Elite Chinese Politics and Political Economy

Okay, and they should report this information to....Oh right, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, which is now controlled by Hu Jintao. This is wonderfully ironic since Zhongban was controlled by Zeng Qinghong in 1997 when this rule was originally implemented. I will take this sort of things seriously when they post all their findings on a website. Until then....

Also, since its appearance in 1997,Chinese officials have developed thousands of ways to get around it, so why bring it back all of the sudden??


CPC requires leading cadres to report their personal affairs
font size ZoomIn ZoomOut People's Daily

The Communist Party of China (CPC) on Tuesday announced it is requiring all leading cadres to provide details of their personal affairs, including listing their investments, changes in their marital status and whether their children marry foreigners.

A circular providing details of reporting requirements was issued after a meeting on Tuesday of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee which was presided over by President Hu Jintao, also general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.

The circular says the goal of the reporting requirement is to strengthen the Party's internal supervision and ensure clean and honest governance.

The circular says that enhancing the Party's internal supervision and preventing corruption are necessary requirements for improving the Party's capacity to govern and to maintain the Party's leading role.

The circular says the requirement to have leading cadres report their personal affairs, which was officially promulgated in January 1997 by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council, is an important Party regulation that reflects the CPC's resolve to supervise its leading cadres.

The circular requires leading cadres to report to the Party within a month when the following changes occur in their personal affairs: if they or their spouses, or their children who live with them, build, buy, sell or rent property; if they participate in organizing a marriage ceremony or funeral rite for themselves or a close relative; if they or their children marry foreigners; if their spouses or children immigrate to other countries; if they travel abroad for private reasons; if their spouses or children are investigated by judicial organs or are suspected of committing crimes and if their spouses and children run individual, private businesses or contract and rent state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises, or act as high-ranking managers in joint ventures and mainland branches of overseas companies.

The circular says the meeting considered that with the development of the country's reforms and modernization, the reporting regulations needed to be revised and the reporting procedures improved.

The meeting required all the Party cadres to adhere to the notion of "exerting power for the people, sharing the feeling of the people and working for the people's interests" and consciously implement the regulations.

Cadre's performance in implementing the regulations will be taken as an important factor in his or her overall tenure assessment, according to the meeting.

The regulations apply to cadres in Party's organs, people's congresses, governments, political advisory organs and judicial organs at county level or above, as well as cadres whose ranks are equivalent to a county head in state-owned enterprises and companies.

Earlier this month, the CPC issued another important rule, namely regulations on the system of withdrawal of officials and their family relatives, saying that the spouse, children and relatives of a person appointed to the leading official post in a government or Party unit cannot be subordinate officials, accountants, auditors or human resources cadres in that unit during the official's tenure.

According to the new regulations, officials must not work in a government office that controls or supervises any industry or enterprise in which their family members hold shares.

China recently exposed some corruption cases.

Zhou Jinhuo, former director of Fujian's Bureau of Industry and Commerce, was accused of graft in the relatively wealthy coastal province.

The 57-year-old official tried to flee overseas in June while being investigated for corruption by the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

He was caught in southwest border province of Yunnan after police tracked a call he made to one of his three mistresses telling her his whereabouts.

On Aug. 27, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, or national legislature, expelled him.

Source: Xinhua

Here is the original decree:
关于领导干部报告个人重大事项的规定
(经中共中央、国务院批准，中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅1997年1月31日印发)


第一条 为加强对领导干部的管理和监督，促进党风廉政建设和领导干部思想作风建设，制定本规定。

第二条本规定所称领导干部包括：各级党的机关、人大机关、行政机关、政协机关、审判机关、检察机关担任领导职务和非领导职务的副县(处)级以上(含副县〔处〕级，下同)干部。社会团体、事业单位中相当于副县(处)级以上干部，国有大型、特大型企业中层以上领导干部，国有中型企业领导干部，实行公司制的大中型企业中由国有股权代表出任或由国有投资主体委派(包括招聘)的领导干部、选举产生并经主管部门批准的领导干部、企业党组织的领导干部。

