Elite Chinese Politics and Political Economy

Well, it's official, former PBOC governor Dai Xianglong will end his career as the head of the National Social Security Fund, replacing former minister of finance Xiang Huaicheng. I heard that NSSF backed out of some of its securities positions a couple of months ago. I hope that is indeed true, else Dai will come into a mess. Either way though, I would think that he is quite happy with this assignment. Now we see what Wu Xiaoling gets. I am sure she is far from ready to retire at this point.



戴相龙任社保基金理事会党组书记
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年01月30日11:38 中国政府网
戴相龙任社保基金理事会党组书记
资料图片：戴相龙

　　近日，中共中央、国务院决定：

　　任命戴相龙同志为全国社会保障基金理事会党组书记、理事长。来源：社保基金会网站

　　戴相龙简历

　　戴相龙，男，汉族，1944年11月生，江苏仪征人，1973年5月加入中国共产党，1967年9月参加工作，大学学历，研究员，博士生导师。曾任云南省圭山煤矿财务科会计、宣传科干事、二工区党支部副书记，省煤炭工业局政治部干事，中国人民银行江苏省分行干部，中国农业银行江苏省分行干部、拨款处副处长，江苏省丰县副县长，中国农业银行江苏省分行副行长。1985年2月起，先后任中国农业银行副行长，交通银行总经理、副董事长、党组书记，中国太平洋保险公司董事长，中国人民银行副行长、党组副书记。1995年6月起，先后任中国人民银行行长、党组书记、党委书记，2001年6月同时担任中央金融工委副书记。2002年12月起，任天津市委副书记，市长、市政府党组书记。

Ah, Premier Wen finally acknowledges the rock and the hard place that the Chinese economy is trapped in. Granted, it will still grow at at least 8% this year, but asset prices may suffer tremendously. When the market tanks in the US, Bernanke can decrease Fed Funds rates since inflation is relatively low. With a building monetary over-hang from the past few years, inflation is high in China, so even if Premier Wen ever changes his mind about wanting to depress housing and stock prices, OOPS, he can't do it because of inflation! With inflation, he would also have to control prices, which creates shortage and black-outs, thus further harming the export economy.

Wen warns of toughest year for economy

SCMP, Denise Tsang , Jan 29, 2008



Premier Wen Jiabao has warned for the first time that this will be a "most difficult year" for the mainland economy, which is caught between global economic uncertainties and crises at home.

In an unusually direct warning, Mr Wen told a State Council meeting that the rapidly growing nation faced strong headwinds that warranted "scientific democratic policies".

His comments were made last Thursday but released yesterday on the central government's website.

Although Mr Wen did not elaborate, some economists attributed his warning to a looming recession in the United States , the biggest consumer of Chinese exports; a 4.8 per cent jump in the mainland's inflation last year, the sharpest rise in 11 years; and the growing strength of the yuan against the US dollar.

Even natural disasters are plaguing the country at an inauspicious time. Severe snowstorms are sweeping across central and southern China , wreaking havoc on electrical supplies, coal and food, and leaving hundreds of thousands of workers stranded at train stations as they try to make their way home for the Lunar New Year.

"As we [State Council leaders] often discuss, we fear that 2008 will be the most difficult year for the economy," Mr Wen said in a tone that reflected deep concern.

"There are uncertainties in international circumstances and the economic environment, and there are new difficulties and contradictions in the domestic economy."

JP Morgan chief China economist Frank Gong said Mr Wen's comments signalled a change in policy in which the government was expected to spur domestic demand instead of curbing growth.

"They (state leaders) realise they have underestimated the impact of the external slowdown," Mr Gong said.

"This probably will lead to a change of policy from tightening to stimulating the economy."

He expected that Beijing would introduce measures to stimulate consumer spending.

"It was a mistake to say at the end of last year that the [2008] tightening had to be biased towards monetary tightening because the external market deteriorated quickly, obviously much faster than they had thought," he said. "The central government should have given themselves more policy flexibility."

Hong Kong exporters owning factories in Guangdong province have felt the pain of weak US consumer confidence, a stronger yuan, rising production costs and the havoc caused by the snowstorm.

Simon Shi Kai-biu, who runs motor-system manufacturer Sun Motor International in Shenzhen , said there were now three days of blackouts a week in Dongguan, up from two.

This has forced the company into a costly and polluting alternative - diesel-fuelled power generation - to avoid disrupting production.

"Generating our own electricity adds an extra 5 per cent to costs," Mr Shi said. "This is on top of extra costs for providing meals for workers who are not able to get home for the Lunar New Year."

Well, well, just months after the completion of Citibank's acquisition of Guangdong Development Bank, the table has turned, and Citi is going to the Chinese begging for money. Once again, the State Council squashed the deal, further confirming our suspicion that deals above 1 billion USD (and possibly less) needs State Council approval. Well, are we surprised? No, not really. The reason is many. The most important perhaps is that Wen realized that such an acquisition would expose China too much to the badly damaged US financial sector. Of secondary importance, Citibank is definitely lacking in the guanxi department, having been a relatively late comer to China. Losing Wei Christianson to Morgan did not help. Certainly it lacks the extensive network of guanxi that Goldman and Morgan have in China. Once again, Citi might have (once again) underestimated the importance of having a wide network of guanxi throughout the Chinese government beyond just guanxi with the potential partner. Sigh....why can't Citibank learn their lesson?

Wall Street Journal

Barriers to Entry
Blockbuster Investments by Government Funds Lead to Backlash
By RICK CAREW in Hong Kong, MARCUS WALKER in Berlin, CHIP CUMMINS in Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, and KATHARINA BART in Brussels
January 15, 2008

The powerful government-run investment funds of Asia and the Middle East -- which have been gobbling up global assets recently -- are hitting new resistance.

Some obstacles are political in nature. But others center on bottom-line questions about whether investments like these are solid business moves.

The latest example: China's government has apparently squashed a multibillion-dollar investment in Citigroup Inc. by state-owned China Development Bank. The move suggests there is discord in Beijing over how best to deploy China's money pile. A few previous China investments like these have fared poorly so far financially.

