushing for his appointment to the Military Commission. After all, Hu himself was first made CMC vice-chairman in 1999, three years before he succeeded ex-president Jiang Zemin as party general secretary in 2012.

There are, however, no specifications in the party charter concerning when a crown prince should be made a CMC member. And given that Hu is still the undisputed supremo of Chinese politics, the president could count on the support of the majority of Central Committee members who are loyal to him – and deny Xi his price until the next Central Committee plenum in 2010.

In the meantime, Hu has to tackle another political minefield at the on-going Central Committee plenum: the plethora of scandals involving the offspring of party leaders. After all, the major theme of the conclave is "party construction," a codeword for ridding the party of corrupt cadres and other bad apples.

It is no coincidence that former premier Zhu Rongji, who retired in 2003, published last month an anthology of the interviews he had given during his five year term as head of government. One of China's most popular politicians, Zhu is remembered as an incorruptible official who personally handled a dozen-odd major graft cases. Several of Chinese media have recently cited one of Zhu's best known sayings: "My only hope is that after retirement, the people will say ‘he is a Mr Clean' – and I'll be satisfied."

Given reports that a high-tech firm once run by Hu's son, Hu Haifeng, was implicated in a corruption incident in Namibia, Africa, senior cadres in the party have indirectly blasted the president by singing the praises of Zhu. While Hu's close aides have banned all reference to Hu Haifeng or his company in the Chinese media, the president still has a lot of explaining to do about how to effectively prevent the spouses and kids of cadres from turning their political connections into hefty profits.

2009-09-14T22:35:00.001-05:00

It's Plenum Season Again,

Dear readers, it's plenum season again,which is a bit like election season, except there is no data, just a lot of speculations. The big question in the on-going plenum is whether Xi Jinping, Hu's likely successor, will be inducted into the Central Military Commission, as this would further seal his candidacy. We will see; I think there is a chance that Hu will find some excuse to exclude Xi from the body in order to prolong his own influence in the future. Here are a couple of excellent pieces on this issue:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/asia/15china.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=print [link OK]

The New York Times

September 15, 2009
China Watched for Sign of New Leader
By MICHAEL WINES

BEIJING — China’s governing Communist Party will convene its annual policy meeting on Tuesday with a sober, if not soporific, mandate to root out government corruption and make the party adapt to changing times.

But lurking in the background is a more compelling topic: Who will become China’s next ruler in 2012?

Analysts will watch the meeting, the annual plenary session of the party’s 17th Central Committee, to see whether Vice President Xi Jinping is given the additional title of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Such an appointment would be seen as a confirmation that Mr. Xi, 56, is set to succeed President Hu Jintao when Mr. Hu’s second term ends in 2012. Any Chinese leader must have experience in leading the military, which is under party control. Mr. Hu was awarded the same post in 1999, three years before he became the party’s general secretary in 2002.

Yet Chinese politics are so opaque that no outsider can say for certain that Mr. Xi, the presumed heir, will win the position — or that there will be a mark against him should he not.

“There is no foregone conclusion these days,” said a political analyst at a Beijing institution tied to the Communist Party.

Whether that is true is a central question hanging over the meeting this week. Since the founding of the People’s Republic 60 years ago, the Communist Party has governed both the Chinese people and itself strictly from the top down, with all important actions approved by a handful of party leaders united by power and personal relationships.

Officially, at least, the 2,000 or more Central Committee members meeting this week have been given an agenda to shake up that model. The members are supposed to prepare plans to bring democracy to the party’s inner deliberations, choosing new leaders by consensus, not by the dictates of those at the top.

“A new crop of leaders who grew up after the reform and opening up started are going to step into new leadership roles” in 2012, Zhen Xiaoying, a professor at the Communist Party’s central party school, stated in a recent article in the state-run newspaper People’s Daily. He was referring to the period of economic reform that began in 1978.

“The era of relying on authority and personal charm to run the party is over,” he said.

Mr. Xi and Mr. Hu epitomize that shift. Mr. Hu, 66, joined the party in 1964, two years before Mao’s Cultural Revolution brought China a decade of social and political chaos. Mr. Xi joined in 1974, two years after President Richard M. Nixon first visited Beijing and China began to reconnect to the outside world.

Mr. Hu was the party’s designated successor to Jiang Zemin, who ruled a battened-down China after the bloody suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

The process of political succession in China’s one-party system is always shrouded in intrigue. The party elite elevated Mr. Xi to the ruling Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 and gave him the highest rank of any leader of his age group, signaling that he had been chosen to succeed Mr. Hu when the latter’s second five-year stint as top leader ends in 2012. But the party’s internal deliberations on such matters are in the highest order of state secret, and there has been no public confirmation of Mr. Xi’s status.

Whatever changes the plenum orders are unlikely to resemble democracy as Westerners know it. China has long shunned Western democracy, branding it anarchy, and embraced what it calls “democratic centralism” — essentially, passing carefully reviewed suggestions from lower-level party organs to leaders at the top.

Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, recently quoted Mr. Hu as saying that democratic centralism would remain China’s guiding version of democracy. One liberal political analyst who has called for a more open Chinese society, Liu Junning, argued in a telephone interview that prospects for genuine changes this week were dim.

“I think it is important in China first to strengthen formal institutions such as the legislature and the court system, rather than informal structures such as the ruling party,” he said. “Let’s see if there are any open factions within the party — any open opposition, any open minorities.”

China’s governing elite, like any group, has factions, but they are tightly cloaked. Mr. Xi, for example, is widely believed to be the favorite of Mr. Jiang, who still has considerable sway in retirement.

After Mao wreaked havoc with the party hierarchy by designating and then toppling multiple successors, the party’s elite clawed back the power to oversee political succession. Mr. Hu was effectively designated China’s future top leader in 1992, leaving Mr. Jiang, then the new No. 1 official, little choice in the matter. Likewise, Mr. Hu’s apparent favorite, Deputy Prime Minister Li Keqiang, was not selected as his future successor, though Mr. Li is now considered likely to be the next prime minister.

The plenum will be closely watched for any signs that internal politicking has kept the succession contest alive.

The analyst at the Communist Party institution, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press, said he believed that Mr. Xi might not win the military post this week. “If he doesn’t,” he said, “it would show that there’s more of a balance of power. But it would not mean that Xi lost the opportunity.”

The plenum is also scheduled to take up anticorruption measures that could include a requirement that some party officials disclose their holdings of property or financial instruments.

Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting, and Li Bibo contributed research.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574411830894747864.html#printMode
A Party Plenum Worth Watching
China's Communist Party has some tough decisions to make.
By RUSSELL LEIGH MOSES

BEIJING—The largest ruling body of the Chinese Communist Party—the Central Committee—will convene its annual meeting in Beijing today. This meeting isn't just another plenum. It will say much about how the current Chinese leadership wants to unjam a backlog of reform initiatives and what role it wants the Party to play in the years to come.

The current leadership has coped with crises of all sorts, from earthquakes to ethnic unrest, exceptionally well, all the while avoiding the soul-searching and power-sharing that many outside of China have insisted was necessary for the Party to survive and the country to prosper. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have a right to feel pleased.

But there is also ample reason for anxiety about the Hu-Wen legacy. For all the praise heaped on China's economic performance by outsiders, many scholars and officials here know better, and they continue to express concern about structural challenges. Analysts bemoan the high cost of housing, the appalling state of health care and the stubbornly high unemployment rates of college graduates. These issues may be raised by plenum delegates. Many ordinary Chinese and some officials believe they have been shunted aside by Party elites more concerned with overseas corporate takeovers and access to oil and strategic minerals than the widening income gap.
Xi Jinping, the future Hu Jintao?
Moses
Moses

To counter this dissatisfaction, the Hu administration may restart local elections, expanding the means by which dissent can take place within the Party. The Party may also announce measures to discipline cadres who employ power for private purposes. The well-oiled state-run media machine has run stories hinting of a coming full-scale crackdown on corruption in Party ranks, as well as a requirement that cadres declare their private and family assets publicly. Even if those rumors are simply smoke, they must reflect discontent among some Party officials who feel themselves excluded from decision-making.

The other major issue on the agenda concerns the future leadership of the Party. Xi Jinping, the current Vice President, heads the shortlist to succeed Mr. Hu as party secretary in 2012, followed closely by Vice Premier Li Keqiang. Many analysts outside China expect that Messrs. Xi and Li will ascend together, sharing the same sort of arrangement that their predecessors President Hu and Premier Wen enjoyed: a division of responsibilities and a tacit agreement not to challenge the prevailing political protocol. Policy disagreements are allowed, so long as power plays are eschewed.

But the problem might turn out to be chemistry. Messrs. Hu and Wen appear to genuinely respect and even like each other. It is not at all clear whether Messrs. Xi and Li can work out the same understanding, for they are competitors whose time in the political saddle has not been especially long. They are each expanding their networks inside the Party but they are still working out whom they can trust at the apex of the political system.

There is also no clear sign that Mr. Hu is ready to name a clear successor, or if he did, that his choice would be met with acclaim across the Party. Whether the armed forces feel comfortable with Mr. Xi is also very much an unknown: A key test of his support base at this plenum will be whether he is chosen to be the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. Should deadlock result, there are other officials in the Party who could seek to seize the opportunity to disrupt the usual process of political succession and try to claim Party leadership for themselves.

There are plenty of examples of Chinese plenums making history. The plenum held in 1978 marked the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's effort to engineer economic transformation through modernization and moving the state away from its dominance of the market. The 1992 plenum, barely three years after the Tiananmen Square incident, stiff-armed conservatives who tried to roll back market reforms but also left no room for organized dissent. Those plenums were the beginnings of a great economic experiment that has largely worked.

This plenum might turn out to be another defining meeting for the current leadership, which has so far been interested less in transforming China than securing continued tenure for the Party. The plenum could be the takeoff point for a more confident Communist Party, one that would be willing to experiment with political alternatives like direct elections. Whatever the outcome, this week's plenum promises to make a bit of history.

Mr. Moses is dean of the Beijing Center for Chinese Studies.

2009-08-17T03:56:00.002-05:00

Chongqing Cabs and Municipal Budgeting

Anonymous reader raised an interesting point: "I have to say its not very logic to link the gangster investigation and Chongqing's bankruptcy together. The additional CNY1500 income from taxi driver even can't afford the interest from Chongqing government's CNY1 trln debt. However, it is true that the government will make some "action" if it finds out someone not following its order.But I think every government around the world will make similar decision, right?"

Let's do some math: 1500/cab/month*12=18000/cab/year. Let's say there are 3000 cabs in Chongqing. This would make 54 million in additional income per year. Now, that's not a large amount, but it can pay interest on a much larger loan. As a government, Chongqing can borrow cheaply from banks, probably in the 5-6% interest rate loan. An additional 54 million in income would allow Chongqing to take out a loan worth 900 million RMB. Now we are talking about somewhat real money. Also, most local governments would not even try to impose such a fee on mafia controlled taxi companies. They would prey on normal residents. Chongqing, due to the connections of the party secretary, can do both.

2009-08-16T18:19:00.003-05:00

More on Chongqing Gangs and Wen Qiang

First of all, I just did a radio interview on Moneytalk with Bob Brinker. If you are interested on my views on everything related to China (45 minutes worth), my sister has kindly recorded and put the clips on-line: http://www.thefacebookera.com/victor/

Second, 21st Century Business Herald did an excellent investigative report on the Wen Qiang case in Chongqing. Apparently, the whole thing began with the taxi strike back in June, which was caused by a fee Chongqing wanted to collect. The private entrepreneurs/mobster behind the taxi company called the strike, which necessitated Bo Xilai to crackdown on them, which led to their protector, Wen Qiang.

In truth, I am somewhat sympathetic to the gangsters, who were unfortunate enough to run into a bigger gangster, Bo Xilai. Basically, where property rights are not secured, a private businessperson has to secure by some means, including bribing officials or cultivating a gang. The problem of course is that once you have acquired those resources, you further use it to gain a monopoly, thus stifling competition. But all this is pretty normal. So, why was Bo Xilai trying to get an additional 1500 RMB in taxes from each taxi in Chongqing? Because Chongqing is broke! It has leveraged itself up the tilt with the formation of 8 major investment companies which have borrowed nearly 1 trillion RMB from the banks. Interest payments alone is in the tens of billions, if not over 100 billion a year. Land sales is still lagging due to still not very robust real estate sales. So, Bo has to be a bigger gangster to concentrate more economic resources.

荣耀末路：重庆市司法局长文强涉黑调查
来源：21世纪经济报道　2009-08-16 09:14:30 　作者：木村

　　

2000年9月19日晚，中国头号悍匪张君被重庆警方擒获，扑地。时任重庆市公安局副局长的文强，一脚踏于其脸一侧，厉声喝问，你服不服？

是役，文强声名远扬。

9年后，连任公安局副局长11年，现任重庆市司法局局长的文强再次引起轰动，此次却是因为他本人的落马。

8月8日，据新华社消息，重庆市纪委证实，文强涉嫌严重违纪，目前正在接受组织调查。

8月13日，重庆市政府新闻发言人周波说，文强被“双规”充分证明了市委市政府打黑除恶的决心是坚决的，不管背景有多深，关系有多复杂，经济压力有多大，只要侵害了党和人民的利益都将一查到底，绝不手软。

最新消息显示，文强案发前后，重庆市公安机关在打黑除恶专项斗争中已抓获一批犯罪嫌疑人，缴获了一批枪支弹药和管制刀具，14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙受到了打击，陈明亮等19名黑恶势力头目无一漏网。同时，将100多名黑恶势力团伙骨干成员全部缉拿归案。

周波称，此成效为当地打黑除恶专项行动的“第一阶段的初步胜利”。而重庆市高级法院亦做出表态，对于黑社会性质组织罪犯，一律不予假释；除了刑法规定的“被判死缓的，两年考察期满后应减为无期”和“有重大立功表现应减刑”外，黑老大将没有减刑机会，被判死缓、无期徒刑的黑老大将面临“终身监禁”。

目前文强一案更多内情仍有待调查。但在重庆当地民声中，“打黑除恶”、“平安重庆”战役，获得了公众空前信任和高度赞赏。

抓捕

实际上，从文强2008年6月由公安局调至市司法局，重庆展开打黑除恶专项行动以来，关于文强被“双规”的传言就此起彼伏。现在终于尘埃落定。

多位政界人士向记者证实，文强系8月6日在京被限制行动，并于8月7日上午通过民航班机押解回渝。当时他正在参加全国司法厅(局)长座谈会。

此前的7月31日，重庆市就司法行政机关贯彻落实“平安重庆”建设等事项展开专题调研，文强作了工作汇报。这是他最后一次出现在民众视野。

重庆警方人士证实，文强在京被采取措施时，重庆本地也有抓捕行动同步展开。

8月7日凌晨两点左右，重庆市公安局一辆警车来到位于重庆南滨路附近的“海棠晓月”小区。据在场人士透露，警方表示的身份为“重庆市公安局文强案专案组”。

专案组要求物管公司负责人提供协助，突击搜查小区的三套住宅，包括B区的一套，C区两套。其中B区所在房屋为200多平方米的跃层豪宅，有多位小区居民称，该处为文强主要居住地。C区两套住房，知情人士透露，登记业主分别为两位女性。