第三条 报告人应报告下列重大事项：

(一)本人、配偶、共同生活的子女营建、买卖、出租私房和参加集资建房的情况；

(二)本人参与操办的本人及近亲属婚丧喜庆事宜的办理情况(不含仅在近亲属范围内办理的上述事宜)；

(三)本人、子女与外国人通婚以及配偶、子女出国(境)定居的情况；

(四)本人因私出国(境)和在国(境)外活动的情况；

(五)配偶、子女受到执法执纪机关查处或涉嫌犯罪的情况；

(六)配偶、子女经营个体、私营工商业，或承包、租赁国有、集体工商企业的情况，受聘于三资企业担任企业主管人员或受聘于外国企业驻华、港澳台企业驻境内代办机构担任主管人员的情况。本人认为应当向组织报告的其他重大事项，也可以报告。

第四条 本规定第三条所列事项，应由报告人在事后一个月内以书面形式报告。因特殊原因不能按期报告的，应及时补报，并说明原因。按照有关规定需要事前请示批准的，应按规定办理。本人认为需要事前请示的事项，也可事前请示。

第五条各级党委及其纪委，各级人大、政府、政协、法院、检察院党组，以及上述领导机关所属的部门和单位(包括事业单位，下同)的党组(党委)，负责受理本级领导干部的报告(不设党组、党委的部门和单位，由相应的机构受理，下同)。各部门和单位内设机构的领导干部的报告，由本部门、本单位的组织人事部门负责受理。本规定第二条中社会团体、企业事业单位的领导干部个人重大事项的报告，由本单位党委(党组)负责受理。

第六条 对于需要答复的请示，受理报告的党委(党组)或组织人事部门应认真研究，及时答复报告人。报告人应按组织答复意见办理。

第七条 对报告的内容，一般应予保密。组织认为应予公开或本人要求予以公开的，可采取适当方式在一定范围内公开。

第八条 领导干部不按本规定报告或不如实报告个人重大事项的，其所在组织应视情节轻重，给予批评教育、限期改正、责令作出检查、在一定范围内通报批评等处理。

第九条各级党委、政府及纪检监察机关、组织人事部门要加强对本规定执行情况的监督检查。组织人事部门和纪检监察机关，要把领导干部执行本规定的情况作为考核干部的一项内容。负责受理领导干部报告的党委(党组)及相应机构每年要将执行本规定的情况向上级党委、纪委综合报告一次。

第十条 各省、自治区、直辖市，中央直属机关工委和中央国家机关工委， 实行系统管理的部门、单位，可根据本规定结合实际制定具体办法。

第十一条 本规定由中共中央纪律检查委员会、中共中央组织部负责解释。

第十二条 本规定自发布之日起施行。

Well, the end is near for the Shanghai faction. Shanghai Baoshan District Secretary Qin Yu was just arrested for the social security fund scandal (see previous post). Who is Qin Yu? He served as the long-time personal secretary of current Shanghai Party Secretary and Politburo member Chen Liangyu. This means that regardless of what happens, Chen is in fairly big trouble. At the very least, Chen would have to make a self criticism and possibly go into early retirement for "failing to oversee one's subordinate." The former party secretary of Hebei suffered such a fate when his personal secretary Li Shan was arrested for corruption. Readers in the newspaper business, please pick up on this story. It is the most important story out of China this year.


上海市宝山区区长秦裕涉嫌严重违纪 正接受调查
2006年08月24日 23:30

　　中新网8月24日电　据来自中共上海市纪委的消息，有关部门在对上海市劳动和社会保障局违规使用社保资金问题进行核查中发现，中共上海市宝山区委副书记、区长秦裕涉嫌严重违纪，正在接受调查。

上海反腐升级 宝山区长秦裕涉嫌严重违纪被调查
http://www.jrj.com 2006年08月26日 13:56 21世纪经济报道
【论坛】 【字体：大 中 小】 【聊天】 【沙龙】
　　

区委副书记、区长秦裕

区委副书记、区长秦裕（左三）、区委副书记沈秋余（左一）、副区长顾佳德（左二）慰问警务人员（金融界网站资料图）

　　短短数日平静之后，各方关注的上海市社保基金案再起波澜。

　　8月24日下午，上海市委官员来到宝山区政府，对宝山局级以上干部通报：“宝山区委副书记、区长秦裕涉嫌严重违纪，正在接受调查。”

　　当夜11时许，新华社发布电文称：“有关部门在对上海市劳动和社会保障局违规使用社保资金问题进行核查中发现，中共上海市宝山区委副书记、区长秦裕涉嫌严重违纪。”