In the West, the newfound assertiveness of these pools of government money -- known as sovereign-wealth funds -- is reinvigorating the debate over possible restrictions amid the realization that the West's share of the world economy is shrinking, and with it, control over the ground rules of globalization.

Germany has been looking into new laws to block takeovers by state-owned foreign companies and investment funds. And last week, French President Nicolas Sarkozy vowed to use France's state pension fund to defend French industries "in the face of a rise in the power of extremely aggressive" state-owned investment funds from abroad.

One irony is that "there haven't been any significant investments by sovereign-wealth funds in Germany or France," says Stephen Jen, an economist at Morgan Stanley in London. Nevertheless, the growing size of sovereign-wealth funds in China, Singapore and Saudi Arabia, among other places, means they are potentially in a position to buy major corporations in Europe's leading economies.

Asian and Middle Eastern investors have snapped up significant assets including stakes in Wall Street giants Citigroup and Morgan Stanley as well as the global port operator Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. and the iconic Madame Tussaud's Group PLC, operator of wax museums.

It hasn't been without controversy. In 2006, the port deal, in which Dubai Ports World would have acquired U.S. container-port operations, among other assets, raised a political firestorm in the U.S.

The newness of government-controlled investment funds on the global financial stage is sparking worries about their intentions. In Switzerland, activist shareholders in UBS AG, the giant bank, are questioning a planned 11 billion Swiss franc ($9.98 billion) acquisition of a 9% stake by the Government of Singapore Investment Corp. That investment would rank GIC as the single largest investor in UBS.

One concern centers on whether foreign investments like these are sizable enough to "effectively block certain decisions through an informal veto right," says Dominique Biedermann, a director of Ethos, a Swiss activist investment fund. The fund fears that poor turnout at shareholder meetings could artificially inflate GIC's influence.

Current shareholders argue that the investment is structured in a way that dilutes their own holdings. GIC has said publicly that it doesn't seek to control UBS's business and views itself as strictly a financial investor. UBS spokesman Christoph Meier said UBS plans to address Ethos's questions no later than Feb. 27, when UBS shareholders are scheduled to vote on the capital infusion.

China's decision to halt a planned $2 billion investment in Citigroup comes after China's government fund, China Investment Corp., pumped $5 billion into Morgan Stanley in December. Citigroup had hoped to sell its stake to China Development Bank to improve its books in the wake of losses from the U.S. subprime lending as well as Citi's decision to fold off-balance-sheet investments into its accounts.

People familiar with the situation say China's senior leadership decided against backing the investment plan, which had been in the works for weeks.

Citigroup hopes to announce a cash infusion from government funds and other investors today when it is due to report its fourth-quarter earnings. In late November, a Middle Eastern state-controlled fund, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, invested $7.5 billion in the New York financial-services company.

It wasn't clear why Chinese leaders scrapped the Citigroup investment. Yang Hua, director of China Development Bank's news department, says she is unaware of any plans for the bank to invest in Citigroup, or any government opposition to any such investment.

China's blockbuster investments so far in Blackstone Group LP and Barclays PLC have fared poorly. A $3 billion stake in U.S. money manager Blackstone triggered sometimes angry Chinese public criticism of China Investment Corp., the state fund set up last year to invest a $200 billion pile of China's money. The value of China Investment Corp.'s stake has fallen 31%.

China's government holds controlling stakes or full ownership in almost all its large financial institutions.

Senior Chinese leaders don't necessarily coordinate the operations of firms like these, instead retaining veto power over major moves.

Unlike some other sovereign investors, China is quite new at doing big deals. Only in the past few years has the country's trade surplus exploded, giving it foreign reserves now valued at more than $1.5 trillion.

"Four years ago they could not imagine that they would be in this position," says Arthur Kroeber, managing director of Dragonomics, an economic research firm in Beijing.

In the Mideast, there are few signs so far of unease over the large investments regional players are making abroad. But officials and fund managers say they still worry about the potential for political backlash in foreign countries, along with high regulatory hurdles and a softening economy in the West.

Dubai International Capital, a government-owned investment fund, has in recent years snapped up big stakes in British bank HSBC Group Holdings. But its last big deal was for a stake in Sony Corp.

DIC's chief executive, Sameer Al Ansari, said he is looking more at Asia than the U.S. and Europe these days. That is partly to diversify geographically, he said late last year. But it also reflects worry about U.S. economic and regulatory conditions.

Well, Li Yuanchao has been a busy boy, vowing to shake up the Central Organization Department. In an editorial in the People's Daily, the author "central organization writer" promised that "honest people will not lose out." We'll see how far this "honesty" push goes!

仲祖文：不能让老实人吃亏
2008年01月11日07:10 来源：人民网－《人民日报》

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　　用什么样的人，不用什么样的人，体现用人导向，关乎党风民意，关系事业发展。

　　干事创业，是实现党在每一阶段目标任务的根本之道。早在延安时期，毛泽东同志就要求全党同志“当老实人，讲老实话，做老实事”。我们讲的老实人，不是那些庸庸碌碌、无能无为的人，而是老老实实做人、踏踏实实干事、兢兢业业工作的人。与老实人相对照，也有一些投机钻营者，不讲党性、不重品行，为了个人私利和宦途升迁捞资本、做虚功、拉关系、搞奉迎，把心思和精力都用在“造势”和“谋官”上。我们队伍中这种人多了，不仅于事业发展无利，而且会严重涣散党的干部队伍，对党的形象是极大的损害。因此，不让老实人吃亏、不让投机钻营者得利历来是我们党选人用人的重要原则。我们就是要形成正确的用人导向，引导各级干部扑下身子、埋头苦干，求真务实、狠抓落实，积极创造经得起实践检验、人民检验和历史检验的政绩，推动党的事业不断发展。