这位知情人称，警方于当晚从小区带走了一男一女，“二三十岁的年龄，看起来很年轻”。

8月8日，重庆市纪委向媒体证实，文强涉嫌严重违纪，目前正在接受组织调查。文强案最终曝光。

据公开的消息，在文强案发前后，重庆市警方已经展开了为期数月的打黑除恶活动，除严打当地黑恶社会势力之外，此次专项斗争的重点也包括打击黑恶势力的“保护伞”。

如重庆市公安局局长王立军所言，“这一轮打黑除恶斗争，要‘内除积弊，外销积怨’，对于黑势力的保护伞将一查到底。”

信息显示，文强是目前专项行动中落马的级别最高的官员，他被指涉嫌包庇黑社会犯罪。

但文强并非警界落马的唯一官员。据知情人士向记者表示，有一批涉嫌包庇黑社会犯罪的警员被限制行动或接受调查，其中包括有区、县公安局局长或副局长。

重庆市公安局婉拒了记者的采访，称现在还不到发布消息的时机。

文强其人

据公开简历，文强出生于1955年12月，重庆市巴南区人，在职大专学历，一级警监。1972年1月参加工作，先后担任过四川省巴县公安局副局长，巴县政法委副书记兼公安局副局长，巴县县委常委、副书记等职务。

1992 年9月，文强调任四川省重庆市公安局任副局长。据知情人士介绍，1990年代初期，文强尚在巴县任职时，曾在西南师范大学举办的研究生课程进修班在职学习两年，“那时候提拔干部学历是很重要一个指标，而警界当时高学历者少，这段学习经历，成为文强到市局任要职的重要砝码。”

1997年重庆直辖后，文强担任重庆市公安局副局长，在任11年，并于2000年11月被提任正厅局级侦查员。2003年任重庆市公安局党委副书记。在公安局期间，文强一直分管刑事侦查工作。

2008年7月，文强出任重庆市司法局局长，接替他位置的为王立军——这位中国警界知名的“打黑英雄”从辽宁空降至重庆，并在2009年3月正式就任重庆市公安局局长。

在市公安局期间，文强在系统内一度是个英雄般的人物。

除2000年闻名全国的张君案外，他主办的好几起要案被公安部记一等功，包括1992年震惊全国的重庆警匪枪战，1994年中国第一盗案，以及2000年的重庆抢劫运钞车案等。

熟知文强的人士评价说，文强工作能力很强，颇有“强人风范”。有接近文强本人的人士称，文强闲时爱斗地主，喜欢金庸、古龙的武侠小说，是一个性情中人。

该人士举例说，1999年5月27日重庆市石桥铺派出所民警芦振龙，在辖区抓捕犯罪嫌疑人过程中，身中21刀，因伤势过重身亡，年仅26岁。该案非文强亲办，但在嫌疑人被抓获后，他坚持要到看守所去见识一下嫌犯。见到嫌疑人后，他飙了一句脏话，大致意思是“你也太黑了 ”，言毕便顺手将刚买不久的价值 4000多元的手机，砸向嫌疑人，拂袖而去。

然而文强在政界及民间被议论最多的，却是他和当地一些“江湖人士”过往甚密。

重庆市一位政府官员说，1990年代时期，重庆一王姓的黑社会大佬在解放碑为女儿办生日宴，文强参加了这次宴会，并为很多人所知。

另一个重庆坊间广为流传的段子则是，文强与这位王姓老大关系亲近到可以在街边破烂的小摊一起吃面。它甚至被一些重庆人引申为，这是衡量与一个权势人物关系是否至“铁”的最高标准。

后来该王姓人士涉案潜逃，至今尚未归案。

而与此同时，重庆屡发涉黑涉枪大案，整体治安形势严峻，这直接导致文强在当地民众中一直口碑不佳。根据重庆市公安局的统计，重庆近年来治安案件每年在10万件以上，严重暴力犯罪时有发生。

7月31日，重庆市公安局召开了一个扫黑除恶通报会，一参会人士透露，市公安局负责人介绍说，在过去很长一段时间内，重庆治安形势非常严峻。

一位司法界人士认为，如此多积案，加上扫黑专项斗争所暴露的重庆黑社会势力猖獗的事实，“作为分管刑事侦查这么年的公安局负责人，文强应负主要责任”。

扫黑

文强落马，与6月份以来开展的轰轰烈烈打黑除恶专项行动息息相关。

这一行动开展背景，是薄熙来在去年5月提出了建设宜居重庆、畅通重庆、森林重庆、平安重庆、健康重庆五大目标，以此为重庆的扩大开放提供优良的软硬环境，同时提升市民生活品质，增强幸福感。

据一位政界人士称，促使重庆决意整顿黑恶势力最直接的原因，是去年的出租车罢运事件及民营公交收编改革——政府在推行有关政策时，感受到来自黑恶利益集团的强烈阻力，政令不能畅通。

2008年11月3日，重庆市发生8000辆出租车集体罢市事件。出租车司机主要诉求称，出租车公司收取高昂的规费，导致司机受到严重盘剥。重庆市委市政府随后做出了妥善处理，很快平息了事件。

作为主要善后措施，重庆市政府要求主城区出租车公司每辆车降低50元“板板钱”。但在一些出租车公司，该项措施却受到强力阻挠。“一辆车每天50元，一个月每辆出租车的营运损失就是1500元，这就触及很多利益，执行遇到相当大阻力。”上述政界人士称。

而此后的民营公交收编事件，则使地方恶势力对政府政令的抵制态度更加明显----因民营公司经营的“7字头”公交车管理散乱，事故频发，多次改革不见成效，市政府终于决定在今年5月31日前，将全市380多辆“7字头”收归为国有，而“民营公交公司提出的收购要价达到 1亿多元，与政府谈判时的态度非常强硬”。

在此背景下，重庆市的打黑行动开始迅猛进行。重庆市政府新闻发言人周波在13日表示，这次行动系“根据市委市政府和公安部的整体部署”。空降重庆的王立军是这次打黑的领军人物。

王立军上任后重拳不断。去年7月10日至9月30日期间，他领导警方进行了重庆市历年来规模最大“夏季社会治安综合整治行动”。行动开展期间，全市日均破案258起，日均逮捕犯罪嫌疑人93人，一时监狱人满为患。

此外，王还在今年1月，部署了“灭枪治暴”专项行动，出动上千名公安特警、刑警和武警官兵，乘专列突袭渝、湘、黔交界区，清剿围捕了一批地下兵工厂及制枪窝点。

一位警界人士对记者称，两次行动，都意在“扫黑”，“这一步是将上面浮漂的部分打去，为下一步深入清理黑势力打下基础。”

今年6月，“打黑除恶”专项行动正式拉开序幕，重庆警方说将对“恶势力进行拉网式的全天候密集打击”。

此后，一批黑恶势力头目相继落网，其中不乏如渝强实业(集团)有限公司董事长黎强这样有影响、有身份的亿万富翁。有警方人士透露，这位从事公交运输的民企老板，与文强交往甚密。

随着行动的深入，打黑也指向了警方内部。知情人士称，多位有“保护伞”嫌疑的警界官员，相继被查或被逮捕。

知情人士透露，这些警界人士有的是自动暴露，如黎强被捕后半个小时内，其手机不断有警示其逃跑的短信，发信者多是警方内部人士；而有的则是在侦办过程被牵涉进来，一位办理刑事案件多年、与警方接触较为密切的律师对记者说，几位熟知的警方人士，最近手机都莫名停机了。

迹象显示，重庆的打黑除恶专项活动还在持续深入中，7月15日，王立军兼任武警重庆市总队第一政委、第一书记。如此一来，重庆武警系统也将被纳入打黑行动的统一调配中。

重庆一位资深律师分析说，最后所有的焦点都会指向文强，因为他负责全市的刑事、治安管理11年之久，对此难脱其咎。

保护伞

“文强的落马，最令人震惊的是，掀开了警界与黑恶势力勾结谋取非法利益的盖子。”该市一位政协委员对记者称。

“据我的了解，重庆黑社会的发展，跟拥有保护伞不无关系。”重庆某大学教授王力(化名)说。王力1994年就开始潜心研究黑社会，并深入黑社会组织进行调查。

而在7月31日该市一次通报会上，王立军亦表示，重庆涉黑案件的总体特点是时间长、跨度大、背景深、人数多、质量高、影响恶劣，特别是一些黑恶组织已有“合法”外衣，以商养“黑”，以“黑”富商。

根据王力对各地黑社会的调查发现，部分成型的黑社会组织与保护伞之间，是相辅相成，互相发展的过程。

王力说，“有些组织一开始并不是黑社会，只是与官员有某种关系，如亲属、同事、朋友、战友、老乡、邻居中，并利用这样一个靠山，不断发展，后来才形成黑社会；有的官员，则靠着黑社会的钱往上爬，比如买官。随着他的升迁，周围聚的集团，利益越来越多，他自然也就成为这个利益体的保护伞。而过去的团伙，随着他升迁，发展越来越大，也逐渐形成了黑社会。”

“中国正处于工业化中期，这个时期的社会特征，就是黑社会成长迅速，并有条件迅速集聚资本，增强实力，这样一个过程中，他们从过去暴力为主，转向以更高层次的经济犯罪为主，治安案件反而大为减少，但危害性更大，更深层次危害社会肌体。”王力认为，而这个过程也是黑社会与保护伞相互作用的过程。

“没有保护伞，黑社会难以长期生存和发展，两者是一个相辅相成的关系。”王力说，“黑社会本质上是市场经济的伴随物，它本身是‘经济动物’，它本质是追求非法的经济利益，发展到一定程度，就会不断向政府浸透，寻求靠山和地域控制力，以维持这种关系。”

王力表示，文强的发展轨迹，也不会脱离上述规律，更为严重的是，“一个公安局局长如果涉入黑恶势力，他自然不会事事亲为，就会牵连各部门、派出所、民警”。

2000 年发生的重庆“白云湖事件”，就是一个典型案例。当时有王渝男等十多人合资在璧山县白云湖度假村开设“百家乐”地下赌场，长期聚众赌博，非法敛取钱财—— 案发后，原重庆市公安局治安总队总队长李某等四名警员被一同抓捕，罪名为“利用职务之便，为王渝男等提供保护，甚至通风报信”。

法院的判决书称，上述警察最后“致使王渝男、董理等人以白云湖为依托，长期非法聚敛钱财未被查禁，并发展成为非法持有枪支、弹药，实施故意杀人等犯罪行为的黑社会性质组织”。

据知情人士透露，作为保护伞，李某获得利益惊人——不仅每月可按时领取5万利钱，并可随时调取300万元以下现金。

王力称，“在这样巨资的诱惑下，有些官员是很难抵抗的，也就被金钱牢牢拴在了贼船上。”

“中国正处于社会转型期，本身就是黑恶势力层出不穷的时期，就像犯罪一样不可能消灭。”长期从事城市平安建设的重庆市社科院研究员孙元明称，“一个地方黑社会存在，除了全局性背景，有其强烈的区域特性，必须要针对性地采取措施。”

孙元明认为，“过去对黑恶势力也在打击，但更多满足于治安层面的一次次运动式出击，基本没有触及社会经济层上的本质的矛盾。所以收效不大，而薄熙来现在提的平安重庆，是以治安为突破口，强调社会经济发展的文化，经济良性安全，跟以往扫黑的概念大有不同，也会大大减少文强这样的现象”。

据重庆市公安部门8月12日公开的数据，今年1到7月，警方破获积案13867起，其中命案积案303起，超过前5年破命案积案的总和。

对于重庆这次扫荡式的扫黑专项活动，重庆民众普遍持欢迎态度。

舆论表示，治安形势的彻底好转不能寄望于某一次严打活动，而应该从制度层面着手，切断黑恶势力向社会各阶层渗透的可能，并断绝其和保护伞之间的关联。而这有待于重庆政府的更进一步努力。

但往事并非如烟，有关于文强的那些故事和传说，注定将会成为这一个民生战役中最核心的段落。

2001年5月，张君案一审宣判后，文强接受一家杂志专访，聊到他的退休后的生活，当时44岁的他表示，要写一本关于张君的书，“张君是一个复杂的人，不能从单一的角度去看，其实最要命的就是把人的简单化。”

他自己的故事，注定不会简单。

2009-08-15T15:23:00.002-05:00

The SCMP did a couple of interesting articles on the Chongqing case, one generalizing the role of gangsters. Well, I guess now the "businessmen" on Bo's side can run things in Chongqing....

South China Morning Post Aug 15, 2009 Saturday He Huifeng p.5

Organised crime calls the shots when it comes to doing business in Chongqing

Organised crime has terrorised the commercial world in Chongqing for so long that it has become part of everyday business. Gangsters have gradually infiltrated many sectors and made their presence felt through blackmail, extortion and loan sharking, local businessmen said. "For most businessmen in Chongqing, you can't survive if you don't submit to the gangsters," said Hu Shuang , whose father runs a lumber company. "Surrender is the only way to protect ourselves. The gangs and officials are together, so revenge would come if you called the police."

Huang Wei , head of Chongqing's Private Economic Promotion Association, said usury was the most common tactic gangs employed to acquire assets from legal businesses. Mr Huang said gangsters would lure businesses with seemingly reasonable rates of interest, and then fail to provide the agreed amount of cash while still demanding full repayment. The deadline for repaying money was also very tough, sometimes only a matter of days, he said. "If you pay it late, they will smash your office with knives and clubs," he said.

Ordinary people and even soldiers have suffered from the gang violence. In March, a soldier standing guard outside a garrison in Chongqing was killed and his machine gun was stolen. The authorities treated it as a terrorist attack at first but later discovered it was the work of organised crime. In November, five amusement arcade workers were killed in a fight at the establishment. Local reports said more than 20 gangsters armed with knives and batons had clashed with the employees.

"Chongqing has a deeply rooted tradition of armed gangs," said Yao Shibo, who runs a trading company. He said many munitions factories had been built in the area when it was the wartime capital of the Kuomintang and "homemade" knives and firearms were readily available in rural areas. He said gangs were widely active, especially in taxi companies, farm produce markets and commercial property construction sites. "The gangs have thousands of youngsters and unemployed men as reserves," Mr Yao said. "They would fight for anyone. You just need to pay them 100 yuan [$113HK] each per attack. Being a hoodlum is a way to make a living."

In Beijing's development blueprint for western regions, Chongqing was pitched as an export and trade base and the major city in the west. But the revelations of gang activity are putting a stain on the municipality's image as a place gearing up for international business. An intercontinental rail line linking Chongqing to Rotterdam is scheduled to be completed by 2012. The rail link has been touted as a way to gradually resolve the economic imbalance between the mainland's prosperous coastal areas and the poorer interior regions.

Dramatic tale of triad fighter's fall from grace
Ng Tze-wei Ibid., p. 5

From triad-buster to police chief, from police chief to target of triad-buster - the story of Wen Qiang is no movie plot, but no less dramatic. Mr Wen, director of the Chongqing Justice Bureau and formerly deputy police chief for 16 years, was placed under internal party investigation last Saturday for allegedly shielding the rampant and growing triad forces in the sprawling municipality of 30 million. The 54-year-old Chongqing native started working right after high school, and slowly climbed up the ladder with the police force in Sichuan , the province Chongqing belonged to before becoming an independent municipality in 1997. Mr Wen became vice-chief of the Chongqing police in 1992, and deputy party secretary in 2003. Mr Wen shot to fame by solving several high-profile robberies in the early 1990s, and became a household name when he caught the infamous crime boss Zhang Jun after a six-year pursuit. Zhang was caught by Mr Wen in 2000, faced charges ranging from armed robbery to murder, and was executed the year after.

