Wednesday, August 30, 2006
Also, since its appearance in 1997,Chinese officials have developed thousands of ways to get around it, so why bring it back all of the sudden??
CPC requires leading cadres to report their personal affairs
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The Communist Party of China (CPC) on Tuesday announced it is requiring all leading cadres to provide details of their personal affairs, including listing their investments, changes in their marital status and whether their children marry foreigners.
A circular providing details of reporting requirements was issued after a meeting on Tuesday of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee which was presided over by President Hu Jintao, also general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.
The circular says the goal of the reporting requirement is to strengthen the Party's internal supervision and ensure clean and honest governance.
The circular says that enhancing the Party's internal supervision and preventing corruption are necessary requirements for improving the Party's capacity to govern and to maintain the Party's leading role.
The circular says the requirement to have leading cadres report their personal affairs, which was officially promulgated in January 1997 by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council, is an important Party regulation that reflects the CPC's resolve to supervise its leading cadres.
The circular requires leading cadres to report to the Party within a month when the following changes occur in their personal affairs: if they or their spouses, or their children who live with them, build, buy, sell or rent property; if they participate in organizing a marriage ceremony or funeral rite for themselves or a close relative; if they or their children marry foreigners; if their spouses or children immigrate to other countries; if they travel abroad for private reasons; if their spouses or children are investigated by judicial organs or are suspected of committing crimes and if their spouses and children run individual, private businesses or contract and rent state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises, or act as high-ranking managers in joint ventures and mainland branches of overseas companies.
The circular says the meeting considered that with the development of the country's reforms and modernization, the reporting regulations needed to be revised and the reporting procedures improved.
The meeting required all the Party cadres to adhere to the notion of "exerting power for the people, sharing the feeling of the people and working for the people's interests" and consciously implement the regulations.
Cadre's performance in implementing the regulations will be taken as an important factor in his or her overall tenure assessment, according to the meeting.
The regulations apply to cadres in Party's organs, people's congresses, governments, political advisory organs and judicial organs at county level or above, as well as cadres whose ranks are equivalent to a county head in state-owned enterprises and companies.
Earlier this month, the CPC issued another important rule, namely regulations on the system of withdrawal of officials and their family relatives, saying that the spouse, children and relatives of a person appointed to the leading official post in a government or Party unit cannot be subordinate officials, accountants, auditors or human resources cadres in that unit during the official's tenure.
According to the new regulations, officials must not work in a government office that controls or supervises any industry or enterprise in which their family members hold shares.
China recently exposed some corruption cases.
Zhou Jinhuo, former director of Fujian's Bureau of Industry and Commerce, was accused of graft in the relatively wealthy coastal province.
The 57-year-old official tried to flee overseas in June while being investigated for corruption by the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
He was caught in southwest border province of Yunnan after police tracked a call he made to one of his three mistresses telling her his whereabouts.
On Aug. 27, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, or national legislature, expelled him.
Here is the original decree:
第十条 各省、自治区、直辖市，中央直属机关工委和中央国家机关工委， 实行系统管理的部门、单位，可根据本规定结合实际制定具体办法。
Saturday, August 26, 2006
Well, the end is near for the Shanghai faction. Shanghai Baoshan District Secretary Qin Yu was just arrested for the social security fund scandal (see previous post). Who is Qin Yu? He served as the long-time personal secretary of current Shanghai Party Secretary and Politburo member Chen Liangyu. This means that regardless of what happens, Chen is in fairly big trouble. At the very least, Chen would have to make a self criticism and possibly go into early retirement for "failing to oversee one's subordinate." The former party secretary of Hebei suffered such a fate when his personal secretary Li Shan was arrested for corruption. Readers in the newspaper business, please pick up on this story. It is the most important story out of China this year.
http://www.jrj.com 2006年08月26日 13:56 21世纪经济报道
【论坛】 【字体：大 中 小】 【聊天】 【沙龙】
Thursday, August 24, 2006
Apparently, these two officials were responsible for mobilizing state assets to benefit privately owned Fuxi Investment, as well as their own careers. First, Zhu Junyi "invested" 3.2 billion RMB in social security funds (against regulations, I may add) in Fuxi Investment. Fuxi then used the funds to lease the Shanghai-Hangzhou railroad for 30 years. It used the other part of the money to overbid on 11% share of Shanghai Electric, thereby giving Wang Chengming the "accomplishment" of selling state assets at a high price.