　　不让老实人吃亏，关键在于各级领导者要把选人用人的眼光更多地投向那些在艰苦环境和岗位上做出政绩的干部。这些人注重埋头做事，不善声张“造势”，辛苦和业绩往往不易广为人知；他们清正自守，不好拉拉扯扯、吃吃喝喝，往往“人脉”不广；他们不跑不送，不找不要，不善奉迎，往往引不起别人的关注。这些干部专注干事不会来事，讲原则不懂圆滑，往往还会得罪人。对于这样的老实人，各级领导者更有责任慧眼识金，积极地发现他们，主动关心他们，旗帜鲜明地支持他们，大张旗鼓地宣传他们，让广大干部群众熟悉他们、了解他们。

　　不让老实人吃亏，根本在于形成科学的用人机制。要进一步健全干部考核体系和评价机制，客观公正地看待干部，科学准确地识别干部，保证那些扎扎实实为群众干实事、真心实意为群众谋利益的优秀干部能够进入组织选拔的视野。要改进民主推荐工作，搞好民意调查工作，积极扩大群众参与，认真贯彻中央纪委、中央组织部提出的换届选举“十个严禁”的要求，使那些一心干事、实绩突出的老实人能够推荐得上来。要切实按照德才兼备、注重实绩、群众公认的原则选人用人，大力选拔那些埋头做事、清正廉洁的优秀干部，在干部队伍中形成老实人受尊敬、受重用的良好导向。

Dear All,

Here is a new review of my book, Factions and Finance in China, from Bradley Gardner at the China International Business Magazine blog called The Yuan Also Rises. He did a great job summarizing my argument, and the review is quite kind. And yes, there is a soap opera aspect to elite Chinese politics, but that is why we love it!

Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation
January 8, 2008 – 8:25 pm

Victor Shih tries to answer the elusive question: how does Chinese monetary policy work?

Factions and Finance in China, though an academic work both in price (USD 85) and structure (it was based on Northwestern University professor Victor Shih’s doctoral dissertation), reads like a soap opera.
Shih argues that the peculiar nature of inflationary cycles in China, which feature sudden run-away inflation followed by quick returns to normalcy along with the absence of credible monetary policy, is a result of conflict and cooperation between two segments of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – the leading generalist faction and economic technocrats. The interaction between these two groups, Shih argues, is key to China’s continued economic and political stability.

The three generalist factions that feature prominently in Shih’s narrative are those led by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The support base for these factions largely comes from provincial leaders, who require high rates of growth in order to advance their careers. Shih argues that it is not only preferable, but a political necessity, that the leaders of generalist factions push resources towards their provincial followers in order to shore up support. The decentralized monetary policy quickly leads to expansion of the money supply and high inflation, which can only be solved by the technocrat factions.

The technocrat factions, led by Chen Yun, Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, advocate centralization of monetary policy, because they need large financial resources in order to accomplish the major economic goals which are necessary for their advancement. According to Shih, when inflation is taking over the economy and creating a political risk for the leading generalist faction, they hand over control of monetary policy to the technocrats, who are not powerful enough to wrest political control of the country out of the hands of the generalists, but are more effective than the generalists at stopping competing factions from excess spending. Once the crisis is over, this cooperation stops as well, as the generalists fight once more to wrest control of the economy from the technocrats.

Shih renders the dynamic between the two groups dramatically: when Deng Xiaoping is calling for faster growth at one point, Chen Yun snipes from the sidelines “five percent growth is neither small nor simple;” Deng follower Zhao Ziyang at one point calls Brazilian-style inflation (over 100% yearly) “acceptable;” Chen Yun makes ample use of corruption investigations to increase his political strength, and the technocrats let the generalists run the economy to the brink of economic collapse in order to gain full control over monetary policy. Three of the nine chapters are completely dedicated to describing the melodrama that is Chinese monetary policy, and provide more inside information on the decision making processes of the Chinese government than you will find almost anywhere else. The book will help anyone who has been struggling to understand how Chinese monetary policy with only a knowledge of conventional central banking.

Though Shih seems to have a grudging respect for the way CCP infighting has succeeded in controlling runaway inflation, he warns that it has wreaked havoc on the banking system and is largely unsustainable. Both the generalists and the technocrats have used the banking system for their own political purposes, leading to a continual problem with non-performing loans. Shih is not optimistic either about successful reform in the coming years, arguing that control over the banks will most likely only leave state hands in the case of a severe economic shock.

Though the thesis is convincing, and Shih provides overwhelming evidence that the political dynamic he describes has existed in the past and has reason to exist in the future, the time period under investigation is too short to provide enough evidence to fully support his largely pessimistic conclusions. Shih admits that thus far Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have cooperated rather extensively, as Hu needs to protect his position from the followers of Jiang Zemin, which leaves the only evidence for the consistency of this dynamic Jiang’s switch from a more moderate position to a strong supporter of decentralization once he needed to consolidate his power in the regions. Shih argues that Hu and Wen will replicate the pattern of the previous two generations (Deng vs. Chen, Jiang vs. Zhu), and his model strongly supports this argument, but there are plenty of reasons to suppose Hu and Wen would find a reason to continue cooperating (such as a continued threat from Jiang), and likewise continued hope that leadership would see the benefit of continued economic reform.

Well, first Q inflation will continue to be robust, and the State Council has rolled out another series of price freezes. This is not going to work, since such price freezes usually result in a spade of "scheduled maintenance" at refineries operated by Sinopec and Petro China, which causes shortage. I think we will gain see truck lines in Guangdong next to gas stations. Also, this shows again how unsuccessful macroeconomic control has been. Facing Wen and the State Council is an increasingly powerful real estate investment lobby that cautions against overly restrictive macro policies. I am not sure who is behind this lobby, but they are powerful. For one, while Wen said that real estate prices were on the top of his agenda in Singapore, the central economic conference right afterward did not mention inflated asset prices as a top worry for the regime. Someone is probably singing a different tune in the Politburo. If I had to take a wild guess....the princelings.



January 9, 2008

China, Fighting Inflation, Freezes Energy Prices
By JIM YARDLEY

BEIJING — Prime Minister Wen Jiabao responded Wednesday to growing public anxiety about inflation by announcing that China would freeze energy prices in the near term, even as international crude oil futures have topped $100 a barrel.

The move to hold down prices came as inflation hit an 11-year high in China. A recent nationwide public opinion survey found that “rising prices of consumer goods” ranked as the top public concern, followed by income inequality and corruption.