During his tenure as police chief, Mr Wen slowly gained a reputation for his close involvement with the rich and powerful, and the darker side of the city's business deals.

In the few months before his fall from grace, three billionaires close to Mr Wen - two were also local legislators - were arrested. Property developer Chen Mingliang , motorbike businessman Gong Gangmo and Li Qiang , the second-richest man in the municipality's Banan region - with interests from property to transport - were among more than 100 people taken away during a 50-day assault on organised crime in Chongqing.

When former Liaoning party chief Bo Xilai was transferred to Chongqing in 2007, he swore to fight crime gangs that were growing out of control in the booming industrial municipality. In July last year, he parachuted Wang Lijun , a well-known triad-buster from Liaoning province, in to take Mr Wen's position. Mr Wen was transferred to head the Justice Bureau, an apparent promotion.

Mr Wang, 40, in his 20 years as a policeman has reportedly sent 800 criminals to their execution. His long-term battle with the triads also gave him at least 20 scars from knife and bullet wounds, and a 10-day coma. He is now rumoured to have a seven-figure price on his head.

Last month Mr Wang said the triads in Chongqing were known for "having a long history, wide coverage, deep connections, huge membership, high quality, and vicious influence".

Above all, "some of the organised crime gangs already have a 'legal' coat, and are using business to support triad activities, and using triad activities to enrich their business".

Many legitimate businesses have fallen victim to organised crime, and have complained about the high extortion fees they pay to survive.

Mr Wen was the most senior official brought down since Mr Wang's drive to crack down on this mingling of power, money and crime.

Public administration professor Mao Shoulong of Renmin University said collusion between police and organised crime was not uncommon around the world, but in China the situation was somewhat different. "The collusion is not so much between police and organised crime gangs. The Chinese police are still quite effective in combating crime," Professor Mao said. "The collusion is more between police and a growing number of businesses using triad-like methods to conduct their affairs."

2009-08-13T19:37:00.002-05:00

I am now on twitter

Dear Readers, my sister just dragged me kicking and screaming into twitter and its universe of 100 characters limit (wish that was 100 Chinese characters!). If you twitter, click on twitter.com/vshih2 or search for me by my name.I will do my best to update with various views and links. I will probably twitter a lot during conferences!

On another note, Bo Xilai is further cleaning house in Chongqing. After the arrest of former vice police chief Wen Qiang, many of his "business" associates were also arrested. Now, we can say that Bo Xilai has complete control over Chongqing. The question is: to what end? This could be a Li Ruihuan strategy of planting factional followers up and down the city bureaucracy so that he maintains residual influence on the city for years down the road.....

重庆多名民企老板涉黑被抓其中不乏亿万富翁
来源：南方都市报　2009-08-14 07:56:36 　作者：

　　
　　本报讯重庆市政府新闻发言人周波昨日称，重庆在50多天内打掉14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙，19名首犯全部落网，100多名黑社会性质组织骨干成员全部缉拿归案。在严厉打击黑恶势力的同时，警方在查封、扣押涉黑人员的企业资产账号时给企业保留下生产经营资金，保证企业正常经营活动不受影响。

周波称，在全国开展的打黑除恶专项行动开始以来，重庆市重拳出击对恶势力进行了拉网式的全天候的密集打击。经过50多天的战役攻坚，重庆警方已抓获了一批犯罪嫌疑人，缴获了一批枪支弹药和管制刀具，查封冻结了一大批涉案资产，14个横行该市多年的黑恶势力团伙已受到了打击，首犯陈明亮、龚刚模、陈坤志、岳村，樊奇杭、王兴强、王天伦等19人无一漏网，100多名黑社会性质组织骨干成员全部缉拿归案。

据介绍，经过近50天的专项集中整治，该市现行命案破案率达到了91.35%，高于全国平均水平2.95个百分点，破命案积案超过过去五年的总和，抓获故意杀人逃犯同比上升了20.7%，杀人犯罪下降了14.74%，创造了五年来同期的最低。

据此间了解，在被抓的犯罪嫌疑人中，有不少是当地的企业家和商人，其中不乏亿万富翁。周波表示，重庆警方在查封、扣押涉案企业资产账号时给企业保留下生产经营资金，指定不涉案负责人管理经营，保证涉案企业不掉链、不断档，保证了诸如今普食品有限公司、渝强集团实业有限公司等涉案企业的正常经营活动。

周波称，不久前重庆市司法局局长文强因严重违纪被双规，充分证明了重庆市委市政府打黑除恶的决心是坚决的，不管背景有多深、关系有多复杂、经济实力有多大，只要侵害了党和人民的利益都将一查到底、绝不手软。　　　　　中新

2009-08-05T04:50:00.002-05:00

Not all 100 millionaires in China are princelings!

The People's Daily today carried an interesting article rebutting the well-cited figure that 90% of the 100 millionaires in China are children of high level cadres. It carefully traced the source of the rumor and found experts to rebut it. To be sure, such a figure is impossible to derived from conventional survey instruments. As someone who is trying hard to track the influence of princelings, I can tell you that it is hard, and figuring out their wealth would be even harder. So, I am sure the official rebuttal has some merit. However, clearly, the reason why this figure is so widely believed is that there is a pervasive popular and elite belief that it takes connections to get rich!

组虚假数据是如何在网上网下以讹传讹的？
——关于“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”的新闻调查

2009年08月05日15:38 来源：人民网-时政频道
【字号大中小】打印留言论坛网摘手机点评纠错
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　　人民网北京8月5日电　记者唐维红张玉珂常红报道：近日，关于“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”的信息和议论在网上广为流传。8月4日，记者在百度上输入“高干子女占超亿元富豪人数91%”这一标题，显示相关网页2810余页，而仅仅在两天前，网页的数字还是2650页。与此同时，传统媒体也陆续推出以此数据为由头的时评、专论，引起广泛关注。

　　那么，这些数据从何而来？权威部门是否发布过这样的调查报告？这样的信息为何能引起如此高的关注度？带着这一系列疑问，人民网记者采访了相关人员和机构，希望通过调查揭开数据背后的真相。

　　数据拼凑嫁接　信息以讹传讹

　　蔡继明委员呼吁媒体准确报道

　　6月26日，《时代周报》刊发了记者韩洪刚采写的报道，报道在导语中称：“在日前召开的政协十一届常委会上，中国财富的‘集中度’正在受到政协常委和委员的热切关注。蔡继明委员说：‘中国权威部门的一份报告显示，0.4％的人掌握了70％的财富，财富集中度高于美国。’”

　　记者称：他 “查阅了几组权威数据显示，中国财富的确在以全球最快的速度流入富人钱包。” 随后，该记者在报道中写道：“据国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中宣部研究室、中国社科院等部门一份联合调查报告的数据,截至2006年3月底，中国内地私人拥有财产(不含在境外、外国的财产)超过5000万元以上的有 27310人，超过1亿元以上的有3220人。在超过1亿元以上的富豪当中，有2932人是高干子女。他们占据了亿元户的91%，拥有资产20450余亿元。”

　　这篇报道刊发后立刻被众多网站、论坛、博客，以及传统媒体转载、转贴。许多媒体和网友在转载、转贴的时候，将数据来源“简化”成蔡继明的发言，将这位曾因倡导假日改革成媒体焦点的全国政协委员再次推上舆论的风口浪尖。

　　人民网记者几经周折，于7月31日终于联系上了《时代周报》记者韩洪刚。他承认，这段数据不是引自蔡继明委员的发言，而是引自互联网上转载的某位国内经济学者2006年写的一篇文章。

　　随后，人民网记者又与该经济学者联系核实。该学者称此数据引自当年的互联网，他说：“当时网上（这组数据）非常流行”。

　　处在舆论旋涡中的蔡继明近来不胜其扰，他曾在7月11日通过个人博客发布澄清声明，但收效甚微。这组数据仍在继续传播和热议。

　　7月31日下午，蔡继明接受了人民网记者的采访。他说，事实上，他在全国政协十一届常委会第六次会议专题讨论会发言时，只是提到“国外一家研究机构估计，中国0.4%的最富裕的人掌握了70%的财富”，并没有指明是哪一家研究机构，更没有说是中国权威部门的报告。《时代周报》记者在没有对他进行采访的前提下，写了这则报道。《时代周报》并未说明后一个数据是他所说，但其他媒体再次引用《时代周报》数据时，就变成了：“蔡继明委员在近日召开的全国政协十一届常委会第六次会议上，援引一份由国务院研究室、中央党校研究室等部门一份联合调查报告的数据。”

　　蔡继明强调：“我对媒体这种乱引数据，误会当事者本意的做法感到非常反感。媒体报道应本着客观、真实、准确的原则，而不是恶意炒作。”

“权威数据”不权威　中宣部、中央党校、国务院、中国社科院等相关部门纷纷辟谣

　　为了增加这组所谓数据的可信度，一些媒体在报道、转载、评论这些信息和数据时，一再强调“中国权威部门”、“全国政协委员”等关键词，可假的终究是假的。不仅蔡继明委员出面澄清事实，该“报告”列举的权威部门也纷纷通过记者正式辟谣。

　　中宣部政研室有关负责人明确表示，“我室从未与国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中国社会科学院等部门联合作过关于社会经济状况的调研，我室也从未进行过这方面的专题调研，更未起草过这方面的调查报告，在已有的调研报告中也未引用过这些数据。”

　　有媒体报道称这组数字最早来自于中国社科院的“当代中国社会流动”课题。该课题负责人中国社科院研究员陆学艺对此坚决否认，连称荒唐！

　　他说：“‘高干子女占超亿元富豪人数的91%’，是不可信的，因为无法统计，并且比例数还精确到个位数，很荒唐！至于说这一数据来源于‘当代中国社会流动’课题，更是荒唐！我们的课题完成于2004年，而统计数据说的是‘截至2006年3月’，这怎么可能？”

　　国务院研究室、中央党校研究室相关负责人则告诉记者，根本没有这份报告，这组数据是假的，两年前曾在网上炒作过，最早来自海外某刊物。

　　记者通过互联网搜索，发现早在2006年10月19日，境外星岛环球网就刊发了题为“官方报告：中国亿万富豪九成以上是高干子女”的报道。报道称：“官方研究机构的调查报告披露：在金融、外贸、国土开发、大型工程、证券五大领域中，担任主要职务的基本上都是高干子弟。中国的亿万富豪九成以上是高干子女，其中有2900多名高干子女，共拥有资产二万多亿。国务院研究室、中央党校研究室、中国社会科学院等部门近日出炉一份关于社会经济状况的调查报告，详细记录了社会不同阶层的经济收入。”这不知是不是网上最早出现的此虚假报告的来源，但此篇报道被传载、引用的频率很高。

　　记者还搜索到了英文时事杂志《远东经济评论》（Far Eastern Economic Review）2007年第4期上的一篇文章，文中也提到了这些数字。文章原文为：“Article after article pores over the potential economic reasons for
the increase in income inequality in China. We ignore the fact that of
the 3,220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of 100 million yuan
($13 million) or more, 2, 932 are children of high-level cadres.”

　　翻译成中文，大意为“一篇又一篇文章在研讨中国贫富差距扩大的潜在经济原因。但是，我们忽视了一个事实，有3220个中国人拥有财富超过1亿元，2932人是高干子女”。记者发现，该文章引用这组数据时并未注明数据来源和统计时间。

　　就是这样一个被相关部门断定为造假的报告，就是这样一组语焉不详的数据，却在境内外许多网站、论坛上广泛流传，且“版本”不尽相同。有网友在此类帖文下跟帖置疑：“我希望通过数据考证来说话，不管原作者出于何种想法或意识形态写了这篇文章，我认为错误的事实都是无法支持的。”

　警惕“刻板印象”　关注舆论热点

　　以权威真实的信息挤压谣言空间

　　这组虚假数据的传播，让人们再次领略了互联网的传播能量和放大器的功能。

　　其实，媒体尤其是互联网上统计数据混乱的现象早已有之。出自境内外民间机构、专家学者的统计数据，乃至一些拼凑捏造、以讹传讹的虚假数据，时常处于一种任意转贴、转载的状态。许多媒体和个人在转贴、引用之前，鲜有人去了解、追问这些数据的科学性和准确度。当然，普通网民个体往往很难核实，但媒体、专业机构、专业人士则不同，不能淡忘职业操守，不能以此来炒作、膨胀公众的不满情绪，更不能违犯相关法律法规。

　　中国人民大学商法研究所所长、博士生导师刘俊海教授在接受人民网记者采访时介绍说，全国人大常委会6月27日表决通过的《中华人民共和国统计法》规定，民间统计调查活动的管理办法，由国务院制定。但是，这方面的规章制度目前还没有制定出来，而许多民间机构、非政府组织却一直在发布与国民经济和社会生活相关的统计结论或结果，这部分数据的真实性、完整性等，常常无法确认。

　　为此，他建议应尽快出台对非官方机构统计数据的管理规定。他提出，在不损害国家安全，不泄漏国家机密，不进行欺诈欺骗，不损害社会公共利益前提下，对民间统计调查活动应允许存在，但要加强监管，加强规范。民间统计活动只要纳入法制化监管轨道，对官方统计数据也可以起到拾遗补缺的作用，促进官方统计数据的真实性、准确性、及时性，从而进一步增强官方统计数据的公信力。

　　蔡继明委员在接受人民网记者采访时，也建议国家有关部门加强对统计数据的管理。他还一再强调，国家有关部门应及时对境内外民间机构和组织等发布的不实数据进行澄清，以免给其留下传播空间。

　　记者在调查中也注意到，许多网友在关注、甚至转贴此类信息时，并不完全相信这些内容。一位网友就明确表示：“网上传播的这些信息，包括高干子女占超亿元富豪的比例等等，其数字不一定很准确，但收入差距过大以及特权阶层掌握了过多的社会财富，却是不争的事实。”

　　可以说，对贫富差距加大的忧虑、对反腐败的期盼、对自己生存状态的不满，等等，都会成为促使大家关注、热议此类信息的原因。

　　前不久，《第24次中国互联网发展状况统计报告》发布，中国网民已达3.38亿，稳居世界第一。一个超过3亿人的群体不再虚拟，他们常常通过发贴、开博、留言等方式表达诉求、宣泄情绪，而用数据说话，正是表达最常用的手段之一。

　　国家行政学院教授、博士生导师刘熙瑞在接受人民网记者采访时就谈到了此类虚假信息传播背后的原因。他说，“这类虚假数据之所以在博客和论坛广为传播，大多是网民们的一种情绪宣泄，或者作为他们一种价值理念的传播。”他认为，尽管这种信息缺乏根据，但是导致此类信息如此广泛传播背后所隐藏的群众的某种不满情绪应引起相关部门的重视。刘熙瑞建议，各级政府及有关部门在依法整治网上网下虚假、有害信息的同时，也应重视这种现象，分析、研究这种现象背后的深层原因，并采取有效措施予以解决。

　　中国人民大学新闻学院副院长、舆论研究所所长喻国明在解读此类现象时，使用了传播学的一个概念——“刻板印象”。他说，一个真假并无确认的数据之所以被广泛流传，甚至为不少人认可，形成共震，是因为社会上有大量的类似这样事件的逻辑积累，传播学称之为“刻板印象”。

　　他认为，社会贫富差距已成为目前影响社会稳定问题的一个重要因素。在现实生活中，一方面少数人利用公款大吃大喝，另一方面还有很多人处在生活的困境中。在这种情况下，这方面的虚假数据就很容易给人们造成一种逻辑上的真实。其实，这正是社会的一种预警信号。他认为，政府部门应针对这些预警做出相应的政策性的调整和安排，切实解决民众关心的热点问题；此外，还应给公众创建一种情绪宣泄的平台，使这种社会情绪得以舒解。

　　在采访的最后，喻国明特别强调，媒介使用相关数据时，应该有严格的核查意识。如果数据信息没有权威解读而又未得到核实时，应注明这是未经核实的数据，提醒社会公众阅读此类信息时应保持一种质疑的态度。

2009-08-04T14:38:00.002-05:00

SMEs Electricity Usage Plunges by 50%!