So, all this is pretty "normal meal" by today's standard. In fact, the head of Fuxi, Zhang Rongkun, seems like a pretty shrewd businessman, and his investment in the Shanghai-Hangzhou railroad is almost sure to make a handsome profit, which means that Shanghai Social Security also would have netted a profit as a major shareholder. But it is noteworthy that this is the first major corruption case to surface in Shanghai since the 80s. Even the Zhou Zhengyi case resulted only in the arrest of a few minor banking officials. Also, the facts of this case seem pretty straight-forward, so why is the central investigation team still in Shanghai. This is surely making the Shanghai leadership quite nervous. Chen Liangyu has already held several meetings in the Shanghai government to emphasize the importance of clean government and the evil of corruption. If the CDIC team manages to "flip" Zhu and Wang Jack Mccoy style and make them into major witnesses in investigations against even more senior officials, we will soon see the complete collapse of the Shanghai "kingdom." Theere is even some rumor that Zhang Rongkun was close to Vice Premier Huang Ju's wife. At this desperate hour, we will see whether Jiang's camp has yet more political resources up its sleeves. The PUblication of Jiang's collected works surely reminds Hu Jintao that anti corruption in Shanghai cannot go too far, or the entire regime would suffer a great loss of legitimacy. Will Hu back off, or will he feel confident enough to call Jiang's bluff.
the ccp could not reduce the corruption. reason is:
the power is not seperate like 3 arms in western countries. say, who is going to be hu jing tao's watch dog?
Tuesday, August 15, 2006
So, Jiang was lounging around in his big villa in Shanghai when he realized that mentions of the "Three Represents" have been slowly replaced by "harmonious society" and "advanceness of CCP members." That will not stand! He then compiled his completed works, and further made the entire party study it! There is now an official movement to study Jiang's work and the important thought of "Three Represents." In this document, there was not a single mention of "harmonious society." The timing of this movement coincides with a series of corruption scandals in Shanghai. The removal of Zhu Junyi, the head of the Shanghai Social Security Bureau, must have been alarming to the Jiangist since he was the highest Shanghai official to be removed for corruption since the 80s. This shows that Hu is starting crack the walls of the Shanghai fortress. More recently, Wang Chengming, the head of the Shanghai Electric Appliance Group, was arrested for corruption. Before a chain reaction begins, Jiang needs to reassert his authority somehow and prevent the complete collapse of the Shanghai faction.
Could this undermine some of Wen and Hu's policies at the 17th Party Congress? Things will continue to get even more interesting.
Friday, August 11, 2006
Well, in one of the most erroneous predictions in this blog's history, the State Council just announced that Fan Gang would serve as Yu's replacement on the Monetary Policy Committee. Wow, it's so obvious in retrospect, as he is well regarded. But this means that the authorities got a bit tired of Yu's flamboyance and wanted someone much more circumspect on the committee. Also, Fan is known as a supporter of the status quo in exchange rate policy, so this probably signals the continuation of creeping revaluation.
China: Fan Gang To Join PBOC Monetary Policy Committee
BEIJING (Dow Jones)--China's Cabinet said Friday it had appointed economist Fan Gang to the People's Bank of China's monetary policy committee, an advisory body to the central bank.
The move is unlikely to affect the direction of the country's monetary or foreign exchange policy.
Fan Gang replaces Yu Yongding as the academic member on the 13-member monetary policy committee. Yu's term expired in July.
The advisory body is headed by PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan.
Fan, 52, is a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government-backed think tank, and Peking University. He is also a director of the National Economic Research Institute.
At a CASS conference in July, Fan said China could allow the yuan to appreciate 3%-4% a year to help correct global imbalances. He said at the time the yuan shouldn't appreciate too much and favored a managed float rather than free float of the currency.
Fan has done research in the U.S. as a visiting fellow at Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research between 1985 and 1987. He is a fluent English speaker.
The PBOC monetary policy committee is composed of representatives of key government departments, including the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and the country's banking, securities, and insurance regulatory agencies. There is one academic seat on the committee.