The freezes, announced on the government’s main Web site, followed a meeting of the State Council led by Mr. Wen on Wednesday to revise policies on price controls.

Prices of oil products, natural gas and electricity will be frozen in the near term. Rates for public water bills will be frozen, as will the cost of public transportation tickets.

The edict also called for stabilizing prices on medical services and for certain agricultural fertilizers. It ordered local governments to closely monitor prices and warned that punishments would be strengthened for those who violate government price control policies.

Ben Simpfendorfer, an economist with the Royal Bank of Scotland in Hong Kong, said the announcement underscored how seriously the State Council regards public attitudes toward inflation.

“The State Council is worried about public sentiment,” he said. “They are worried that rising prices will have a negative impact.”

China raised gasoline prices by 10 percent in November after state-owned refineries, complaining that price controls were forcing them to accept higher world crude oil prices, cut production, causing long lines at fuel stations around the country.

But the November price increase helped drive consumer prices up 6.9 percent from a year earlier — a figure that represented an 11-year high.

“It was a shock,” said Mr. Simpfendorfer.

Now, oil futures have continued to rise on world markets and Chinese refiners are again raising the same concerns. Again, lines are forming at service stations, particularly for truckers in southern China.

Even Wednesday’s announcement hinted that domestic price increases might be inevitable later this year in response to world markets.

“Prices of crude oil, grains and other primary products are still rising on the international market, and China faces relatively large pressures of further price increases,” the announcement on the government Web site said.

For ordinary Chinese citizens, inflation has emerged as a major concern. Last year, food prices rose roughly 12 percent, eliciting an often angry public response. More recently, prices for eggs and pork have fallen, though flooding in farming regions of central China damaged vegetable production and kept those prices high, Mr. Simpfendorfer said.

Last week, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences released a national survey that found 30.5 percent of respondents considered inflation the country’s top problem. Stories about the urban poor struggling with rising prices have become common in the Chinese media.

China’s rapid economic growth has been fueled by rising demand for oil, coal and other energy sources.

Sigh...in Chinese politics, one day you are somebody, the next day you ain't. That's what happened to Forbes most powerful financial player in China, the vice governor of the PBOC Wu Xiaoling. Due entirely to age, she retired just a few days ago. The below article pays tribute to her, but also contains some interesting vignettes of Wu. For example, she was on the verge of giving birth in Inner Mongolia when the Red Guards came after her. I had no idea that she had a kid. Who is the father? She is a princeling? Well, regardless, she claims that she will keep her life "colorful" in the future. We'll see what awaits her.



　　2008年1月3日，北京华融大厦。在中国人民银行召开的2008年工作会议上，央行行长周小川宣布了人事任免事项，61岁的吴晓灵因年龄原因卸去副行长职务。

　　尽管这一刻不可抗拒地到来，但在关心中国金融改革事业的人们心里，仍充满了依依不舍。

　　吴晓灵本人也十分动情。她说：“离开领导岗位是一个自然的规律，也是人生的新起点。我将尽自己所能，继续为社会尽自己的一份力量，也会为自己安排一个平和多彩的生活。但我的心永远和大家在一起。”

　　她在央行工作了整整23个年头，把自己的才华和青春全部献给了金融改革和中央银行事业。早年的坎坷经历练就了她宠辱不惊的磊落胸怀，而踏实勤奋、爽朗洒脱、真诚宽容，是她给身边的人留下的深刻印象。

　　上山下乡、参加高考、金融研究、创办报纸、体改政研……她的生活是一本精彩的书；推动经常项目可兑换、推动利率市场化、参与人民币汇率机制改革……20年来几乎中国所有重要的金融改革，她都是参与者和推动者。

　　金融改革的推动者

　　周小川1995年就开始和吴晓灵合作，算是“老搭档”了。他对吴晓灵给予了高度评价：“晓灵同志经济、金融理论基础扎实，熟悉宏观经济管理和金融业务工作，熟悉我国金融业改革的发展状况，并善于理论联系实际，能够创造性地提出我国金融业发展的思路与设想。晓灵同志有较强的组织领导能力和协调能力，为积极稳妥推进金融业各项改革做出了大量艰苦细致的开创性工作，为我国金融改革与发展作出了重要贡献，在我国经济金融界享有较高的威信。”

　　这不是溢美之词，而是恰如其分的评价。

　　无论是改革领域的推进利率市场化、人民币汇率形成机制改革、藏汇于民、放松金融管制、推动第三方存管，还是大力发展公司债企业债、私募股权基金、小额信贷等等，都留下了深刻的吴晓灵烙印。

　　吴晓灵多次呼吁推动利率市场化。“中国现在不缺资金，关键是要提高资金的使用效益。而金融资源配置不合理是目前资金使用效益低下的根本原因。合理配置金融资源，关键是要稳步推进利率市场化。”“完成利率市场化的目标难度不小，这要靠金融机构自我约束能力的加强；要靠监管当局调控水平和监管能力的提高；还有赖于企业经营机制的完善，能够对利率杠杆作出灵敏的反应。但我认为，利率市场化已是曙光在前！”2002年她发出的呼唤，至今依然响彻在金融机构耳畔。

　　在稳步推进人民币汇率机制改革方面，面对国外压力，吴晓灵在国际场合表现得有理有利有节，展现了一个大国央行行长级官员应有的风范。

　　2007年的达沃斯世界经济论坛年会上，吴晓灵毫不含糊地指出，人民币汇率将趋向市场化，但中国将坚持符合自身实际情况的改革步调，不会在短期内大幅调整汇率，其他国家应尊重中国在如履薄冰的改革过程中逐步实施的步伐，并建议批评家们“各家自扫门前雪”。此话不仅回应了一些国家近乎苛刻的要求，还展示了其性格中刚毅的另一面。

　　她多次强调，人民币汇率政策基本方针是加大汇率形成机制的灵活性，但速度不能太快。这主要因为中国经济问题不是单纯的汇价问题，而是高储蓄、高投资、低消费造成的经济结构失衡，绝非汇率所能解决。