　　此时，距离秦裕就任宝山区区长恰好一个月。

　　秦裕被带走

　　7月6日，上海市委、市政府办公厅副主任秦裕调任宝山区委副书记。7月13日，任宝山区代理区长。7月25日，在宝山区五届人大五次会议上被补选为宝山区区长。

　　在这次会上，秦裕发表了讲话，“相当于施政纲领吧”，一位区政府官员回忆道。

　　秦裕当选之日表示，在区长岗位上，他将做到“三个始终坚持”：“始终坚持革命工作的激情和冲劲，求真务实、真抓实干……；始终坚持把维护好、发展好人民群众的利益作为衡量政府工作的唯一标准……；始终自觉接受人大代表及区人大的监督，勤政廉政、严格自律。”

　　此后，区长秦裕“冒着酷暑”在宝山区展开调研，足迹遍布区内各镇。“他刚来一个月左右，平时几乎不在办公室，我们都不太看得到他。”

　　直到8月21日，秦裕尚在宝山城市工业园区调研。22日，宝山区召开加强党风廉政建设干部大会，秦裕还以区委副书记、区长的身份主持是次会议，可见秦裕被带走实属突然。

　　8月24日，上海市委领导就人口综合调控工作赴宝山调研，区委书记和副区长陪同，秦裕身影不见了。该区局级干部于当天下午获悉，秦裕正在接受调查。

　　而大多数宝山区官员是在次日早晨的电视新闻中获知此事的。记者于8月25日上午来到宝山区委、区政府办公楼，尚未来得及说明来意，区纪委的人士就已经明白，并直接请出了区委办公室官员。

　　区委办官员对本报记者表示，宝山区的正常工作没有停顿。“新华社的消息也说了，主要是对违规使用社保资金问题进行核查中发现的问题，这是在到宝山以前的事，具体情况我们也不知道。”

　　由于秦裕就任宝山区长时间有限，而原上海市社保局局长祝均一在秦就任宝山区区长前即已被中纪委“双规”，因此秦裕接受调查应与他任宝山区长以前的作为有关。

　　据本报了解，秦裕1960年代初出生，1981年进入华东师范大学政教系哲学专业，并获博士学位。2002年2月任上海市政府市长秘书。2002年11月任上海市委办公厅副主任、市政府办公厅副主任。但除此之外，关于秦裕在宝山区之前的公开信息少之又少。而在宝山区政府网站中，秦裕的图片和介绍已经消失。

两个人的2002

　　秦裕与上海社保案的主角、福禧投资董事长张荣坤的人生拐点，都出现在2002年2月，当月，秦裕成为市长秘书，张荣坤则注册了日后呼风唤雨的福禧投资，成为一个月后收购上海路桥公司的平台。

　　迄今没有证据表明这两件事之间存在关联。但现在的事实是，这两人皆因社保基金串案在“接受调查”，两人的人生同样在2006年夏季再次转折。

　　2002年2月，张荣坤控制的福禧投资在上海注册，注册资金5亿元。上海大通会计师事务出具的福禧投资2002年度审计报表显示，福禧投资的负债和所有者权益合计为14.96亿元。其中股本金5亿元，某国有银行短期借款6亿元，另有一笔数额为3.94亿元的其他应付款，支付的对象为福禧投资的股东之一上海沸点投资发展有限公司。

　　沸点投资为张荣坤提供的收购资金应出自上海社保资金，这3.94亿加上6亿元短期贷款刚好接近10亿，与张拿下上海路桥的价格基本吻合——上海路桥当年的股权转让协议书显示，福禧投资以32.07亿的总价受让上海路桥99.35％股份，张荣坤需支付现金10.15亿元，承担 21.92亿元长期借款。

　　本报掌握的多份材料显示，张荣坤这次收购疑点重重，除挪用社保资金外，还有三处疑点。

　　疑点一是转让价格。

　　上海技术产权交易所于2002年12月12日出具的《产权转让交割单》显示，上海路桥99.35％股权总资产为37亿元，但最后产权转让总价却只有32.07亿元。

　　疑点二是转让程序。

　　上海市建设和管理委员会和上海市计委于2002年3月22日联合向市政府上报有关事宜。3月26日，股权转让协议就已在市政府一号贵宾厅内签署。然而到2002年4月15日，上海市建委还在向市政府请示称：“目前在办理转让手续中，有关部门需要市政府书面批示，现恳请市政府给予补办批复。”