Wow, it is breath-taking that first half 2009 electricity usage by small-medium enterprises in China dropped by 50% compared with the same period last year. However, it should not be interpreted as SMEs facing mass bankruptcy. In fact, I think slowing and stopping production is a very healthy reaction on the part of many SMEs, which allow them to survive the crisis financially intact. With orders slowly picking up in the second half, some SMEs in Zhejiang are opening up production again. I think this story is significant for the growth story in China this year, which will reach 8% due to massive state investment and bank loans. However, it should not be interpreted as the annihilation of the private sector, which is still resilient in the short run. In the long run, massive state money may crowd out private investment, which is a worry.

http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-03/110220099.html
中国中小工业企业用电量下降近五成
本文来源于《财经网》　 2009年08月03日 18:57 共有 0 条点评

字号：
2009年上半年，消耗电力相对较少的工业行业，支撑了整体工业增加值的增长

　　【《财经网》/北京】2009年上半年，中小工业企业用电量下降近五成，大幅拉低整体工业企业用电量增长。

　　2009年上半年，全国规模以上工业增加值增长7%，带动国内生产总值累计增长7.1%，但全社会用电量减少2.2%。经济增长与用电量下降的反差，一度引起人们质疑。
相关新闻：

交通银行首席经济学家连平建议，应加快银行对中小企业不良贷款核销速度

　　8月3日，国家统计局能源统计司发表分析文章称，2009年上半年，规模以下工业企业（即中小工业企业）用电量同比下降48.9%，而同期全国工业企业用电量下降5.9%。

　　对于中小工业企业用电量下降更快的原因，瑞银证券中国区首席经济学家汪涛认为，在经济下行时，中小企业订单通常最先减少，甚至一张订单也拿不到；和大企业相比，中小企业减产幅度更大，关停更多。

　　“由于中小企业能源利用率较低，再加上大企业也会维持更先进、能耗更低的生产线的运行，淘汰落后生产线，”汪涛说，“因此，用电量的下跌幅度要大于产量。”

　　国家统计局能源统计司认为，根据中国电力企业联合会统计的全部工业企业用电，以及国家统计局统计的规模以上工业企业用电测算，2009年上半年，中小工业企业用电的大幅下降，对全部工业用电减少产生了较大的拉动作用。

　　另外，2009年上半年，高能耗工业以及部分高能耗工业产品产出快速回落，也使得工业用电急剧减少。

　　汪涛认为，这主要是因为中国经济受到内需、外需快速下滑双重冲击。其中，内需不振使得重工业的产出迅速减少。

　　国家统计局数据显示，2009年上半年，黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业、有色金属冶炼和压延加工业、化学原料和化学制品、电力和热力生产供应这四大高耗电行业，其工业增加值快速回落，增幅均在7%以下。其中，黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业，上半年工业增加值仅增长1%。

　　因此，2009年上半年，消耗电力相对较少的工业行业，支撑了整体工业增加值的增长。

　　此外，在上述四大行业中，一些耗电多行业的产品产量下降得更快，从而减少了用电量。国家统计局认为，这也是经济增长与用电量背离的原因之一。

　　以黑色金属冶炼业为例，在钢材产量总体上升5.7%的同时，冷轧薄板、冷轧薄宽钢带、镀层板和电工钢板（带）等耗电多的加工材，产量却分别下降了3.3%、3.7%、1.4%和10.9%。■

　　（《财经》记者王晶）

2009-07-26T00:03:00.000-05:00

Interesting article on Princeling, nothing we don't know already though!

The Straits Times (Singapore) July 25, 2009 Saturday Peh Shing Huei

China's corporate world ruled by princes;
About 90 per cent of China's billionaires are the children of high-ranking officials

BEIJING: It has been days since news first broke of a graft probe in Namibia into a firm formerly run by the son of Chinese President Hu http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifNews, Most Recent 60 Days

Jintao. Yet, in China, hardly anyone knows of the case. Nuctech - which makes security scanners and was headed by the 38-year-old Mr Hu Haifeng until last year - is being investigated over a lucrative contract it had won to deliver equipment to Namibia. It is not known if the case, which happened last year, took place while Hu junior was still in charge. There has been nothing to suggest that he is involved in any way in the probe, but Namibia's Anti-Corruption Commission has requested an interview with him and senior Nuctech management.

In China, discussions about the business dealings of the 'princelings' or taizidang - offspring of political leaders - are considered taboo. People might whisper about them over dinner tables, but will never discuss them in public. Some princelings, such as Vice-President Xi Jinping, become public figures after being drawn into politics, but their counterparts in the corporate world shy away from the limelight. Nevertheless, they are a force to be reckoned with. A 2006 study by several Chinese research institutions showed that almost 90 per cent of the country's top leaders in sectors encompassing finance, foreign trade, property development, construction and stock trading were princelings.

And about 90 per cent of China's billionaires are the children of high-ranking officials. Princelings have fared far better in business than in politics, observed analyst Zhang Hua, who commented on the phenomenon in Hong Kong's Apple Daily in 2007. 'Not a single (princeling) family has been left behind,' he said sardonically. The various families have carved out territories in various industries. The family of former premier Li Peng, for example, controls the country's energy sector. His daughter Li Xiaolin is chairman of China Power International Development, an electricity monopoly. His son Li Xiaopeng used to head Huaneng Power, another energy heavyweight.

The family of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin has moved into telecommunications, while the offspring of former premier Zhu Rongji are strong figures in banking. His son Levin Zhu is the chief executive of China International Capital Corp. The princelings began staking out their dominions in the business world in the 1980s when China was opening up its economy. Armed with their fathers' connections, they were able to exploit the opportunities thrown up by China's economic transformation.By the 1980s, this economic revolution had led to much public disquiet, and when students staged protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, much of their anger was initially directed at what they saw as rampant corruption by senior officials and their families.

The bloody crackdown that followed left deep scars in the political psyches of most Chinese. For the princelings, Tiananmen provided further incentive to move away from politics into business. 'After 1989, princelings in politics suffered. They were very unpopular within the Chinese Communist Party,' explained analyst Bo Zhiyue, an expert on China's elite politics at the National University of Singapore's East Asian Institute. 'It was very hard for them to get into the Central Committee. They were not chosen at internal elections because of their family names, so many left politics and jumped into the corporate world.'

After Tiananmen, their business dealings became even more politically sensitive. A bad slip could see their fathers stepping on that proverbial banana skin and tumbling from power.

For President Hu President Hu -Search using:

http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifBiographies Plus News who has repeatedly pointed out that the battle against graft is 'a matter of life and death' - the timing of the Nuctech case could prove awkward. In just three months, on Oct 1, the nation will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of Communist China - at which glorious occasion he is expected to be conferred the rare honour of a military review on Tiananmen Square.

Unsavoury rumours about the princelings' business activities do damage the image of the leaders concerned, said Hong Kong-based analyst Joseph Cheng. Still, he feels that any fallout from the Nuctech case will be extremely limited and that Mr Hu's political rivals are unlikely to use it against him because almost all the top leaders have family members with substantial stake in the corporate world.

shpeh@sph.com.sg

Princelings have fared far better in business than in politics, observed analyst Zhang Hua in Hong Kong's Apple Daily in 2007.

Five princes and their business ties

HU HAIFENG, 38 Son of Chinese President Hu President Hu -Search using: http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifBiographies Plus News http://w3.nexis.com:80/new/images/IconInfo.gifNews, Most Recent 60 Days

Jintao Chief of Tsinghua Holdings, the group which controls Nuctech and 30 other companies. Nuctech is one of the world's top providers of security scanning equipment, supplying to about 50 nations. It has 90 per cent of the Chinese market for scanners and X-ray systems.

WINSTON WEN YUNSONG, 35 Son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao CEO of Beijing-based Unihub Global Networks, a telecoms services provider which he set up in 1999. The company mainly deals in setting up telecommunications facilities and networks for banks, stock agencies and insurance companies.

JIANG MIANHENG, 57 Son of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin Co-founded Shanghai-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which became one of the leading semiconductor foundries in the world. Mr Jiang also sits on the board of many major Chinese companies, ranging from telecommunications and airport management to TV manufacture.

LI XIAOPENG, 50 Eldest son of former Chinese premier Li Peng The former general manager of energy giant Huaneng Power became vice-governor of Shanxi province last year. Huaneng develops, constructs, operates and manages large power plants throughout China.

LEVIN ZHU, 52 Son of former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji Chief executive of China International Capital Corp (CICC), a state-owned company which is one of China's largest in the field of investment banking and research. Headquartered in Beijing, CICC, among other things, offers advice to fund managers and corporate clients on corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions.

2009-07-22T22:14:00.001-05:00

Comparing China's Stimulus Programs

Dear readers, my new op ed at the AWSJ

China Takes the Brakes Off

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By VICTOR SHIH

The official Chinese press recently issued a series of stories celebrating an apparent recovery of the country’s growth rate to 8%. By all appearances, China has once again deployed its enormous state capacity, including state control of the banking system, to ward off a recession. However, unlike the last major stimulus program in the late 1990s, this stimulus relies on an unconstrained credit expansion and is generating much fewer marginal benefits to the economy. Quite the opposite: Out-of-control credit expansion contains the seeds of future financial problems.

A decade ago, as now, China faced a serious economic downturn. At the beginning of 1998, growth had sunk briefly below 7% from the robust growth of nearly 9% in 1997. The trigger was the Asian financial crisis. In response, the central government first launched a 200 billion yuan (roughly $24 billion at that time’s exchange rate) rescue package for ailing state-owned enterprises in 1998, followed by investment of nearly one trillion yuan in western China from 2000 to 2003 to help maintain growth rates at 7%.

Although these programs appear similar to the current package, there are some significant differences. Most importantly, the previous stimulus was not accompanied by a spectacular increase in bank loans. Increases in lending between 1998 and 2001 never went above 20% per quarter compared to the same quarter in the previous year. For most quarters, lending increased by less than 15%.

In sharp contrast, the first and second quarters of 2009 saw credit expansion well above 30% compared to the same quarters in 2008. The reason for this disparity is that the late ’90s stimulus was under much stricter guidance from the central government. First, although the state-owned enterprise rescue plan and the Go West campaign were large for the time and in some respects not very efficient, the stimulus investment boom was kept under the relatively firm grasp of the central authorities.

In contrast, the current central stimulus package of four trillion yuan ($586 billion) is a side show compared to the 20-plus trillion yuan in investment planned by local governments. For some reason, Beijing has shown little willingness to constrain fantastical local investment plans. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), previously a bastion against uncontrolled local investment, has shown nothing but great enthusiasm for approving local construction projects. The NDRC even has devised ways to allow local governments to borrow more by using long-term loans from policy banks or bond issuance as the 30% required initial capital. Local governments then can borrow the rest from commercial banks, effectively financing some projects entirely with debt.

As a result, banks are asked to finance projects with dubious commercial viability. This despite the fact that the local authorities guaranteeing construction-related loans in many cases will have a hard time repaying the debt with their own fiscal income. Unlike in the late ’90s, the central government this time has done little to shield banks from local political pressure. Instead, regulators are only asking banks to bolster their bad-debt provisions in anticipation of the inevitable rise in nonperforming loans.

Another difference between the previous package and the current one is the net benefits to the economy. In 2000, there were only 96,000 miles of expressway and well-built Class 1 and 2 highways. In 2008, after eight years of intensive building, China had 248,000 miles of higher-grade highway, an increase of more than 200%. Construction of other infrastructure has seen similar pace in the past few years. The marginal benefit of additional trillions of yuan in infrastructure investment is likely limited. Although lower-level technocrats and some government think-tanks have pointed this out, the higher authorities seem to pay little heed to the economic benefits of such a torrential pace of investment. The central government simply has approved the construction of more highways, bridges, airports and dams.

But not all the money may end up going toward infrastructure anyway. State Council researcher Wei Jianing estimates that at least 20% of the new credit has gone into the stock and real-estate markets instead of generating real benefits to the economy. This is leading to a revival of speculative investment in these markets. The Shanghai composite stock index has increased by well over 50% from the beginning of the year, while real estate prices in several major markets have climbed back near previous highs. This robust recovery took place in the face of still-declining exports and a relatively modest recovery in the growth rate. Given that result, the 20% figure may be a conservative estimate.

Should this pace of credit expansion continue for the remainder of the year, China may well face a difficult trade-off down the road. The economy is unlikely to face a financial crisis because most of the debt is owed to domestic investors and depositors and China can still prevent large-scale capital flight. However, if inflation spikes next year, the central government will have to choose between shutting off credit, which will reveal a massive nonperforming loan problem currently obscured by a torrent of new loans, or an unprecedented level of inflation. High inflation is destabilizing, as it has caused major runs on the banks before. If additional credit expansion in the face of rising inflation is not an option, the greater the extent to which lending is uncontrolled at the moment, the bigger a nonperforming loan problem the central government will face in the future.

An often overlooked ingredient to China’s success story is that generations of top-level central technocrats like Chen Yun, Yao Yilin and Zhu Rongji time and again used their political influence to constrain local investment bubbles, thus forestalling high inflation and major financial crises. Past retrenchment campaigns were unpopular and controversial, but senior technocrats nonetheless maneuvered to stop uncontrolled local investment. As credit continues to rocket toward the stratosphere, China is in increasing need of such leadership again.

Mr. Shih, an assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, is author of “Factions and Finance in China:” (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2009-07-20T13:20:00.002-05:00

Hu Jintao's son under possible probe; Hu shores up support in the army

Dear Readers, apologies for my long absence. I was in China and didn't want to post anything provocative, even though there was plenty provocative that took place. Anyway, I would like to juxtapose a couple of items below. The first item is a an excellent story by the Telegraph (bravo!) on a Namibia probe into a Chinese tech firm recently run by Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng. The second item is a story in the People's Daily about a recent promotion ceremony in which three PLA general received promotions to full generals, including the son of Liu Shaoqi Liu Yuan. I am not at all sure that these two items are related, but clearly to ward off such attacks as a corruption probe against one's son, Hu needs ultimately the support of the army, which in recent years is purchased by promoting a group of generals to replace generals promoted by one's predecessor. It will be interesting to see if this probe continues and actually get Hu Haifeng into trouble. I think this will get interesting.....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5851056/Hu-Jintaos-son-linked-to-African-corruption-probe.html

Hu Jintao's son linked to African corruption probe
The eldest son of the Chinese president Hu Jintao faces questioning in connection with a multi-million pound corruption investigation in Namibia.

By Sebastien Berger Southern Africa Correspondent And Malcolm Moore In Shanghai
Published: 5:25PM BST 17 Jul 2009

Three people have been arrested in the country on charges of fraud, corruption and bribery involving a government contract with the state-owned Chinese company Nuctech, a world leader in scanning technology.

