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Tuesday, November 17, 2009


Leveraging Big-Time by Local Development Companies

I would just like to show readers the type of leveraging that is going on in China. Hainan Highway, set up by the Hainan government ten years ago to finance highway construction, is an early example of the thousands of local development companies that now pervade China. They usually get a bit of capital from the government and use that to borrow money from banks or issue bonds to investors. Fortunately, some of these entities are listed so we can see how they work. Note, however, that because they are listed, they already represent "the best of" local development companies. finance.Sina.com has a very powerful feature that breaks down various parts of listed companies' annual and quarterly reports. See here.

So here, Hainan Highway has total asset of around 2.7 billion RMB. The largest category is various kinds of accounts receivables. Well, that sounds good, except the annual report also states that the largest debtor to Hainan Highway is the founder of the company, Hainan Department of Transportation!! Moreover, its debt to Hainan Highway ballooned from around 150 million in 2008 to nearly 450 million RMB! Okay, so this is what is happening. Local governments use some land or revenue cash flows to start these entities, which then go and borrow money from banks and investors. Then, local governments in turn borrow from these entities, especially those that generate some cash flows. My question is: since these loans to local government is identified as asset, can these companies borrow even more from banks on the basis of this "account receivable?" I think they can!

Again, this is happening to thousands of such entities across China! (by the way, kudos to reader who figures out who Chen Xuehui is, as he got a million RMB loan from the company for no apparent reason).

Comments:
A very interesting find Professor!! After a quick look at other pages of their financial statements, this entity looks like many others --- with operations continuously burning cash, relying on the accumulation of receivables and debt to plug their deficits. Their actual liquid assests - cash and marketable securities - is pretty low relative to their level of leverage. It is also worth noting that receivables due from the Hainan jiaotongting are growing over time and aging (extended to 1-3 yrs to 1-4 in the page you cited). In reality, most of the projects the highway company does have a fiscal basis, meaning that they are included in budgets passed by the local NPC, and then the local finance office makes transfers to the investment co. to pay for part of them and service the related debt. The rising receivables number probably means is that the finances of the local government are not looking so good.
 
Is this proof of a bubble?
 
What is more worrisome is the municipal bond debt in US and the use of derivatives and mismanagement of variable rate debt.

Jefferson County is being called a canary in the coal mine.
 
【《财经网》/综合专稿】11月19日消息,昨日,国家发改委下发《关于水泥、平板玻璃建设项目清理工作有关问题的通知》(以下简称《通知》),由此,抑制部分行业产能过剩和重复建设的重拳砸向了建材业。《通知》要求,即日起对9月底前未开工项目全面停建清理,重新审核后方可决定留存,清理工作今年年底前要完成。

  《通知》明确指出了清理范围,其中,水泥为今年9月30日前尚未投产的在建项目、已核准未开工项目(含水泥熟料线和粉磨站);平板玻璃为今年9月30日前尚未点火的在建项目、已备案未开工项目。

  此前,在国务院印发的《国务院批转发展改革委等部门关于抑制部分行业产能过剩和重复建设引导产业健康发展若干意见的通知》(以下简称《若干意见》),提出了抑制产能过剩的四个原则、九项措施。国家发改委新闻发言人李朴民表示,当前,我国经济正处在企稳回升的关键时期,在保增长中要更加注重推进结构调整。《若干意见》将钢铁、水泥、平板玻璃、煤化工、多晶硅、风电设备六个行业确定为调控和引导的重点。

  目前我国在建水泥生产线418条,产能6.2亿吨,另外还有已核准尚未开工的生产线147条,产能2.1亿吨。这些产能全部建成后,水泥产能将达到27亿吨,市场需求仅为16亿吨,产能将严重过剩。通知还指出,目前我国各地还有30余条在建和拟建浮法玻璃生产线,平板玻璃产能将超过8亿重箱,产能明显过剩。

  根据《通知》要求,此次清理内容包括:在建项目重点审查是否符合产业政策,各项审批手续是否齐备,建设内容与申报内容是否一致。

  与此同时,各省市自治区已核准未开工项目要清查“是否符合国家和区域规划布局要求,是否符合产业政策,是否取得土地使用证、环境影响评价报告、银行贷款承诺函等项目核准所必须的相关材料。”