　　在补办手续的过程中，张荣坤已于2002年4月1日支付1亿元收购款。其后又分别于6月28日、7月2日、12月12日分三次分别支付了3亿元、2亿元、4.15亿元的收购款。

　　疑点三是收购资金。

　　福禧投资股本金仅有5亿，对外投资却高达10.15亿，已明显违反当时公司法的规定——公司对外投资不得超过净资产的50％。

　　在12月12日支付完最后一笔收购款当天，福禧投资给有关方面写了一份情况说明，里面写道：“从账面上看，对外投资已超过本公司净资产 50％。……公司虽然成立时间不长，但自成立以来运行良好，相信在短期内公司的对外投资与净资产之比会很快缩小，最终会低于50％。”

　　尽管疑点重重，但张荣坤不仅如愿拿下上海路桥，还于2002年8月与某国有银行上海分行签订银企合作协议，该行为其提供100亿元本外币融资额度。此后，该行的贷款和上海社保资金开始为张荣坤频繁的大额投资保驾护航。

　　从2002年2月到12月，就在张荣坤频频闯关风生水起的这段时间里，秦裕恰为市长秘书，并于2002年11月获任上海市委办公厅副主任、市政府办公厅副主任。

　　就在秦裕出事前的8月15日，上海刚刚召开了加强党风廉政建设干部大会。在是次会议上，上海市委主要领导表态，要重点加大对公权力大、公益性强、公众关注度高的“三公”部门的监督力度，“完善对政府性资金和社会公共性资金的管理制度和监管机制”。

　　市委主要领导还在会议上表示，必须对滥用职权的问题加强查处。对于监督中发现的涉及党员干部的各种重大案件，市委的态度非常鲜明，“就是不管是哪一级、权力有多大、地位有多高，也不论以前有多少成绩、作过多大贡献，只要违纪违法，都要坚决查处，绝不姑息迁就，更不会包庇纵容”。

　　会上，上海市纪委主要领导还援引《刑法修正案（六）》称：“社保基金、公积金等管理机构违反国家规定运用资金的，只要挪用资金且情节严重，对有关责任人员也要追究刑事责任。”

　　记者：陈芳

　　相关报道：

The litany of corrupt official is increasing around China, but after the fall of Beijing vice mayor Liu Zhihua, we are left with the interesting development in Shanghai, where the head of the social security bureau Zhu Junyi was arrested. This was followed by the arrest of Wang Chengming, the chairman of the Hong Kong listed Shanghai Electric. In the middle of July, the CDIC, the center's main anti corruption watchdog, sent a special team to Shanghai to investigate the case. They are currenlty holed up in a Shanghai hotel steep in investigation.

Apparently, these two officials were responsible for mobilizing state assets to benefit privately owned Fuxi Investment, as well as their own careers. First, Zhu Junyi "invested" 3.2 billion RMB in social security funds (against regulations, I may add) in Fuxi Investment. Fuxi then used the funds to lease the Shanghai-Hangzhou railroad for 30 years. It used the other part of the money to overbid on 11% share of Shanghai Electric, thereby giving Wang Chengming the "accomplishment" of selling state assets at a high price.

So, all this is pretty "normal meal" by today's standard. In fact, the head of Fuxi, Zhang Rongkun, seems like a pretty shrewd businessman, and his investment in the Shanghai-Hangzhou railroad is almost sure to make a handsome profit, which means that Shanghai Social Security also would have netted a profit as a major shareholder. But it is noteworthy that this is the first major corruption case to surface in Shanghai since the 80s. Even the Zhou Zhengyi case resulted only in the arrest of a few minor banking officials. Also, the facts of this case seem pretty straight-forward, so why is the central investigation team still in Shanghai. This is surely making the Shanghai leadership quite nervous. Chen Liangyu has already held several meetings in the Shanghai government to emphasize the importance of clean government and the evil of corruption. If the CDIC team manages to "flip" Zhu and Wang Jack Mccoy style and make them into major witnesses in investigations against even more senior officials, we will soon see the complete collapse of the Shanghai "kingdom." Theere is even some rumor that Zhang Rongkun was close to Vice Premier Huang Ju's wife. At this desperate hour, we will see whether Jiang's camp has yet more political resources up its sleeves. The PUblication of Jiang's collected works surely reminds Hu Jintao that anti corruption in Shanghai cannot go too far, or the entire regime would suffer a great loss of legitimacy. Will Hu back off, or will he feel confident enough to call Jiang's bluff.