Hu Haifeng, 38, was the president of the firm until last year, when he was promoted to being the party secretary of Tsinghua Holdings, the group which controls Nuctech and 30 other companies.

The investigation centres on a £34 million deal Namibia signed with Nuctech to provide it with scanners for its ports and airports.

Under the deal, the Namibian government was to make a £8 million down payment, with the balance coming from a loan Beijing has provided Namibia, on condition that it is spent with Chinese companies.

But according to Namibia's Anti-Corruption Commission, within weeks of the ministry of finance making its payment to Nuctech, the company signed contracts for an identical sum with a Namibian consultancy called Teko Trading.

The money was allegedly then disbursed to Teko's co-owners, Teckla Lameck and Kongo Mokaxwa, and Yang Fan, a Chinese national described in court as Nuctech's African representative.

All three are being held in custody while the investigation continues.

The director of the Anti-Corruption Commission, Paulus Noah, said the matching sums going to and from Nuctech had raised suspicions.

"It's very strange," he said. "We are suspecting that corruption might have been involved."

He said he would like to question Nuctech's management, including Mr Hu.

"Of course if he can make himself available I will be happy," he said. "I would like to know how they do business in China."

He said Mr Hu was not a suspect at this stage and he would be interviewed as a potential witness.

It is potentially a huge embarrassment for Hu Jintao, as popular discontent with Communist Party corruption has grown in recent years – with some officials executed on conviction – but publicised cases have tended to involve local and provincial figures, rather than national ones.

His son usually keeps an extremely low profile, and has been nicknamed the "Teflon princeling" for his ability to keep out of the media.

Nuctech, previously known as Nuclear Technology Company, was spun out of Tsinghua University, the elite university often referred to as China's MIT which both Hu Jintao and his son attended.

It claims to have world-leading technology for scanning the inside of containers and has 90 per cent of the Chinese market for scanners and x-ray systems. Its machines are also used in British ports and it has held talks with the airports operator BAA, although the company will not confirm whose machines it uses for security reasons.

Hu Haifeng graduated from Tsinghua with a master's in engineering physics and joined Nuctech directly as assistant to the general manager.

Contacted for comment, a man who answered the telephone at Nuctech's Hong Kong office said: "There is no need to verify anything, and we are out doing business."

In its international business division in Beijing a woman who would not give her name would not say if it had a spokesman.

中央军委举行晋升上将军衔仪式胡锦涛颁发命令状

2009年07月20日19:56 来源：新华社
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　　中央军委２０日在北京八一大楼隆重举行晋升上将军衔仪式。中央军委主席胡锦涛向晋升上将军衔的同志颁发命令状。

　　下午３时，晋衔仪式在庄严的国歌声中开始。中央军委副主席郭伯雄宣读了６月２８日由中央军委主席胡锦涛签署的晋升上将军衔的命令。中央军委副主席徐才厚主持晋衔仪式。

　　这次晋升上将军衔的高级军官是：副总参谋长马晓天、军事科学院政治委员刘源、成都军区政治委员张海阳。

　　晋升上将军衔的３位高级军官军容严整、精神抖擞地列队主席台前。胡锦涛主席向他们颁发命令状，并与他们亲切握手，表示祝贺。佩戴了上将军衔肩章的３位高级军官向胡锦涛等领导同志敬礼，向参加仪式的全体同志敬礼，全场响起了热烈的掌声。

　　中央军委委员梁光烈、陈炳德、李继耐、廖锡龙、常万全、吴胜利、许其亮出席晋衔仪式。

　　晋衔仪式在嘹亮的军歌声中结束后，胡锦涛等领导同志和晋升上将军衔的同志合影留念。

　　出席晋衔仪式的还有解放军四总部、驻京各大单位和军委办公厅的领导等。（记者曹智）

2009-06-12T02:27:00.002-05:00

Wang Rong to Serve as Shenzhen Mayor

As a colleague alerted me, Xu's replacement will be current party secretary of Suzhou and purported Li Yuanchao protege Wang Rong. He was a professor for a long time! We'll see how this academic performs!

许宗衡因严重违纪被免职务
苏州市委书记王荣今将接任深圳市长

(2009-06-12)
早报导读
世卫：流感警戒升至最高第六级
世卫昨天决定把流感警戒级别提升至最高的第六级。这意味着甲型H1N1流感已在全球大流行。[甲型流感]
反对电脑预装过滤软件网民:政府把民众当儿童
如何认知美国的“反华势力”
中日高层经济对话与中美日三边关系
● 杨永欣广州特派员

　　苏州市委书记王荣将接任深圳市长一职，深圳今早将召开干部大会作出宣布。按照程序，王荣会先担任代市长，待人大通过后正式成为市长。

　　本报消息来源指出，王荣从苏州空降到深圳，显示深圳官场在原市长许宗衡下台引发的政治地震后，将还有会另一波更大的变动。目前，深圳市局级以上官员的港澳通行证都已被没收，防止他们离开大陆。

　　新华社昨天报道，中央组织部有关负责人证实，原深圳市长许宗衡因严重违纪，中央已经决定免去其领导职务，现正在按程序办理。

　　现年51岁的王荣在出任苏州市委书记前，曾是无锡市委书记、江苏省教育厅厅长、以及江苏省农业科学院院长。

稳定深圳官员军心

　　王荣正式上任后，相信将能稳定深圳官员的“军心”。据了解，自许宗衡和深圳副市长闫小培相继出事后，深圳官员的士气和情绪就相当低迷，广东省政府近日非常关注此情况，昨早又召开了一次“稳定军心”的高层会议。广东省委书记汪洋几天前才在深圳高层会议上提醒深圳官员在加强自律的同时，也要对人心浮动的一众官员加以安抚。

　　除了许宗衡和闫小培外，近期出事的广东高官也还包括原广东省政协主席陈绍基、中共广东省原纪委书记王华元等。

　　学而优则仕的王荣从江苏省委常委、苏州市委书记到深圳市长虽然同属副部级，但消息人士分析，他将更上一层楼，很可能再接替今年60岁的深圳市委书记刘玉浦。深圳市委书记属于副省委书记一级。

　　过去几任苏州市委书记，调离苏州即升任省长、省委副书记。梁保华担任苏州市委书记后，任江苏省委书记；陈德铭离开苏州后到陕西担任副省长后再任省委副书记、王珉则到吉林省担任省委副书记、省长。

　　王荣接任深圳市长后料也将能促进新加坡企业在深圳的投资和合作项目。王荣最近刚参加苏州工业园区15周年的庆典。他也曾访问过新加坡，与新加坡官员多有过接触，对新加坡相当熟悉，由他领导深圳，相信也符合汪洋一直提倡的“叫板新加坡”理念。

王荣简历

　　王荣（左）在1958年出生于江苏省滨海县，1975年高中毕业后在该县农村插队劳动，1976年加入中国共产党。1978年考入江苏农学院，就读于农业经济系农业经济管理专业；1979年转入恢复的南京农学院，自此连续攻读学士、硕士、博士学位，1988年在南京农业大学毕业。1991年获国家公派留学资助，以高级访问学者身份赴荷兰Tilburg大学进修并合作研究。先后担任江苏省农林厅副厅长、江苏省教育厅厅长、无锡市市长及市委书记。自2004 年以来，他担任苏州市委书记。他也是江苏省委常委。

2009-06-10T01:37:00.002-05:00

More on the disgraced mayor of Shenzhen

First of all, kudos to the Hong Kong press for doing such a good job covering the downfall of the mayor of its northern neighbor. I wish the Western press would cover this story more extensively.

In a way, this is an important story because Shenzhen is supposedly at the forefront of economic and political reform in China. Yet, here we see some of the worst corruption in this thriving metropolis. Beyond the usual millions in bribes, mistresses, and free apartments, Xu also engaged in extensive buying and selling of offices, pretty much the worst kind of corruption one can have in an authoritarian regime. In such a regime, the leaders hold on to power by having the power to appoint and dismiss officials, but if this organizational discipline is being subverted by office selling, it can lead to major compliance issues when central-local interests clash. If it turns out that Xu sold offices, then the "buyers" will also get into trouble, and they may number into the dozens. Thus, a major shakeup may be on the horizon for Shenzhen.

I originally suspected that Zhou Yongkang pursued the GOME case to clean house in the judicial system, but now I am not sure. There are signs that Wang Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong, had a hand in Xu's downfall as Xu was a cadre with extensive Shenzhen connections cultivated by former party secreary Huang Liman-- a Jiang Zemin protege. It is certainly in Wang Yang's interest to remove Xu and install Xu Qin, his protege from his days at the NDRC. If readers know something I don't know, please let us all know!

Mayor paid his way to top, sources say More details of shady deals in Shenzhen
Staff Reporters
540 words
10 June 2009
South China Morning Post
5
English
(c) 2009 South China Morning Post Publishers Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved.

Disgraced Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng had spent millions of yuan trying to buy his way to the top position in the city and had angered many parties with his

arrogant behaviour, sources said.

Mr Xu, who was detained on Friday and taken away from Shenzhen, was accused of scheming to get Shenzhen party boss Liu Yupu's position once Mr Liu stepped down.

Sources said Mr Xu, Shenzhen's first locally promoted mayor, was so keen on advancement he offered bribes to boost his chances of promotion.

One source said Mr Xu got his position as mayor mainly by buying support from different camps.

He grew excited early this year over rumours that Mr Liu, who turns 60 in August, would soon step down and be transferred out of Shenzhen. Mr Liu was later tipped to take over from Chen Shaoji , arrested for alleged corruption, as Guangdong's top political adviser.

Sensing his chance had finally arrived, Mr Xu started an aggressive lobbying campaign to win more support, government sources said.

Once known for his low-key, hard-working image, he had courted media attention in recent months. He appeared on a CCTV talk show in Beijing during the annual National People's Congress session in March, when he boasted of his achievements in Shenzhen. A source said an actress friend of Mr Xu's had arranged for him to join the popular programme.

Government sources said Mr Xu spent most of his time in Beijing during the NPC session building relationships and seeking support. "He has no direct links or powerful patrons in the higher echelons, so he tried to buy his way up," a source said.

The tactic backfired as a number of people he approached later reported him. Mr Xu, who became mayor of Shenzhen in 2005, had also angered powerful parties by being arrogant.

A source from a ministry-level central government organisation in Hong Kong said that in 2006 Mr Xu swapped a reserved land parcel near the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Corridor on which the organisation was going to build an office for a strip in a remote suburban area. He then sold the reserved land to a developer. The source said leaders of the organisation were deeply offended.

Shi Dongbing, a dissident writer who claimed he was jailed after being framed by Mr Xu, recently detailed on his blog the corruption allegations surrounding Mr Xu. "Xu has climbed up the power ladder really fast. He has gathered a bunch of henchmen around him and these people have helped him to collect bribes and build connections. His sister-in-law in particular is the one who represents him in these shady dealings."

A bank source said yesterday that senior bank managers had been summoned to a meeting before Mr Xu's arrest by anti-corruption authorities. They were asked to freeze bank accounts linked to Mr Xu as the authorities worried he might try to escape overseas.

A government source also said Mr Xu had an escape plan in case he was exposed. But he was taken down before he could make any move.

Business links of Shenzhen mayor face probe
Bonnie Chen
326 words
10 June 2009
The Standard
English
Copyright 2009 The Standard Newspapers Publishing Limited. All Rights Reserved.

Many current and former Shenzhen officials and businessmen are expected to be grilled over their ties to detained Shenzhen mayor Xu Zhongheng.

According to mainland writer Shi Dongbing, writing before the arrest on Friday, Xu has admitted investing a lot to become mayor and many entrepreneurs have ``invested in me.''

His political career was described as a ``rarity'' by mainland media, having left Hunan for Shenzhen in 1993, and been assigned to party affairs before switching to administration, then becoming mayor.

While working for party affairs, Xu trained many officials, although it is alleged several of his relatives have also been appointed to top positions in the Shenzhen municipal government. Shi said Xu's brother-in-law works at the Shenzhen border and his son-in-law is a tax official in Luohu.

Xu's wife is alleged to have received bribes from a property developer, and there have been questions raised over his son's overseas studies.

Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang went to Shenzhen to pacify officials who are not allowed to leave the area because of the Xu investigation.

At least four vice mayors are expected to be questioned _ Lu Ruifeng (property), Chen Yingchun (finance), Yan Xiaopei (culture) and Tang Jie (finance).

The central government began its probe in the middle of last year.

One claim that could not be verified is that Xu attempted to commit suicide on Sunday.

Xu was linked to disgraced Gome chief Wong Kwong-yu. Questions have also been raised over the Taoyuanju property project, and the building of a stadium for the World University Games _ which will take place in 2011 _ as well as some railway projects.

One of Xu's vice mayors, Xu Qin, has been appointed acting mayor and an official announcement is expected soon.

The central discipline committee has confirmed one more official has been arrested in connection with the Gome case.

Source : The Standard.

2009-06-08T22:13:00.002-05:00

Zhou Yongkang is Healthy

Well, a recent appearance by Zhou Yongkang exploded the rumor I posted earlier on. He looks quite healthy! Tsk Tsk to rumor mongerers like myself!

周永康与公安边防部队群众工作先进代表座谈强调
周永康：加强新时期群众工作　维护边疆和谐稳定

2009年06月09日05:27 来源：人民网-《人民日报》
【字号大中小】打印留言论坛网摘手机点评纠错
E-mail推荐:
【领导相册】
6月8日，公安边防部队群众工作报告会在北京举行。中共中央政治局常委、中央政法委书记周永康会见参加报告会的先进集体、先进个人并与代表座谈。新华社记者王建民摄

　　本报北京６月８日电（记者石国胜）公安边防部队群众工作报告会８日在北京举行。中共中央政治局常委、中央政法委书记周永康会见参加报告会的先进集体、先进个人并与代表座谈。周永康强调，公安边防部队要大力开展爱民活动，主动服务群众、紧紧依靠群众，全力维护国家安全和边疆社会稳定，促进边疆经济社会发展，保障人民安居乐业。

　　在认真听取新疆科克牙尔边防派出所民警吾斯曼江、浙江罗家岙边防派出所民警周斌、广西凭祥市礼茶村党支部书记凌振森的发言后，周永康代表党中央、国务院和中央政法委向受到表彰的先进集体、先进个人表示热烈祝贺，向全国公安边防官兵致以亲切问候。他指出，公安边防部队作为党和国家部署在沿边沿海地区的一支重要武装执法力量，承担着边防管理、边防检查、海上治安及渔船民管理、边防涉外合作等繁重任务，肩负着维护边疆稳定、保卫国家安全的神圣使命。近年来，按照公安部党委开展“三基工程”建设、“三项建设”的部署，公安边防部队大力实施爱民固边战略，积极探索新时期群众工作新路子，做了大量暖民心、顺民心、得民心的工作，帮助群众解决了大量实际问题。广大官兵在爱民实践中经受了锻炼，提高了素质，增长了才干，对构建和谐警民关系、夯实边海防基层基础、维护边疆安全稳定、促进边疆经济社会发展作出了突出贡献。