　　“我们希望在中国经济转型过程中，世界应该有足够的耐心，应该相信中国政府的决心和市场化的方向。”吴晓灵说。

　　“一位了解国情、务实肯干的理论家。”金融界人士不约而同地对她给出了这样的评价。

　　五道口：“我眷恋的地方”

　　如果要追溯吴晓灵理论紧密联系实际、推动金融改革思想的起源，那么上世纪80年代初她在人民银行研究生部接受的教育无疑是最重要的一笔。

　　1947年1月出生的吴晓灵，与其他很多同龄人一样，高中毕业后没有机会走进大学课堂，而是到内蒙古插队。但正如她在一次讲座上说的那样， “机会永远属于有准备的人”。上山下乡期间，吴晓灵没有放松学习。因此，在恢复高考的第一年，吴晓灵顺利考上了大学。1981年，她成为中国人民银行研究生部招收的第一批学生。

　　当时，央行研究生部在北京海淀区五道口的一个小院刚刚成立，条件艰苦。1982年2月，北京依然天寒地冻，包括吴晓灵在内的18名男女学生走入五道口，在一间纤维板搭成的简易教室中，开始了两年半的研究生学习生涯。多年后，这些人早已成为推动金融改革和金融市场建设的中流砥柱：央行副行长兼国家外汇局局长胡晓炼、国家外汇局副局长魏本华、央行金融市场司司长穆怀朋、国务院发展研究中心金融所所长夏斌、深交所研究所所长波涛……

　　回忆起当年的求学经历，吴晓灵充满着感情：“五道口是我难以忘怀和无限眷恋的地方。多年前我作为第一届学生入校学习的情景仿佛是在昨天。我们班的同学大小相差十多岁，老师来自不同的学校和单位，但这并没有妨碍我们在一起融洽地生活了三年。老师以他们严谨的治学精神和强烈的社会责任感熏陶着我们，引导着我们走上了一条理论联系实际的治学道路。”

　　“我眷恋‘五道口’，是因为三年的学习为我打下了在工作岗位上不断摸索前进和进一步研究的理论基础。”吴晓灵说。

　　既是同学又是同事的胡晓炼回忆起当年情形时说：“能够作为第一批学员走进这座小楼感觉非常不容易。这种不容易不仅仅是通过考试和录取，更重要的是我们每个人都有下乡及工作的经历，通过奋斗成为文革后的第一届大学生，又跨进了研究生部的大门。这一历史性的机会来之不易，因此我们格外珍惜。”

　　胡晓炼至今依然记得，在寒冷的冬天，北风呼啸，教室和宿舍暖气片冰凉，同学们身穿大衣，怀揣热水袋伏案学习的情形。但作为开拓者，他们无疑是幸运的，五道口请了最好的老师为他们授课：厉以宁主讲宏观经济与微观经济，为他们打开了跳出原来政治经济学框架来分析经济活动的新视角；黄达主讲的社会主义金融理论，代表了国内金融研究和发展的最新成果；央行各业务领域的专家则向他们传授了金融实务……可以说，当时放眼中国，没有一家高校有像五道口这样集百家之长、汇当代成果的独特优势。

　　在五道口深厚的理论和务实精神滋养下，研究生们投身中国金融改革的激情在燃烧。1984年，研究生部25名研究生在合肥中国金融学会第二次代表大会上提出《中国金融改革战略探索提纲》，主张以建立金融市场作为金融改革的突破口。提纲导言铿锵有力，洋溢着自信与无畏的开拓精神：

　　“本提纲宗旨提出我国金融改革必须重新确定新的战略指导思想，摆脱目前金融改革单纯局限于银行机构改组的被动局面，使金融改革成为进一步推动国民经济改革的催化剂。现在，逐步地稳妥地开放中国式的金融市场是我国经济改革大趋势的客观要求，是推动商品生产规模扩大的重大步骤，是金融体制全面改革的突破口，它要求我们冲破传统思想的束缚，扬弃已过时的金融理论，全面开创金融改革的新局面。”

　　二十五杰中，就有吴晓灵。而日后位居央行副行长、主管货币政策和金融市场业务的她，正是按照这一精神身体力行地推动中国金融市场建设。

　　同年，吴晓灵从研究生部毕业，抱着一腔改革的热情，她选择了央行金融研究所。同为81级校友的夏斌说：“当时，中国的金融改革已经进入了紧迫阶段，需要观点、思想和理论的积累。大家血气方刚，积极向上，搞研究的兴趣都很大，都想把中国的改革搞好。毕业分配，吴晓灵就拉着我去了研究所。81级毕业生有6个去了总行，都在研究所，我想这不是一种巧合。”

　　“我们当年毕业的时候想法很单纯，那是一个理想主义盛行的年代，每个人都怀着创业的冲动和对国家整体发展的责任感。”胡晓炼道出了那一代人的心声。

　　成功奥秘： 勤奋+好学

　　进入央行后，从履历上看，吴晓灵的路可谓顺风顺水：研究所应用理论研究室副主任，参与创办《金融时报》，并于1988年任副总编辑；历任金融体制改革司副司长、 政策研究室主任、国家外汇管理局副局长、局长、中国人民银行上海分行行长；2000年2月起，任央行副行长。

　　“如果以官位衡量的话，可能很多人认为我是成功的，但是我认为官位并不能说明一个人成功不成功。我之所以走到现在，是因为每一步我都踏踏实实地干好我现在能做的事情，而不去奢求我下一步能做什么。另外一点，就是不能放弃学习。”吴晓灵在与北大学生的一次对话中这样阐释自己的成功学。

　　1997年，刚过知天命之年的吴晓灵，用了三句话总结自己经历了五十个春秋后的体会：

　　第一句话，一步一个脚印，走自己的路。“也许在校友们的眼中我是一个一帆风顺的人，如果问经验，就是认真地参与遇到的所有的事，不管大事、小事，不管把自己放在什么环境中，都要认真努力地去做，不断地学习，独立地思考，不断适应形势的发展。机遇总是属于有准备的人，就这样我一步一步走过上山下乡、知青选调、恢复高考、攻读学位的路，走过了金融研究、创办报纸、体改政研的路。在这年过半百之际，我又开始学习外汇业务，去熟悉一个新的领域。”