So, Jiang was lounging around in his big villa in Shanghai when he realized that mentions of the "Three Represents" have been slowly replaced by "harmonious society" and "advanceness of CCP members." That will not stand! He then compiled his completed works, and further made the entire party study it! There is now an official movement to study Jiang's work and the important thought of "Three Represents." In this document, there was not a single mention of "harmonious society." The timing of this movement coincides with a series of corruption scandals in Shanghai. The removal of Zhu Junyi, the head of the Shanghai Social Security Bureau, must have been alarming to the Jiangist since he was the highest Shanghai official to be removed for corruption since the 80s. This shows that Hu is starting crack the walls of the Shanghai fortress. More recently, Wang Chengming, the head of the Shanghai Electric Appliance Group, was arrested for corruption. Before a chain reaction begins, Jiang needs to reassert his authority somehow and prevent the complete collapse of the Shanghai faction.

Could this undermine some of Wen and Hu's policies at the 17th Party Congress? Things will continue to get even more interesting.

中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定

　　新华网北京8月15日电

中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定
（2006年8月13日）

　　党的十六大以来，党中央相继部署在全党兴起学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想新高潮、开展以实践“三个代表”重要思想为主要内容的保持共产党员先进性教育活动，把学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想不断引向深入。党中央还作出了编辑出版《江泽民文选》的重大决定。现在，《江泽民文选》已经出版发行。这是党和国家政治生活中的一件大事。

　　《江泽民文选》主要收录了江泽民同志从20世纪80年代末到21世纪初的重要著作。这些重要著作，生动记录了以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代中央领导集体带领全党全国各族人民把中国特色社会主义事业推向前进的历史进程，科学总结了我们党领导人民战胜各种艰难险阻、全面开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面的宝贵经验，集中反映了我们党坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论为指导，坚持把马克思主义基本原理同当代中国实践和时代特征相结合创造性地提出的新的重大理论成果，为我们巩固和加强全党全国各族人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础提供了最好的教材。认真学习《江泽民文选》，对于我们高举邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想伟大旗帜，坚定不移地贯彻落实党的基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验，坚定不移地贯彻落实科学发展观，不断巩固马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位，正确认识国内外发展大势，团结带领全国各族人民为全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化而不懈奋斗具有十分重大的意义。

　　江泽民同志是党的第三代中央领导集体的核心，他坚持马克思主义的思想路线，尊重实践，尊重群众，准确把握时代特征，科学判断我们党所处的历史方位，围绕建设中国特色社会主义这个主题，在改革发展稳定、内政外交国防、治党治国治军等各方面都提出了一系列新思想、新观点、新论断。特别是他集中全党智慧创立的“三个代表”重要思想，进一步回答了什么是社会主义、怎样建设社会主义的问题，创造性地回答了在长期执政的历史条件下建设什么样的党、怎样建设党的问题，是对马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论的继承和发展，实现了我们党在指导思想上的又一次与时俱进，为坚持和发展党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验作出了杰出贡献。

　　学习《江泽民文选》，要紧密联系国内外形势的发展变化，着眼于推进党和国家的工作，进一步增强贯彻邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想的自觉性和坚定性，继续在武装头脑、指导实践、推动工作上下功夫。要深刻领会“三个代表”重要思想的时代背景、实践基础、科学内涵、精神实质、历史地位和重大意义，全面把握“三个代表”重要思想同马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论一脉相承而又与时俱进的科学体系，深刻认识“三个代表”重要思想是党必须长期坚持的指导思想，深刻认识党的十六大以来党中央提出的科学发展观等重大战略思想是对“三个代表”重要思想的坚持和发展。要深刻领会坚持解放思想、实事求是、与时俱进的极端重要性，认真学习江泽民同志运用马克思主义的立场、观点、方法解决重大理论和实际问题的科学态度和创新精神，继续推进理论创新，使党的全部理论和工作体现时代性、把握规律性、富于创造性。要深刻领会建设中国特色社会主义这个主题，紧紧抓住本世纪头20年的重要战略机遇期，满怀信心地为实现“十一五”时期的宏伟目标、推进全面建设小康社会进程而努力工作。要深刻领会发展是党执政兴国的第一要务，坚持以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放，全面推进社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设。要深刻领会立党为公、执政为民的本质要求，坚持权为民所用、情为民所系、利为民所谋，实现好、维护好、发展好最广大人民的根本利益。要深刻领会推进中国特色军事变革的重大意义，坚持党对军队的绝对领导，贯彻新时期军事战略方针，有效履行新世纪新阶段军队历史使命，继续推进国防和军队现代化。要深刻领会维护和促进祖国统一的重大意义，坚持“一国两制”方针，保持香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定，维护台海和平稳定，积极促进祖国统一大业。要深刻领会维护世界和平、促进共同发展的外交政策宗旨，坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持走和平发展道路，继续为我国发展争取良好的外部环境，为建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界作出贡献。要深刻领会全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程的重大意义，着力加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平、提高拒腐防变和抵御风险能力，使党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。