　　周永康强调，我国边疆地区多数属于少数民族地区、经济欠发达地区，公安边防部队要牢记根本宗旨，坚持立警为公、执法为民，大力开展爱民活动，不断创新群众工作的方式方法，永做人民群众的贴心人。一要时刻心系各族群众。把人民放在心中最高的位置，始终怀着真挚感情，把各族群众当亲人、当朋友、当老师，带着真情去倾听群众呼声、体察群众疾苦，千方百计为群众排忧解难。二要全心全意服务各族群众。深入最边远、最困难的村寨，了解他们的困难和关切，不断完善便民利民措施，提高服务水平；及时处置各类警情，防范化解矛盾纠纷，不断增强群众安全感；坚持严格公正文明廉洁执法，维护群众合法权益，维护社会公平正义。三要紧紧依靠各族群众。组织发动各族群众参与边防保卫工作，形成专群结合、警民联防的防控网络，不断巩固公安边防工作的群众基础。

　　周永康要求，公安边防部队要认真履行职责，全力维护国家安全和沿边沿海地区社会稳定，特别是要严密防范、严厉打击分裂势力、恐怖势力、极端势力的捣乱破坏活动，严密防范、严厉打击跨境走私制贩毒品、拐卖人口等违法犯罪活动，加强边境管理和执法合作，维护边境秩序，确保边疆社会大局稳定，为边疆经济社会发展创造良好治安环境。

　　周永康强调，公安边防工作点多线长面广，官兵流动性大，必须把队伍建设放在重中之重的位置，特别要进一步加强基层基础建设，严格教育、严格管理、严格监督，确保广大官兵思想政治过硬、执法业务过硬、纪律作风过硬，做到在任何条件任何环境下不变质、打得赢。同时，各级党委、政府和公安机关要关心广大官兵的工作生活和家庭，搞好后勤保障，为部队履行职责创造良好条件。希望广大公安边防官兵在保卫边疆、服务人民方面不断取得新进步，以优异成绩迎接新中国成立６０周年。

　　座谈会后，公安部举行了“春暖边关——公安边防部队群众工作报告会”。

　　国务委员兼公安部部长孟建柱参加会见、座谈并出席了报告会。

2009-06-06T00:38:00.004-05:00

A big domino falls: the Shenzhen mayor

Reuters reports that Xu Zongheng, the mayor of Shenzhen, was just arrested for corruption related to the Huang Guangyu case, which has already afflicted several officials.The Chinese press suggests it was for another reason. Regardless, this is a high profile case as Shenzhen has quasi-provincial status. The top leaders of Shenzhen are directly appointed by the central government. Note that Xu engaged in "organizational" work for years in Shenzhen, which means that he had a hand in promoting hundreds of cadres over the years. If he engaged in the buying and selling of offices, this could lead to a wholesale clean up of the Shenzhen government. This may ultimately be Hu Jintao flexing his muscles through Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang, who is now expected to impose stricter control over Shenzhen.

By the way, the People's Daily just confirmed this news:

http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/9431537.html

From the Straits Times

(http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_386806.html).

June 6, 2009
Chinese mayor in graft probe

HONG KONG - THE mayor of China's southern boomtown of Shenzhen is being investigated in a growing graft probe linked to the billionaire head of the GOME electronics retail chain, a newspaper reported on Saturday.

Xu Zongheng had been put under shuanggui - a form of detention imposed on party officials, given his alleged links to Huang Guangyu, the founder of GOME and once ranked China's richest man, the South China Morning Post reported citing several unnamed sources.

'It must have something to do with economic irregularities... but it could also have something to do with a power struggle,' a government source was quoted as saying by the Post.

Corruption investigations in China can be proxies for political struggles.

Xu would be the latest in a number of senior officials to be implicated in Huang's graft investigation, triggered last year by alleged financial misconduct.

The chief of the disciplinary body in eastern Zhejiang province, Wang Huayuan, and the former head of police in Guangdong province, Chen Shaoji, were both detained for investigation in relation to Huang's case. -- REUTERS

许宗衡
[编辑本段]
1.中共广东省深圳市委副书记、市长
　　男，汉族，1955年7月生，湖南湘潭人，1973年11月加入中国共产党， 1972年3月参加工作，中国政法大学民商法专业毕业，在职研究生学历，双硕士学位（中国政法大学民商法专业硕士学位，美国国际东西方大学工商管理硕士学位）。
　　
学习简历

　　
　　1972年03月－1974年08月，湖南省衡南县宝盖农场知青，任场长、副指导员；
　　1974年08月—1976年08月，湖南省交通学校汽车专业学生，担任班长、校学生会主席；
　　1984年06月－1986年09月，湘潭大学中文系汉语言文学专业学生；
　　1994年02月－1996年01月，在中国政法大学研究生院民商法专业研究生班学习；
　　1997年08月－1999年08月，在美国国际东西方大学工商管理硕士研究生班学习；
　　
任职简历

　　
　　1976年08月—1977年09月，湖南省衡阳汽车修配厂技术员、政治处干部；
　　1977年09月—1978年12月，湖南省衡阳市经委组干科干部；
　　1978年12月—1986年08月，湖南省衡阳市委组织部干部科干事、副科长、科长；
　　1986年08月—1990年04月，湖南省衡阳市委组织部副部长；
　　1990年04月—1993年01月，湖南省衡阳市委常委（副厅）、组织部部长；
　　1993年01月—1994年07月，深圳市委组织部干部培训处处长；
　　1994年07月—1996年08月，深圳海天出版社党委书记、社长、总编辑（副局级）；
　　1996年08月—2000年01月，深圳市委党校常务副校长，市行政学院、市社会主义学院、市经济管理学院常务副院长（正局级）；
　　2000年01月—2000年05月，深圳市委组织部副部长（正局级）；
　　2000年05月—2000年06月，深圳市委常委；
　　2000年06月—2000年08月，深圳市委常委、市委组织部部长；
　　2000年08月—2001年06月，深圳市委常委、市委组织部部长、市党建研究会会长；
　　2001年06月—2002年09月，深圳市委常委、市委组织部部长、市党建研究会会长、省党建研究会会长；
　　2002年09月—2003年08月，深圳市委常委、市委组织部部长、市党建研究会会长、省党建研究会会长、市人才研究协会会长；
　　2003年08月—2005年06月，深圳市委常委，常务副市长、党组副书记；
　　2005年06月— 深圳市委副书记，市长，市政府党组书记。
　　第十一届全国人大代表，
　　十届省委委员
　　许宗衡出生在铁路工人家庭。经历了“知识青年下乡”运动。17岁那年，他到离衡阳120公里的宝盖乡农场锻炼。在这两年内，因其干活卖力，先被推荐入党，后被保送至湖南省交通学校上学。在湖南省交通学校念书时，许宗衡担任过班长、学生会主席。一年后，他被抽调到衡阳市经委组干科工作。记者虽然无法寻访到其在汽配厂的表现，但据经委组干科的工作人员介绍，当年的老法院宋院长调到汽修厂任革委会主任。宋主任很快在这个新分来的中专生身上发现了潜力。之后经其推荐，许宗衡被抽调到经委“工业学大庆办公室”接受锻炼。据经委的徐荣主任回忆，那时候常跟他一同背着网挎包，骑着单车，日2005年6月2日当选为深圳市市长以后，许宗衡坦言：“面对未来的巨大挑战和压力，我没有丝毫的彷徨和犹豫；面对未来的工作和使命，我充满了信心和决心！”
　　在文化产业方面，深圳具有市场、科技、创新三大优势，许宗衡希望有更多的支柱产业，使深圳的产业基础更加稳定和牢固。在公共关系方面，许宗衡表示：加强与市民群众之间的沟通就是促进政府转型、构建现代政府的一项重要工作。在人口管理方面，推出 “1＋5”文件。许宗衡更加强调的是要把发展成果转化为市民的实惠。在交通整治方面，要从“硬”、“软”两方面着手。社会治安方面，坚持抓源头、抓队伍、抓严打。许宗衡要把今后每年一届的“中国(深圳)国际文化产业博览交易会”办成广交会那样具有知名度和经济效益，“应该说从全国各城市来看，深圳不是最具有文化优势的，那么为什么深圳要去极力发展它呢？这里最关键的是文化优势如何转换成产业，而在这个地方深圳恰恰具有得天独厚的优势。文化要转换成产业要有三个条件：第一要有市场，第二要有科技的结合，第三文化必须要以创新相结合。而深圳恰好是高科技非常好、市场体系非常完善、创新充满活力。深圳通过25年的努力，已经形成三大支柱产业：高新技术、现代物流和金融业。我们希望有更多的支柱产业，使深圳的产业基础更加稳定和牢固。”

2009-06-04T10:08:00.002-05:00

Zhou Yongkang DID make an appearance last month

As reader dylan pointed out, Zhou Yongkang did make a public appearance in mid May at a reward ceremony for "comprehensive management for social stability," one of his key portfolios. The strange thing is that this appearance was not put on his profile at the People's Daily website or the Xinhua website, which show his last appearance in early May. I include the links below for readers to verify. Was it just a mistake? Regardless, his level of activities in the past month was quite slow relatively to his previous activities and relative to other Standing Committee members. I guess only time will tell whether May was only an anomaly or the beginning of a new pattern.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/zhouyongkang/index.htm

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64192/106178/index.html

全国社会治安综合治理表彰大会在京举行胡锦涛温家宝习近平周永康会见全体代表

http://www.sznews.com (05-18 23:37) 深圳新闻网【字号：大中小】

5月18日，全国社会治安综合治理表彰大会在北京人民大会堂举行。会前，党和国家领导人胡锦涛、温家宝、习近平、周永康会见全体与会代表。新华社记者饶爱民摄

全国社会治安综合治理表彰大会在京举行

胡锦涛温家宝习近平周永康会见全体代表周永康出席大会并讲话　

新华网北京５月１８日电（记者李斌）全国社会治安综合治理表彰大会１８日上午在人民大会堂举行。会前，中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席胡锦涛，中共中央政治局常委、国务院总理温家宝，中共中央政治局常委、中央书记处书记、国家副主席习近平，中共中央政治局常委、中央政法委书记、中央社会治安综合治理委员会主任周永康亲切会见了全体与会代表。

周永康出席表彰大会并讲话。他首先代表党中央、国务院和中央社会治安综合治理委员会，向受到表彰的２００５至２００８年度全国社会治安综合治理先进集体、先进工作者表示热烈祝贺，向长期战斗在社会治安综合治理第一线的全体同志表示崇高敬意，向积极参与、支持社会治安综合治理工作的社会各界和广大人民群众表示衷心感谢。周永康说，２００５年以来，在党中央、国务院的坚强领导下，各地区、各部门以平安建设为载体，以完善社会治安综合治理工作机制为着力点，全面推进社会治安综合治理工作。四年来，各地区、各部门对社会治安综合治理工作的领导力度明显加大，预防化解矛盾纠纷的主动性明显增强，驾驭社会治安局势的能力明显提高，社会管理和服务工作明显改进，社会治安综合治理基层基础建设明显加强，人民群众安全感逐年上升，实现了社会大局持续稳定，促进了经济社会又好又快发展。

周永康指出，在新形势下，人民群众期盼更平安的社会环境，维护社会和谐稳定的任务艰巨繁重。各地区、各部门要以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，深入贯彻落实科学发展观，主动适应新形势新任务提出的新要求新挑战，积极推动社会治安综合治理的理念思路、体制机制、方法手段创新，完善和发展社会治安综合治理工作体系，确保人民群众安居乐业，确保社会和谐稳定。

2009-06-03T03:17:00.002-05:00

Zhou Yongkang Sick??

The opposition press is spreading a rumor that China's top cop Zhou Yongkang is afflicted with cancer. I checked the official press and found indeed that Zhou has not made a public appearance since May 4th. At the same time, all of the other Standing Committee members have made public appearances since May 4th. We can't be sure that he has cancer, but his disappearance certainly suggests that he either is sick or is under investigation. Either would be extremely interesting for the power balance. Hu Jintao can certainly use this as a way to drastically change the power balance in his own favor. The problem is that I can't really think of anyone loyal to Hu who would be equipped to take on such an important position. Anyway, I will continue to monitor this situation.

2009-05-27T19:17:00.004-05:00

The Deng Yujiao Case,

Well, I usually don't comment on such cases of injustice, since there are so many. However, it emerges that there may be a political economy angle here. Apparently, the deceased (I won't say victim since he was a perpetrator) and his two associates worked for the county investment attraction bureau. This bureau is in every local government unit, and their job is to attract investment. The day of the confrontation, Deng Guida (the deceased) and his underlings were asked by the local iron mine boss to "take care" of a few farmers whose land was taken by the mine boss. They did so successfully and were invited by the mine boss for an evening of entertainment, which ended in "Fantasy City." The piece below, published by Boxun, claims that the mine boss gave Deng Guida another "task", that of "procuring" Deng Yujiao for the mine boss. This then led to the subsequent confrontation between Deng Guida and Deng Yujiao and the killing.

There is some intimation that this case may lead higher up and uncover of network of corrupt cadres in Hubei (Question, why are county level cadres doing the biddings of some mine boss?). This may place party secretary Luo Qingchuan in a difficult position since he was promoted upward from the local bureaucracy. Badong County was never in the jurisdiction of Yichang, where Luo cut his teeth. Yet, Badong is only a few kilometer up river (the Yangtze) from Yichang and Luo may be familiar with many officials in Badong. If this proves to be the case, he may have incentive to slow any investigations launched by Beijing to dig deeper on this issue. He may have preempted this by placing Deng Yujiao under house arrest instead of placing her in jail or a mental hospital. Perhaps he is hoping that her release will stop a Beijing investigation. However, I don't think the netizens of China will be satisfied with this.