Yu is director of the Institute of World Economics & Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
¶ -By Rick Carew, Dow Jones Newswires; 8610 6588-5848; email@example.com
Thursday, August 10, 2006
宋国青 (Song Guoqing-Beida)、林毅夫 (Lin Yifu-Beida)，钱颖一 (Qian Yingyi-- Qinghua, UC Berkeley)、夏斌 (Xia Bin-- DRC)、汪同三 (Wang Tongsa-- CASS)、李扬 (Li Yang--CASS), 巴曙松 (Ba Shusong--DRC), 钟伟 (Zhong Wei--Beishida)
Since Lin, Qian, Wang have no expertise in finance, that leaves one of the others. Although people talk about Li Yang, he served one term on the MPC already, and is unlikely to become the next person. Of the remaining, although Xia Bin, the head of DRC's finance institute seems an obvious choice, I think he has too many connections with the PBOC and might be seen as another PBOC representative on the MPC. Although he does well in the media, Zhong Wei is likely too junior. Now, we are left with Song Guoqing and Ba Shusong, which I think are the two most likely candidates. While Song is a well respected scholar with deep connections with senior members of the administration, Ba is extremely savvy and an effective conveyor of his ideas. As the vice director of the DRC's Finance Institute and an expert in international finance, he likely has been an important voice on the revaluation issue. Thus, I slightly favor Ba's chances at this point.
To give you an example of Ba's savviness, he actually has a blog that charges money to view entries. I should have that! Well, the quality of entries would definitely improve. Think about that my dear readers.......
Monday, August 07, 2006
Below is Gilley's read on the succession, which I basically agree. Nonetheless, I don't think Li Keqiang's rise will be all that smooth. The primary problem is that he remains a central committee member at this point. It would break a more or less established norm if he was given a two-step promotion at the 17th PC. Even when Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's favorite, was promoted into the Standing Committee, he had served as alternate member of the Politburo for a few years. At the same time, it would be hard for Li to take over if he served less than 5 years in the standing committee before taking over. If Hu promoted Li to a Politburo position at the 17th PC and into the Standing Committee a year later, Li would not have the full 5 years of experience before taking over. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, is already a Politburo member and can smoothly go into the Standing Committee next year. One speculation: perhaps Hu intends to place Li in this vulnerable position, so that in 2012, Hu can argue that "for the sake of stability," he serves another 5-year term?
Who Follows Hu?
By Bruce Gilley
7 August 2006
The Wall Street Journal Asia
The campaign season is underway in China. As preparations begin for the
ruling Chinese Communist Party's 17th congress late next year, senior party
members are engaged in intensive discussions about the new leadership to be
formally elected at that congress. The issue being most hotly debated in
Beijing is who should be given the informal title of designated successor to
the current party chief, Hu Jintao. According to two party sources familiar
with the discussions, the current favorite is Liao-ning province party chief
Li Keqiang, age 51. If chosen, he would assume the post of national party
chief at the 2012 congress.
The biggest impact of this is that China appears set for a stable transition
to a new leadership that would govern until 2022, based on the now standard
practice of party leaders serving two five-year terms. This creates
confidence among foreign investors and diplomatic partners alike. The
downside is that Mr. Li is an uncompromising supporter of absolute party
rule who has performed poorly in his provincial leadership posts. If chosen,
he may lack the ability to respond creatively to new demands in a rapidly
changing China. While his succession would signal a new stability within the
top ranks of the party, it would raise doubts about whether the party can
keep up with the demands of China's people.
Mr. Li is not the only candidate for the top party post. Mr. Xi Jinping is
also a strong contender, as noted in the 2002 book Disidai by a former party
and government official who writes under the pseudonym Zong Hairen. Mr.
Zong's report, identifying these two contenders, was further substantiated
when both men were transferred to high-profile coastal provinces after the
2002 party congress -- Mr. Xi to Zhejiang and Mr. Li to Liaoning. Since
then, Mr. Li has -- with Mr. Hu's support -- emerged as the front-runner. A
July report in Hong Kong's China-watching magazine Kaifang placed Mr. Li in
the lead. This was confirmed by two Chinese sources close to the
discussions, one a former party official and the other a scholar who has
taken part in preparations for the 2007 congress.