　　学习《江泽民文选》，必须大力发扬理论联系实际的马克思主义学风，牢固树立尊重实践、尊重群众的科学态度，发扬求真务实、勇于创新的优良作风，坚持学习理论与指导实践相结合、改造客观世界与改造主观世界相结合、运用理论与发展理论相结合，密切联系各地区各部门的工作实际和干部群众的思想实际，使全党在思想上不断有新解放、理论上不断有新发展、实践上不断有新创造。

　　当前，要把学习《江泽民文选》摆在党的思想政治建设和党员干部理论学习培训的重要地位。全党同志都要充分认识学习《江泽民文选》的重要性和必要性，潜心研读原著，把握精神实质，真正学通弄懂。各级干部要做好学习表率，用学习收获加强和改进工作，做到学以致用、用有所成。各级党委要加强对学习的领导，认真研究，精心部署，务求实效。各地区各部门都要作出周密的学习安排，把学习纳入县（处）级以上党员干部培训计划，重点抓好各级党委（党组）理论学习中心组学习。要发挥党校、行政学院等干部培训学校的作用，通过举办各种形式的研讨班、培训班、学习班，推动干部的学习。各级党委宣传部门、组织部门要加强对学习的指导和督促检查，组织好宣传报道活动，注意总结和宣传学习的好经验好做法，不断把学习引向深入。

　　全党同志和全国各族人民要紧密团结在以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央周围，高举邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想伟大旗帜，全面贯彻落实科学发展观，同心同德，扎实工作，开拓进取，在全面建设小康社会的伟大进程中不断开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面！

Well, in one of the most erroneous predictions in this blog's history, the State Council just announced that Fan Gang would serve as Yu's replacement on the Monetary Policy Committee. Wow, it's so obvious in retrospect, as he is well regarded. But this means that the authorities got a bit tired of Yu's flamboyance and wanted someone much more circumspect on the committee. Also, Fan is known as a supporter of the status quo in exchange rate policy, so this probably signals the continuation of creeping revaluation.


China: Fan Gang To Join PBOC Monetary Policy Committee

·

BEIJING (Dow Jones)--China's Cabinet said Friday it had appointed economist Fan Gang to the People's Bank of China's monetary policy committee, an advisory body to the central bank.

The move is unlikely to affect the direction of the country's monetary or foreign exchange policy.

Fan Gang replaces Yu Yongding as the academic member on the 13-member monetary policy committee. Yu's term expired in July.

The advisory body is headed by PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan.

Fan, 52, is a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government-backed think tank, and Peking University. He is also a director of the National Economic Research Institute.

At a CASS conference in July, Fan said China could allow the yuan to appreciate 3%-4% a year to help correct global imbalances. He said at the time the yuan shouldn't appreciate too much and favored a managed float rather than free float of the currency.

Fan has done research in the U.S. as a visiting fellow at Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research between 1985 and 1987. He is a fluent English speaker.

The PBOC monetary policy committee is composed of representatives of key government departments, including the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and the country's banking, securities, and insurance regulatory agencies. There is one academic seat on the committee.