Oh, also, the WSJ did a write up of this. Please see below:

省委知情人透露：罗清泉19日已知邓玉娇案幕后凶手，来头更大
(博讯北京时间2009年5月28日首发)
作者最新留言显示，此文给博讯首发，内容可信。

【二】案情如下（整体如此，细节另论）：

1、案发日下午，福成矿业与当地农民发生用地纠纷，矿上打电话给镇主管招商工作的郑建武，要求派员协助解决，郑随即指示邓贵大、黄德智、邓佳中三人出现场。邓三人不辱使命，把事平的很快很好。傍晚，周矿长率三人尾随邓贵大三人来到镇上，喊上郑建武，举办一个答谢性质的宴会。酒后八人去梦幻城继续“消费 ”（先吃后洗，这是现在场面人请人“潇洒”的必然一条龙服务）。

是酒前、酒中还是酒后，商定“嫖娼”细节的，现在不清楚。但有一个主题：就是周矿长看上邓玉娇了，或者是听说是“梦幻城”有邓玉娇这么一个人，今天，要去“买春”“买处”，邓贵大等三人须在周程见到邓玉娇之前，把邓玉娇“摆平”。

另一方面，我们知道邓玉娇在歌厅上班，这时（很可能还没到上班点）邓玉娇怎么会在洗浴房洗衣服呢？这很可能是唐芹、贺德江做内应，给邓玉娇下的一个套。（邓玉娇好朋友杨红艳不是说了吗，唐芹给她打电话，说给她妹妹今天过生日，请好朋友们来梦幻城洗脚，K歌嘛）。唐芹和另两个服务员在“水浴房”休息间，这时邓玉娇背着挎包来洗浴房洗衣服，这才有黄德智与邓玉娇在洗浴房“不期而至”的场面。

2、邓贵大八人到梦幻城后，周程等人进入包间等候，邓贵大三人去“摆平”邓玉娇。黄走在前面，进入洗浴房，把门插上，向邓玉娇提出“特殊服务”的要求。邓玉娇一正派女子，虽不得不谋生在此地方，但直接听此要求还是感到愤慨，但仍不失理智的、较强硬的拒绝了黄德智，黄德智遂拿出对一般小女子“买春”“买处 ”的手段，纠缠、猥亵、性侵害邓玉娇（就是抓摸乳部、下身等，不是指强奸；邓母与律师闹矛盾即在此），邓玉娇恼怒挣脱，躲避至休息间，黄德智不依不饶又跟进。跟在外边的邓贵大见如此，矿老板要求的“事”给安排不了，那还行？！对工作尽职尽责的邓贵大遂上来加入施压，并有炫耀、扇击邓玉娇那沓钱的过程（注意：一般嫖娼不用4000元的），威逼利诱邓玉娇都予以拒绝。这时，邓玉娇所谓好朋友唐芹上前解劝（很可能是站在邓贵大立场上）。邓玉娇一下明白过来，这一切都是别人给自己下的套，遂大怒，要走出房间。这时邓贵大恼羞成怒（心理活动应该是：这工作还怎么完成），拦住邓玉娇往沙发上推，邓玉娇掏出水果刀示警，欲走；邓贵大二人仍上前拦推邓玉娇，邓玉娇这时已急了眼，挥刀刺向二人，混乱中邓贵大扑通倒地，黄德智受伤，邓佳中在门口吓傻了。

一时间时间凝固了，这时邓玉娇的好朋友杨红艳赶到了，看见这一幕，遂拉住愣住的邓玉娇，“你还握着刀干什么?”这时邓玉娇才醒过神来，掏出电话报警。

3、野三关派出所接警后，赶到现场，一看这架势遂控制了现场，郑主任、周矿长等人知道出了这样的事也害怕了，遂向韩谭所长告饶，要求圆场。谭报案至县局，政委张友刚、副局长宋俊带人连夜过来，例行公事，做了讯问、笔录、勘验现场、组织救护转送伤员（或在这之前人就不在现场了）等。事这么大怎么办？请示领导（下面周矿长、郑主任也电话不断四处找人），最后领导指示：周矿长、郑主任等人马上消失，邓玉娇带到派出所留置；邓玉娇一见：我报的警，他们都没事了，反要带我走，什么道理？遂才有玻璃杯砸警察一说。

4、第二天，宋副局长等向县委、政府汇报的那个版本，基本上是原生态的，总的情况是清楚的（把饭店报销的饭单都取走了）。领导一听，这回丑丢大了！怎么办？他们素以“讲大局”“政治上成熟”在关键时刻励己，遂决定：首先把周矿长、邓主任摘出，小女子邓玉娇留置，剩下邓贵大等怎么善后，你们公安局拿出一个方案来再议。“控制局势，稳定大局，是其大政方针”。

【注：这时讲“人和事都不能逾越法律，要依法遵法，公民人权高于一切”，跟本不在他们的视野之内，邓玉娇这个活生生值得人们尊重的生命，在他们眼里只是一个"符号"；至于胡总书记讲过：“要科学发展观，绿色GDP,要以人为本，和谐社会”对此时巴东县正合适嘛？福成矿业与民纠纷（有没有污染和破坏资源、损害农民利益等问题），黄雄的“梦幻城”娱乐业的负面效果，对生意人就这么惯着，好吗？这么对待一奇女子，对待一群为非做歹之人合适吗？真要善恶不分、黑白颠倒，激起民怨民愤来怎么办？哎！壮士断腕，不要这样的GDP也罢，以人为本，建和谐社会从今以后“科学发展”；这才是真正有“大局观 ”“政治上成熟”。你巴东县变害为利，因势利导，真正按胡总书记的指示，这么干下来，说不定正是时代典型呢。可惜，这种正反馈的思维模式，在这些干部身上，绝对是负反馈反映的】

调子这么一定，更周程、黄雄等人平日里纠缠不清的人，一听，精神一振，对，就这么办，我们马上具体执行。

【三】后面的话：

不知是提炼原生态的东西，必定会露出本色的东西，还是公安队伍中总还是有些天地良心的人，或者还是深文周纳考虑的不周全，总之“邓玉娇不是卖淫女，邓贵大等三人是在索要特殊服务被拒，还有‘一沓钱打脸’‘推到’等情节后，被邓玉娇刺伤致死的。事发后，是邓玉娇主动打电话给警方报告的，邓玉娇受到了‘精神病人 ’的待遇”。这些基本情节和根本事实，就这样“公示”给了社会大众。

人民就有判断善恶是非的天然的良知良能，他们就从巴东官方的“通告”中，就能读出真实来。越描越黑，越掩盖越暴露，越回避越实质........;全中国人民现在都清楚地知道是怎么回事了,就你们巴东公安和有关上级"还在侦查"。

够了，快止步后头吧，不然，你们和你们的上级都将被拖入深渊，一往不复。

邓玉娇暴露的问题是敏感、深刻的，《潜伏》中吴站长有句话：神奇的一跳，正跳在我的神经上，有点牙疼。邓玉娇的一刀，击中了邓贵大的要害（其实一个小小的邓贵大以致周程，何足挂齿），也击破了天。

1、基层公务人员（基层一级政权）沦为商财人等的工具，逼良为娼、犯强迫民女卖淫罪（期间涉及到流氓侮辱、性侵害妇女罪，以及涉嫌强奸妇女罪）。

（注：杨立勇局长讲“邓贵大不会强奸邓玉娇”，其实在“技术上”他并未扯谎，黄德志、邓贵大虽然拿出流氓手段，如若邓玉娇屈从了，邓贵大们是不敢吃“第一口”的，他们会将叼来的羔羊送到另一个大狮子面前）。

2、地方一些公务人员，与财商、黑恶等沆瀣一气，受害的只能是平民百姓（如此地方，色情场所必是泛滥，而黄雄类后面没有警方背景那是不可能的，周程矿长可以“ 买春”“买处”，邓贵大等也可以陪同嫖娼，被鱼肉的只能是受经济危机影响回乡，被迫在梦幻城处打工谋生的邓玉娇们）

3、片面以经济建设为唯一导向，经意发展是硬道理，不管黑猫白猫抓住耗子就是好猫，这是被歪嘴和尚念经的典型代表，其实巴东县发生的问题也正是对科学发展观，要以人为本，建和谐社会，倡导八荣八耻的发动。

4、民女邓玉娇被逼无奈，奋起反抗逼良为娼，英勇的与“强迫妇女卖淫罪”做斗争，如果不说是崇高的，至少在法律上是无罪的，如有不当后果，也只能有巴东地方当局承担。好女反成“精神病”，不是对人民基本价值观念的讽刺吗？不是对基本人权的侵害吗？

罗清泉书记5月19日看到了邓玉娇材料。

作者署名：字匠101

　　2009年5月27日

　　最后附一句：今早打开电脑，知湖北警方已把邓玉娇转为监视居住，很好！又往正确方向走了一步。

[博讯首发，转载、引用请注明出处。图片文字部分，请直接转图片]

博讯记者找到24日人民网的一个帖子，基本佐证了这个真相：
投资人为什么要请招商办的人

关于邓玉娇案福成矿业的老板为什么要宴请劝贵大等镇干部？

此案的报道五花八门，但是有的网友想的比较细致，对相关的事情开始分析深层的东西，本人也一直在高度地关注，就本题目做一些分析,也许对网友们有所帮助。

据相关报道说当晚和劝贵大等人一起吃饭的是福成铁矿的周矿长，而且是周买的单。

1，那么如何能在一个地方投资铁矿呢？如果你有钱，有两个办法，一是你公司报名参加正规的招标，拍卖，挂牌，依据你自己的经济实力和矿的价值去竞买取得探矿权或采矿权证;二是你在当地以招商引资的名义进入，拿上你的投资计划书，（最好能证明你的经济实力）和县级以上政府的主要领导和相关部门接触，一经谈好，这些权证政府会出面给你协调的，同样也是走程序把权证办到你公司的名义，而且不用花大力气去竞买，得到的价格可能是起始价或略高于起始价，给国土部门的解释是此矿为招商引资相目，此项目如果给了此公司每年能有多少多少利税，还有什么就业岗位等诸多好处，当然国土部门照样公告：有资质的公司都可参加等，但事实上当地政府给你设一任何条件，别的公司根本就连报名的资格都没有，比如说报名时到当地县级政府的那个部门开一个什么证，或要县政府的什么部门审核才能报名，你想你能通过吗，做梦去吧，只有认可的投资人才有权啊，明白了吧!

2，公司拿到探矿权证后，公司要投资开矿，取矿石，建铁粉选厂，要赚钱，对不起按规定不能以探代采，你要花钱让地质部门给你做勘查报告，到最终详查报告出来你要等将近一年，还有地灾报告，水土保持，安全报告等一系列报告做出并专家评审通过后才能审领采矿证，这样一折腾起码要两年的时间，最后还要办安全生产许可证，投资人能等吗，只好想办法。

3，找县领导通融或黙认后能开工后，接下来你要做的工作多啦，求的部们和人更多，有人说受那么多气，那钱不赚不行啊，不，你不能和钱记仇吧，都知道你做的是暴利的行业，你总要意思一下吧，要按法规来你就等两年以后吧，到那时还不一定全能批下来。

4，通常走访的是，地市级和县级国土部门的相关科室，地质科，矿管科，土地科（你要办占地临时土地证），林业局，生态保持等，还有本来和他管的部门没关系也想办法让你的项目和他的职责发生关系，哈哈，明白吗？

5，最后你毕竞要在所在的镇村做事吧，开矿，建厂，那就涉及到和村镇，农民打交道啦，这时的村镇干部才能大有作为，占地的事你要和农民打交道，用地下水，用几百千瓦的电，建尾矿坝，尾矿对土地和地下水的污染，破坏生态，空气浮尘的扩散，矿车损坏路面，等那一条都能让你停产，这样的工作全凭镇干部和村干部给你协调，一般干部你要给点辛苦费吧，要不谁给你去得罪人去，虽然都明白你和县领导大人物处的和亲兄弟似的，但是有个卖力与否的问题吧，这种项目其实镇上所有部门及干部和村里的任何干部你都要维护的很好，要不你就做不成或高成本，任何一条理由就足以让你停产，你出血不？甚至你要拿出一部分暗股去送人才能摆平，你不和邓大贵搞好关系行不？更有比较卑鄙的人一方故意鼓动农民闹事，另一方帮矿主做工作，抬高自己的价值。

6，按照网上的公布福成矿业投资一个多亿估计是县主要领导主抓的项目。给你们一个专业的数字，一吨铁粉的生产成本在巴东最多350元，07年行情在1200元以上，现在还有700元左右，按福成的投资至少在日产500吨以上，能赚多少钱你们自己算，有关部门当然更明白。所以看你投资人如何去和谐吧！(Modified on 2009/5/28) (博讯 boxun.com)

WALL STREET JOURNAL
MAY 28, 2009
China Murder Case Sparks Women's Rights Uproar

By LORETTA CHAO

BEIJING -- A hotel employee whose arrest for murder sparked a wave of national sympathy in China after her lawyers said she was fighting off a rape attack has been released on bail, the official Xinhua news agency said.

Deng Yujiao, 21, was arrested May 10 after she allegedly stabbed two local government officials with a fruit knife in the Xiongfeng Hotel in central Hubei province, killing one of them.

Ms. Deng got in a quarrel with Huang Dezhi when he "mistook" her for a bathhouse attendant and asked her for "cross gender" services, according to a police report.

Deng Yujiao at a hospital in Badong, in central China, on May 18.

Mr. Huang's colleague, Deng Guida, eventually intervened and the argument escalated when he pushed Ms. Deng onto a couch twice, and she "took a fruit knife and stabbed" Mr. Deng four times, including once in the neck, the report said. She also stabbed Mr. Huang in the forearm. Mr. Deng, who worked for an office overseeing investment projects in Badong city and isn't related to Ms. Deng, later died from his injuries.

Badong County officials said the local public-security bureau is investigating the case, and Ms. Deng hasn't been formally charged. A public-security report said she was initially detained for "suspicion of intentionally killing" Mr. Deng.

Ms. Deng's lawyers have said she was acting in self-defense when the men tried to rape her after she refused to have sex with them for money.

The case sparked public anguish over the issue of violence against women, and a flood of sympathy for Ms. Deng in comments flooding in to Chinese Internet forums and blogs.

An essay posted on a Web forum hosted by the People's Daily newspaper called the stabbing a "heroic act" and a milestone for women's liberation. The date of the attack -- May 10 -- "will forever be remembered as the day on which a [girl] bravely defended herself and fought against the corrupt official when her life was threatened," said the author, writing under the name "Shenzhou Shouwang," or "Watching Over China."

In an forum on the same Web site, a user called Guo Chunfu wrote that Ms. Deng "used her own acts to show that even the underprivileged can have a dignified life."

The outpouring of support prompted the Badong County government to take the extraordinary step of posting a headline on its Web site inviting anyone concerned with the case to call the county's news and information center. The site says a representative has been assigned to the case in order to ensure that investigations are transparent and timely.

Last weekend, five women demonstrated in support of Ms. Deng near the Beijing West Railway Station. Wu Rongrong, an AIDS activist in the group, said the protest highlighted the need for greater "social respect and legal protection" for women. Another protester, wrapped in white cloth and wearing a face mask, lay on the floor next to sheets of paper that read: "Anyone may become Deng Yujiao."

Spokesmen for the Badong County government declined to comment further on the case, and Ms. Deng couldn't be reached for comment.

Her defense lawyers were fired at her mother's request this week after disagreements over strategy.

2009-05-24T12:06:00.003-05:00

Still Geniuses Out There

Okay, this princeling worshiping has really gone quite far. Now, we have the media doing stories which pay tributes to the grand children of revolutionary veterans! I am sure their accomplishments have nothing to do with their grandparents and parents' status. Chinadigitaltimes has some nice photos of grandson Bo Guagua to go with the piece. As you can see, he leads a charmed life in the UK....

Oxford star Bo scoops top award in Britain
(China Daily)
Updated: 2009-05-11 07:32
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The son of a high-ranking Chinese official studying in Britain won a special prize at the weekend aimed at celebrating the country's ten most outstanding Chinese youngsters, the China News Service reported Sunday.

Oxford star Bo scoops top award in Britain

Bo Guagua, a philosophy, politics and economics (PPE) scholar at the prestigious Oxford University, was among 10 people given the Big Ben Award on Saturday for his contributions to the community, the report said.

The 22-year-old is the son of Bo Xilai, the former Chinese minister of commerce and current Party secretary of Chongqing municipality. He was chosen from 28 candidates nominated this year for the prize, which is awarded by the British Chinese Youth Federation, the report said.

The other winning candidates include snooker player Fu Jiajun, director and writer He Xueyi and violinist Chen Mei. Bo was the first person from Chinese mainland to be enrolled in the Harrow School before being accepted at Balliol College, Oxford.

He has already written his first book, entitled Uncommonwealth, a sharp criticism on the blind pursuit of fads.

He has also been involved with the Oxford Subsidizing Poor Overseas Student Association, the Beijing Olympics Overseas Student Volunteer Organization and the Adam Smith Institute. He also set up the Oxford University Sichuan Earthquake Fundraising Committee, raising 15,000 pounds ($22,500) for victims of the May 12 disaster last year.

2009-05-17T07:51:00.001-05:00

Chinese Banks Are Not Good Students

Peter Goodman, whose columns are always concise and well informed, wrote yet another stinging critique of American banks entitled “Lessons the Teacher Forgot.” The basic argument of the piece is that US banks increasingly behaved like Chinese banks, which were supposed to learn market discipline from their teachers. His observations of Chinese banks were also quite on-point:

In effect, American banks operated not unlike the Chinese banks they were supposed to modernize. They extracted profits by following a variation of the principle long pursued by their Chinese counterparts: lend without hesitation while extracting your cut, confident that the government is on the hook for the losses.