  《通知》还要求,清理时,水泥项目要提交石灰石矿山开采许可证;平板玻璃项目则应符合发改委等六部委文件和平板玻璃准入条件的要求。

  国家发改委关于清理水泥和平板玻璃现有在建项目和未开工项目的通知一出,众多上市公司正在建设的水泥项目可能不得不“急刹车”。

  近两年来,不少上市公司都通过增发或配股的方式募集资金,投向水泥生产线项目。虽然不少公司也在完成募资之前便通过自有资金开始上马建设,但至今尚未披露投产公告,或可视同为尚未投产。如此一来,也在被清理之列。

  市场人士分析,由于一些公司今年年中才筹备这些项目开建,估计目前竣工的可能性不大。同时,也有公司虽然在去年便开始筹备水泥项目,但由于资金问题到今年开解决,或许项目至今也未竣工。■
 
Does this not seem like a relatively low number of assets?
Just googling around a bit it seems that 1 km of highway could cost between a million or more Euros.

If we take one of the three highways on Hainan and ~ 300 km, that should be 300m Euros...at a minimum, 3 billion Yuan.
 
There is a lot of competition in the highway sector in China, and the combined effects of this and corruption mean that there is little money to be made, so construction quality is very low and actual costs (those related to building the road, not those related to greasing the local officials) are quite low. So far, it is still very difficult to capitalize bribes on a balance sheet and boost the overall asset balance.
 
Whenever I see data with scary numbers (the real ones are probably more so), it seems to signal action from the State Council or others. Look for this on the agenda of the upcoming economic working meeting. Will this set off tension between the centralizers and Hu's support network atop provincial governments? Please let us know professor!

中国地方政府融资平台贷款近6万亿 潜在风险隐现
地方政府融资平台隐藏的各种潜在风险开始隐现

  【《财经网》/综合专稿】来自中国监管部门内部资料显示,截至目前,中国各级地方政府通过超过8000多家融资平台获取的各项银行贷款余额已经累计6万亿元,尤其是在融资平台贷款中,项目贷款余额近5万亿元,占全部融资平台贷款的比例已经超过80%。地方政府融资平台隐藏的各种潜在风险开始隐现。

  近年来,在全国商业银行股份制改革的浪潮中,国有大型银行纷纷制定更为严格信贷政策,国有大型银行对地方政府要求的项目贷款大都不予支持。为此,各地纷纷成立地方城市商业银行,并努力推进农村信用社的商业化改造乃至完全成立农村商业银行,城商行和农商行瞬间成为地方政府获取项目贷款的当然角色。

  地方政府获取项目贷款的途径一般有以下两种:一是利用一个项目向多家银行融资,套取信贷资金。其操作手法是,如果地方政府的建设项目总投资为10亿元,其中自筹4亿元,项目公司可以籍此向城商行申请6亿元贷款的同时,又以同一项目向另外一家股份制商业银行申请3亿元的流动资金贷款,总体看建设资金高度依赖一航,项目资金根本有名无实。

  地方政府获取项目贷款的另外一条途径,是改变起初约定的用途,挪用信贷资金。最后,地方政府在通过融资平台获取的资金后,坚持“不赖账、不还账”的基本原则,而且多年如一日,据此久拖不还,长期占据信贷资金。

  近年来,地方政府都通过直接和间接出资,纷纷成立了各类融资平台公司,从事项目开发和建设任务。由于其和政府间千丝万缕的联系,绝大多数地方政府融资平台实为依附于政府的附属单位。因此,全国各地存在的各种地方政府融资平台本身实际上并不具有独立自偿能力,依赖财政拨款偿还贷款。

  为此,商业银行对于政府融资平台公司的贷款的风险评估,更多的仰赖于对地方政府财政收支状况的判断,而不是按照企业法人贷款的标准进行分析。在此信贷机制下,不可避免的形成许多地方融资平台的超过财政偿还能力的过度负债,虽然许多融资平台公司诚信不足,还款意愿难确保,更加上期限偏长,对银行流动性构成不利影响,对持续稳健的金融风险形成巨大的不确定性
 
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