Yu is director of the Institute of World Economics & Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

¶ -By Rick Carew, Dow Jones Newswires; 8610 6588-5848; rick.carew@dowjones.com

It's getting late (early) in Seattle, and I am looking at possible replacement for Yu Yongding, the out-going academic member of the PBOC Monetary Policy Committee, an advisory body that in reality serves as a bargaining arena between various agencies. The NDRC, MOF, and the CBRC each send someone to sit on this committee. Some possibilities mentioned in the Chinese press include

宋国青 (Song Guoqing-Beida)、林毅夫 (Lin Yifu-Beida)，钱颖一 (Qian Yingyi-- Qinghua, UC Berkeley)、夏斌 (Xia Bin-- DRC)、汪同三 (Wang Tongsa-- CASS)、李扬 (Li Yang--CASS), 巴曙松 (Ba Shusong--DRC), 钟伟 (Zhong Wei--Beishida)

Since Lin, Qian, Wang have no expertise in finance, that leaves one of the others. Although people talk about Li Yang, he served one term on the MPC already, and is unlikely to become the next person. Of the remaining, although Xia Bin, the head of DRC's finance institute seems an obvious choice, I think he has too many connections with the PBOC and might be seen as another PBOC representative on the MPC. Although he does well in the media, Zhong Wei is likely too junior. Now, we are left with Song Guoqing and Ba Shusong, which I think are the two most likely candidates. While Song is a well respected scholar with deep connections with senior members of the administration, Ba is extremely savvy and an effective conveyor of his ideas. As the vice director of the DRC's Finance Institute and an expert in international finance, he likely has been an important voice on the revaluation issue. Thus, I slightly favor Ba's chances at this point.

To give you an example of Ba's savviness, he actually has a blog that charges money to view entries. I should have that! Well, the quality of entries would definitely improve. Think about that my dear readers.......

Below is Gilley's read on the succession, which I basically agree. Nonetheless, I don't think Li Keqiang's rise will be all that smooth. The primary problem is that he remains a central committee member at this point. It would break a more or less established norm if he was given a two-step promotion at the 17th PC. Even when Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's favorite, was promoted into the Standing Committee, he had served as alternate member of the Politburo for a few years. At the same time, it would be hard for Li to take over if he served less than 5 years in the standing committee before taking over. If Hu promoted Li to a Politburo position at the 17th PC and into the Standing Committee a year later, Li would not have the full 5 years of experience before taking over. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, is already a Politburo member and can smoothly go into the Standing Committee next year. One speculation: perhaps Hu intends to place Li in this vulnerable position, so that in 2012, Hu can argue that "for the sake of stability," he serves another 5-year term?

Who Follows Hu?
By Bruce Gilley
1320 words
7 August 2006
The Wall Street Journal Asia
15
English

The campaign season is underway in China. As preparations begin for the
ruling Chinese Communist Party's 17th congress late next year, senior party
members are engaged in intensive discussions about the new leadership to be
formally elected at that congress. The issue being most hotly debated in
Beijing is who should be given the informal title of designated successor to
the current party chief, Hu Jintao. According to two party sources familiar
with the discussions, the current favorite is Liao-ning province party chief
Li Keqiang, age 51. If chosen, he would assume the post of national party
chief at the 2012 congress.

The biggest impact of this is that China appears set for a stable transition
to a new leadership that would govern until 2022, based on the now standard
practice of party leaders serving two five-year terms. This creates
confidence among foreign investors and diplomatic partners alike. The
downside is that Mr. Li is an uncompromising supporter of absolute party
rule who has performed poorly in his provincial leadership posts. If chosen,
he may lack the ability to respond creatively to new demands in a rapidly
changing China. While his succession would signal a new stability within the
top ranks of the party, it would raise doubts about whether the party can
keep up with the demands of China's people.

Mr. Li is not the only candidate for the top party post. Mr. Xi Jinping is
also a strong contender, as noted in the 2002 book Disidai by a former party
and government official who writes under the pseudonym Zong Hairen. Mr.
Zong's report, identifying these two contenders, was further substantiated
when both men were transferred to high-profile coastal provinces after the
2002 party congress -- Mr. Xi to Zhejiang and Mr. Li to Liaoning. Since
then, Mr. Li has -- with Mr. Hu's support -- emerged as the front-runner. A
July report in Hong Kong's China-watching magazine Kaifang placed Mr. Li in
the lead. This was confirmed by two Chinese sources close to the
discussions, one a former party official and the other a scholar who has
taken part in preparations for the 2007 congress.