In China, ventures may be spectacularly unprofitable, yet enrich everyone lucky enough to get a piece. Developers, for example, construct vacant office buildings as an excuse to borrow from state banks. They rake off a cut for themselves, pay bribes to the party officials who deliver the land and reward bank functionaries with sumptuous banquets and trips to Macao. Soon enough, the trophy skyscraper descends into financial disaster, but the developers, bankers and party officials have already extracted their riches, and for long afterward they will still enjoy them.

As an illustration, there was an interesting exchange between Baogang executive and CBRC official at the Lujiazui Conference recently. Basically, Xu Lejiang argued that the government is doing too much to keeping steel firms alive (Baogang was forced to buy up many firms, for example) and that some steel firms should be allowed to go bankrupt. Banks then should be prepared to “foot the bill.” There is a wonderful sense of irony here because Baogang has benefited from billions upon billions in preferential loans from banks. Anyway, a CBRC official in audience responded by saying that “as a banking regulator, I most fear the phrase ‘banks footing the bill’.”

As Goodman points out, the reality is that thousands of Chinese firms are being kept alive by the banks and government policies now. The difference between the US and China is that the US government could not have ordered the Feds to intervene to save these financial institutions before the crisis, whereas the main job of the PBOC and CBRC is to prevent a major financial crisis. Of course, they do some monitoring, but when financial institutions become insolvent, they have shown perfect willingness to print money to bail them out to preempt a system-wide crisis. So, this signals to all financial firms and state-related conglomerates that the center is there to bail them out, setting off a frenzy of borrowing and bond issuance. Over time, massive debt is issued on the basis of empty office buildings, under-utilized infrastructure, stock market speculations….etc. I am not sure how this all will end…..

2009-05-10T14:10:00.003-05:00

What's behind negative PPI? What about factions?

I got a couple of nice emails from readers later, and I thought I would share my replies with everyone.

First, a couple of people said that the hugely negative PPI is accounted for by declining commodities prices and a lot of "wait and see" attitude among urban consumers. Here is my reply:

I think rich urban consumers are taking a wait and see attitude. You are neglecting the estimated 40 or so million who are unemployed at this point due to the export slump. Also, if commodities deflation accounted for most of it, why don't we see the same deflation in advanced countries. US PPI deflation was 1.2% in March (Jan, Feb was positive), while CPI was -.1% in March and positive for Jan and Feb. Consumers and firms in the US consume a heck of a lot of oil also, so how do you account for it? To be sure, China is factory of the world and is more vulnerable to price shocks of commodities, but we do not see any similar deflation among other net exporters in Asia, like Japan, S. Korea, or Taiwan. Another explanation is that wages are less rigid in China, and we are seeing wages plummeting in China. I think this probably explains some of the negative PPI, but it certainly does not help the consumption picture if true. Finally, there is massive over capacity in some sectors, like steel, which is driving down prices. This is partly caused by the stimulus program.

Another reader also wrote in to ask a question about my book (now as low as 23 bucks!). Basically, he asks whether my theory of factional politics can account for current events, as it seems the generalist factions have taken over economic policies during a crisis. My reply:

Wen is generally seen as a weak technocrat, but he has used this crisis as a way to strengthen central power. He abolished road tolls, centralized fuel tax, and started on a national health bureaucracy. The problem now though is not that the generalists are in charge, but that no generalist faction is powerful enough to delegate policies to Wen in the face of a crisis, which exacerbates the problem of Wen's perceived weakness. Back in the 80s, Deng, though reluctant to centralize, would delegate economic power to the technocrats when he had to. Now however, at least two elite factions (Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and possibly Zhou Yongkang) are jockeying for power, so no one can say that "Ok Wen, you are in charge here 100%". Instead, Wen is only getting Hu's support and facing opposition and delays from followers of other generalist factions.

In the conclusion of my book, I argue that the conflicts between generalists and technocrats are ultimately policy disagreements. The real fight is actually between generalists factions jockeying for power. In all politics (not just authoritarian politics), the worse thing for decisive decision is continuous struggle without resolution.

2009-05-07T23:00:00.001-05:00

Deflation, Lending Slow-down in China, Now What?

Dear All, new post for RGE Monitor

Victor Shih | May 7, 2009

The recently published PBOC Monetary Policy Report is filled with optimism. Growth is strong; investment is on the rise; even export is looking better....etc. Then, I noticed something strange about the report. Throughout the original Chinese version of the report, CPI is referred to as "CPI," and the figure for 1Q wasn't so bad at -0.6%. However, the figure for PPI was only mentioned in Chinese "生产价格" and only in a brief discussion under a large green box on page 36. The PPI figures for 1Q was horrendous! The price of industrial goods fell by 3.3%, 4.5%, and 6% in January, February, and March respectively. So deflationary pressure is getting worse, not better. In terms of commodities and energy prices, the trend for January through March was -5.3%, -7.1%, and -8.9%, again showing a negative trend. To give the PBOC credit, someone actually put the PPI figures for a number of products on their English website: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6400&id=1346

I strongly suggest readers take a close look at it. There is still some incomplete reporting though. For example, capital goods on the PBOC website shows a price increase of 0.1%, but the price of industrial goods decreased in March. What's the relationship between the two? Instead of getting industrial output figures, we find some data on individual categories of industrial outputs, like cars, buses, and TVs at the end of the table. We find that the MoM price of washing machines stayed the same while the price of TVs fell in March...etc. What about other industrial goods used by firms, like heavy machineries?? In a way, this is very disappointing. I think China has made great strides in statistical reporting, but when things get bad, they return back to their old game: obfuscation. Of course, all governments are tempted to do so when things get bad!

The other interesting figure that will creep up on us is April lending. The major state banks, which typically account for half of lending, already report that total new loans made in April was only 220 billion RMB, implying that total new lending was in the 400-500 billion RMB range. As a reminder to readers, March new lending was 1.89 trillion RMB, so we see a very drastic slow-down in April lending. Now we will really put to test the notion that the stimulus has generated sustainable growth. If May and June lending continues to be in the modest range (say below 500 billion RMB--already pretty high), we will see whether growth continues to be strong, investment continues apace, and whether housing and stock markets continue to rally. We'll see.

2009-04-27T03:02:00.002-05:00

Oh Jeez, let's see what the PBOC is saying....

According to PBOC internal report, the 4.58 trillion went mainly to construction and, surprise!, to SOEs in the electricity equipment, coal, concrete, non-ferrious and machinery sectors. Folks, these are the sectors that will see prolonged over-capacity!

4万亿信贷加剧产能过剩担忧可能无法达到初衷
来源：南方日报　2009-04-27 08:43:26 　作者：

　　

　　央行信贷分析报告引发争议,有学者建议不宜推出新的经济刺激计划

　　中国信贷洪闸一季度大开,达到4.58万亿!这些钱到底流向何处?有媒体报道,央行上周出台一份报告,称第一季度信贷资金在第一、二、三大产业上分布比较合理,并得出中国经济形势比较乐观的结论,但央行的观点并未得到其他部门的认同。部分学者和机构担心加剧过剩产能,建议不宜急于推出新的经济刺激计划。

　　4.58万亿投向哪儿去了?

　　据悉,中国人民银行内部已经做出一份详细的一季度信贷分析报告,报告对第一季度信贷资金流入的区域、产业、行业、企业规模做出分析,之后央行认为第一季度信贷资金在第一、二、三大产业上分布比较合理,所谓合理是一种比较均匀的资金分配模式。

　　但央行所认为的信贷结构合理的报告引来了不同的声音。国家信息中心经济预测部副主任祝宝良猜测,根据之前他已经从央行那边获取的一些信息,一些产能过剩的产业获得的贷款也不在少数。

　　事实上,第一季度经济数据就已经让祝宝良感到十分奇怪。4月16日,国家统计局公布的数据显示:一季度,全社会固定资产投资28129亿元,同比增长 28.8%。从产业看,第一、二、三产业(下面分别简称为一产、二产、三产)投资分别为332亿元、10180亿元和13050亿元,同比分别增长 85.0%、26.8%和29.1%。

　　“本来4万亿投资计划应该集中民生工程、‘三农’、基础设施在内产业,这些投资方向多属于第一产业和第三产业。 ”祝宝良说,“三产、一产投得快,大家可以理解,因为一产农业基数低,三产包括医疗保险等在内,所以85.0%、29.1%增长率并不是说很快,但我不明白一季度第二产业投资速度增长为什么那么快。”

　　国金证券最近对上市公司做了调查,结果发现,贷款多的行业主要集中在中上游和投资周期较长的行业,如房地产、电力设备、煤炭、水泥、有色金属和机械等,而这些企业主要是国有企业。“贷款流向投资周期偏长的中上游企业,这些行业有大量的资金需求,资金流入对这些企业有一定支撑。”国金证券王晓辉给出结论。

　　4万亿可能无法达到初衷

　　祝宝良认为, 如果二产投资主要集中在家电、电子元器件、服装、造纸等下游产业,由于这些产业民营企业居多,这可能意味着民间企业真的开始增加,这是真实的经济恢复状况。但是,如果二产投资集中在钢铁、有色金属、造船等这些政府主导的垄断性行业,那么政府4万亿计划可能无法达到计划初衷,因为这些行业产能已经过剩,那么这就预示着产能过剩的调整没有结束。

　　“今年前三个月过高的信贷投放已经加剧经济失衡的风险。”经济学家王小广认为,首先,信贷刺激会导致资金无法有效被利用。“第一季度的信贷不大可能全部都流到实体经济之中,即使流到实体经济也是流到国有企业,可能很多企业把这个钱都用在圈地或搞房地产,而真正需要资金、用于技术升级的企业和中小企业无法得到现金。”

　　其次,当前的资金流向可能会进一步增加过剩产能。由于政府刺激经济,有一些企业可能因此误判,从而增加投资,采取积极进取的经营措施。但经济并没有复苏,一旦经济再次进入调整,这批企业可能就要死掉了。这些情况在国有企业身上可能更加明显。

　　因此,目前一些政府部门建议,未来一个季度不要着急推出新一轮的经济刺激计划,而是等待4万亿投资计划落实情况,观测出现的新变化。祝宝良他认为目前的关键在于对4万亿投资计划的落实。“去年实际投下去是1040亿,今年剩下3个季度每个季度还有2000多个亿,未来三个季度投资肯定比前期要稍微快一点。”

　　本报记者黄应来

2009-04-23T13:29:00.001-05:00

What did 5 Trillion RMB Buy?

Dear All, my latest blog post on RGE Monitor

Victor Shih | Apr 23, 2009

I have been getting a wave of bullish sell side reports about how the stimulus program launched late last year is having an unexpectedly good impact on leading indicators in China. Before we draw quick conclusions about how rosy everything will be, let's step back and examine what these figures are actually telling us. In essence, most of the benefits of pumping 5 trillion into the economy are temporary. When this pace of lending slows, many benefits will reverse into major problems.

First of all, I am more or less repeating some points that Mike Pettis raised in earlier notes. Also, unlike many sell side analysts, Stephen Green at Standard Chartered has issued several reports that give a more comprehensive view. Let's look at the latest figures. In conjunction with the stimulus program, the banks issued nearly 5 trillion RMB in new loans in the first quarter, a historically high level. Because there was basically no share issuance or new corporate bond issuance, the 5 trillion from the banks was really the main engine for 1Q 2009. The 5 trillion is almost the size of the US fiscal stimulus package and basically 1/6 of China's 2008 GDP. As far as I know, this is the largest monetary easing in this period of time as a share of a country's GDP (that didn't go into writing off bad debt, that is). Impressive indeed, but what did China get in return?

1. To be sure, fixed asset investment grew by 25+%, which was one of the intended effects of monetary easing of this magnitude.
2. Official PMI, which mainly reflects sentiment among SOEs or state corporation, went back into positive territory, but private sector PMI was still in negative territory at the end of March.
3. There has been a pretty impressive stock market rebound in the A share.
4. The housing market is showing some sign of life after a long winter. Sales in many major cities are going up significantly, even driving up prices in some cases.

So far so good, BUT...

When we look at figures for non-investment economic activities, things do not look good at all. In fact, it is down right disappointing after pumping 5 trillion into the economy.

1. First of all, export and FDI continue to fall at a pretty fast pace, which can't be helped.
2. More alarming, inventory for many industrial goods continue to build UP! According to a recent note by Stephen Green's team, refined oil inventory is up over 35% YoY as of the end of February.
3. Coal inventory seems to have gone down, but that's because many coal mines have ceased to operate. The 21st Century Business Herald reported that 50-70% of mines are "resting" for the moment. Iron ore mines are facing the same problem as international iron ore now costs less than domestic ore.
4. Electricity usage continues to be in negative territory.

Steel consumption has picked up somewhat from a collapse late last year. However, I think the problem there is continual over-capacity. The central government didn't want any major steel firms to go under, so they are spending billions to "merge" a bunch of steel firms. For example, Bao Steel based in Shanghai will buy up several steel producers in the Jiangsu/Zhejiang area. This maintains the over-capacity in the sector and will put upward pressure on inventory.

In electricity generation, there is rumor of a ,CIC2, a mega company that will buy up distressed electricity producers and coal mines from across China, boosting the on-going consolidation financed by bank loans. In the airline industry, billions have been injected into airlines to keep them afloat amidst disastrous bets on world oil prices.

There is then the widely cited figures of 12% increase in urban income at the end of 2008 and increase in car sales in first quarter. In the first instance, I have no idea how the income figures were produced, but they almost always miss migrant workers, who are also urban residents. On the car sales, China Economist already points to a recent FT article which questions whether sales of minivans will help car company profitability. Finally, employment, which supposedly was the main point of the stimulus, was only marginally improved by the 5 trillion. Most large projects haven't gotten going yet as land still needs to be procured. The biggest employment impact was that the 5 trillion prevented the mass bankruptcy of hundreds and perhaps thousands of firms. However, some firms are staying alive by laying off or furloughing workers, like the coal mines.

So, really, when it comes down to it, the 5 trillion bought:

1. some psychological relief
2. some more sales of real estate, thus delaying the bankruptcies of many developers
3. an upbeat stock market, for a while
4. prevented the bankruptcy of numerous state firms, especially in the airline, coal, electricity, and steel sector

The most alarming thing is that these "positive" effects of pumping money into the economy lasts only as long as the money keeps flowing. If for whatever reason, the central government decides to slow down the pace of lending (and there are signs they are thinking of doing so), ALL of the above benefits will collapse relatively quickly. Imagine; if the flow of funds slows significantly, the psychological relief will disappear quickly, as will short-term loans to developers; the upbeat market sentiment will follow as speculative funds withdraw suddenly from the market. SOEs, which are building UP their capacity and inventory as we speak, will face growing losses from depreciation and deflationary pressure on output. Without free flow of bank loans, they will begin to default on their previous loans. Speculative demand for real estate will also collapse, given that inventory is expected to reach over 1 billion sqmtr some time in 2009 (again citing SCB report by Green et al.).

What does this mean? The central government cannot stop or even significantly slow this pace of lending until export picks up in a significant way, else the bubble will burst. This is a race against time. At some point, this pace of lending will lead to a serious NPL problem or inflation, or both. If by that point, export and domestic household consumption remain anemic, I am not sure what options the central government will have.