　　第二句话，勤能补拙。“我不是一个才气横溢的人，论学识我在八一、八二级同学中不过是个中等水平。我看清了这点，因而要勤奋、认真、实干，想以勤补拙，也格外珍惜同学间的友谊。”

　　第三句话，后生可畏。“科学在发展，知识要更新。每当我们参加一次学术活动或到五道口参加学生论文答辩时，我都深切感受到一种压力，现在的年轻人知识结构比我们强。我们作为老师去五道口讲课或是带研究生是在一种危机感下，为自己提供一个教学相长的机会，让自己不要过于落伍。”

　　吴晓灵的勤奋努力是很多人有目共睹的。“她非常好学。在上海分行当行长时，她经常拿个笔记本到各处室了解情况。”一位央行工作人员表示。

　　深圳证券交易所总经理张育军是五道口85级的学生。他说：“吴晓灵当年在总行政策研究室时，就中国金融发展的重大问题阅读了大量资料，进行了深入的研究，后来她的许多见解主张得到时任人民银行代行长朱镕基的首肯。如果没有多年来一步一步踏踏实实的努力，何谈今天的成功。”

　　这位时常引用毛泽东“妇女要顶半边天”名言来鼓励妇女多学习金融知识的中央银行家，自身对金融业诸多问题的研究成果都属上乘，在学界有着很高的声誉。她和谢平合写的《转向市场经济过程中的中国货币政策》获1994年孙冶方经济学奖；2006年的《国际收支双顺差下的中国货币政策》一文深入分析了当前货币政策的大背景和操作思路，引领着中央银行近年来的货币政策操作思路。

　　究其根源，吴晓灵深受一位已故老师一句话的影响：一个好的研究人员如果一年中能写出一两篇有独立见解或新观点的研究文章就不错了。“因为职务关系，有时为了应景，自己也常讲些重复的话，但治学我总以老师的告诫为鉴。”

　　做人做事平常心

　　“世界上没有第二个女人在中国财经界的影响力超过吴晓灵！” 2006年，美国《福布斯》公布的“2006年全球最有影响力的女性”排行榜，将吴晓灵位列第二，并如是评价。2005年，吴晓灵被《华尔街日报》评为“2005年度全球最受关注的50位商界女性”之一。

　　对于这些评价，吴晓灵如是回应：“对于那些国际媒体对我的评价，或者叫荣誉吧，我个人是这样看的，这些荣誉的取得，首先是属于中国的，其次是属于央行的，最后才是属于我个人的。”

　　她坦率地说：“您想想，如果没有中国在世界上这么高的国际地位，如果没有央行在国际金融方面那么大的影响力，如果不是国家把我放在央行副行长这一重要的位置上，我不可能有机会做出那些有影响的事情，别人也不可能对我有这样的评价，80%是中国的因素，20%才是自己的因素。”

　　“我的看法是：做人做事，只要有一颗平常心，就什么都不在话下了。你只要有一颗平常心，人家追捧你也好，不理你也好，你都会觉得无所谓了。”

　　吴晓灵认为，如果说自己对金融界也作出过一些应有的贡献的话，其实也就两件事：一件是她从研究生部毕业后，一直在人民银行工作，20多年来参与了央行所有的金融改革，这些认可，可以看成是对她20多年来勤勤恳恳工作的一种肯定；第二是亚洲金融危机时，特别是在1998年的外汇大检查中，在朱镕基总理的直接领导下，当时外汇局采取的措施比较得当，采取的措施也比较及时，使一场可能爆发的金融危机得到及时的化解。

　　“因为央行在国家和社会上的特殊地位和国民经济中所起的重要作用，可以说是‘牵一发而动全身’。而我又有幸在其中做了一些自己应该做的工作。作为一名央行女性，我感到自豪和骄傲。”

　　1998年亚洲金融危机爆发后，人民币面临着巨大的贬值压力。身为国家外汇局第一任女局长，吴晓灵当时面临的挑战可想而知。在外汇大检查后，吴晓灵9月29日在国务院新闻办召开了一场新闻发布会。面对满场的中外记者，吴晓灵铿锵有力地强调，决不能放任外汇的非法流动，开展外汇大检查是必要的。 “我国资本项目实行严格管制，只要控制住资本项目下的资金流动，汇率稳定就有了保证。因此，采取措施保持资本项下资金合法流动，打击非法资金流动，从而保持人民币汇率稳定，不仅是中国也是全世界的根本利益所在。”

　　她指出，“对于像我国这样一个大国来说，不可能靠贬值来扩大外需从而刺激经济增长，扩大国内需求才是根本所在。”时隔近10年，人民币早已从贬值戏剧化地转为面临着升值压力，但吴晓灵10年前提出来的扩大内需仍是解决当下问题的关键性措施之一。

　　“我爱学习也爱玩”

　　吴晓灵的性格中有着直爽泼辣的一面。2004年她说：“不要和央行博弈，以免出台更强硬措施。”这一句话，使她一度被外界称为铁腕女行长。但更多的时候，她更像个可亲的师长，演讲时娓娓动听，而且对媒体耐心备至。

　　她的央行岁月比较顺利，但她的生活也经历过不少曲折。

　　“如果不是“四人帮”倒台，我早就该蹲在牢里了。当时有一帮人，说我是北京的高干子女什么的，逮捕令都发出来了。当时我在内蒙古包头，正怀着孩子。逮捕令下到包头的时候，那里的同志对北京来的人说：‘她快生孩子了，等生过孩子再抓吧’。就用这个理由把逮捕令暂时压了一下，就这样我才躲过了这场浩劫，否则后果真是不堪想象。”

　　“在我这一生中，遇到这种事的时候也不是只有一两次。天底下毕竟还是好人多。遇到那些关口我之所以能够一一躲过，主要是靠一些好领导、好同志的保护。”

　　2001年前，吴晓灵生过一场病，大概有6、7个月的时间躺在家里。在那之后，她悟出“健康是‘一’，其他都是零”的道理。这位外界人眼中的“女强人”，并不赞成“做女强人就应该不顾生活”的看法。