The two contenders for the top party post could not be more different. A
commoner from poor Anhui province, Mr. Li rose through the ranks of the
Communist Youth League (the source of a quarter of China's present
provincial leaders) under Mr. Hu's patronage until 1997. He was then sent to
a provincial-level position in Henan as preparation for his elevation to
high party office. He has a reputation as an orthodox party leader with a
penchant for Maoist-style campaigns and an inability to handle complex
governance issues. Mr. Xi, age 53, by contrast, is the son of a revered
party founder and a market-oriented policy maker who made his reputation in
the dynamic southern province of Fujian. While Mr. Li would likely tack
close to the winds of ideological and political orthodoxy, Mr. Xi is
expected to be more inventive in reforming China's governance structure.

According to Mr. Zong's Disidai, Mr. Xi once blamed Mao Zedong's Cultural
Revolution for the delay in providing state housing to boat-bound fisherman
in Fujian. Mr. Li, by contrast, like Mr. Hu, was an eager participant in the
Cultural Revolution, rusticating himself for three years from 1974 in remote
Anhui province to show support for the dying Mao's policies. While Mr. Li is
politically correct, Mr. Xi is populist. Mr. Li's support comes from elites
in the party's organization and ideology sectors (state media gave unusual
play in July to a visit to Liaoning by former premier Li Peng, who praised
Mr. Li's work). Mr. Xi's support comes from elites in the private and
state-controlled sectors of the economy.

Mr. Hu has argued in favor of Mr. Li's succession by pointing to his greater
"moral" stature, according to the sources. That refers to Mr. Hu's personal
ideological campaign of the "Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces," launched in
March. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, this campaign aims "to
measure the work, conduct, and attitude" of party leaders. Mr. Xi, by
contrast, is widely seen to be less interested in Confucian moralizing than
in economic and welfare improvements. For example, Mr. Xi has countered Mr.
Hu's theory of a "harmonious" society, where stability is upheld by moral
codes, with his own concept of a "peaceful Zhejiang." According to a 2004
report in the state-run Liaowang magazine, this means stability based on
political openness and policy fairness.

Messrs. Xi and Li have both kept quiet about their political prospects.
Asked about the issue at this year's meeting of the National People's
Congress, Mr. Li told reporters: "That is rumor. You should not believe it."


One possible outcome is that both Messrs. Li and Xi will be appointed to the
powerful Politburo Standing Committee that, in practice, rules China.
Currently consisting of nine members, Mr. Hu reportedly wants to shrink it
back to the conventional size of seven people, that existed prior to 2002.
According to the sources, internal security chief Luo Gan, party personnel
head Zeng Qinghong, anti-corruption chief Wu Guanzheng and United Front
overseer Jia Qinglin are scheduled to step down from the Standing Committee
at next year's congress. All are over, or close to, the age of 70, and a
long-standing party principle states that no one who has reached that age
should be appointed to the Politburo. One of the expected replacements is
Zhou Yongkang, according to the sources as well as the July report in
Kaifang. Mr. Zhou is an ally of the outgoing Mr. Zeng. His appointment to
take over the internal-security portfolio will complete a long-planned
takeover of this key role by the moderate faction associated with former
party chief Jiang Zemin from the hard-line faction associated with Li Peng.

For optimists, the fact that the front-runners for the 2012 succession have
been known since at least 2002 signals the remarkable degree to which the
party has developed a methodical and consensus-driven process. That is
sorely needed in the absence of the party elders who called the shots in
every previous succession -- including Mr. Hu's 2002 ascension -- since
Mao's death in 1976. That resolves what might be called the "internal"
threat to party rule, the risk that the party will tear itself apart in
choosing leaders.

However, it has unclear implications for the "external" threat to party rule
-- how long China's people will continue to tolerate an unelected single
party. Mr. Li looks more like one of the hidebound leaders who presided over
the end of the Soviet Union than a pragmatic neo-authoritarian able to steer
China along the path of Asian dynamism. That would leave the regime more
liable to break down if and when China's increasingly affluent -- and
assertive -- population decide that they deserve more than the current
regime can deliver.

As long as China's people, especially its educated urban minority, prefer a
stable succession to a fair and open one, it is easier for the leadership to
impose ad hoc rules that ensure a "smooth" succession. Losers never complain
in the Chinese political system. Social forces, not party
institutionalization, are what keeps the succession process on track and
will likely make the 2007 and 2012 changes uneventful. The party may have
solved the succession problem, but the cost may be a less agile leadership
and a less stable China.