The two contenders for the top party post could not be more different. A
commoner from poor Anhui province, Mr. Li rose through the ranks of the
Communist Youth League (the source of a quarter of China's present
provincial leaders) under Mr. Hu's patronage until 1997. He was then sent to
a provincial-level position in Henan as preparation for his elevation to
high party office. He has a reputation as an orthodox party leader with a
penchant for Maoist-style campaigns and an inability to handle complex
governance issues. Mr. Xi, age 53, by contrast, is the son of a revered
party founder and a market-oriented policy maker who made his reputation in
the dynamic southern province of Fujian. While Mr. Li would likely tack
close to the winds of ideological and political orthodoxy, Mr. Xi is
expected to be more inventive in reforming China's governance structure.
According to Mr. Zong's Disidai, Mr. Xi once blamed Mao Zedong's Cultural
Revolution for the delay in providing state housing to boat-bound fisherman
in Fujian. Mr. Li, by contrast, like Mr. Hu, was an eager participant in the
Cultural Revolution, rusticating himself for three years from 1974 in remote
Anhui province to show support for the dying Mao's policies. While Mr. Li is
politically correct, Mr. Xi is populist. Mr. Li's support comes from elites
in the party's organization and ideology sectors (state media gave unusual
play in July to a visit to Liaoning by former premier Li Peng, who praised
Mr. Li's work). Mr. Xi's support comes from elites in the private and
state-controlled sectors of the economy.
Mr. Hu has argued in favor of Mr. Li's succession by pointing to his greater
"moral" stature, according to the sources. That refers to Mr. Hu's personal
ideological campaign of the "Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces," launched in
March. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, this campaign aims "to
measure the work, conduct, and attitude" of party leaders. Mr. Xi, by
contrast, is widely seen to be less interested in Confucian moralizing than
in economic and welfare improvements. For example, Mr. Xi has countered Mr.
Hu's theory of a "harmonious" society, where stability is upheld by moral
codes, with his own concept of a "peaceful Zhejiang." According to a 2004
report in the state-run Liaowang magazine, this means stability based on
political openness and policy fairness.
Messrs. Xi and Li have both kept quiet about their political prospects.
Asked about the issue at this year's meeting of the National People's
Congress, Mr. Li told reporters: "That is rumor. You should not believe it."
One possible outcome is that both Messrs. Li and Xi will be appointed to the
powerful Politburo Standing Committee that, in practice, rules China.
Currently consisting of nine members, Mr. Hu reportedly wants to shrink it
back to the conventional size of seven people, that existed prior to 2002.
According to the sources, internal security chief Luo Gan, party personnel
head Zeng Qinghong, anti-corruption chief Wu Guanzheng and United Front
overseer Jia Qinglin are scheduled to step down from the Standing Committee
at next year's congress. All are over, or close to, the age of 70, and a
long-standing party principle states that no one who has reached that age
should be appointed to the Politburo. One of the expected replacements is
Zhou Yongkang, according to the sources as well as the July report in
Kaifang. Mr. Zhou is an ally of the outgoing Mr. Zeng. His appointment to
take over the internal-security portfolio will complete a long-planned
takeover of this key role by the moderate faction associated with former
party chief Jiang Zemin from the hard-line faction associated with Li Peng.
For optimists, the fact that the front-runners for the 2012 succession have
been known since at least 2002 signals the remarkable degree to which the
party has developed a methodical and consensus-driven process. That is
sorely needed in the absence of the party elders who called the shots in
every previous succession -- including Mr. Hu's 2002 ascension -- since
Mao's death in 1976. That resolves what might be called the "internal"
threat to party rule, the risk that the party will tear itself apart in
However, it has unclear implications for the "external" threat to party rule
-- how long China's people will continue to tolerate an unelected single
party. Mr. Li looks more like one of the hidebound leaders who presided over
the end of the Soviet Union than a pragmatic neo-authoritarian able to steer
China along the path of Asian dynamism. That would leave the regime more
liable to break down if and when China's increasingly affluent -- and
assertive -- population decide that they deserve more than the current
regime can deliver.
As long as China's people, especially its educated urban minority, prefer a
stable succession to a fair and open one, it is easier for the leadership to
impose ad hoc rules that ensure a "smooth" succession. Losers never complain
in the Chinese political system. Social forces, not party
institutionalization, are what keeps the succession process on track and
will likely make the 2007 and 2012 changes uneventful. The party may have
solved the succession problem, but the cost may be a less agile leadership
and a less stable China.