　　吴晓灵小时候有一个墨盒，写毛笔字时用的那种。她在墨盒上面写了几个字“我爱学习也爱玩”，这句话对她的一生影响挺大。

　　她说：“我们不妨把人生当成一种投资组合。妥善处理好工作与生活的关系对我们来说很重要，大家要学会分配好自己的时间，8小时以内不应该干与工作无关的事情，有时候为了做好工作可能你也需要加班加点，但只要不是到了这个事情不做就会影响大局时，还是应该留点时间给自己安排好自己的生活。”

　　“人生和历史比较起来不过是一场戏、一瞬间的事情，对地球的转动最多也就相当于1秒钟不到，要相信天下还是好人多，只要我尽了最大努力了，只要你做人是正直的，工作是努力的，你就不怕。对于有些东西，我们没必要想得太多。想得越多越苦恼。”吴晓灵说。

　　在身为师弟的张育军看来，个人在社会中为事业拼搏努力能否成功最终靠的还是人品，一种人格力量的展现和竞争。只有在生活和事业的磨难中，始终坚持自己的道德信念，成为一个公正无私、忠诚守信和有责任感的人，才能最终取得成功。“在这一点上，吴晓灵等为我们作出了最好的榜样。”

　　展望未来的生活，吴晓灵说，“我卸任副行长后，希望专心地做一位老师。我的愿望之一，是能够散发余热，利用我在人民银行工作时的影响力，将金融知识普及到农村去。”

　　“一步一个脚印，走自己的路。如果问经验，就是认真地参与遇到的所有的事，不管大事、小事，不管把自己放在什么环境中，都要认真努力地去做，不断地学习，独立地思考，不断适应形势的发展。”

　　“机遇总是属于有准备的人，就这样我一步一步走过上山下乡、知青选调、恢复高考、攻读学位的路，走过了金融研究、创办报纸、体改政研的路。在年过半百之际，我又开始学习外汇业务，去熟悉一个新的领域。”

　　“勤能补拙。我不是一个才气横溢的人，论学识我在八一、八二级同学中不过是个中等水平。我看清了这点，因而要勤奋、认真、实干，想以勤补拙。”

　　“我的看法是：做人做事，只要有一颗平常心，就什么都不在话下了。你只要有一颗平常心，人家追捧你也好，不理你也好，你都会觉得无所谓的了。”

　　吴晓灵简历

　　1984年毕业进入央行工作

　　1985年，中国人民银行金融研究所应用理论研究室副主任

　　1987年参与创办《金融时报》，1988年任副总编辑

　　1991年，中国人民银行金融体制改革司副司长

　　1994年，中国人民银行政策研究室主任

　　1995年，国家外汇管理局副局长

　　1998年4月，国家外汇管理局局长

　　1998年11月，中国人民银行上海分行行长

　　2000年2月，中国人民银行副行长

　　2000年6月，中国人民银行副行长兼国家外汇管理局局长

　　2001年4月，中国人民银行副行长

As expected, PBOC vice governor Wu Xiaoling stepped down from her post. Unlike Wu Yi, who is also going to step down soon, Wu Xiaoling did not tell anyone to "forget about me." We will see where she ends up next. In her place, and also replacing Xiang Junbo (who departed for the Agricultural Bank of China), are Ma Delun (top) and Yi Gang (bottom). Of course, the most noteworthy aspect of these appointments is that Yi Gang is a "sea turtle" as he received his Ph.D. from the US (U of I Urbana Champagn) and was a tenure track professor (like myself!) at Indiana University before being persuaded to return to China. The latest development clearly shows that his decision was not regrettable. Whatever one may say about Zhou Xiaochuan and wherever he may end up, he certainly nurtured and in many instances protected "sea turtles" in the PBOC, and Yi is a testament of it. We are still awaiting to see if Zhou is going to be replaced. The word is that he will be replaced by Shang Fulin, a veteran central banker who has been lusting after the governorship for quite some time.

国务院决定任命马德伦易纲为中国人民银行副行长
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年01月03日 10:52 中国人民银行网站
国务院决定任命马德伦易纲为中国人民银行副行长

马德伦升任中国人民银行副行长（资料图片）
国务院决定任命马德伦易纲为中国人民银行副行长

易纲升任中国人民银行副行长（资料图片）
国务院决定任命马德伦易纲为中国人民银行副行长

央行原第一副行长吴晓灵因为年龄到线退休（图片来源：新浪财经）

　　国务院2007年12月23日决定，任命马德伦、易纲为中国人民银行副行长；免去吴晓灵的中国人民银行副行长职务。（完）

　　马德伦简历

　　男，1949年11月出生，大学本科毕业，研究员。

　　1985年至1996年，先后工作于中国人民银行办公厅、条法司、政策研究室；

　　(1990年12月至1991年12月在新加坡金管局工作研修一年)

　　1992年至1994年，任中国人民银行政策研究室副主任；

　　1994年至1998年，任中国人民银行办公厅副主任、主任，新闻发言人；

　　1998年至2001年，任中国人民银行会计财务司司长；

　　2001年3月至2005年3月，任国家外汇管理局副局长；

　　2005年3月，任中国人民银行党委委员、行长助理；

　　(2005年8月兼任中国人民银行上海总部党委副书记、副主任)

　　2007年12月，任中国人民银行党委委员、副行长。

　　易纲简历

　　男, 1958年出生，经济学博士。

　　1978年至1980年，在北京大学经济系学习；

　　1980年至1986年，分别在美国哈姆林大学工商管理专业、伊利诺大学经济学专业学习，获经济学博士学位；

　　1986年至1994年，在美国印第安那大学经济系先后担任助教、副教授，其中1992年获终身教职；

　　1994年回国，与林毅夫等发起组建北京大学中国经济研究中心，任教授、副主任、博士生导师；

　　1997年至2002年，任中国人民银行货币政策委员会副秘书长；

　　2002年至2003年，任中国人民银行货币政策委员会秘书长(正司局级)兼货币政策司副司长；

　　2003年，任中国人民银行货币政策司司长；

　　2004年7月，任中国人民银行党委委员、行长助理(期间：2006年9月-2007年10月兼任中国人民银行营业管理部党委书记、主任、国家外汇管理局北京外汇管理部主任)；

　　2007年12月，任中国人民银行党委委员、副行长。

　　相关报道：

　　央行海选副行长

　　马德伦升任中国人民银行副行长

　　马德伦相关文章：

　　央行行长助理马德伦：货币政策不针对股市楼市

　　马德伦：央行将进一步支持香港金融业发展

　　马德伦：抓住有利时机加快金融市场发展

　　马德伦：分散银行风险 扩大直接融资规模和比重

　　易纲相关文章：

　　易纲：对中国金融业的前景看好

　　易纲：统一认识各尽其责推进农金改革

易纲：美国次贷危机加大我国宏观调控难度

易纲：美元仍是外汇储备首要货币

易纲：人民币汇率问题不应被政治化

易纲：中国不改变以美元为主外储货币的政策

Labels: central bank China monetary PBOC

Now we know the outcome of the last major provincial rotation. Current vice secretary of Guangdong Liu Yupu will now be the party secretary of Shenzhen, despite widespread rumor that former Wen Jiabao secretary Lin Xiong would serve in that role. Regardless, the outcome is the same. Liu is a Hu Jintao implant into the Guangdong party committee from the early 2000s. He was in the standing committee of the Communist Youth League and will keep Shenzhen under strict control of Hu, but will Hu and Wen necessarily cooperate fully on retrenchment?



广东省委副书记刘玉浦出任深圳市委书记(图)
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年01月02日11:30 红网 (来源：奥一网)
广东省委副书记刘玉浦出任深圳市委书记(图)
刘玉浦

　　南方都市报记者和南方报业传媒记者王茔、张国栋等11点12分在现场发回报道 刘玉浦同志同时被提名为深圳市人大常委会主任人选。

　　南方都市报记者和南方报业传媒记者王茔、张国栋等11点09分在现场发回报道 今天上午11点的深圳全市领导干部大会，广东省委常委、省委组织部长胡泽君宣读了中央和广东省委对刘玉浦同志的任命决定。

　　奥一网1月2日快讯 在今天上午11点召开的深圳全市领导干部大会上，广东省委常委、省委组织部长胡泽君宣读了中央和广东省委对刘玉浦同志的任命决定，中央候补委员、广东省委副书记刘玉浦被任命为深圳市委书记。而前任深圳市委书记李鸿忠已经调往湖北出任湖北省代省长。

　　在此之前，刘玉浦同志担任广东省委副书记、省委党校校长和省政法委书记。刘玉浦同志有长期的基层工作，并且在担任陕西省工作期间一 直主抓经济工作，还曾获得过中央党校研究生院世界经济专业硕士学位。

　　而在2007年12月9日下午中共深圳市委召开全市领导干部会议，正是广东省委副书记刘玉浦宣布了李鸿忠调往湖北省任职和许宗衡市长临时主持深圳市委工作的决定。他在讲话中高度评价李鸿忠同志的四年多工作：“李鸿忠同志在深圳工作的四年多时间里，恪尽职守，殚精竭虑，为深圳的改革开放和现代化建设付出了艰辛的努力，使深圳的各项工作在历届班子打下的良好基础上，又向前迈进了一大步。”并称“这几年是深圳经济社会发展速度最快、效益最好、人民群众得到实惠最多的时期之一。”

　　在这次讲话中，他希望全市各级领导干部讲政治、顾大局、守纪律，把思想和行动统一到中央和省委的决定上来，齐心协力，尽职尽责，努力保持工作的连续性和稳定性，保持经济社会发展的良好势头，维护团结稳定的大好局面。他还强调，深圳全市各级领导干部要立足全局，着眼未来，高起点谋划好深圳的各项工作，使深圳的改革发展始终走在全省、全国前列，努力把深圳的事情办好，让中央和省委放心，让全省人民和深圳人民满意。

　　深圳市委书记一职已空缺24天。这期间由深圳市委副书记、市长许宗衡临时主持深圳市委工作。目前，深圳市委领导班子分别为：深圳市委书记刘玉浦，市委副书记许宗衡、谭国箱、白天，市委常委李意珍、王穗明、刘勇、戴北方、李锋、王京生、刘应力、吕锐锋、王毅。

　　刘玉浦简历

　　男，汉族，1949年8月生，山东泰安人，1971年10月入党，1968年9月参加工作，中央党校研究生院世界经济专业毕业，中央党校研究生学历 。

　　现任中央候补委员，省委副书记，省委党校(广东行政学院)校(院)长。

　　1968～1972年，辽宁省西丰县凉泉公社插队知青；

　　1972～1973年，辽宁省西丰县革委会干事；

　　1973～1976年，东北工学院钢冶系电冶金专业学习；

　　1976～1977年，冶金部北京钢铁设计院技术员；

　　1977～1982年，冶金部直工部助理工程师、部机关团委书记；

　　1982～1986年，团中央常委、团中央国家机关委员会书记(其间：1985.08～1986.01在中央党校青年干部培训班学习)；

　　1986～1995年，中央国家机关工作委员会委员、办公室主任；

　　1995～1996年，陕西省省长助理；

　　1996～1998年，陕西省省长助理、省计委主任；

　　1998～2000年，陕西省委常委、组织部部长(其间：1998.05～1998.06任陕西省委常委，省长助理、省计委主任；1995.09～1998.07在中央党校研究生院世界经济专业学习)；

　　2000～2003年，广东省委常委、组织部部长；

　　2003～2004年，广东省委副书记、组织部部长，省委党校(广东行政学院)校(院)长；

　　2004年至今，广东省委副书记，省委党校(广东行政学院)校(院)长。

　　2007年5月任广东省委副书记、省委党校校长、省政法委书记。

　　2008年1月任广东省委副书记、深圳市委书记。

　　第十六届中央候补委员、第十七届中央候补委员。第八届、九届、十届广东省委委员。(来源：奥一网)